*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ***

Title: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government

Author: Jefferson Davis

Release Date: November 16, 2006 [EBook #19831]

Language: English

Character set encoding: ASCII


Produced by Geoff Horton, David King, and the Online
Distributed Proofreaders team at http://www.pgdp.net

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT

By

JEFFERSON DAVIS

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pHIjITWiBxh6edOFy1V4dzEqUu-ihEhFjlqZiJ3tyNY/edit?usp=sharing

PREFACE.


The object of this work has been from historical data to show that the
Southern States had rightfully the power to withdraw from a Union into
which they had, as sovereign communities, voluntarily entered; that the
denial of that right was a violation of the letter and spirit of the
compact between the States; and that the war waged by the Federal
Government against the seceding States was in disregard of the
limitations of the Constitution, and destructive of the principles of
the Declaration of Independence.

The author, from his official position, may claim to have known much of
the motives and acts of his countrymen immediately before and during the
war of 1861-'65, and he has sought to furnish material far the future
historian, who, when the passions and prejudices of the day shall have
given place to reason and sober thought, may, better than a
contemporary, investigate the causes, conduct, and results of the war.

The incentive to undertake the work now offered to the public was the
desire to correct misapprehensions created by industriously circulated
misrepresentations as to the acts and purposes of the people and the
General Government of the Confederate States. By the reiteration of such
unappropriate terms as "rebellion" and "treason," and the asseveration
that the South was levying war against the United States, those ignorant
of the nature of the Union, and of the reserved powers of the States,
have been led to believe that the Confederate States were in the
condition of revolted provinces, and that the United States were forced
to resort to arms for the preservation of their existence. To those who
knew that the Union was formed for specific enumerated purposes, and
that the States had never surrendered their sovereignty it was a
palpable absurdity to apply to them, or to their citizens when obeying
their mandates, the terms "rebellion" and "treason"; and, further, it is
shown in the following pages that the Confederate States, so far from
making war or seeking to destroy the United States, as soon as they had
an official organ, strove earnestly, by peaceful recognition, to
equitably adjust all questions growing out of the separation from their
late associates.
https://docs.google.com/document/d/130ySaBxdkBh6X9-NLVjqQfvmYxwBSgu_HkhMcyfB7ns/edit?usp=sharingAnother great perversion of truth has been the arraignment of the men
who participated in the formation of the Confederacy and who bore arms
in its defense, as the instigators of a controversy leading to disunion.
Sectional issues appear conspicuously in the debates of the Convention
which framed the Federal Constitution, and its many compromises were
designed to secure an equilibrium between the sections, and to preserve
the interests as well as the liberties of the several States. African
servitude at that time was not confined to a section, but was
numerically greater in the South than in the North, with a tendency to
its continuance in the former and cessation in the latter. It therefore
thus early presents itself as a disturbing element, and the provisions
of the Constitution, which were known to be necessary for its adoption,
bound all the States to recognize and protect that species of property.
When at a subsequent period there arose in the Northern States an
antislavery agitation, it was a harmless and scarcely noticed movement
until political demagogues seized upon it as a means to acquire power.
Had it been left to pseudo-philanthropists and fanatics, most zealous
where least informed, it never could have shaken the foundations of the
Union and have incited one section to carry fire and sword into the
other. That the agitation was political in its character, and was
clearly developed as early as 1803, it is believed has been established
in these pages. To preserve a sectional equilibrium and to maintain the
equality of the States was the effort on one side, to acquire empire was
the manifest purpose on the other. This struggle began before the men of
the Confederacy were born; how it arose and how it progressed it has
been attempted briefly to show. Its last stage was on the question of
territorial governments; and, if in this work it has not been
demonstrated that the position of the South was justified by the
Constitution and the equal rights of the people of all the States, it
must be because the author has failed to present the subject with a
sufficient degree of force and clearness.

In describing the events of the war, space has not permitted, and the
loss of both books and papers has prevented, the notice of very many
entitled to consideration, as well for the humanity as the gallantry of
our men in the unequal combats they fought. These numerous omissions, it
is satisfactory to know, the official reports made at the time and the
subsequent contributions which have been and are being published by the
actors, will supply more fully and graphically than could have been done
in this work.

Usurpations of the Federal Government have been presented, not in a
spirit of hostility, but as a warning to the people against the dangers
by which their liberties are beset. When the war ceased, the pretext on
which it had been waged could no longer be alleged. The emancipation
proclamation of Mr. Lincoln, which, when it was issued, he humorously
admitted to be a nullity, had acquired validity by the action of the
highest authority known to our institutions--the people assembled in
their several State Conventions. The soldiers of the Confederacy had
laid down their arms, had in good faith pledged themselves to abstain
from further hostile operations, and had peacefully dispersed to their
homes; there could not, then, have been further dread of them by the
Government of the United States. The plea of necessity could, therefore,
no longer exist for hostile demonstration against the people and States
of the deceased Confederacy. Did vengeance, which stops at the grave,
subside? Did real peace and the restoration of the States to their
former rights and positions follow, as was promised on the restoration
of the Union? Let the recital of the invasion of the reserved powers of
the States, or the people, and the perversion of the republican form of
government guaranteed to each State by the Constitution, answer the
question. For the deplorable fact of the war, for the cruel manner in
which it was waged, for the sad physical and yet sadder moral results it
produced, the reader of these pages, I hope, will admit that the South,
in the forum of conscience, stands fully acquitted.

Much of the past is irremediable; the best hope for a restoration in the
future to the pristine purity and fraternity of the Union, rests on the
opinions and character of the men who are to succeed this generation:
that they maybe suited to that blessed work, one, whose public course is
ended, invokes them to draw their creed from the fountains of our
political history, rather than from the lower stream, polluted as it has
been by self-seeking place-hunters and by sectional strife.

THE AUTHOR.




CONTENTS.


Introduction

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

African Servitude.--A Retrospect.--Early Legislation with Regard to the
Slave-Trade.--The Southern States foremost in prohibiting it.--A Common
Error corrected.--The Ethical Question never at Issue in Sectional
Controversies.--The Acquisition of Louisiana.--The Missouri
Compromise.--The Balance of Power.--Note.--The Indiana Case.


CHAPTER II.

The Session of 1849-'50.--The Compromise Measures.--Virtual Abrogation
of the Missouri Compromise.--The Admission of California.--The Fugitive
Slave Law.--Death of Mr. Calhoun.--Anecdote of Mr. Clay.


CHAPTER III.

Reelection to the Senate.--Political Controversies in
Mississippi.--Action of the Democratic State Convention.--Defeat of the
State-Rights Party.--Withdrawal of General Quitman and Nomination of the
Author as Candidate for the Office of Governor.--The Canvass and its
Result.--Retirement to Private Life.


CHAPTER IV.

The Author enters the Cabinet.--Administration of the War
Department.--Surveys for a Pacific Railway.--Extension of the
Capitol.--New Regiments organized.--Colonel Samuel Cooper,
Adjutant-General.--A Bit of Civil-Service Reform.--Reelection to the
Senate.--Continuity of the Pierce Cabinet.--Character of Franklin
Pierce.


CHAPTER V.

The Territorial Question.--An Incident at the White House.--The Kansas
and Nebraska Bill.--The Missouri Compromise abrogated in 1850, not in
1854.--Origin of "Squatter Sovereignty."--Sectional Rivalry and its
Consequences.--The Emigrant Aid Societies.--"The Bible and Sharpe's
Rifles."--False Pretensions as to Principle.--The Strife in Kansas.--A
Retrospect.--The Original Equilibrium of Power and its Overthrow.--
Usurpations of the Federal Government.--The Protective Tariff.--
Origin and Progress of Abolitionism.--Who were the Friends of
the Union?--An Illustration of Political Morality.


CHAPTER VI.

Agitation continued.--Political Parties: their Origin, Changes, and
Modifications.--Some Account of the "Popular Sovereignty," or
"Non-Intervention," Theory.--Rupture of the Democratic Party.--The John
Brown Raid.--Resolutions introduced by the Author into the Senate on the
Relations of the States, the Federal Government, and the Territories;
their Discussion and Adoption.


CHAPTER VII.

A Retrospect.--Growth of Sectional Rivalry.--The Generosity of
Virginia.--Unequal Accessions of Territory.--The Tariff and its
Effects.--The Republican Convention of 1860, its Resolutions and its
Nominations.--The Democratic Convention at Charleston, its Divisions and
Disruption.--The Nominations at Baltimore.--The "Constitutional-Union"
Party and its Nominees.--An Effort in Behalf of Agreement declined by
Mr. Douglas.--The Election of Lincoln and Hamlin.--Proceedings in the
South.--Evidences of Calmness and Deliberation.--Mr. Buchanan's
Conservatism and the weakness of his Position.--Republican Taunts.--The
"New York Tribune," etc.


CHAPTER VIII.

Conference with the Governor of Mississippi.--The Author censured as
"too slow."--Summons to Washington.--Interview with the President.--His
Message.--Movements in Congress.--The Triumphant Majority.--The
Crittenden Proposition.--Speech of the Author on Mr. Green's
Resolution.--The Committee of Thirteen.--Failure to agree.--The
"Republicans" responsible for the Failure.--Proceedings in the House of
Representatives.--Futility of Efforts for an Adjustment.--The Old Year
closes in Clouds.


CHAPTER IX.

Preparations for Withdrawal from the Union.--Northern Precedents.--New
England Secessionists.--Cabot, Pickering, Quincy, etc.--On the
Acquisition of Louisiana.--The Hartford Convention.--The Massachusetts
Legislature on the Annexation of Texas, etc., etc. 70


CHAPTER X.

False Statements of the Grounds for Separation.--Slavery not the Cause,
but an Incident.--The Southern People not "Propagandists" of
Slavery.--Early Accord among the States with regard to African
Servitude.--Statement of the Supreme Court.--Guarantees of the
Constitution.--Disregard of Oaths.--Fugitives from Service and the
"Personal Liberty Laws."--Equality in the Territories the Paramount
Question.--The Dred Scott Case.--Disregard of the Decision of the
Supreme Court.--Culmination of Wrongs.--Despair of their
Redress.--Triumph of Sectionalism.


PART II.

_THE CONSTITUTION._

CHAPTER I.

The Original Confederation.--"Articles of Confederation and Perpetual
Union."--Their Inadequacy ascertained.--Commercial Difficulties.--The
Conference at Annapolis.--Recommendation of a General Convention.--
Resolution of Congress.--Action of the Several States.--Conclusions
drawn therefrom.


CHAPTER II.

The Convention of 1787.--Diversity of Opinion.--Luther Martin's Account
of the Three Parties.--The Question of Representation.--Compromise
effected.--Mr. Randolph's Resolutions.--The Word "National"
condemned.--Plan of Government framed.--Difficulty with Regard to
Ratification, and its Solution.--Provision for Secession from the
Union.--Views of Mr. Gerry and Mr. Madison.--False Interpretations.--
Close of the Convention.


CHAPTER III.

Ratification of the Constitution by the States.--Organization of the New
Government.--Accession of North Carolina and Rhode Island.--
Correspondence between General Washington and the Governor of Rhode
Island.


CHAPTER IV.

The Constitution not adopted by one People "in the Aggregate."--A Great
Fallacy exposed.--Mistake of Judge Story.--Colonial Relations.--The
United Colonies of New England.--Other Associations.--Independence of
Communities traced from Germany to Great Britain, and from Great Britain
to America.--Mr. Everett's "Provincial People."--Origin and Continuance
of the Title "United States."--No such Political Community as the
"People of the United States."


CHAPTER V.

The Preamble to the Constitution.--"We, the People."


CHAPTER VI.

The Preamble to the Constitution--subject continued.--Growth of the
Federal Government and Accretions of Power.--Revival of Old
Errors.--Mistakes and Misstatements.--Webster, Story, and Everett.--Who
"ordained and established" the Constitution?


CHAPTER VII.

Verbal Cavils and Criticisms.--"Compact," "Confederacy," "Accession,"
etc.--The "New Vocabulary."--The Federal Constitution a Compact, and the
States acceded to it.--Evidence of the Constitution itself and of
Contemporary Records.


CHAPTER VIII.

Sovereignty


CHAPTER IX.

The same Subject continued.--The Tenth Amendment.--Fallacies
exposed.--"Constitution," "Government," and "People" distinguished from
each other.--Theories refuted by Facts.--Characteristics of
Sovereignty.--Sovereignty identified.--Never thrown away.


CHAPTER X.

A Recapitulation.--Remarkable Propositions of Mr. Gouverneur Morris in
the Convention of 1787, and their Fate.--Further Testimony.--Hamilton,
Madison, Washington, Marshall, etc.--Later Theories.--Mr. Webster: his
Views at Various Periods.--Speech at Capon Springs.--State Rights not a
Sectional Theory.


CHAPTER XI.

The Right of Secession.--The Law of Unlimited Partnerships.--The
"Perpetual Union" of the Articles of Confederation and the "More Perfect
Union" of the Constitution.--The Important Powers conferred upon the
Federal Government and the Fundamental Principles of the Compact the
same in both Systems.--The Right to resume Grants, when failing to
fulfill their Purposes, expressly and distinctly asserted in the
Adoption of the Constitution.


CHAPTER XII.

Coercion the Alternative to Secession.--Repudiation of it by the
Constitution and the Fathers of the Constitutional Era.--Difference
between Mr. Webster and Mr. Hamilton.


CHAPTER XIII.

Some Objections considered.--The New States.--Acquired
Territory.--Allegiance, false and true.--Difference between
Nullification and Secession.--Secession a Peaceable Remedy.--No Appeal
to Arms.--Two Conditions noted.


CHAPTER XIV.

Early Foreshadowings.--Opinions of Mr. Madison and Mr. Rufus
King.--Safeguards provided.--Their Failure.--State Interposition.--The
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.--Their Endorsement by the People in
the Presidential Elections of 1800 and Ensuing Terms.--South Carolina
and Mr. Calhoun.--The Compromise of 1833.--Action of Massachusetts in
1843-'45.--Opinions of John Quincy Adams.--Necessity for Secession.


CHAPTER XV.

A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration of
Independence.--Articles of Confederation.--The Constitution of the
United States.--The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of Power in
both.--The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the Powers
delegated.--The Power of Amendment merely a Power to amend the Delegated
Grants.--A Smaller Power was required for Amendment than for a
Grant.--The Power of Amendment is confined to Grants of the
Constitution.--Limitations on the Power of Amendment.


PART III.

_SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION._

CHAPTER I.

Opening of the New Year.--The People in Advance of their
Representatives.--Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members of
Congress.--Sensational Fictions.--Misstatements of the Count of
Paris.--Obligations of a Senator.--The Southern Forts and
Arsenals.--Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens.--The Alleged "Caucus" and its
Resolutions.--Personal Motives and Feelings.--The Presidency not a
Desirable Office.--Letter from the Hon. C. C. Clay.


CHAPTER II.

Tenure of Public Property ceded by the States.--Sovereignty and Eminent
Domain.--Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, and
other States.--The Charleston Forts.--South Carolina sends Commissioners
to Washington.--Sudden Movement of Major Anderson.--Correspondence of
the Commissioners with the President.--Interviews of the Author with Mr.
Buchanan.--Major Anderson.--The Star of the West.--The President's
Special Message.--Speech of the Author in the Senate.--Further
Proceedings and Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter.--Mr. Buchanan's
Rectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action.


CHAPTER III.

Secession of Mississippi and Other States.--Withdrawal of
Senators.--Address of the Author on taking Leave of the Senate.--Answer
to Certain Objections.


CHAPTER IV.

Threats of Arrest.--Departure from Washington.--Indications of Public
Anxiety.--"Will there be war?"--Organization of the "Army of
Mississippi."--Lack of Preparations for Defense in the South.--Evidences
of the Good Faith and Peaceable Purposes of the Southern People.


CHAPTER V.

Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States.--Adoption
of a Provisional Constitution.--Election of President and
Vice-President.--Notification to the Author of his Election.--His Views
with Regard to it.--Journey to Montgomery.--Interview with Judge
Sharkey.--False Reports of Speeches on the Way.--Inaugural
Address.--Editor's Note.


CHAPTER VI.

The Confederate Cabinet.


CHAPTER VII.

Early Acts of the Confederate Congress.--Laws of the United States
continued in Force.--Officers of Customs and Revenue continued in
Office.--Commission to the United States.--Navigation of the
Mississippi.--Restrictions on the Coasting-Trade removed.--Appointment
of Commissioners to Washington.


CHAPTER VIII.

The Peace Conference.--Demand for "a Little Bloodletting."--Plan
proposed by the Conference.--Its Contemptuous Reception and Treatment in
the United States Congress.--Failure of Last Efforts at Reconciliation
and Reunion.--Note.--Speech of General Lane, of Oregon.


CHAPTER IX.

Northern Protests against Coercion.--The "New York Tribune," Albany
"Argus," and "New York Herald."--Great Public Meeting in New
York.--Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour, ex-Chancellor
Walworth, and Others.--The Press in February, 1861.--Mr. Lincoln's
Inaugural.--The Marvelous Change or Suppression of Conservative
Sentiment.--Historic Precedents.


CHAPTER X.

Temper of the Southern People indicated by the Action of the Confederate
Congress.--The Permanent Constitution.--Modeled after the Federal
Constitution.--Variations and Special Provisions.--Provisions with
Regard to Slavery and the Slave-Trade.--A False Assertion
refuted.--Excellence of the Constitution.--Admissions of Hostile or
Impartial Criticism.


CHAPTER XI.

The Commission to Washington City.--Arrival of Mr. Crawford.--Mr.
Buchanan's Alarm.--Note of the Commissioners to the New
Administration.--Mediation of Justices Nelson and Campbell.--The
Difficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens.--Mr. Secretary Seward's
Assurances.--Duplicity of the Government at Washington.--Mr. Fox's Visit
to Charleston.--Secret Preparations for Coercive Measures.--Visit of Mr.
Lamon.--Renewed Assurances of Good Faith.--Notification to Governor
Pickens.--Developments of Secret History.--Systematic and Complicated
Perfidy exposed.


CHAPTER XII.

Protests against the Conduct of the Government of the United
States.--Senator Douglas's Proposition to evacuate the Forts, and
Extracts from his Speech in Support of it.--General Scott's
Advice.--Manly Letter of Major Anderson, protesting against the Action
of the Federal Government.--Misstatements of the Count of
Paris.--Correspondence relative to Proposed Evacuation of the Fort.--A
Crisis.


CHAPTER XIII.

A Pause and a Review.--Attitude of the Two Parties.--Sophistry exposed
and Shams torn away.--Forbearance of the Confederate Government.--Who
was the Aggressor?--Major Anderson's View, and that of a Naval
Officer.--Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter Case.--The Bombardment
and Surrender.--Gallant Action of ex-Senator Wigfall.--Mr. Lincoln's
Statement of the Case.


PART IV.

_THE WAR._

CHAPTER I.

Failure of the Peace Congress.--Treatment of the Commissioners.--Their
Withdrawal.--Notice of an Armed Expedition.--Action of the Confederate
Government.--Bombardment and Surrender of Fort Sumter.--Its Reduction
required by the Exigency of the Case.--Disguise thrown off.--President
Lincoln's Call for Seventy-five Thousand Men.--His Fiction of
"Combinations."--Palpable Violation of the Constitution.--Action of
Virginia.--Of Citizens of Baltimore.--The Charge of Precipitation
against South Carolina.--Action of the Confederate Government.--The
Universal Feeling.


CHAPTER II.

The Supply of Arms; of Men.--Love of the Union.--Secessionists
few.--Efforts to prevent the Final Step.--Views of the People.--Effect
on their Agriculture.--Aid from African Servitude.--Answer to the
Clamors on the Horrors of Slavery.--Appointment of a Commissary-
General.--His Character and Capacity.--Organization, Instruction,
and Equipment of the Army.--Action of Congress.--The Law.--Its
Signification.--The Hope of a Peaceful Solution early entertained;
rapidly diminished.--Further Action of Congress.--Policy of the
Government for Peace.--Position of Officers of United States
Army.--The Army of the States, not of the Government.--The Confederate
Law observed by the Government.--Officers retiring from United States
Army.--Organization of Bureaus.


CHAPTER III.

Commissioners to purchase Arms and Ammunition.--My Letter to Captain
Semmes.--Resignations of Officers of United States Navy.--Our
Destitution of Accessories for the Supply of Naval Vessels.--Secretary
Mallory.--Food-Supplies.--The Commissariat Department.--The
Quartermaster's Department.--The Disappearance of Delusions.--The Supply
of Powder.--Saltpeter.--Sulphur.--Artificial Niter-Beds.--Services of
General G. W. Rains.--Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery.--The
Master Armorer.--Machinery secured.--Want of Skillful Employees.--
Difficulties encountered by Every Department of the Executive Branch
of the Government.


CHAPTER IV.

The Proclamation for Seventy-five Thousand Men by President Lincoln
further examined.--The Reasons presented by him to Mankind for the
Justification of his Conduct shown to be Mere Fictions, having no
Relation to the Question.--What is the Value of Constitutional Liberty,
of Bills of Rights, of Limitations of Powers, if they may be
transgressed at Pleasure?--Secession of South Carolina.--Proclamation of
Blockade.--Session of Congress at Montgomery.--Extracts from the
President's Message.--Acts of Congress.--Spirit of the People.--
Secession of Border States.--Destruction of United States Property by
Order of President Lincoln.


CHAPTER V.

Maryland first approached by Northern Invasion.--Denies to United States
Troops the Right of Way across her Domain.--Mission of Judge
Handy.--Views of Governor Hicks.--His Proclamation.--Arrival of
Massachusetts Troops at Baltimore.--Passage through the City
disputed.--Activity of the Police.--Burning of Bridges.--Letter of
President Lincoln to the Governor.--Visited by Citizens.--Action of the
State Legislature.--Occupation of the Relay House.--The City Arms
surrendered.--City in Possession of United States Troops.--Remonstrances
of the City to the Passage of Troops disregarded.--Citizens arrested;
also, Members of the Legislature.--Accumulation of Northern Forces at
Washington.--Invasion of West Virginia by a Force under
McClellan.--Attack at Philippi; at Laurel Hill.--Death of General
Garnett.


CHAPTER VI.

Removal of the Seat of Government to Richmond.--Message to Congress at
Richmond.--Confederate Forces in Virginia.--Forces of the Enemy.--Letter
to General Johnston.--Combat at Bethel Church.--Affair at
Romney.--Movements of McDowell.--Battle of Manassas.


CHAPTER VII.

Conference with the Generals after the Battle.--Order to pursue the
Enemy.--Evidences of a Thorough Rout.--"Sweet to die for such a
Cause."--Movements of the Next Day.--What more it was practicable to
do.--Charge against the President of preventing the Capture of
Washington.--The Failure to pursue.--Reflection on the President.--
General Beauregard's Report.--Endorsement upon it.--Strength
of the Opposing Forces.--Extracts relating to the Battle, from the
Narrative of General Early.--Resolutions of Congress.--Efforts to
increase the Efficiency of the Army.


CHAPTER VIII.

The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-'99.--Their Influence on Political
Affairs.--Kentucky declares for Neutrality.--Correspondence of Governor
Magoffin with the President of the United States and the President of
the Confederate States.--Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky, by
Major-General Polk.--His Correspondence with the Kentucky
Commissioners.--President Lincoln's View of Neutrality.--Acts of the
United States Government.--Refugees.--Their Motives of Expatriation.--
Address of ex-Vice-President Breckinridge to the People of the
State.--The Occupation of Columbus secured.--The Purpose of the
United States Government.--Battle of Belmont.--Albert Sidney Johnston
commands the Department.--State of Affairs.--Line of Defense.-Efforts to
obtain Arms; also Troops.


CHAPTER IX.

The Coercion of Missouri.--Answers of the Governors of States to
President Lincoln's Requisition for Troops.--Restoration of Forts
Caswell and Johnson to the United States Government.--Condition of
Missouri similar to that of Kentucky.--Hostilities, how initiated in
Missouri.--Agreement between Generals Price and Harney.--Its Favorable
Effects.--General Harney relieved of Command by the United States
Government because of his Pacific Policy.--Removal of Public Arms from
Missouri.--Searches for and Seizure of Arms.--Missouri on the Side of
Peace.--Address of General Price to the People.--Proclamation of
Governor Jackson.--Humiliating Concessions of the Governor to the United
States Government, for the sake of Peace.--Demands of the Federal
Officers.--Revolutionary Principles attempted to be enforced by the
United States Government.--The Action at Booneville.--The Patriot Army
of Militia.--Further Rout of the Enemy.--Heroism and Self-sacrifice of
the People.--Complaints and Embarrassments--Zeal: its effects.--Action
of Congress.--Battle of Springfield.--General Price.--Battle at
Lexington.--Bales of Hemp.--Other Combats.


CHAPTER X.

Brigadier-General Henry A. Wise takes command in Western Virginia.--His
Movements.--Advance of General John B. Floyd.--Defeats the
Enemy.--Attacked by Rosecrans.--Controversy between Wise and
Floyd.--General R. E. Lee takes the Command in West Virginia.--Movement
on Cheat Mountain.--Its Failure.--Further Operations.--Winter
Quarters.--Lee sent to South Carolina.


CHAPTER XI.

The Issue.--The American Idea of Government.--Who was responsible for
the War?--Situation of Virginia.--Concentration of the Enemy against
Richmond.--Our Difficulty.--Unjust Criticisms.--The Facts set
forth.--Organization of the Army.--Conference at Fairfax
Court-House.--Inaction of the Army.--Capture of Romney.--Troops ordered
to retire to the Valley.--Discipline.--General Johnston regards his
Position as unsafe.--The First Policy.--Retreat of General
Johnston.--The Plans of the Enemy.--Our Strength magnified by the
Enemy.--Stores destroyed.--The Trent Affair.


CHAPTER XII.

Supply of Arms at the Beginning of the War; of Powder; of Batteries; of
other Articles.--Contents of Arsenals.--Other Stores, Mills, etc.--First
Efforts to obtain Powder, Niter, and Sulphur.--Construction of Mills
commenced.--Efforts to supply Arms, Machinery, Field-Artillery,
Ammunition, Equipment, and Saltpeter.--Results in 1862.--Government
Powder-Mills; how organized.--Success.--Efforts to obtain
Lead.--Smelting-Works.--Troops, how armed.--Winter of 1862.--Supplies.--
Niter and Mining Bureau.--Equipment of First Armies.--Receipts by
Blockade-Runners.--Arsenal at Richmond.--Armories at Richmond and
Fayetteville.--A Central Laboratory built at Macon.--Statement of
General Gorgas.--Northern Charge against General Floyd answered.--
Charge of Slowness against the President answered.--Quantities of
Arms purchased that could not be shipped in 1861.--Letter of Mr. Huse.


CHAPTER XIII.

Extracts from my Inaugural.--Our Financial System: Receipts and
Expenditures of the First Year.--Resources, Loans, and Taxes.--Loans
authorized.--Notes and Bonds.--Funding Notes.--Treasury Notes guaranteed
by the States.--Measure to reduce the Currency.--Operation of the
General System.--Currency fundable.--Taxation.--Popular
Aversion.--Compulsory Reduction of the Currency.--Tax Law.--Successful
Result.--Financial Condition of the Government at its Close.--Sources
whence Revenue was derived.--Total Public Debt.--System of Direct Taxes
and Revenue.--The Tariff.--War-Tax of Fifty Cents on a Hundred
Dollars.--Property subject to it.--Every Resource of the Country to be
reached.--Tax paid by the States mostly.--Obstacle to the taking of the
Census.--The Foreign Debt.--Terms of the Contract.--Premium.--False
charge against me of Repudiation.--Facts stated.


CHAPTER XIV.

Military Laws and Measures.--Agricultural Products
diminished.--Manufactures flourishing.--The Call for Volunteers.--The
Term of Three Years.--Improved Discipline.--The Law assailed.--Important
Constitutional Question raised.--Its Discussion at Length.--Power of the
Government over its own Armies and the Militia.--Object of
Confederations.--The War-Powers granted.--Two Modes of raising Armies in
the Confederate States.--Is the Law necessary and proper?--Congress is
the Judge under the Grant of Specific Power.--What is meant by
Militia.--Whole Military Strength divided into Two Classes.--Powers of
Congress.--Objections answered.--Good Effects of the Law.--The
Limitations enlarged.--Results of the Operations of these Laws.--Act for
the Employment of Slaves.--Message to Congress.--"Died of a
Theory."--Act to use Slaves as Soldiers passed.--Not Time to put it in
Operation.


APPENDIXES.

[Transcriber's Note: There is no Appendix A.]


APPENDIX B.

Speech of the Author on the Oregon Question


APPENDIX C.

Extracts from Speeches of the Author on the Resolutions of Compromise
proposed by Mr. Clay

On the Reception of a Memorial from Inhabitants of Pennsylvania and
Delaware, praying that Congress would adopt Measures for an Immediate
and Peaceful Dissolution of the Union

On the Resolutions of Mr. Clay relative to Slavery in the Territories


APPENDIX D.

Speech of the Author on the Message of the President of the United
States, transmitting to Congress the "Lecompton Constitution" of Kansas


APPENDIX E.

Address of the Author to Citizens of Portland, Maine

Address of the Author at a Public Meeting in Faneuil Hall, Boston; with
the Introductory Remarks by Caleb Cushing


APPENDIX F.

Speech of the Author in the Senate, on the Resolutions relative to the
Relations of the States, the Federal Government, and the Territories


APPENDIX G.

Correspondence between the Commissioners of South Carolina and the
President of the United States (Mr. Buchanan), relative to the Forts in
the Harbor of Charleston


APPENDIX H.

Speech of the Author on a Motion to print the Special Message of the
President of the United States of January 9, 1861


APPENDIX I.

Correspondence and Extracts from Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter,
from the Affair of the Star of the West, January 9, 1861, to the
Withdrawal of the Envoy of South Carolina from Washington, February 8,
1861


APPENDIX K.

The Provisional Constitution of the Confederate States, adopted February
8, 1861

The Constitution of the United States and the Permanent Constitution of
the Confederate States, in Parallel Columns


APPENDIX L.

Correspondence between the Confederate Commissioners, Mr. Secretary
Seward, and Judge Campbell




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.


Jefferson Davis, aged Thirty-two

J. C. Calhoun

Briarfield, Early Residence of Mr. Davis

The First Confederate Cabinet

Alexander H. Stephens

General P. G. T. Beauregard

Members of President's Staff

General A. S. Johnston

General Robert E. Lee

Battle of Manassas (Map)




INTRODUCTION.


A duty to my countrymen; to the memory of those who died in defense of a
cause consecrated by inheritance, as well as sustained by conviction;
and to those who, perhaps less fortunate, staked all, and lost all, save
life and honor, in its behalf, has impelled me to attempt the
vindication of their cause and conduct. For this purpose I have decided
to present an historical sketch of the events which preceded and
attended the struggle of the Southern States to maintain their existence
and their rights as sovereign communities--the creators, not the
creatures, of the General Government.

The social problem of maintaining the just relation between
constitution, government, and people, has been found so difficult, that
human history is a record of unsuccessful efforts to establish it. A
government, to afford the needful protection and exercise proper care
for the welfare of a people, must have homogeneity in its constituents.
It is this necessity which has divided the human race into separate
nations, and finally has defeated the grandest efforts which conquerors
have made to give unlimited extent to their domain. When our fathers
dissolved their connection with Great Britain, by declaring themselves
free and independent States, they constituted thirteen separate
communities, and were careful to assert and preserve, each for itself,
its sovereignty and jurisdiction.

At a time when the minds of men are straying far from the lessons our
fathers taught, it seems proper and well to recur to the original
principles on which the system of government they devised was founded.
The eternal truths which they announced, the rights which they declared
"_unalienable_," are the foundation-stones on which rests the
vindication of the Confederate cause.

He must have been a careless reader of our political history who has not
observed that, whether under the style of "United Colonies" or "United
States," which was adopted after the Declaration of Independence,
whether under the articles of Confederation or the compact of Union,
there everywhere appears the distinct assertion of State sovereignty,
and nowhere the slightest suggestion of any purpose on the part of the
States to consolidate themselves into one body. Will any candid,
well-informed man assert that, at any time between 1776 and 1790, a
proposition to surrender the sovereignty of the States and merge them in
a central government would have had the least possible chance of
adoption? Can any historical fact be more demonstrable than that the
States did, both in the Confederation and in the Union, retain their
sovereignty and independence as distinct communities, voluntarily
consenting to federation, but never becoming the fractional parts of a
nation? That such opinions should find adherents in our day, may be
attributable to the natural law of aggregation; surely not to a
conscientious regard for the terms of the compact for union by the
States.

In all free governments the constitution or organic law is supreme over
the government, and in our Federal Union this was most distinctly marked
by limitations and prohibitions against all which was beyond the
expressed grants of power to the General Government. In the foreground,
therefore, I take the position that those who resisted violations of the
compact were the true friends, and those who maintained the usurpation
of undelegated powers were the real enemies of the constitutional Union.




PART I.

CHAPTER I.

    African Servitude.--A Retrospect.--Early Legislation with Regard
    to the Slave-Trade.--The Southern States foremost in prohibiting
    it.--A Common Error corrected.--The Ethical Question never at
    Issue in Sectional Controversies.--The Acquisition of
    Louisiana.--The Missouri Compromise.--The Balance of
    Power.--Note.--The Indiana Case.


Inasmuch as questions growing out of the institution of negro servitude,
or connected with it, will occupy a conspicuous place in what is to
follow, it is important that the reader should have, in the very outset,
a right understanding of the true nature and character of those
questions. No subject has been more generally misunderstood or more
persistently misrepresented. The institution itself has ceased to exist
in the United States; the generation, comprising all who took part in
the controversies to which it gave rise, or for which it afforded a
pretext, is passing away; and the misconceptions which have prevailed in
our own country, and still more among foreigners remote from the field
of contention, are likely to be perpetuated in the mind of posterity,
unless corrected before they become crystallized by tacit acquiescence.

It is well known that, at the time of the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, African servitude existed in all the States that were
parties to that compact, unless with the single exception of
Massachusetts, in which it had, perhaps, very recently ceased to exist.
The slaves, however, were numerous in the Southern, and very few in the
Northern, States. This diversity was occasioned by differences of
climate, soil, and industrial interests--not in any degree by moral
considerations, which at that period were not recognized, as an element
in the question. It was simply because negro labor was more profitable
in the South than in the North that the importation of negro slaves had
been, and continued to be, chiefly directed to the Southern ports.[1]
For the same reason slavery was abolished by the States of the Northern
section (though it existed in several of them for more than fifty years
after the adoption of the Constitution), while the importation of slaves
into the South continued to be carried on by Northern merchants and
Northern ships, without interference in the traffic from any quarter,
until it was prohibited by the spontaneous action of the Southern States
themselves.

The Constitution expressly forbade any interference by Congress with the
slave-trade--or, to use its own language, with the "migration or
importation of such persons" as any of the States should think proper to
admit--"prior to the year 1808." During the intervening period of more
than twenty years, the matter was exclusively under the control of the
respective States. Nevertheless, every Southern State, without
exception, either had already enacted, or proceeded to enact, laws
forbidding the importation of slaves.[2] Virginia was the first of all
the States, North or South, to prohibit it, and Georgia was the first to
incorporate such a prohibition in her organic Constitution.

Two petitions for the abolition of slavery and the slave-trade were
presented February 11 and 12, 1790, to the very first Congress convened
under the Constitution.[3] After full discussion in the House of
Representatives, it was determined, with regard to the first-mentioned
subject, "that Congress have no authority to interfere in the
emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the
States"; and, with regard to the other, that no authority existed to
prohibit the migration or importation of such persons as the States
might think proper to admit--"prior to the year 1808." So distinct and
final was this statement of the limitations of the authority of Congress
considered to be that, when a similar petition was presented two or
three years afterward, the Clerk of the House was instructed to return
it to the petitioner.[4]

In 1807, Congress, availing itself of the very earliest moment at which
the constitutional restriction ceased to be operative, passed an act
prohibiting the importation of slaves into any part of the United States
from and after the first day of January, 1808. This act was passed with
great unanimity. In the House of Representatives there were one hundred
and thirteen (113) yeas to five (5) nays; and it is a significant fact,
as showing the absence of any sectional division of sentiment at that
period, that the five dissentients were divided as equally as possible
between the two sections: two of them were from Northern and three from
Southern States.[5]

The slave-trade had thus been finally abolished some months before the
birth of the author of these pages, and has never since had legal
existence in any of the United States. The question of the maintenance
or extinction of the system of negro servitude, already existing in any
State, was one exclusively belonging to such State. It is obvious,
therefore, that no subsequent question, legitimately arising in Federal
legislation, could properly have any reference to the merits or the
policy of the institution itself. A few zealots in the North afterward
created much agitation by demands for the abolition of slavery within
the States by Federal intervention, and by their activity and
perseverance finally became a recognized party, which, holding the
balance of power between the two contending organizations in that
section, gradually obtained the control of one, and to no small degree
corrupted the other. The dominant idea, however, at least of the
absorbed party, was sectional aggrandizement, looking to absolute
control, and theirs is the responsibility for the war that resulted.

No moral nor sentimental considerations were really involved in either
the earlier or later controversies which so long agitated and finally
ruptured the Union. They were simply struggles between different
sections, with diverse institutions and interests.

It is absolutely requisite, in order to a right understanding of the
history of the country, to bear these truths clearly in mind. The
phraseology of the period referred to will otherwise be essentially
deceptive. The antithetical employment of such terms as _freedom_ and
_slavery_, or "anti-slavery" and "pro-slavery," with reference to the
principles and purposes of contending parties or rival sections, has had
immense influence in misleading the opinions and sympathies of the
world. The idea of freedom is captivating, that of slavery repellent to
the moral sense of mankind in general. It is easy, therefore, to
understand the effect of applying the one set of terms to one party, the
other to another, in a contest which had no just application whatever to
the essential merits of freedom or slavery. Southern statesmen may
perhaps have been too indifferent to this consideration--in their ardent
pursuit of principles, overlooking the effects of phrases.

This is especially true with regard to that familiar but most fallacious
expression, "the extension of slavery." To the reader unfamiliar with
the subject, or viewing it only on the surface, it would perhaps never
occur that, as used in the great controversies respecting the
Territories of the United States, it does not, never did, and never
could, imply the addition of a single slave to the number already
existing. The question was merely whether the slaveholder should be
permitted to go, with his slaves, into territory (the common property of
all) into which the non-slaveholder could go with _his_ property of any
sort. There was no proposal nor desire on the part of the Southern
States to reopen the slave-trade, which they had been foremost in
suppressing, or to add to the number of slaves. It was a question of the
distribution, or dispersion, of the slaves, rather than of the
"extension of slavery." Removal is not extension. Indeed, if
emancipation was the end to be desired, the dispersion of the negroes
over a wider area among additional Territories, eventually to become
States, and in climates unfavorable to slave-labor, instead of
hindering, would have promoted this object by diminishing the
difficulties in the way of ultimate emancipation.

The distinction here defined between the distribution, or dispersion, of
slaves and the extension of slavery--two things altogether different,
although so generally confounded--was early and clearly drawn under
circumstances and in a connection which justify a fuller notice.

Virginia, it is well known, in the year 1784, ceded to the United
States--then united only by the original Articles of Confederation--her
vast possessions northwest of the Ohio, from which the great States of
Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota,
have since been formed. In 1787--before the adoption of the Federal
Constitution--the celebrated "Ordinance" for the government of this
Northwestern Territory was adopted by the Congress, with the full
consent, and indeed at the express instance, of Virginia. This Ordinance
included six definite "Articles of compact between the original States
and the people and States in the said Territory," which were to "for
ever remain unalterable unless by common consent." The sixth of these
articles ordains that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

In December, 1805, a petition of the Legislative Council and House of
Representatives of the Indiana Territory--then comprising all the area
now occupied by the States of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and
Wisconsin--was presented to Congress. It appears from the proceedings of
the House of Representatives that several petitions of the same purport
from inhabitants of the Territory, accompanied by a letter from William
Henry Harrison, the Governor (afterward President of the United States),
had been under consideration nearly two years earlier. The prayer of
these petitions was for a _suspension_ of the sixth article of the
Ordinance, so as to permit the introduction of slaves into the
Territory. The whole subject was referred to a select committee of seven
members, consisting of representatives from Virginia, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Kentucky, and New York, and the delegate
from the Indiana Territory.

On the 14th of the ensuing February (1806), this committee made a report
favorable to the prayer of the petitioners, and recommending a
suspension of the prohibitory article for ten years. In their report the
committee, after stating their opinion that a qualified suspension of
the article in question would be beneficial to the people of the Indiana
Territory, proceeded to say:

    "The suspension of this article is an object almost universally
    desired in that Territory. It appears to your committee to be a
    question entirely different from that between slavery and
    freedom, inasmuch as it would merely occasion the removal of
    persons, already slaves, from one part of the country to
    another. The good effects of this suspension, in the present
    instance, would be to accelerate the population of that
    Territory, hitherto retarded by the operation of that article of
    compact; as slaveholders emigrating into the Western country
    might then indulge any preference which they might feel for a
    settlement in the Indiana Territory, instead of seeking, as they
    are now compelled to do, settlements in other States or
    countries permitting the introduction of slaves. The condition
    of the slaves themselves would be much ameliorated by it, as it
    is evident, from experience, that the more they are separated
    and diffused the more care and attention are bestowed on them by
    their masters, each proprietor having it in his power to
    increase their comforts and conveniences in proportion to the
    smallness of their numbers."

These were the dispassionate utterances of representatives of every part
of the Union--men contemporary with the origin of the Constitution,
speaking before any sectional division had arisen in connection with the
subject. It is remarkable that the very same opinions which they express
and arguments which they adduce had, fifty years afterward, come to be
denounced and repudiated by one half of the Union as partisan and
sectional when propounded by the other half.

No final action seems to have been taken on the subject before the
adjournment of Congress, but it was brought forward at the next session
in a more imposing form. On the 20th of January, 1807, the Speaker laid
before the House of Representatives a letter from Governor Harrison,
inclosing certain resolutions formally and _unanimously_ adopted by the
Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Indiana
Territory, in favor of the suspension of the sixth article of the
Ordinance and the introduction of slaves into the Territory, which they
say would "meet the approbation of at least nine tenths of the good
citizens of the same." Among the resolutions were the following:

    "_Resolved unanimously_, That the abstract question of liberty
    and slavery is not considered as involved in a suspension of the
    said article, inasmuch as the number of slaves in the United
    States _would not be augmented_ by this measure.

    "_Resolved unanimously_, That the suspension of the said article
    would be equally advantageous to the Territory, to the States
    from whence the negroes would be brought, and to the negroes
    themselves....

    "The States which are overburdened with negroes would be
    benefited by their citizens having an opportunity of disposing
    of the negroes which they can not comfortably support, or of
    removing with them to a country abounding with all the
    necessaries of life; and the negro himself would exchange a
    scanty pittance of the coarsest food for a plentiful and
    nourishing diet, and a situation which admits not the most
    distant prospect of emancipation for one which presents no
    considerable obstacle to his wishes."

These resolutions were submitted to a committee drawn, like the former,
from different sections of the country, which again reported favorably,
reiterating in substance the reasons given by the former committee.
Their report was sustained by the House, and a resolution to suspend the
prohibitory article was adopted. The proposition failed, however, in the
Senate, and there the matter seems to have been dropped. The proceedings
constitute a significant and instructive episode in the political
history of the country.

The allusion which has been made to the Ordinance of 1787, renders it
proper to notice, very briefly, the argument put forward during the
discussion of the Missouri question, and often repeated since, that the
Ordinance afforded a precedent in support of the claim of a power in
Congress to determine the question of the admission of slaves into the
Territories, and in justification of the prohibitory clause applied in
1820 to a portion of the Louisiana Territory.

The difference between the Congress of the Confederation and that of the
Federal Constitution is so broad that the action of the former can, in
no just sense, be taken as a precedent for the latter. The Congress of
the Confederation represented the States in their sovereignty, each
delegation having one vote, so that all the States were of equal weight
in the decision of any question. It had legislative, executive, and in
some degree judicial powers, thus combining all departments of
government in itself. During its recess a committee known as the
Committee of the States exercised the powers of the Congress, which was
in spirit, if not in fact, an assemblage of the States.

On the other hand, the Congress of the Constitution is only the
legislative department of the General Government, with powers strictly
defined and expressly limited to those delegated by the States. It is
further held in check by an executive and a judiciary, and consists of
two branches, each having peculiar and specified functions.

If, then, it be admitted--which is at least very questionable--that the
Congress of the Confederation had rightfully the power to exclude slave
property from the territory northwest of the Ohio River, that power must
have been derived from its character as an assemblage of the sovereign
States; not from the Articles of Confederation, in which no indication
of the grant of authority to exercise such a function can be found. The
Congress of the Constitution is expressly prohibited from the assumption
of any power not distinctly and specifically delegated to it as the
legislative branch of an organized government. What was questionable in
the former case, therefore, becomes clearly inadmissible in the latter.

But there is yet another material distinction to be observed. The
States, owners of what was called the Northwestern Territory, were
component members of the Congress which adopted the Ordinance for its
government, and gave thereto their full and free consent. The Ordinance
may, therefore, be regarded as virtually a treaty between the States
which ceded and those which received that extensive domain. In the other
case, Missouri and the whole region affected by the Missouri Compromise,
were parts of the territory acquired from France under the name of
Louisiana; and, as it requires two parties to make or amend a treaty,
France and the Government of the United States should have cooeperated in
any amendment of the treaty by which Louisiana had been acquired, and
which guaranteed to the inhabitants of the ceded territory "all the
rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States,"
and "the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion
they profess."--("State Papers," vol. ii, "Foreign Relations," p. 507.)

For all the reasons thus stated, it seems to me conclusive that the
action of the Congress of the Confederation in 1787 could not constitute
a precedent to justify the action of the Congress of the United States
in 1820, and that the prohibitory clause of the Missouri Compromise was
without constitutional authority, in violation of the rights of a part
of the joint owners of the territory, and in disregard of the
obligations of the treaty with France.

The basis of sectional controversy was the question of the balance of
political power. In its earlier manifestations this was undisguised. The
purchase of the Louisiana Territory from France in 1803, and the
subsequent admission of a portion of that Territory into the Union as a
State, afforded one of the earliest occasions for the manifestation of
sectional jealousy, and gave rise to the first threats, or warnings
(which proceeded from New England), of a dissolution of the Union. Yet,
although negro slavery existed in Louisiana, no pretext was made of that
as an objection to the acquisition. The ground of opposition is frankly
stated in a letter of that period from one Massachusetts statesman to
another--"that the influence of _our_ part of the Union must be
diminished by the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity."[6]

Some years afterward (in 1819-'20) occurred the memorable contest with
regard to the admission into the Union of Missouri, the second State
carved out of the Louisiana Territory. The controversy arose out of a
proposition to attach to the admission of the new State a proviso
prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude therein. The vehement
discussion that ensued was continued into the first session of a
different Congress from that in which it originated, and agitated the
whole country during the interval between the two. It was the first
question that ever seriously threatened the stability of the Union, and
the first in which the sentiment of opposition to slavery in the
abstract was introduced as an adjunct of sectional controversy. It was
clearly shown in debate that such considerations were altogether
irrelevant; that the number of existing slaves would not be affected by
their removal from the older States to Missouri; and, moreover, that the
proposed restriction would be contrary to the spirit, if not to the
letter, of the Constitution.[7] Notwithstanding all this, the
restriction was adopted, by a vote almost strictly sectional, in the
House of Representatives. It failed in the Senate through the firm
resistance of the Southern, aided by a few patriotic and conservative
Northern, members of that body. The admission of the new State, without
any restriction, was finally accomplished by the addition to the bill of
a section for ever prohibiting slavery in all that portion of the
Louisiana Territory lying north of thirty-six degrees and thirty
minutes, north latitude, except Missouri--by implication leaving the
portion south of that line open to settlement either with or without
slaves.

This provision, as an offset to the admission of the new State without
restriction, constituted the celebrated Missouri Compromise. It was
reluctantly accepted by a small majority of the Southern members. Nearly
half of them voted against it, under the conviction that it was
unauthorized by the Constitution, and that Missouri was entitled to
determine the question for herself, as a matter of right, not of bargain
or concession. Among those who thus thought and voted were some of the
wisest statesmen and purest patriots of that period.[8]

This brief retrospect may have sufficed to show that the question of the
right or wrong of the institution of slavery was in no wise involved in
the earlier sectional controversies. Nor was it otherwise in those of a
later period, in which it was the lot of the author of these memoirs to
bear a part. They were essentially struggles for sectional equality or
ascendancy--for the maintenance or the destruction of that balance of
power or equipoise between North and South, which was early recognized
as a cardinal principle in our Federal system. It does not follow that
both parties to this contest were wholly right or wholly wrong in their
claims. The determination of the question of right or wrong must be left
to the candid inquirer after examination of the evidence. The object of
these preliminary investigations has been to clear the subject of the
obscurity produced by irrelevant issues and the glamour of ethical
illusions.


[Footnote 1: It will be remembered that, during her colonial condition,
Virginia made strenuous efforts to prevent the importation of Africans,
and was overruled by the Crown; also, that Georgia, under Oglethorpe,
did prohibit the introduction of African slaves until 1752, when the
proprietors surrendered the charter, and the colony became a part of the
royal government, and enjoyed the same privileges as the other
colonies.]

[Footnote 2: South Carolina subsequently (in 1803) repealed her law
forbidding the importation of slaves. The reason assigned for this
action was the impossibility of enforcing the law without the aid of the
Federal Government, to which entire control of the revenues, revenue
police, and naval forces of the country had been surrendered by the
States. "The geographical situation of our country," said Mr. Lowndes,
of South Carolina, in the House of Representatives on February 14, 1804,
"is not unknown. With navigable rivers running into the heart of it, it
was impossible, with our means, to prevent our Eastern brethren ...
engaged in this trade, from introducing them [the negroes] into the
country. The law was completely evaded.... Under these circumstances,
sir, it appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repeal
the law, and remove from the eyes of the people the spectacle of its
authority being daily violated."

The effect of the repeal was to permit the importation of negroes into
South Carolina during the interval from 1803 to 1808. It in probable
that an extensive _contraband_ trade was carried on by the New England
slavers with other ports, on account of the lack of means to enforce the
laws of the Southern States forbidding it.]

[Footnote 3: One from the Society of Friends assembled at Philadelphia
and New York, the other from the Pennsylvania society of various
religious denominations combined for the abolition of slavery.

For report of the debate, see Benton's "Abridgment," vol. i, pp.
201-207, _et seq._]

[Footnote 4: See Benton's "Abridgment," vol. i, p. 397.]

[Footnote 5: One was from New Hampshire, one from Vermont, two from
Virginia, and one from South Carolina.--(Benton's "Abridgment," vol.
iii, p. 519.)

No division on the final vote in the Senate.]

[Footnote 6: Cabot to Pickering, who was then Senator from
Massachusetts.--(See "Life and Letters of George Cabot," by H. C. Lodge,
p. 334.)]

[Footnote 7: The true issue was well stated by the Hon. Samuel A. Foot,
a representative from Connecticut, in an incidental reference to it in
debate on another subject, a few weeks after the final settlement of the
Missouri case. He said: "The Missouri question did not involve the
question of freedom or slavery, but merely _whether slaves now in the
country might be permitted to reside in the proposed new State; and
whether Congress or Missouri possessed the power to decide_."]

[Footnote 8: The votes on the proposed _restriction_, which eventually
failed of adoption, and on the _compromise_, which was finally adopted,
are often confounded. The advocacy of the former measure was exclusively
sectional, no Southern member voting for it in either House. On the
adoption of the compromise line of thirty-six degrees and thirty
minutes, the vote in the Senate was 34 yeas to 10 nays. The Senate
consisted of forty-four members from twenty-two States, equally divided
between the two sections--Delaware being classed as a Southern State.
Among the yeas were all the Northern votes, except two from
Indiana--being 20--and 14 Southern. The nays consisted of 2 from the
North, and 8 from the South.

In the House of Representatives, the vote was 134 yeas to 42 nays. Of
the yeas, 95 were Northern, 39 Southern; of the nays, 5 Northern, and 37
Southern.

Among the nays in the Senate were Messrs. James Barbour and James
Pleasants, of Virginia; Nathaniel Macon, of North Carolina; John
Gaillard and William Smith, of South Carolina. In the House, Philip P.
Barbour, John Randolph, John Tyler, and William S. Archer, of Virginia;
Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina (one of the authors of the
Constitution); Thomas W. Cobb, of Georgia; and others of more or less
note.

(See speech of the Hon. D. L. Yulee, of Florida, in the United States
Senate, on the admission of California, August 6, 1850, for a careful
and correct account of the compromise. That given in the second chapter
of Benton's "Thirty Years' View" is singularly inaccurate; that of
Horace Greeley, in his "American Conflict," still more so.)]




CHAPTER II.

    The Session of 1849-'50.--The Compromise Measures.--Virtual
    Abrogation of the Missouri Compromise.--The Admission of
    California.--The Fugitive Slave Law.--Death of Mr.
    Calhoun.--Anecdote of Mr. Clay.


The first session of the Thirty-first Congress (1849-'50) was a
memorable one. The recent acquisition from Mexico of New Mexico and
California required legislation by Congress. In the Senate the bills
reported by the Committee on Territories were referred to a select
committee, of which Mr. Clay, the distinguished Senator from Kentucky,
was chairman. From this committee emanated the bills which, taken
together, are known as the compromise measures of 1850.

With some others, I advocated the division of the newly acquired
territory by an extension to the Pacific Ocean of the Missouri
Compromise line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude.
This was not because of any inherent merit or fitness in that line, but
because it had been accepted by the country as a settlement of the
sectional question which, thirty years before, had threatened a rupture
of the Union, and it had acquired in the public mind a prescriptive
respect which it seemed unwise to disregard. A majority, however,
decided otherwise, and the line of political conciliation was then
obliterated, as far as it lay in the power of Congress to do so. An
analysis of the vote will show that this result was effected almost
exclusively by the representatives of the North, and that the South was
not responsible for an action which proved to be the opening of
Pandora's box.[9]

However objectionable it may have been in 1820 to adopt that political
line as expressing a geographical definition of different sectional
interests, and however it may be condemned as the assumption by Congress
of a function not delegated to it, it is to be remembered that the act
had received such recognition and _quasi_-ratification by the people of
the States as to give it a value which it did not originally possess.
Pacification had been the fruit borne by the tree, and it should not
have been recklessly hewed down and cast into the fire. The frequent
assertion then made was that all discrimination was unjust, and that the
popular will should be left untrammeled in the formation of new States.
This theory was good enough in itself, and as an abstract proposition
could not be gainsaid; but its practical operation has but poorly
sustained the expectations of its advocates, as will be seen when we
come to consider the events that occurred a few years later in Kansas
and elsewhere. Retrospectively viewed under the mellowing light of time,
and with the calm consideration we can usually give to the irremediable
past, the compromise legislation of 1850 bears the impress of that
sectional spirit so widely at variance with the general purposes of the
Union, and so destructive of the harmony and mutual benefit which the
Constitution was intended to secure.

The refusal to divide the territory acquired from Mexico by an extension
of the line of the Missouri Compromise to the Pacific was a consequence
of the purpose to admit California as a State of the Union before it had
acquired the requisite population, and while it was mainly under the
control of a military organization sent from New York during the war
with Mexico and disbanded in California upon the restoration of peace.
The inconsistency of the argument against the extension of the line was
exhibited in the division of the Territory of Texas by that parallel,
and payment to the State of money to secure her consent to the partition
of her domain. In the case of Texas, the North had everything to gain
and nothing to lose by the application of the practice of geographical
compromise on an arbitrary line. In the case of California, the
conditions were reversed; the South might have been the gainer and the
North the loser by a recognition of the same rule.

The compensation which it was alleged that the South received was a more
effective law for the rendition of fugitives from service or labor. But
it is to be remarked that this law provided for the execution by the
General Government of obligations which had been imposed by the Federal
compact upon the several States of the Union. The benefit to be derived
from a fulfillment of that law would be small in comparison with the
evil to result from the plausible pretext that the States had thus been
relieved from a duty which they had assumed in the adoption of the
compact of union. Whatever tended to lead the people of any of the
States to feel that they could be relieved from their constitutional
obligations by transferring them to the General Government, or that they
might thus or otherwise evade or resist them, could not fail to be like
the tares which the enemy sowed amid the wheat. The union of States,
formed to secure the permanent welfare of posterity and to promote
harmony among the constituent States, could not, without changing its
character, survive such alienation as rendered its parts hostile to the
security, prosperity, and happiness of one another.

It was reasonably argued that, as the Legislatures of fourteen of the
States had enacted what were termed "personal liberty laws," which
forbade the cooeperation of State officials in the rendition of fugitives
from service and labor, it became necessary that the General Government
should provide the requisite machinery for the execution of the law. The
result proved what might have been anticipated--that those communities
which had repudiated their constitutional obligations, which had
nullified a previous law of Congress for the execution of a provision of
the Constitution, and had murdered men who came peacefully to recover
their property, would evade or obstruct, so as to render practically
worthless, _any_ law that could be enacted for that purpose. In the
exceptional cases in which it might be executed, the event would be
attended with such conflict between the State and Federal authorities as
to produce consequent evils greater than those it was intended to
correct.

It was during the progress of these memorable controversies that the
South lost its most trusted leader, and the Senate its greatest and
purest statesman. He was taken from us--

  "Like a summer-dried fountain,
  When our need was the sorest;"--

when his intellectual power, his administrative talent, his love of
peace, and his devotion to the Constitution, might have averted
collision; or, failing in that, he might have been to the South the
Palinurus to steer the bark in safety over the perilous sea. Truly did
Mr. Webster--his personal friend, although his greatest political
rival--say of him in his obituary address, "There was nothing groveling,
or low, or meanly selfish, that came near the head or the heart of Mr.
Calhoun." His prophetic warnings speak from the grave with the wisdom of
inspiration. Would that they could have been appreciated by his
countrymen while he yet lived!

    Note.--While the compromise measures of 1850 were pending, and
    the excitement concerning them was at its highest, I one day
    overtook Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, and Mr. Berrien, of Georgia, in
    the Capitol grounds. They were in earnest conversation. It was
    the 7th of March--the day on which Mr. Webster had delivered his
    great speech. Mr. Clay, addressing me in the friendly manner
    which he had always employed since I was a schoolboy in
    Lexington, asked me what I thought of the speech. I liked it
    better than he did. He then suggested that I should "join the
    compromise men," saying that it was a measure which he thought
    would probably give peace to the country for thirty years--the
    period that had elapsed since the adoption of the compromise of
    1820. Then, turning to Mr. Berrien, he said, "You and I will be
    under ground before that time, but our young friend here may
    have trouble to meet." I somewhat impatiently declared my
    unwillingness to transfer to posterity a trial which they would
    be relatively less able to meet than we were, and passed on my
    way.


[Footnote 9: The vote in the Senate on the proposition to continue the
line of the Missouri Compromise through the newly acquired territory to
the Pacific was twenty-four yeas, to thirty-two nays. Reckoning Delaware
and Missouri as Southern States, the vote of the two sections was
exactly equal. The yeas were _all_ cast by Southern Senators; the nays
were all Northern, except two from Delaware, one from Missouri, and one
from Kentucky.]




CHAPTER III.

    Reelection to the Senate.--Political Controversies in
    Mississippi.--Action of the Democratic State Convention.--Defeat
    of the State-Rights Party.--Withdrawal of General Quitman and
    Nomination of the Author as Candidate for the Office of
    Governor.--The Canvass and its Result.--Retirement to Private
    Life.


I had been reelected by the Legislature of Mississippi as my own
successor, and entered upon a new term of service in the Senate on March
4, 1851.

On my return to Mississippi in 1851, the subject chiefly agitating the
public mind was that of the "compromise" measures of the previous year.
Consequent upon these was a proposition for a convention of delegates,
from the people of the Southern States respectively, to consider what
steps ought to be taken for their future peace and safety, and the
preservation of their constitutional rights. There was diversity of
opinion with regard to the merits of the measures referred to, but the
disagreement no longer followed the usual lines of party division. They
who saw in those measures the forerunner of disaster to the South had no
settled policy beyond a convention, the object of which should be to
devise new and more effectual guarantees against the perils of
usurpation. They were unjustly charged with a desire to destroy the
Union--a feeling entertained by few, very few, if by any, in
Mississippi, and avowed by none.

There were many, however, who held that the principles of the
Declaration of Independence, and the purposes for which the Union was
formed, were of higher value than the mere Union itself. Independence
existed before the compact of union between the States; and, if that
compact should be broken in part, and therefore destroyed in whole, it
was hoped that the liberties of the people in the States might still be
preserved. Those who were most devoted to the Union of the Constitution
might, consequently, be expected to resist most sternly any usurpation
of undelegated power, the effect of which would be to warp the Federal
Government from its proper character, and, by sapping the foundation, to
destroy the Union of the States.

My recent reelection to the United States Senate had conferred upon me
for six years longer the office which I preferred to all others. I could
not, therefore, be suspected of desiring a nomination for any other
office from the Democratic Convention, the meeting of which was then
drawing near. Having, as a Senator of the State, freely participated in
debate on the measures which were now exciting so much interest in the
public mind, it was very proper that I should visit the people in
different parts of the State and render an account of my stewardship.

My devotion to the Union of our fathers had been so often and so
publicly declared; I had, on the floor of the Senate, so defiantly
challenged any question of my fidelity to it; my services, civil and
military, had now extended through so long a period, and were so
generally known--that I felt quite assured that no whisperings of envy
or ill will could lead the people of Mississippi to believe that I had
dishonored their trust by using the power they had conferred on me to
destroy the Government to which I was accredited. Then, as afterward, I
regarded the separation of the States as a great, though not the
greatest, evil.

I returned from my tour among the people at the time appointed for the
meeting of the nominating convention of the Democratic (or State-Rights)
party. During the previous year the Governor, General John A. Quitman,
had been compelled to resign his office to answer an indictment against
him for complicity with the "filibustering" expeditions against Cuba.
The charges were not sustained; many of the Democratic party of
Mississippi, myself included, recognized a consequent obligation to
renominate him for the office of which he had been deprived. When,
however, the delegates met in party convention, the committee appointed
to select candidates, on comparison of opinions, concluded that, in view
of the effort to fix upon the party the imputation of a purpose of
disunion, some of the antecedents of General Quitman might endanger
success. A proposition was therefore made, in the committee on
nominations, that I should be invited to become a candidate, and that,
if General Quitman would withdraw, my acceptance of the nomination and
the resignation of my place in the United States Senate, which it was
known would result, was to be followed by the appointment by the
Governor of General Quitman to the vacated place in the Senate. I
offered no objection to this arrangement, but left it to General Quitman
to decide. He claimed the nomination for the governorship, or nothing,
and was so nominated.

To promote the success of the Democratic nominees, I engaged actively in
the canvass, and continued in the field until stricken down by disease.
This occurred just before the election of delegates to a State
Convention, for which provision had been made by the Legislature, and
the canvass for which, conducted in the main upon party lines, was in
progress simultaneously with that for the ordinary State officers. The
Democratic majority in the State when the canvass began was estimated at
eight thousand. At this election, in September, for delegates to the
State Convention, we were beaten by about seven thousand five hundred
votes. Seeing in this result the foreshadowing of almost inevitable
defeat, General Quitman withdrew from the canvass as a candidate, and
the Executive Committee of the party (empowered to fill vacancies)
called on me to take his place. My health did not permit me to leave
home at that time, and only about six weeks remained before the election
was to take place; but, being assured that I was not expected to take
any active part, and that the party asked only the use of my name, I
consented to be announced, and immediately resigned from the United
States Senate. Nevertheless, I soon afterward took the field in person,
and worked earnestly until the day of election. I was defeated, but the
majority of more than seven thousand votes, that had been cast a short
time before against the party with which I was associated, was reduced
to less than one thousand.[10]

In this canvass, both before and after I became a candidate, no argument
or appeal of mine was directed against the perpetuation of the Union.
Believing, however, that the signs of the time portended danger to the
South from the usurpation by the General Government of undelegated
powers, I counseled that Mississippi should enter into the proposed
meeting of the people of the Southern States, to consider what could and
should be done to insure our future safety, frankly stating my
conviction that, unless such action were taken then, sectional rivalry
would engender greater evils in the future, and that, if the controversy
was postponed, "the last opportunity for a peaceful solution would be
lost, then the issue would have to be settled by blood."


[Footnote 10: The following letter, written in 1853 to the Hon. William
J. Brown, of Indiana, formerly a member of Congress from that State, and
subsequently published, relates to the events of this period, and
affords nearly contemporaneous evidence in confirmation of the
statements of the text:

"Washington D.C., _May 7, 1853_.

"My dear Sir: I received the 'Sentinel' containing your defense of me
against the fate accusation of disunionism, and, before I had returned
to you the thanks to which you are entitled, I received this day the St.
Joseph 'Valley Register,' marked by you, to call my attention to an
article in answer to your defense, which was just in all things, save
your too complimentary terms.

"I wish I had the letter quoted from, that you might publish the whole
of that which is garbled to answer a purpose. In a part of the letter
not published, I put such a damper on the attempt to fix on me the
desire to break up our Union, and presented other points in a form so
little acceptable to the unfriendly inquirers, that the publication of
the letter had to be drawn out of them.

"At the risk of being wearisome, but encouraged by your marked
friendship, I will give you a statement in the case. The meeting of
October, 1849, was a convention of delegates equally representing the
Whig and Democratic parties in Mississippi. The resolutions were
decisive as to equality of right in the South with the North to the
Territories acquired from Mexico, and proposed a convention of the
Southern States. I was not a member, but on invitation addressed the
Convention. The succeeding Legislature instructed me, as a Senator, to
assert this equality, and, under the existing circumstances, to resist
by all constitutional means the admission of California as a State. At a
called session of the Legislature in 1850, a self-constituted committee
called on me, by letter, for my views. They were men who had enacted or
approved the resolutions of the Convention of 1849, and instructed me,
as members of the Legislature, in regular session, in the early part of
the year 1850. To them I replied that I adhered to the policy they had
indicated and instructed me in their official character to pursue.

"I pointed out the mode in which their policy could, in my opinion, be
executed without bloodshed or disastrous convulsion, but in terms of
bitter scorn alluded to such as would insult me with a desire to destroy
the Union, for which my whole life proved me to be a devotee.

"Pardon the egotism, in consideration of the occasion, when I say to you
that my father and my uncles fought through the Revolution of 1776,
giving their youth, their blood, and their little patrimony to the
constitutional freedom which I claim as my inheritance. Three of my
brothers fought in the war of 1812. Two of them were comrades of the
Hero of the Hermitage, and received his commendation for gallantry at
New Orleans. At sixteen years of age I was given to the service of my
country; for twelve years of my life I have borne its arms and served
it, zealously, if not well. As I feel the infirmities, which suffering
more than age has brought upon me, it would be a bitter reflection,
indeed, if I was forced to conclude that my countrymen would hold all
this light when weighed against the empty panegyric which a time-serving
politician can bestow upon the Union, for which he never made a
sacrifice.

"In the Senate I announced that, if any respectable man would call me a
disunionist, I would answer him in monosyllables.... But I have often
asserted the right, for which the battles of the Revolution were
fought--the right of a people to change their government whenever it was
found to be oppressive, and subversive of the objects for which
governments are instituted--and have contended for the independence and
sovereignty of the States, a part of the creed of which Jefferson was
the apostle, Madison the expounder, and Jackson the consistent defender.

"I have written freely, and more than I designed. Accept my thanks for
your friendly advocacy. Present me in terms of kind remembrance to your
family, and believe me, very sincerely yours,

"Jefferson Davis.

"Note.--No party in Mississippi ever advocated disunion. They differed
as to the mode of securing their rights in the Union, and on the power
of a State to secede--neither advocating the exercise of the power.

"J.D."
]




CHAPTER IV.

    The Author enters the Cabinet.--Administration of the War
    Department.--Surveys for a Pacific Railway.--Extension of the
    Capitol.--New Regiments organized.--Colonel Samuel Cooper,
    Adjutant-General.--A Bit of Civil-Service Reform.--Reelection to
    the Senate.--Continuity of the Pierce Cabinet.--Character of
    Franklin Pierce.


Happy in the peaceful pursuits of a planter; busily engaged in cares for
servants, in the improvement of my land, in building, in rearing
live-stock, and the like occupations, the time passed pleasantly away
until my retirement was interrupted by an invitation to take a place in
the Cabinet of Mr. Pierce, who had been elected to the Presidency of the
United States in November, 1852. Although warmly attached to Mr. Pierce
personally, and entertaining the highest estimate of his character and
political principles, private and personal reasons led me to decline the
offer. This was followed by an invitation to attend the ceremony of his
inauguration, which took place on the 4th of March, 1853. While in
Washington, on this visit, I was induced by public considerations to
reconsider my determination and accept the office of Secretary of War.
The public records of that period will best show how the duties of that
office were performed.

While in the Senate, I had advocated the construction of a railway to
connect the valley of the Mississippi with the Pacific coast; and, when
an appropriation was made to determine the most eligible route for that
purpose, the Secretary of War was charged with its application. We had
then but little of that minute and accurate knowledge of the interior of
the continent which was requisite for a determination of the problem.
Several different parties were therefore organized to examine the
various routes supposed to be practicable within the northern and
southern limits of the United States. The arguments which I had used as
a Senator were "the military necessity for such means of transportation,
and the need of safe and rapid communication with the Pacific slope, to
secure its continuance as a part of the Union."

In the organization and equipment of these parties, and in the selection
of their officers, care was taken to provide for securing full and
accurate information upon every point involved in the determination of
the route. The only discrimination made was in the more prompt and
thorough equipment of the parties for the extreme northern line, and
this was only because that was supposed to be the most difficult of
execution of all the surveys.

In like manner, my advocacy while in the Senate of an extension of the
Capitol, by the construction of a new Senate-Chamber and Hall of
Representatives, may have caused the appropriation for that object to be
put under my charge as Secretary of War.

During my administration of the War Department, material changes were
made in the models of arms. Iron gun-carriages were introduced, and
experiments were made which led to the casting of heavy guns hollow,
instead of boring them after casting. Inquiries were made with regard to
gunpowder, which subsequently led to the use of a coarser grain for
artillery.

During the same period the army was increased by the addition of two
regiments of infantry and two of cavalry. The officers of these
regiments were chosen partly by selection from those already in service
in the regular army and partly by appointment from civil life. In making
the selections from the army, I was continually indebted to the
assistance of that pure-minded and accurately informed officer, Colonel
Samuel Cooper, the Adjutant-General, of whom it may be proper here to
say that, although his life had been spent in the army, and he, of
course, had the likes and dislikes inseparable from men who are brought
into close contact and occasional rivalry, I never found in his official
recommendations any indication of partiality or prejudice toward any
one.

When the first list was made out, to be submitted to the President, a
difficulty was found to exist, which had not occurred either to Colonel
Cooper or myself. This was, that the officers selected purely on their
military record did not constitute a roster conforming to that
distribution among the different States, which, for political
considerations, it was thought desirable to observe--that is to say, the
number of such officers of Southern birth was found to be
disproportionately great. Under instructions from the President, the
list was therefore revised and modified in accordance with this new
element of geographical distribution. This, as I am happy to remember,
was the only occasion in which the current of my official action, while
Secretary of War, was disturbed in any way by sectional or political
considerations.

Under former administrations of the War Office it had not been customary
to make removals or appointments upon political grounds, except in the
case of clerkships. To this usage I not only adhered, but extended it to
include the clerkships also. The Chief Clerk, who had been removed by my
predecessor, had peculiar qualifications for the place; and, although
known to me only officially, he was restored to the position. It will
probably be conceded by all who are well informed on the subject that
his restoration was a benefit to the public service.[11]

[The reader desirous for further information relative to the
administration of the War Department during this period may find it in
the various official reports and estimates of works of defense
prosecuted or recommended, arsenals of construction and depots of arms
maintained or suggested, and foundries employed, during the Presidency
of Mr. Pierce, 1853-'57.]

Having been again elected by the Legislature of Mississippi as Senator
to the United States, I passed from the Cabinet of Mr. Pierce, on the
last day of his term (March 4, 1857), to take my seat in the Senate.

The Administration of Franklin Pierce presents the only instance in our
history of the continuance of a Cabinet for four years without a single
change in its _personnel_. When it is remembered that there was much
dissimilarity if not incongruity of character among the members of that
Cabinet, some idea may be formed of the power over men possessed and
exercised by Mr. Pierce. Chivalrous, generous, amiable, true to his
friends and to his faith, frank and bold in the declaration of his
opinions, he never deceived any one. And, if treachery had ever come
near him, it would have stood abashed in the presence of his truth, his
manliness, and his confiding simplicity.


[Footnote 11: Soon after my entrance upon duty as secretary of War,
General Jesup, the Quartermaster-General, presented to me a list of
names from which to make selection of a clerk for his department.
Observing that he had attached certain figures to these names, I asked
whether the figures were intended to indicate the relative
qualifications, or preference in his estimation, of the several
applicants; and, upon his answer in the affirmative, without further
question, authorized him to appoint "No. 1" of his list. A day or two
afterward, certain Democratic members of Congress called on me and
politely inquired whether it was true that I had appointed a Whig to a
position in the War Office. "Certainly not," I answered. "We thought you
were not aware of it," said they, and proceeded to inform me that Mr.
----, the recent appointee to the clerkship just mentioned, was a Whig.
After listening patiently to this statement, I answered that it was they
who were deceived, not I. I had appointed a clerk. He had been appointed
neither as a Whig nor as a Democrat, but merely as the fittest candidate
for the place in the estimation of the chief of the bureau to which it
belonged. I further gave them to understand that the same principle of
selection would be followed in similar cases, so far as my authority
extended. After some further discussion of the question, the visitors
withdrew, dissatisfied with the result of the interview.

The Quartermaster-General, on hearing of this conversation, hastened to
inform me that it was all a mistake--that the appointee to the office
had been confounded with his father, who was a well-known Whig, but that
he (the son) was a Democrat. I assured the General that this was
altogether immaterial, adding that it was "a very pretty quarrel" as it
stood, and that I had no desire to effect a settlement of it on any
inferior issue. Thenceforward, however, I was but little troubled with
any pressure for political appointments in the department.]




CHAPTER V.

    The Territorial Question.--An Incident at the White House.--The
    Kansas and Nebraska Bill.--The Missouri Compromise abrogated in
    1850, not in 1854.--Origin of "Squatter Sovereignty."--Sectional
    Rivalry and its Consequences.--The Emigrant Aid Societies.--"The
    Bible and Sharpe's Rifles."--False Pretensions as to
    Principle.--The Strife in Kansas.--A Retrospect.--The Original
    Equilibrium of Power and its Overthrow.--Usurpations of the
    Federal Government.--The Protective Tariff.--Origin and Progress
    of Abolitionism.--Who were the Friends of the Union?--An
    Illustration of Political Morality.


The organization of the Territory of Kansas was the first question that
gave rise to exciting debate after my return to the Senate. The
celebrated Kansas-Nebraska Bill had become a law during the
Administration of Mr. Pierce. As this occupies a large space in the
political history of the period, it is proper to state some facts
connected with it, which were not public, but were known to me and to
others yet living.

The declaration, often repeated in 1850, that climate and the will of
the people concerned should determine their institutions when they
should form a Constitution, and as a State be admitted into the Union,
and that no legislation by Congress should be permitted to interfere
with the free exercise of that will when so expressed, was but the
announcement of the fact so firmly established in the Constitution, that
sovereignty resided alone in the States, and that Congress had only
delegated powers. It has been sometimes contended that, because the
Congress of the Confederation, by the Ordinance of 1787, prohibited
involuntary servitude in all the Northwestern Territory, the framers of
the Constitution must have recognized such power to exist in the
Congress of the United States. Hence the deduction that the prohibitory
clause of what is known as the Missouri Compromise was justified by the
precedent of the Ordinance of 1787. To make the action of the Congress
of the Confederation a precedent for the Congress of the United States
is to overlook the great distinction between the two.

The Congress of the Confederation represented the States in their
sovereignty, and, as such representatives, had legislative, executive,
and, in some degree, judicial power confided to it. Virtually, it was an
assemblage of the States. In certain cases a majority of nine States
were required to decide a question, but there is no express limitation,
or restriction, such as is to be found in the ninth and tenth amendments
to the Constitution of the United States. The General Government of the
Union is composed of three departments, of which the Congress is the
legislative branch, and which is checked by the revisory power of the
judiciary, and the veto power of the Executive, and, above all, is
expressly limited in legislation to powers expressly delegated by the
States. If, then, it be admitted, which is certainly questionable, that
the Congress of the Confederation had power to exclude slave property
northwest of the Ohio River, that power must have been derived from its
character as representing the States in their sovereignty, for no
indication of such a power is to be found in the Articles of
Confederation.

If it be assumed that the absence of a prohibition was equivalent to the
admission of the power in the Congress of the Confederation, the
assumption would avail nothing in the Congress under the Constitution,
where power is expressly limited to what had been delegated. More
briefly, it may be stated that the Congress of the Confederation could,
like the Legislature of a State, do what had not been prohibited; but
the Congress of the United States could only do what had been expressly
permitted. It is submitted whether this last position is not conclusive
against the possession of power by the United States Congress to
legislate slavery into or exclude it from Territories belonging to the
United States.

This subject, which had for more than a quarter of a century been one of
angry discussion and sectional strife, was revived, and found occasion
for renewed discussion in the organization of Territorial governments
for Kansas and Nebraska. The Committees on Territories of the two Houses
agreed to report a bill in accordance with that recognized principle,
provided they could first be assured that it would receive favorable
consideration from the President. This agreement was made on Saturday,
and the ensuing Monday was the day (and the only day for two weeks) on
which, according to the order of business established by the rules of
the House of Representatives, the bill could be introduced by the
Committee of that House.

On Sunday morning, the 22d of January, 1854, gentlemen of each Committee
called at my house, and Mr. Douglas, chairman of the Senate Committee,
fully explained the proposed bill, and stated their purpose to be,
through my aid, to obtain an interview on that day with the President,
to ascertain whether the bill would meet his approbation. The President
was known to be rigidly opposed to the reception of visits on Sunday for
the discussion of any political subject; but in this case it was urged
as necessary, in order to enable the Committee to make their report the
next day. I went with them to the Executive mansion, and, leaving them
in the reception-room, sought the President in his private apartments,
and explained to him the occasion of the visit. He thereupon met the
gentlemen, patiently listened to the reading of the bill and their
explanations of it, decided that it rested upon sound constitutional
principles, and recognized in it only a return to that rule which had
been infringed by the compromise of 1820, and the restoration of which
had been foreshadowed by the legislation of 1850. This bill was not,
therefore, as has been improperly asserted, a measure inspired by Mr.
Pierce or any of his Cabinet. Nor was it the first step taken toward the
repeal of the conditions or obligations expressed or implied by the
establishment, in 1820, of the politico-sectional line of thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes. That compact had been virtually abrogated,
in 1850, by the refusal of the representatives of the North to apply it
to the territory then recently acquired from Mexico. In May, 1854, the
Kansas-Nebraska Bill was passed; its purpose was declared in the bill
itself to be to carry into practical operation the "propositions and
principles established by the compromise measures of 1850" The "Missouri
Compromise," therefore, was not repealed by that bill--its virtual
repeal by the legislation of 1850 was recognized as an existing fact,
and it was declared to be "inoperative and void."

It was added that the "true intent and meaning" of the act was "not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to
the Constitution of the United States."

From the terms of this bill, as well as from the arguments that were
used in its behalf, it is evident that its purpose was to leave the
Territories equally open to the people of all the States, with every
species of property recognized by any of them; to permit climate and
soil to determine the current of immigration, and to secure to the
people themselves the right to form their own institutions according to
their own will, as soon as they should acquire the right of
self-government; that is to say, as soon as their numbers should entitle
them to organize themselves into a State, prepared to take its place as
an equal, sovereign member of the Federal Union. The claim, afterward
advanced by Mr. Douglas and others, that this declaration was intended
to assert the right of the first settlers of a Territory, in its
inchoate, rudimental, dependent, and transitional condition, to
determine the character of its institutions, constituted the doctrine
popularly known as "squatter sovereignty." Its assertion led to the
dissensions which ultimately resulted in a rupture of the Democratic
party.

Sectional rivalry, the deadly foe of the "domestic tranquillity" and the
"general welfare," which the compact of union was formed to insure, now
interfered, with gigantic efforts, to prevent that free migration which
had been promised, and to hinder the decision by climate and the
interests of the inhabitants of the institutions to be established by
these embryo States. Societies were formed in the North to supply money
and send emigrants into the new Territories; and a famous preacher,
addressing a body of those emigrants, charged them to carry with them to
Kansas "the Bible and Sharpe's rifles." The latter were of course to be
leveled against the bosoms of their Southern brethren who might migrate
to the same Territory, but the use to be made of the Bible in the same
fraternal enterprise was left unexplained by the reverend gentleman.

The war-cry employed to train the Northern mind for the deeds
contemplated by the agitators was "No extension of slavery!" Was this
sentiment real or feigned? The number of slaves (as has already been
clearly shown) would not have been increased by their transportation to
new territory. It could not be augmented by further importation, for the
law of the land made that piracy. Southern men were the leading authors
of that enactment, and the public opinion of their descendants, stronger
than the law, fully sustained it. The climate of Kansas and Nebraska was
altogether unsuited to the negro, and the soil was not adapted to those
productions for which negro labor could be profitably employed. If,
then, any negroes held to service or labor, as provided in the compact
of union, had been transported to those Territories, they would have
been such as were bound by personal attachment mutually existing between
master and servant, which would have rendered it impossible for the
former to consider the latter as property convertible into money. As
white laborers, adapted to the climate and its products, flowed into the
country, negro labor would have inevitably become a tax to those who
held it, and their emancipation would have followed that condition, as
it has in all the Northern States, old or new--Wisconsin furnishing the
last example.[12] It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the
"war-cry" was employed by the artful to inflame the minds of the less
informed and less discerning; that it was adopted in utter disregard of
the means by which negro emancipation might have been peaceably
accomplished in the Territories, and with the sole object of obtaining
sectional control and personal promotion by means of popular agitation.

The success attending this artifice was remarkable. To such an extent
was it made available, that Northern indignation was aroused on the
absurd accusation that the South had destroyed "that sacred instrument,
the compromise of 1820." The internecine war which raged in Kansas for
several years was substituted for the promised peace under the operation
of the natural laws regulating migration to new countries. For the
fratricide which dyed the virgin soil of Kansas with the blood of those
who should have stood shoulder to shoulder in subduing the wilderness;
for the frauds which corrupted the ballot-box and made the name of
election a misnomer--let the authors of "squatter sovereignty" and the
fomenters of sectional hatred answer to the posterity for whose peace
and happiness the fathers formed the Federal compact.

In these scenes of strife were trained the incendiaries who afterward
invaded Virginia under the leadership of John Brown; and at this time
germinated the sentiments which led men of high position to sustain,
with their influence and their money, this murderous incursion into the
South.[13]

Now was seen the lightning of that storm, the distant muttering of which
had been heard so long, and against which the wise and the patriotic had
given solemn warning, regarding it as the sign which portended a
dissolution of the Union.

Diversity of interests and of opinions among the States of the
Confederation had in the beginning presented great difficulties in the
way of the formation of a more perfect union. The compact was the result
of compromise between the States, at that time generally distinguished
as navigating and agricultural, afterward as Northern and Southern. When
the first census was taken, in 1790, there was but little numerical
difference in the population of these two sections, and (including
States about to be admitted) there was also an exact equality in the
number of States. Each section had, therefore, the power of
self-protection, and might feel secure against any danger of Federal
aggression. If the disturbance of that equilibrium had been the
consequence of natural causes, and the government of the whole had
continued to be administered strictly for the general welfare, there
would have been no ground for complaint of the result.

Under the old Confederation the Southern States had a large excess of
territory. The acquisition of Louisiana, of Florida, and of Texas,
afterward greatly increased this excess. The generosity and patriotism
of Virginia led her, before the adoption of the Constitution, to cede
the Northwest Territory to the United States. The "Missouri Compromise"
surrendered to the North all the newly acquired region not included in
the State of Missouri, and north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees
and a half. The northern part of Texas was in like manner given up by
the compromise of 1850; and the North, having obtained, by those
successive cessions, a majority in both Houses of Congress, took to
itself all the territory acquired from Mexico. Thus, by the action of
the General Government, the means were provided permanently to destroy
the original equilibrium between the sections.

Nor was this the only injury to which the South was subjected. Under the
power of Congress to levy duties on imports, tariff laws were enacted,
not merely "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States," as authorized by the
Constitution, but, positively and primarily, for the protection against
foreign competition of domestic manufactures. The effect of this was to
impose the main burden of taxation upon the Southern people, who were
consumers and not manufacturers, not only by the enhanced price of
imports, but indirectly by the consequent depreciation in the value of
exports, which were chiefly the products of Southern States. The
imposition of this grievance was unaccompanied by the consolation of
knowing that the tax thus borne was to be paid into the public Treasury,
for the increase of price accrued mainly to the benefit of the
manufacturer. Nor was this all: a reference to the annual appropriations
will show that the disbursements made were as unequal as the burdens
borne--the inequality in both operating in the same direction.

These causes all combined to direct immigration to the Northern section;
and with the increase of its preponderance appeared more and more
distinctly a tendency in the Federal Government to pervert functions
delegated to it, and to use them with sectional discrimination against
the minority.

The resistance to the admission of Missouri as a State, in 1820, was
evidently not owing to any moral or constitutional considerations, but
merely to political motives; and the compensation exacted for granting
what was simply a right, was the exclusion of the South from equality in
the enjoyment of territory which justly belonged equally to both, and
which was what the enemies of the South stigmatized as "slave
territory," when acquired.

The sectional policy then indicated brought to its support the passions
that spring from man's higher nature, but which, like all passions, if
misdirected and perverted, become hurtful and, it may be, destructive.
The year 1835 was marked by the public agitation for the abolition of
that African servitude which existed in the South, which antedated the
Union, and had existed in every one of the States that formed the
Confederation. By a great misconception of the powers belonging to the
General Government, and the responsibilities of citizens of the Northern
States, many of those citizens were, little by little, brought to the
conclusion that slavery was a sin for which _they_ were answerable, and
that it was the duty of the Federal Government to abate it. Though, at
the date above referred to, numerically so weak, when compared with
either of the political parties at the North, as to excite no
apprehension of their power for evil, the public demonstrations of the
Abolitionists were violently rebuked generally at the North. The party
was contemned on account of the character of its leaders, and the more
odious because chief among them was an Englishman, one Thompson, who was
supposed to be an emissary, whose mission was to prepare the way for a
dissolution of the Union. Let us hope that it was reverence for the
obligations of the Constitution as the soul of the Union that suggested
lurking danger, and rendered the supposed emissary for its destruction
so odious that he was driven from a Massachusetts hall where he
attempted to lecture. But bodies in motion will overcome bodies at rest,
and the unreflecting too often are led by captivating names far from the
principles they revere.

Thus, by the activity of the propagandists of abolitionism, and the
misuse of the sacred word Liberty, they recruited from the ardent
worshipers of that goddess such numbers as gave them in many Northern
States the balance of power between the two great political forces that
stood arrayed against each other; then and there they came to be courted
by both of the great parties, especially by the Whigs, who had become
the weaker party of the two. Fanaticism, to which is usually accorded
sincerity as an extenuation of its mischievous tenets, affords the best
excuse to be offered for the original abolitionists, but that can not be
conceded to the political associates who joined them for the purpose of
acquiring power; with them it was but hypocritical cant, intended to
deceive. Hence arose the declaration of the existence of an
"irrepressible conflict," because of the domestic institutions of
sovereign, self-governing States--institutions over which neither the
Federal Government nor the people outside of the limits of such States
had any control, and for which they could have no moral or legal
responsibility.

Those who are to come after us, and who will look without prejudice or
excitement at the record of events which have occurred in our day, will
not fail to wonder how men professing and proclaiming such a belief
should have so far imposed upon the credulity of the world as to be able
to arrogate to themselves the claim of being the special friends of a
Union contracted in order to insure "domestic tranquillity" among the
people of the States united; that _they_ were the advocates of peace, of
law, and of order, who, when taking an oath to support and maintain the
Constitution, did so with a mental reservation to violate one of the
provisions of that Constitution--one of the conditions of the
compact--without which the Union could never have been formed. The tone
of political morality which could make this possible was well indicated
by the toleration accorded in the Senate to the flippant,
inconsequential excuse for it given by one of its most eminent
exemplars--"Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this
thing?"--meaning thereby, not that it would be the part of a dog to
_violate_ his oath, but to _keep_ it in the matter referred to. (See
Appendix D.)


[Footnote 12: Extract from a speech of Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, in the
Senate of the United States, May 17, 1860: "There is a relation
belonging to this species of property, unlike that of the apprentice or
the hired man, which awakens whatever there is of kindness or of
nobility of soul in the heart of him who owns it; this can only be
alienated, obscured, or destroyed, by collecting this species of
property into such masses that the owner is not personally acquainted
with the individuals who compose it. In the relation, however, which can
exist in the Northwestern Territories, the mere domestic connection of
one, two, or at most half a dozen servants in a family, associating with
the children as they grow up, attending upon age as it declines, there
can be nothing against which either philanthropy or humanity can make an
appeal. Not even the emancipationist could raise his voice; for this is
the high-road and the open gate to the condition in which the masters
would, from interest, in a few years, desire the emancipation of every
one who may thus be taken to the northwestern frontier."]

[Footnote 13: See "Report of Senate Committee of Inquiry into the John
Brown Raid."]




CHAPTER VI.

    Agitation continued.--Political Parties: their Origin, Changes,
    and Modifications.--Some Account of the "Popular Sovereignty,"
    or "Non-Intervention," Theory.--Rupture of the Democratic
    Party.--The John Brown Raid.--Resolutions introduced by the
    Author into the Senate on the Relations of the States, the
    Federal Government, and the Territories; their Discussion and
    Adoption.


The strife in Kansas and the agitation of the territorial question in
Congress and throughout the country continued during nearly the whole of
Mr. Buchanan's Administration, finally culminating in a disruption of
the Union. Meantime the changes, or modifications, which had occurred or
were occurring in the great political parties, were such as may require
a word of explanation to the reader not already familiar with their
history.

The _names_ adopted by political parties in the United States have not
always been strictly significant of their principles. The old Federal
party inclined to nationalism, or consolidation, rather than
federalization, of the States. On the other hand, the party originally
known as Republican, and afterward as Democratic, can scarcely claim to
have been distinctively or exclusively such in the primary sense of
these terms, inasmuch as no party has ever avowed opposition to the
general principles of government by the people. The fundamental idea of
the Democratic party was that of the sovereignty of the States and the
federal, or confederate, character of the Union. Other elements have
entered into its organization at different periods, but this has been
the vital, cardinal, and abiding principle on which its existence has
been perpetuated. The Whig, which succeeded the old Federal party,
though by no means identical with it, was, in the main, favorable to a
strong central government, therein antagonizing the transatlantic
traditions connected with its name. The "Know-Nothing," or "American,"
party, which sprang into existence on the decadence of the Whig
organization, based upon opposition to the alleged overgrowth of the
political influence of naturalized foreigners and of the Roman Catholic
Church, had but a brief duration, and after the Presidential election of
1856 declined as rapidly as it had arisen.

At the period to which this narrative has advanced, the "Free-Soil,"
which had now assumed the title of "Republican" party, had grown to a
magnitude which threatened speedily to obtain entire control of the
Government. Based, as has been shown, upon sectional rivalry and
opposition to the growth of the Southern equally with the Northern
States of the Union, it had absorbed within itself not only the
abolitionists, who were avowedly agitating for the destruction of the
system of negro servitude, but other diverse and heterogeneous elements
of opposition to the Democratic party. In the Presidential election of
1856, their candidates (Fremont and Dayton) had received 114 of a total
of 296 electoral votes, representing a popular vote of 1,341,264 in a
total of 4,053,967. The elections of the ensuing year (1857) exhibited a
diminution of the so-called "Republican" strength, and the Thirty-fifth
Congress, which convened in December of that year, was decidedly
Democratic in both branches. In the course of the next two years,
however, the Kansas agitation and another cause, to be presently
noticed, had so swollen the ranks of the so-called Republicans, that, in
the House of Representatives of the Thirty-sixth Congress, which met in
December, 1859, neither party had a decided majority, the balance of
power being held by a few members still adhering to the virtually
extinct Whig and "American," or Know-Nothing, organizations, and a still
smaller number whose position was doubtful or irregular. More than eight
weeks were spent in the election of a Speaker; and a so-called
"Republican" (Mr. Pennington, of New Jersey) was finally elected by a
majority of one vote. The Senate continued to be decidedly Democratic,
though with an increase of the so-called "Republican" minority.

The cause above alluded to, as contributing to the rapid growth of the
so-called Republican party after the elections of the year 1857, was the
dissension among the Democrats, occasioned by the introduction of the
doctrine called by its inventors and advocates "popular sovereignty," or
"non-intervention," but more generally and more accurately known as
"squatter sovereignty." Its character has already been concisely stated
in the preceding chapter. Its origin is generally attributed to General
Cass, who is supposed to have suggested it in some general expressions
of his celebrated "Nicholson letter," written in December, 1847. On the
16th and 17th of May, 1860, it became necessary for me in a debate, in
the Senate, to review that letter of Mr. Cass. From my remarks then
made, the following extract is taken:

    "The Senator [Mr. Douglas] might have remembered, if he had
    chosen to recollect so unimportant a thing, that I once had to
    explain to him, ten years ago, the fact that I repudiated the
    doctrine of that letter at the time it was published, and that
    the Democracy of Mississippi had well-nigh crucified me for the
    construction which I placed upon it. There were men mean enough
    to suspect that the construction I gave to the Nicholson letter
    was prompted by the confidence and affection I felt for General
    Taylor. At a subsequent period, however, Mr. Cass thoroughly
    reviewed it. He uttered (for him) very harsh language against
    all who had doubted the true construction of his letter, and he
    construed it just as I had done during the canvass of 1848. It
    remains only to add that I supported Mr. Cass, not because of
    the doctrine of the Nicholson letter, but in despite of it;
    because I believed a Democratic President, with a Democratic
    Cabinet and Democratic counselors in the two Houses of Congress,
    and he as honest a man as I believed Mr. Cass to be, would be a
    safer reliance than his opponent, who personally possessed my
    confidence as much as any man living, but who was of, and must
    draw his advisers from, a party the tenets of which I believed
    to be opposed to the interests of the country, as they were to
    all my political convictions.

    "I little thought at that time that my advocacy of Mr. Cass upon
    such grounds as these, or his support by the State of which I am
    a citizen, would at any future day be quoted as an endorsement
    of the opinions contained in the Nicholson letter, as those
    opinions were afterward defined. But it is not only upon this
    letter, but equally upon the resolutions of the Convention as
    constructive of that letter, that the Senator rested his
    argument. [I will here say to the Senator that, if at any time I
    do him the least injustice, speaking as I do from such notes as
    I could take while he progressed, I will thank him to correct
    me.]

    "But this letter entered into the canvass; there was a doubt
    about its construction: there were men who asserted that they
    had positive authority for saying that it meant that the people
    of a Territory could only exclude slavery when the Territory
    should form a Constitution and be admitted as a State. This
    doubt continued to hang over the construction, and it was that
    doubt alone which secured Mr. Cass the vote of Mississippi. If
    the true construction had been certainly known, he would have
    had no chance to get it."

Whatever meaning the generally discreet and conservative statesman, Mr.
Cass, may have intended to convey, it is not at all probable that he
foresaw the extent to which the suggestions would be carried and the
consequences that would result from it.

In the organization of a government for California in 1850, the theory
was more distinctly advanced, but it was not until after the passage of
the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, in 1854, that it was fully developed under the
plastic and constructive genius of the Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, of
Illinois. The leading part which that distinguished Senator had borne in
the authorship and advocacy of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which affirmed
the right of the people of the Territories "to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution
of the United States," had aroused against him a violent storm of
denunciation in the State which he represented and other Northern
States. He met it very manfully in some respects, defended his action
resolutely, but in so doing was led to make such concessions of
principle and to attach such an interpretation to the bill as would have
rendered it practically nugatory--a thing to keep the promise of peace
to the ear and break it to the hope.

The Constitution expressly confers upon Congress the power to admit new
States into the Union, and also to "dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States." Under these grants of power, the
uniform practice of the Government had been for Congress to lay off and
divide the common territory by convenient boundaries for the formation
of future States; to provide executive, legislative, and judicial
departments of government for such Territories during their temporary
and provisional period of pupilage; to delegate to these governments
such authority as might be expedient--subject always to the supervision
and controlling government of the Congress. Finally, at the proper time,
and on the attainment by the Territory of sufficient strength and
population for self-government, to receive it into the Union on a
footing of entire equality with the original States--sovereign and
self-governing. All this is no more inconsistent with the true
principles of "popular sovereignty," properly understood, than the
temporary subjection of a minor to parental control is inconsistent with
the doctrines of the Declaration of Independence, or the exceptional
discipline of a man-of-war or a military post with the principles of
republican freedom.

The usual process of transition from a territorial condition to that of
a State was, in the first place, by an act of Congress authorizing the
inhabitants to elect representatives for a convention to form a State
Constitution, which was then submitted to Congress for approval and
ratification. On such ratification the supervisory control of Congress
was withdrawn, and the new State authorized to assume its sovereignty,
and the inhabitants of the Territory became citizens of a State. In the
cases of Tennessee in 1796, and Arkansas and Michigan in 1836, the
failure of the inhabitants to obtain an "enabling act" of Congress,
before organizing themselves, very nearly caused the rejection of their
applications for admission as States, though they were eventually
granted on the ground that the subsequent approval and consent of
Congress could heal the prior irregularity. The entire control of
Congress over the whole subject of territorial government had never been
questioned in earlier times. Necessarily conjoined with the _power_ of
this protectorate, was of course the _duty_ of exercising it for the
safety of the persons and property of all citizens of the United States,
permanently or temporarily resident in any part of the domain belonging
to the States in common.

Logically carried out, the new theory of "popular sovereignty" would
apply to the first adventurous pioneers settling in the wilderness
before the organization of any Territorial government by Congress, as
well as afterward. If "sovereignty" is inherent in a thousand or five
thousand persons, there can be no valid ground for denying its existence
in a dozen, as soon as they pass beyond the limits of the State
governments. The advocates of this novel doctrine, however, if rightly
understood, generally disavowed any claim to its application prior to
the organization of a territorial government.

The Territorial Legislatures, to which Congress delegated a portion of
its power and duty to "make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the Territory," were the mere agents of Congress, exercising an
authority subject to Congressional supervision and control--an authority
conferred only for the sake of convenience, and liable at any time to be
revoked and annulled. Yet it is proposed to recognize in these
provisional, subordinate, and temporary legislative bodies, a power not
possessed by Congress itself. This is to claim that the creature is
endowed with an authority not possessed by the creator, or that the
stream has risen to an elevation above that of its source.

Furthermore, in contending for a power in the Territorial Legislatures
permanently to determine the fundamental, social, and political
institutions of the Territory, and thereby virtually to prescribe those
of the future State, the advocates of "popular sovereignty" were
investing those dependent and subsidiary bodies with powers far above
any exercised by the Legislatures of the fully organized and sovereign
States. The authority of the State Legislatures is limited, both by the
Federal Constitution and by the respective State Constitutions from
which it is derived. This latter limitation did not and could not exist
in the Territories.

Strange as it may seem, a theory founded on fallacies so flimsy and
leading to conclusions so paradoxical was advanced by eminent and
experienced politicians, and accepted by many persons, both in the North
and in the South--not so much, perhaps, from intelligent conviction as
under the delusive hope that it would afford a satisfactory settlement
of the "irrepressible conflict" which had been declared. The terms
"popular sovereignty" and "non-intervention" were plausible, specious,
and captivating to the public ear. Too many lost sight of the elementary
truth that political sovereignty does not reside in unorganized or
partially organized masses of individuals, but in the people of
regularly and permanently constituted States. As to the
"non-intervention" proposed, it meant merely the abnegation by Congress
of its duty to protect the inhabitants of the Territories subject to its
control.

The raid into Virginia under John Brown--already notorious as a
fanatical partisan leader in the Kansas troubles--occurred in October,
1859, a few weeks before the meeting of the Thirty-sixth Congress.
Insignificant in itself and in its immediate results, it afforded a
startling revelation of the extent to which sectional hatred and
political fanaticism had blinded the conscience of a class of persons in
certain States of the Union; forming a party steadily growing stronger
in numbers, as well as in activity. Sympathy with its purposes or
methods was earnestly disclaimed by the representatives of all parties
in Congress; but it was charged, on the other hand, that it was only the
natural outgrowth of doctrines and sentiments which for some years had
been freely avowed on the floors of both Houses. A committee of the
Senate made a long and laborious investigation of the facts, with no
very important or satisfactory results. In their final report, June 15,
1860, accompanying the evidence obtained and submitted, this Committee
said:

    "It [the incursion] was simply the act of lawless ruffians,
    under the sanction of no public or political authority,
    distinguishable only from ordinary felonies by the ulterior ends
    in contemplation by them, and by the fact that the money to
    maintain the expedition, and the large armament they brought
    with them, had been contributed and furnished by the citizens of
    other States of the Union under circumstances that must continue
    to jeopard the safety and peace of the Southern States, and
    against which Congress has no power to legislate.

    "If the several States [adds the Committee], whether from
    motives of policy or a desire to preserve the peace of the
    Union, if not from fraternal feeling, do not hold it incumbent
    on them, after the experience of the country, to guard in future
    by appropriate legislation against occurrences similar to the
    one here inquired into, the Committee can find no guarantee
    elsewhere for the security of peace between the States of the
    Union."

On February 2, 1860, the author submitted, in the Senate of the United
States, a series of resolutions, afterward slightly modified to read as
follows

    "1. _Resolved_, That, in the adoption of the Federal
    Constitution, the States, adopting the same, acted severally as
    free and independent sovereignties, delegating a portion of
    their powers to be exercised by the Federal Government for the
    increased security of each against dangers, _domestic_ as well
    as foreign; and that any intermeddling by any one or more
    States, or by a combination of their citizens, with the domestic
    institutions of the others, on any pretext whatever, political,
    moral, or religious, with the view to their disturbance or
    subversion, is in violation of the Constitution, insulting to
    the States so interfered with, endangers their domestic peace
    and tranquillity--objects for which the Constitution was
    formed--and, by necessary consequence, tends to weaken and
    destroy the Union itself.

    "2. _Resolved_, That negro slavery, as it exists in fifteen
    States of this Union, composes an important portion of their
    domestic institutions, inherited from our ancestors, and
    existing at the adoption of the Constitution, by which it is
    recognized as constituting an important element in the
    apportionment of powers among the States, and that no change of
    opinion or feeling on the part of the non-slaveholding States of
    the Union in relation to this institution can justify them or
    their citizens in open or covert attacks thereon, with a view to
    its overthrow; and that all such attacks are in manifest
    violation of the mutual and solemn pledge to protect and defend
    each other, given by the States respectively, on entering into
    the constitutional compact which formed the Union, and are a
    manifest breach of faith and a violation of the most solemn
    obligations.

    "3. _Resolved_, That the Union of these States rests on the
    equality of rights and privileges among its members, and that it
    is especially the duty of the Senate, which represents the
    States in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to
    discriminate either in relation to persons or property in the
    Territories, which are the common possessions of the United
    States, so as to give advantages to the citizens of one State
    which are not equally assured to those of every other State.

    "4. _Resolved_, That neither Congress nor a Territorial
    Legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of an
    indirect and unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or
    impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United
    States to take his slave property into the common Territories,
    and there hold and enjoy the same while the territorial
    condition remains.

    "5. _Resolved_, That if experience should at any time prove that
    the judiciary and executive authority do not possess means to
    insure adequate protection to constitutional rights in a
    Territory, and if the Territorial government shall fail or
    refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it
    will be the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency.[14]

    "6. _Resolved_, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the
    United States, when they rightfully form a Constitution to be
    admitted as a State into the Union, may then, for the first
    time, like the people of a State when forming a new
    Constitution, decide for themselves whether slavery, as a
    domestic institution, shall be maintained or prohibited within
    their jurisdiction; and they shall be received into the Union
    with or without slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at
    the time of their admission.

    "7. _Resolved_, That the provision of the Constitution for the
    rendition of fugitives from service or labor, 'without the
    adoption of which the Union could not have been formed,' and
    that the laws of 1793 and 1850, which were enacted to secure its
    execution, and the main features of which, being similar, bear
    the impress of nearly seventy years of sanction by the highest
    judicial authority, should be honestly and faithfully observed
    and maintained by all who enjoy the benefits of our compact of
    union; and that all acts of individuals or of State Legislatures
    to defeat the purpose or nullify the requirements of that
    provision, and the laws made in pursuance of it, are hostile in
    character, subversive of the Constitution, and revolutionary in
    their effect."[15]

After a protracted and earnest debate, these resolutions were adopted
_seriatim_, on the 24th and 25th of May, by a decided majority of the
Senate (varying from thirty-three to thirty-six yeas against from two to
twenty-one nays), the Democrats, both Northern and Southern, sustaining
them unitedly, with the exception of one adverse vote (that of Mr. Pugh,
of Ohio) on the fourth and sixth resolutions. The Republicans all voted
against them or refrained from voting at all, except that Mr. Teneyck,
of New Jersey, voted for the fifth and seventh of the series. Mr.
Douglas, the leader if not the author of "popular sovereignty," was
absent on account of illness, and there were a few other absentees.

The conclusion of a speech, in reply to Mr. Douglas, a few days before
the vote was taken on these resolutions, is introduced here as the best
evidence of the position of the author at that period of excitement and
agitation:

    Conclusion of Reply to Mr. Douglas, _May 17, 1860_.

    "Mr. President: I briefly and reluctantly referred, because the
    subject had been introduced, to the attitude of Mississippi on a
    former occasion. I will now as briefly say that in 1851, and in
    1860, Mississippi was, and is, ready to make every concession
    which it becomes her to make to the welfare and the safety of
    the Union. If, on a former occasion, she hoped too much from
    fraternity, the responsibility for her disappointment rests upon
    those who failed to fulfill her expectations. She still clings
    to the Government as our fathers formed it. She is ready to-day
    and to-morrow, as in her past and though brief yet brilliant
    history, to maintain that Government in all its power, and to
    vindicate its honor with all the means she possesses. I say
    brilliant history; for it was in the very morning of her
    existence that her sons, on the plains of New Orleans, were
    announced, in general orders, to have been the admiration of one
    army and the wonder of the other. That we had a division in
    relation to the measures enacted in 1850, is true; that the
    Southern rights men became the minority in the election which
    resulted, is true; but no figure of speech could warrant the
    Senator in speaking of them as subdued--as coming to him or
    anybody else for quarter. I deemed it offensive when it was
    uttered, and the scorn with which I repelled it at the instant,
    time has only softened to contempt. Our flag was never borne
    from the field. We had carried it in the face of defeat, with a
    knowledge that defeat awaited it; but scarcely had the smoke of
    the battle passed away which proclaimed another victor, before
    the general voice admitted that the field again was ours. I have
    not seen a sagacious, reflecting man, who was cognizant of the
    events as they transpired at the time, who does not say that,
    within two weeks after the election, our party was in a
    majority; and the next election which occurred showed that we
    possessed the State beyond controversy. How we have wielded that
    power it is not for me to say. I trust others may see
    forbearance in our conduct--that, with a determination to insist
    upon our constitutional rights, then and now, there is an
    unwavering desire to maintain the Government, and to uphold the
    Democratic party.

    "We believe now, as we have asserted on former occasions, that
    the best hope for the perpetuity of our institutions depends
    upon the cooeperation, the harmony, the zealous action, of the
    Democratic party. We cling to that party from conviction that
    its principles and its aims are those of truth and the country,
    as we cling to the Union for the fulfillment of the purposes for
    which it was formed. Whenever we shall be taught that the
    Democratic party is recreant to its principles; whenever we
    shall learn that it can not be relied upon to maintain the great
    measures which constitute its vitality--I for one shall be ready
    to leave it. And so, when we declare our tenacious adherence to
    the Union, it is the Union of the Constitution. If the compact
    between the States is to be trampled into the dust; if anarchy
    is to be substituted for the usurpation and consolidation which
    threatened the Government at an earlier period; if the Union is
    to become powerless for the purposes for which it was
    established, and we are vainly to appeal to it for
    protection--then, sir, conscious of the rectitude of our course,
    the justice of our cause, self-reliant, yet humbly, confidingly
    trusting in the arm that guided and protected our fathers, we
    look beyond the confines of the Union for the maintenance of our
    rights. An habitual reverence and cherished affection for the
    Government will bind us to it longer than our interests would
    suggest or require; but he is a poor student of the world's
    history who does not understand that communities at last must
    yield to the dictates of their interests. That the affection,
    the mutual desire for the mutual good, which existed among our
    fathers, may be weakened in succeeding generations by the denial
    of right, and hostile demonstration, until the equality
    guaranteed but not secured within the Union may be sought for
    without it, must be evident to even a careless observer of our
    race. It is time to be up and doing. There is yet time to remove
    the causes of dissension and alienation which are now
    distracting, and have for years past divided, the country.

    "If the Senator correctly described me as having at a former
    period, against my own preferences and opinions, acquiesced in
    the decision of my party; if, when I had youth, when physical
    vigor gave promise of many days, and the future was painted in
    the colors of hope, I could thus surrender my own convictions,
    my own prejudices, and cooeperate with my political friends
    according to their views of the best method of promoting the
    public good--now, when the years of my future can not be many,
    and experience has sobered the hopeful tints of youth's gilding;
    when, approaching the evening of life, the shadows are reversed,
    and the mind turns retrospectively, it is not to be supposed
    that I would abandon lightly, or idly put on trial, the party to
    which I have steadily adhered. It is rather to be assumed that
    conservatism, which belongs to the timidity or caution of
    increasing years, would lead me to cling to, to be supported by,
    rather than to cast off, the organization with which I have been
    so long connected. If I am driven to consider the necessity of
    separating myself from those old and dear relations, of
    discarding the accustomed support, under circumstances such as I
    have described, might not my friends who differ from me pause
    and inquire whether there is not something involved in it which
    calls for their careful revision?

    "I desire no divided flag for the Democratic party.

    "Our principles are national; they belong to every State of the
    Union; and, though elections may be lost by their assertion,
    they constitute the only foundation on which we can maintain
    power, on which we can again rise to the dignity the Democracy
    once possessed. Does not the Senator from Illinois see in the
    sectional character of the vote be received,[16] that his
    opinions are not acceptable to every portion of the country? Is
    not the fact that the resolutions adopted by seventeen States,
    on which the greatest reliance must be placed for Democratic
    support, are in opposition to the dogma to which he still
    clings, a warning that, if he persists and succeeds in forcing
    his theory upon the Democratic party, its days are numbered? We
    ask only for the Constitution. We ask of the Democracy only from
    time to time to declare, as current exigencies may indicate,
    what the Constitution was intended to secure and provide. Our
    flag bears no new device. Upon its folds our principles are
    written in living light; all proclaiming the constitutional
    Union, justice, equality, and fraternity of our ocean-bound
    domain, for a limitless future."


[Footnote 14: The words, "within the limits of its constitutional
powers," were subsequently added to this resolution, on the suggestion
of Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, with the approval of the mover.]

[Footnote 15: The speech of the author, delivered on the 7th of May
ensuing, in exposition of these resolutions, will be found in Appendix
F.]

[Footnote 16: In the Democratic Convention, which had been recently held
in Charleston. (See the ensuing chapter.)]




CHAPTER VII

    A Retrospect.--Growth of Sectional Rivalry.--The Generosity of
    Virginia.--Unequal Accessions of Territory.--The Tariff and its
    Effects.--The Republican Convention of 1860, its Resolutions and
    its Nominations.--The Democratic Convention at Charleston, its
    Divisions and Disruption.--The Nominations at Baltimore.--The
    "Constitutional-Union" Party and its Nominees.--An Effort in
    Behalf of Agreement declined by Mr. Douglas.--The Election of
    Lincoln and Hamlin.--Proceedings in the South.--Evidences of
    Calmness and Deliberation.--Mr. Buchanan's Conservatism and the
    weakness of his Position.--Republican Taunts.--The "New York
    Tribune," etc.


When, at the close of the war of the Revolution, each of the thirteen
colonies that had been engaged in that contest was severally
acknowledged by the mother-country, Great Britain, to be a free and
independent State, the confederation of those States embraced an area so
extensive, with climate and products so various, that rivalries and
conflicts of interest soon began to be manifested. It required all the
power of wisdom and patriotism, animated by the affection engendered by
common sufferings and dangers, to keep these rivalries under restraint,
and to effect those compromises which it was fondly hoped would insure
the harmony and mutual good offices of each for the benefit of all. It
was in this spirit of patriotism and confidence in the continuance of
such abiding good will as would for all time preclude hostile
aggression, that Virginia ceded, for the use of the confederated States,
all that vast extent of territory lying north of the Ohio River, out of
which have since been formed five States and part of a sixth. The
addition of these States has accrued entirely to the preponderance of
the Northern section over that from which the donation proceeded, and to
the disturbance of that equilibrium which existed at the close of the
war of the Revolution.

It may not be out of place here to refer to the fact that the grievances
which led to that war were directly inflicted upon the Northern
colonies. Those of the South had no material cause of complaint; but,
actuated by sympathy for their Northern brethren, and a devotion to the
principles of civil liberty and community independence, which they had
inherited from their Anglo-Saxon ancestry, and which were set forth in
the Declaration of Independence, they made common cause with their
neighbors, and may, at least, claim to have done their full share in the
war that ensued.

By the exclusion of the South, in 1820, from all that part of the
Louisiana purchase lying north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes, and not included in the State of Missouri, by the
extension of that line of exclusion to embrace the territory acquired
from Texas; and by the appropriation of _all_ the territory obtained
from Mexico under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, both north and south
of that line, it may be stated with approximate accuracy that the North
had monopolized to herself more than three fourths of all that had been
added to the domain of the United States since the Declaration of
Independence. This inequality, which began, as has been shown, in the
more generous than wise confidence of the South, was employed to obtain
for the North the lion's share of what was afterward added at the cost
of the public treasure and the blood of patriots. I do not care to
estimate the relative proportion contributed by each of the two
sections.

Nor was this the only cause that operated to disappoint the reasonable
hopes and to blight the fair prospects under which the original compact
was formed. The effects of discriminating duties upon imports have been
referred to in a former chapter--favoring the manufacturing region,
which was the North; burdening the exporting region, which was the
South; and so imposing upon the latter a double tax: one, by the
increased price of articles of consumption, which, so far as they were
of home production, went into the pockets of the manufacturer; the
other, by the diminished value of articles of export, which was so much
withheld from the pockets of the agriculturist. In like manner the power
of the majority section was employed to appropriate to itself an unequal
share of the public disbursements. These combined causes--the possession
of more territory, more money, and a wider field for the employment of
special labor--all served to attract immigration; and, with increasing
population, the greed grew by what it fed on.

This became distinctly manifest when the so-called "Republican"
Convention assembled in Chicago, on May 16, 1860, to nominate a
candidate for the Presidency. It was a purely sectional body. There were
a few delegates present, representing an insignificant minority in the
"border States," Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri;
but not one from any State south of the celebrated political line of
thirty-six degrees thirty minutes. It had been the invariable usage with
nominating conventions of all parties to select candidates for the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency, one from the North and the other from
the South; but this assemblage nominated Mr. Lincoln, of Illinois, for
the first office, and for the second, Mr. Hamlin, of Maine--both
Northerners. Mr. Lincoln, its nominee for the Presidency, had publicly
announced that the Union "could not permanently endure, half slave and
half free." The resolutions adopted contained some carefully worded
declarations, well adapted to deceive the credulous who were opposed to
hostile aggressions upon the rights of the States. In order to
accomplish this purpose, they were compelled to create a fictitious
issue, in denouncing what they described as "the new dogma that the
Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the
Territories of the United States"--a "dogma" which had never been held
or declared by anybody, and which had no existence outside of their own
assertion. There was enough in connection with the nomination to assure
the most fanatical foes of the Constitution that their ideas would be
the rule and guide of the party.

Meantime, the Democratic party had held a convention, composed as usual
of delegates from all the States. They met in Charleston, South
Carolina, on April 23d, but an unfortunate disagreement with regard to
the declaration of principles to be set forth rendered a nomination
impracticable. Both divisions of the Convention adjourned, and met again
in Baltimore in June. Then, having finally failed to come to an
agreement, they separated and made their respective nominations apart.
Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, was nominated by the friends of the doctrine
of "popular sovereignty," with Mr. Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, for the
Vice-Presidency. Both these gentlemen at that time were Senators from
their respective States. Mr. Fitzpatrick promptly declined the
nomination, and his place was filled with the name of Mr. Herschel V.
Johnson, a distinguished citizen of Georgia.

The Convention representing the conservative, or State-Rights, wing of
the Democratic-party (the President of which was the Hon. Caleb Cushing,
of Massachusetts), on the first ballot, unanimously made choice of John
C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, then Vice-President of the United States,
for the first office, and with like unanimity selected General Joseph
Lane, then a Senator from Oregon, for the second. The resolutions of
each of these two conventions denounced the action and policy of the
Abolition party, as subversive of the Constitution, and revolutionary in
their tendency.

Another convention was held in Baltimore about the same period[17] by
those who still adhered to the old Whig party, reenforced by the remains
of the "American" organization, and perhaps some others. This Convention
also consisted of delegates from all the States, and, repudiating all
geographical and sectional issues, and declaring it to be "both the part
of patriotism and of duty to recognize no political principle other than
the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the
enforcement of the laws," pledged itself and its supporters "to
maintain, protect, and defend, separately and unitedly, those great
principles of public liberty and national safety against all enemies at
home and abroad." Its nominees were Messrs. John Bell, of Tennessee, and
Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, both of whom had long been
distinguished members of the Whig party.

The people of the United States now had four rival tickets presented to
them by as many contending parties, whose respective position and
principles on the great and absorbing question at issue may be briefly
recapitulated as follows:

1. The "Constitutional-Union" Party, as it was now termed, led by
Messrs. Bell and Everett, which ignored the territorial controversy
altogether, and contented itself, as above stated, with a simple
declaration of adherence to "the Constitution, the Union, and the
enforcement of the laws."

2. The party of "popular sovereignty," headed by Douglas and Johnson,
who affirmed the right of the people of the Territories, in their
territorial condition, to determine their own organic institutions,
independently of the control of Congress; denying the power or duty of
Congress to protect the persons or property of individuals or minorities
in such Territories against the action of majorities.

3. The State-Rights party, supporting Breckinridge and Lane, who held
that the Territories were open to citizens of all the States, with their
property, without any inequality or discrimination, and that it was the
duty of the General Government to protect both persons and property from
aggression in the Territories subject to its control. At the same time
they admitted and asserted the right of the people of a Territory, on
emerging from their territorial condition to that of a State, to
determine what should then be their domestic institutions, as well as
all other questions of personal or proprietary right, without
interference by Congress, and subject only to the limitations and
restrictions prescribed by the Constitution of the United States.

4. The so-called "Republicans," presenting the names of Lincoln and
Hamlin, who held, in the language of one of their leaders,[18] that
"slavery can exist only by virtue of municipal law"; that there was "no
law for it in the Territories, and no power to enact one"; and that
Congress was "bound to prohibit it in or exclude it from any and every
Federal Territory." In other words, they asserted the right and duty of
Congress to exclude the citizens of half the States of the Union from
the territory belonging in common to all, unless on condition of the
sacrifice or abandonment of their property recognized by the
Constitution--indeed, of the _only_ species of their property distinctly
and specifically recognized as such by that instrument.

On the vital question underlying the whole controversy--that is, whether
the Federal Government should be a Government of the whole for the
benefit of all its equal members, or (if it should continue to exist at
all) a sectional Government for the benefit of a part--the first three
of the parties above described were in substantial accord as against the
fourth. If they could or would have acted unitedly, they, could
certainly have carried the election, and averted the catastrophe which
followed. Nor were efforts wanting to effect such a union.

Mr. Bell, the Whig candidate, was a highly respectable and experienced
statesman, who had filled many important offices, both State and
Federal. He was not ambitious to the extent of coveting the Presidency,
and he was profoundly impressed by the danger which threatened the
country. Mr. Breckinridge had not anticipated, and it may safely be said
did not eagerly desire, the nomination. He was young enough to wait, and
patriotic enough to be willing to do so, if the weal of the country
required it. Thus much I may confidently assert of both those gentlemen;
for each of them authorized me to say that he was willing to withdraw,
if an arrangement could be effected by which the divided forces of the
friends of the Constitution could be concentrated upon some one more
generally acceptable than either of the three who had been presented to
the country. When I made this announcement to Mr. Douglas--with whom my
relations had always been such as to authorize the assurance that he
could not consider it as made in an unfriendly spirit--he replied that
the scheme proposed was impracticable, because his friends, mainly
Northern Democrats, if he were withdrawn, would join in the support of
Mr. Lincoln, rather than of any one that should supplant _him_
(Douglas); that he was in the hands of his friends, and was sure they
would not accept the proposition.

It needed but little knowledge of the _status_ of parties in the several
States to foresee a probable defeat if the conservatives were to
continue divided into three parts, and the aggressives were to be held
in solid column. But angry passions, which are always bad counselors,
had been aroused, and hopes were still cherished, which proved to be
illusory. The result was the election, by a minority, of a President
whose avowed principles were necessarily fatal to the harmony of the
Union.

Of 303 _electoral_ votes, Mr. Lincoln received 180, but of the _popular_
suffrage of 4,676,853 votes, which the electors represented, he obtained
only 1,866,352--something over a third of the votes. This discrepancy
was owing to the system of voting by "general ticket"--that is, casting
the State votes as a unit, whether unanimous or nearly equally divided.
Thus, in New York, the total popular vote was 675,156, of which 362,646
were cast for the so-called Republican (or Lincoln) electors, and
312,510 against them. Now York was entitled to 35 electoral votes.
Divided on the basis of the popular vote, 19 of these would have been
cast for Mr. Lincoln, and 16 against him. But under the "general ticket"
system the entire 35 votes were cast for the Republican candidates, thus
giving them not only the full strength of the majority in their favor,
but that of the great minority against them superadded. So of other
Northern States, in which the small majorities on one side operated with
the weight of entire unanimity, while the virtual unanimity in the
Southern States, on the other side, counted nothing more than a mere
majority would have done.

The manifestations which followed this result, in the Southern States,
did not proceed, as has been unjustly charged, from chagrin at their
defeat in the election, or from any personal hostility to the
President-elect, but from the fact that they recognized in him the
representative of a party professing principles destructive to "their
peace, their prosperity, and their domestic tranquillity." The
long-suppressed fire burst into frequent flame, but it was still
controlled by that love of the Union which the South had illustrated in
every battle-field, from Boston to New Orleans. Still it was hoped,
against hope, that some adjustment might be made to avert the calamities
of a practical application of the theory of an "irrepressible conflict."
Few, if any, then doubted the right of a State to withdraw its grants
delegated to the Federal Government, or, in other words, to secede from
the Union; but in the South this was generally regarded as the remedy of
last resort, to be applied only when ruin or dishonor was the
alternative. No rash or revolutionary action was taken by the Southern
States, but the measures adopted were considerate, and executed
advisedly and deliberately. The Presidential election occurred (as far
as the popular vote, which determined the result, was concerned) in
November, 1860. Most of the State Legislatures convened soon afterward
in regular session. In some cases special sessions were convoked for the
purpose of calling State Conventions--the recognized representatives of
the sovereign will of the people--to be elected expressly for the
purpose of taking such action as should be considered needful and proper
under the existing circumstances.

These conventions, as it was always held and understood, possessed all
the power of the people assembled in mass; and therefore it was conceded
that they, and they only, could take action for the withdrawal of a
State from the Union. The consent of the respective States to the
formation of the Union had been given through such conventions, and it
was only by the same authority that it could properly be revoked. The
time required for this deliberate and formal process precludes the idea
of hasty or passionate action, and none who admit the primary power of
the people to govern themselves can consistently deny its validity and
binding obligation upon every citizen of the several States. Not only
was there ample time for calm consideration among the people of the
South, but for due reflection by the General Government and the people
of the Northern States.

President Buchanan was in the last year of his administration. His
freedom from sectional asperity, his long life in the public service,
and his peace-loving and conciliatory character, were all guarantees
against his precipitating a conflict between the Federal Government and
any of the States; but the feeble power that he possessed in the closing
months of his term to mold the policy of the future was painfully
evident. Like all who had intelligently and impartially studied the
history of the formation of the Constitution, he held that the Federal
Government had no rightful power to coerce a State. Like the sages and
patriots who had preceded him in the high office that he filled, he
believed that "our Union rests upon public opinion, and can never by
cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil war. If it can not
live in the affections of the people, it must one day perish. Congress
may possess many means of preserving it by conciliation, but the sword
was not placed in their hand to preserve it by force."--(Message of
December 3, 1860.)

Ten years before, Mr. Calhoun addressing the Senate with all the
earnestness of his nature and with that sincere desire to avert the
danger of disunion which those who knew him best never doubted, had
asked the emphatic question, "How can the Union be saved?" He answered
his question thus:

    "There is but one way by which it can be [saved] with any
    certainty; and that is by a full and final settlement, on the
    principles of justice, of all the questions at issue between the
    sections. The South asks for justice--simple justice--and less
    she ought not to take. She has no compromise to offer but the
    Constitution, and no concession or surrender to make....

    "Can this be done? Yes, easily! Not by the weaker party; for it
    can of itself do nothing--not even protect itself--but by the
    stronger.... But will the North agree to do this? It is for her
    to answer this question. But, I will say, she can not refuse if
    she has half the love of the Union which she professes to have,
    nor without exposing herself to the charge that her love of
    power and aggrandizement is far greater than her love of the
    Union."

During the ten years that intervened between the date of this speech and
the message of Mr. Buchanan cited above, the progress of sectional
discord and the tendency of the stronger section to unconstitutional
aggression had been fearfully rapid. With very rare exceptions, there
were none in 1850 who claimed the right of the Federal Government to
apply coercion to a State. In 1860 men had grown to be familiar with
threats of driving the South into submission to any act that the
Government, in the hands of a Northern majority, might see fit to
perform. During the canvass of that year, demonstrations had been made
by _quasi_-military organizations in various parts of the North, which
looked unmistakably to purposes widely different from those enunciated
in the preamble to the Constitution, and to the employment of means not
authorized by the powers which the States had delegated to the Federal
Government.

Well-informed men still remembered that, in the Convention which framed
the Constitution, a proposition was made to authorize the employment of
force against a delinquent State, on which Mr. Madison remarked that
"the use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of
war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered
by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which
it might have been bound." The Convention expressly refused to confer
the power proposed, and the clause was lost. While, therefore, in 1860,
many violent men, appealing to passion and the lust of power, were
inciting the multitude, and preparing Northern opinion to support a war
waged against the Southern States in the event of their secession, there
were others who took a different view of the case. Notable among such
was the "New York Tribune," which had been the organ of the
abolitionists, and which now declared that, "if the cotton States wished
to withdraw from the Union, they should be allowed to do so"; that "any
attempt to compel them to remain, by force, would be contrary to the
principles of the Declaration of Independence and to the fundamental
ideas upon which human liberty is based"; and that, "if the Declaration
of Independence justified the secession from the British Empire of three
millions of subjects in 1776, it was not seen why it would not justify
the secession of five millions of Southerners from the Union in 1861."
Again, it was said by the same journal that, "sooner than compromise
with the South and abandon the Chicago platform," they would "let the
Union slide." Taunting expressions were freely used--as, for example,
"If the Southern people wish to leave the Union, we will do our best to
forward their views."

All this, it must be admitted, was quite consistent with the
oft-repeated declaration that the Constitution was a "covenant with
hell," which stood as the caption of a leading abolitionist paper of
Boston. That signs of coming danger so visible, evidences of hostility
so unmistakable, disregard of constitutional obligations so wanton,
taunts and jeers so bitter and insulting, should serve to increase
excitement in the South, was a consequence flowing as much from reason
and patriotism as from sentiment. He must have been ignorant of human
nature who did not expect such a tree to bear fruits of discord and
division.


[Footnote 17: May 19, 1860.]

[Footnote 18: Horace Greeley, "The American Conflict," vol. i, p. 322.]




CHAPTER VIII.

    Conference with the Governor of Mississippi.--The Author
    censured as "too slow."--Summons to Washington.--Interview with
    the President.--His Message.--Movements in Congress.--The
    Triumphant Majority.--The Crittenden Proposition.--Speech of the
    Author on Mr. Green's Resolution.--The Committee of
    Thirteen.--Failure to agree.--The "Republicans" responsible for
    the Failure.--Proceedings in the House of
    Representatives.--Futility of Efforts for an Adjustment.--The
    Old Year closes in Clouds.


In November, 1860, after the result of the Presidential election was
known, the Governor of Mississippi, having issued his proclamation
convoking a special session of the Legislature to consider the propriety
of calling a convention, invited the Senators and Representatives of the
State in Congress, to meet him for consultation as to the character of
the message he should send to the Legislature when assembled.

While holding, in common with my political associates, that the right of
a State to secede was unquestionable, I differed from most of them as to
the probability of our being permitted peaceably to exercise the right.
The knowledge acquired by the administration of the War Department for
four years, and by the chairmanship of the Military Committee of the
Senate at two different periods, still longer in combined duration, had
shown me the entire lack of preparation for war in the South. The
foundries and armories were in the Northern States, and there were
stored all the new and improved weapons of war. In the arsenals of the
Southern States were to be found only arms of the old and rejected
models. The South had no manufactories of powder, and no navy to protect
our harbors, no merchant-ships for foreign commerce. It was evident to
me, therefore, that, if we should be involved in war, the odds against
us would be far greater than what was due merely to our inferiority in
population. Believing that secession would be the precursor of war
between the States, I was consequently slower and more reluctant than
others, who entertained a different opinion, to resort to that remedy.

While engaged in the consultation with the Governor just referred to, a
telegraphic message was handed to me from two members of Mr. Buchanan's
Cabinet, urging me to proceed "immediately" to Washington. This dispatch
was laid before the Governor and the members of Congress from the State
who were in conference with him, and it was decided that I should comply
with the summons. I was afterward informed that my associates considered
me "too slow," and they were probably correct in the belief that I was
behind the general opinion of the people of the State as to the
propriety of prompt secession.[19]

On arrival at Washington, I found, as had been anticipated, that my
presence there was desired on account of the influence which it was
supposed I might exercise with the President (Mr. Buchanan) in relation
to his forthcoming message to Congress. On paying my respects to the
President, he told me that he had finished the rough draft of his
message, but that it was still open to revision and amendment, and that
he would like to read it to me. He did so, and very kindly accepted all
the modifications which I suggested. The message was, however, afterward
somewhat changed, and, with great deference to the wisdom and
statesmanship of its author, I must say that, in my judgment, the last
alterations were unfortunate--so much so that, when it was read in the
Senate, I was reluctantly constrained to criticise it. Compared,
however, with documents of the same class which have since been
addressed to the Congress of the United States, the reader of
Presidential messages must regret that it was not accepted by Mr.
Buchanan's successors as a model, and that his views of the Constitution
had not been adopted as a guide in the subsequent action of the Federal
Government.

The popular movement in the South was tending steadily and rapidly
toward the secession of those known as "planting States"; yet, when
Congress assembled on December 3, 1860 the representatives of the people
of all those States took their seats in the House, and they were all
represented in the Senate, except South Carolina, whose Senators had
tendered their resignation to the Governor immediately on the
announcement of the result of the Presidential election. Hopes were
still cherished that the Northern leaders would appreciate the impending
peril, would cease to treat the warnings, so often given, as idle
threats, would refrain from the bravado, so often and so unwisely
indulged, of ability "to whip the South" in thirty, sixty, or ninety
days, and would address themselves to the more manly purpose of devising
means to allay the indignation, and quiet the apprehensions, whether
well, founded or not, of their Southern brethren. But the debates of
that session manifest, on the contrary, the arrogance of a triumphant
party, and the determination to reap to the uttermost the full harvest
of a party victory.

Mr. Crittenden, of Kentucky, the oldest and one of the most honored
members of the Senate,[20] introduced into that body a joint resolution
proposing certain amendments to the Constitution--among them the
restoration and incorporation into the Constitution of the geographical
line of the Missouri Compromise, with other provisions, which it was
hoped might be accepted as the basis for an adjustment of the
difficulties rapidly hurrying the Union to disruption. But the earnest
appeals of that venerable statesman were unheeded by Senators of the
so-called Republican party. Action upon his proposition was postponed
from time to time, on one pretext or another, until the last day of the
session--when seven States had already withdrawn from the Union and
established a confederation of their own--and it was then defeated by a
majority of one vote.[21]

Meantime, among other propositions made in the Senate were two
introduced early in the session, which it may be proper specially to
mention. One of these was a resolution offered by Mr. Powell, of
Kentucky, which, after some modification by amendment, when finally
acted upon, had taken the following form:

    "_Resolved_, That so much of the President's message as relates
    to the present agitated and distracted condition of the country,
    and the grievances between the slaveholding and the non-slave
    holding States, be referred to a special committee of thirteen
    members, and that said committee be instructed to inquire into
    the present condition of the country, and report by bill or
    otherwise."

The other was a resolution offered by Mr. Green, of Missouri, to the
following effect:

    "_Resolved_, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed
    to inquire into the propriety of providing by law for
    establishing an armed police force at all necessary points along
    the line separating the slaveholding States from the
    non-slaveholding States, for the purpose of maintaining the
    general peace between those States, of preventing the invasion
   of one State by citizens of another, and also for the efficient
    execution of the fugitive-slave laws."

In the discussion of these two resolutions I find, in the proceedings of
the Senate on December 10th, as reported in the "Congressional Globe,"
some remarks of my own, the reproduction of which will serve to exhibit
my position at that period--a position which has since been often
misrepresented:

    "Mr. President, if the political firmament seemed to me dark
    before, there has been little in the discussion this morning to
    cheer or illumine it. When the proposition of the Senator from
    Kentucky was presented--not very hopeful of a good result--I was
    yet willing to wait and see what developments it might produce.
    This morning, for the first time, it has been considered; and
    what of encouragement have we received? One Senator proposes, as
    a cure for the public evil impending over us, to invest the
    Federal Government with such physical power as properly belongs
    to monarchy alone; another announces that his constituents cling
    to the Federal Government, if its legislative favors and its
    Treasury secure the works of improvement and the facilities
    which they desire; while another rises to point out that the
    evils of the land are of a party character. Sir, we have fallen
    upon evil times indeed, if the great convulsion which now shakes
    the body-politic to its center is to be dealt with by such
    nostrums as these. Men must look more deeply, must rise to a
    higher altitude; like patriots they must confront the danger
    face to face, if they hope to relieve the evils which now
    disturb the peace of the land, and threaten the destruction of
    our political existence.

    "First of all, we must inquire what is the cause of the evils
    which beset us? The diagnosis of the disease must be stated
    before we are prepared to prescribe. Is it the fault of our
    legislation here? If so, then it devolves upon us to correct it,
    and we have the power. Is it the defect of the Federal
    organization, of the fundamental law of our Union? I hold that
    it is not. Our fathers, learning wisdom from the experiments of
    Rome and of Greece--the one a consolidated republic, and the
    other strictly a confederacy--and taught by the lessons of our
    own experiment under the Confederation, came together to form a
    Constitution for 'a more perfect union,' and, in my judgment,
    made the best government which has ever been instituted by man.
    It only requires that it should be carried out in the spirit in
    which it was made, that the circumstances under which it was
    made should continue, and no evil can arise under this
    Government for which it has not an appropriate remedy. Then it
    is outside of the Government--elsewhere than to its Constitution
    or to its administration--that we are to look. Men must not
    creep in the dust of partisan strife and seek to make points
    against opponents as the means of evading or meeting the issues
    before us. The fault is not in the form of the Government, nor
    does the evil spring from the manner in which it has been
    administered. Where, then, is it? It is that our fathers formed
    a Government for a Union of friendly States; and though under it
    the people have been prosperous beyond comparison with any other
    whose career is recorded in the history of man, still that Union
    of friendly States has changed its character, and sectional
    hostility has been substituted for the fraternity in which the
    Government was founded.

    "I do not intend here to enter into a statement of grievances; I
    do not intend here to renew that war of crimination which for
    years past has disturbed the country, and in which I have taken
    a part perhaps more zealous than useful; but I call upon all men
    who have in their hearts a love of the Union, and whose service
    is not merely that of the lip, to look the question calmly but
    fully in the face, that they may see the true cause of our
    danger, which, from my examination, I believe to be that a
    sectional hostility has been substituted for a general
    fraternity, and thus the Government rendered powerless for the
    ends for which it was instituted. The hearts of a portion of the
    people have been perverted by that hostility, so that the powers
    delegated by the compact of union are regarded not as means to
    secure the welfare of all, but as instruments for the
    destruction of a part--the minority section. How, then, have we
    to provide a remedy? By strengthening this Government? By
    instituting physical force to overawe the States, to coerce the
    people living under them as members of sovereign communities to
    pass under the yoke of the Federal Government? No, sir; I would
    have this Union severed into thirty-three fragments sooner than
    have that great evil befall constitutional liberty and
    representative government. Our Government is an agency of
    delegated and strictly limited powers. Its founders did not look
    to its preservation by force; but the chain they wove to bind
    these States together was one of love and mutual good offices.
    They had broken the fetters of despotic power; they had
    separated themselves from the mother-country upon the question
    of community independence; and their sons will be degenerate
    indeed if, clinging to the mere name and forms of free
    government, they forge and rivet upon their posterity the
    fetters which their ancestors broke....

    "The remedy for these evils is to be found in the patriotism and
    the affection of the people, if it exists; and, if it does not
    exist, it is far better, instead of attempting to preserve a
    forced and therefore fruitless Union, that we should peacefully
    part and each pursue his separate course. It is not to this side
    of the Chamber that we should look for propositions; it is not
    here that we can ask for remedies. Complaints, with much
    amplitude of specification, have gone forth from the members on
    this side of the Chamber heretofore. It is not to be expected
    that they will be renewed, for the people have taken the subject
    into their own hands. States, in their sovereign capacity, have
    now resolved to judge of the infractions of the Federal compact,
    and of the mode and measure of redress. All we can usefully or
    properly do is to send to the people, thus preparing to act for
    themselves, evidence of error, if error there be; to transmit to
    them the proofs of kind feeling, if it actuates the Northern
    section, where they now believe there is only hostility. If we
    are mistaken as to your feelings and purposes, give a
    substantial proof, that here may begin that circle which hence
    may spread out and cover the whole land with proofs of
    fraternity, of a reaction in public sentiment, and the assurance
    of a future career in conformity with the principles and
    purposes of the Constitution. All else is idle. I would not give
    the parchment on which the bill would be written that is to
    secure our constitutional rights within the limits of a State,
    where the people are all opposed to the execution of that law.
    It is a truism in free governments that laws rest upon public
    opinion, and fall powerless before its determined opposition.

    "The time has passed, sir, when appeals might profitably be made
    to sentiment. The time has come when men must of necessity
    reason, assemble facts, and deal with current events. I may be
    permitted in this to correct an error into which one of my
    friends fell this morning, when he impressed on us the great
    value of our Union as measured by the amount of time and money
    and blood which were spent to form this Union. It cost very
    little time, very little money, and no blood. It was one of the
    most peaceful transactions that mark the pages of human history.
    Our fathers fought the war of the Revolution to maintain the
    rights asserted in their Declaration of Independence."

    Mr. Powell: "The Senator from Mississippi will allow me to say
    that I spoke of the Government, not of the Union. I said time
    and money and blood had been required to form the Government."

    Mr. Davis: "The Government is the machinery established by the
    Constitution; it is the agency created by the States when they
    formed the Union. Our fathers, I was proceeding to say, having
    fought the war of the Revolution, and achieved their
    independence--each State for itself, each State standing out an
    integral part, each State separately recognized by the parent
    Government of Great Britain--these States as independent
    sovereignties entered into confederate alliance. After having
    tried the Confederation and found it to be a failure, they, of
    their own accord, came peacefully together, and in a brief
    period made a Constitution, which was referred to each State and
    voluntarily ratified by each State that entered the Union;
    little time, little money, and no blood being expended to form
    this Government, the machine for making the Union useful and
    beneficial. Blood, much and precious, was expended to vindicate
    and to establish community independence, and the great American
    idea that all governments rest on the consent of the governed,
    and that the people may at their will alter or abolish their
    government, however or by whomsoever instituted.

    "But our existing Government is not the less sacred to me
    because it was not sealed with blood. I honor it the more
    because it was the free-will offering of men who chose to live
    together. It rooted in fraternity, and fraternity supported its
    trunk and all its branches. Every bud and leaflet depends
    entirely on the nurture it receives from fraternity as the root
    of the tree. When that is destroyed, the trunk decays, and the
    branches wither, and the leaves fall; and the shade it was
    designed to give has passed away for ever. I cling not merely to
    the name and form, but to the spirit and purpose of the Union
    which our fathers made. It was for domestic tranquillity; not to
    organize within one State lawless bands to commit raids upon
    another. It was to provide for the common defense; not to
    disband armies and navies, lest they should serve the protection
    of one section of the country better than another. It was to
    bring the forces of all the States together to achieve a common
    object, upholding each the other in amity, and united to repel
    exterior force. All the custom-house obstructions existing
    between the States were destroyed; the power to regulate
    commerce transferred to the General Government. Every barrier to
    the freest intercourse was swept away. Under the Confederation
    it had been secured as a right to each citizen to have free
    transit over all the other States; and under the Union it was
    designed to make this more perfect. Is it enjoyed? Is it not
    denied? Do we not have mere speculative question of what is
    property raised in defiance of the clear intent of the
    Constitution, offending as well against its letter as against
    its whole spirit? This must be reformed, or the Government our
    fathers instituted is destroyed. I say, then, shall we cling to
    the mere forms or idolize the name of Union, when its blessings
    are lost, after its spirit has fled? Who would keep a flower,
    which had lost its beauty and its fragrance, and in their stead
    had formed a seed-vessel containing the deadliest poison? Or, to
    drop the figure, who would consent to remain in alliance with
    States which used the power thus acquired to invade his
    tranquillity, to impair his defense, to destroy his peace and
    security? Any community would be stronger standing in an
    isolated position, and using its revenues to maintain its own
    physical force, than if allied with those who would thus war
    upon its prosperity and domestic peace; and reason, pride,
    self-interest, and the apprehension of secret, constant danger
    would impel to separation.

    "I do not comprehend the policy of a Southern Senator who would
    seek to change the whole form of our Government, and substitute
    Federal force for State obligation and authority. Do we want a
    new Government that is to overthrow the old? Do we wish to erect
    a central Colossus, wielding at discretion the military arm, and
    exercising military force over the people and the States? This
    is not the Union to which we were invited; and so carefully was
    this guarded that, when our fathers provided for using force to
    put down insurrection, they required that the fact of the
    insurrection should be communicated by the authorities of the
    State before the President could interpose. When it was proposed
    to give to Congress power to execute the laws against a
    delinquent State, it was refused on the ground that that would
    be making war on the States; and, though I know the good purpose
    of my honorable friend from Missouri is only to give protection
    to constitutional rights, I fear his proposition is to rear a
    monster, which will break the feeble chain provided, and destroy
    rights it was intended to guard. That military Government which
    he is about to institute, by passing into hostile hands, becomes
    a weapon for his destruction, not for his protection. All
    dangers which we may be called upon to confront as independent
    communities are light, in my estimation, compared with that
    which would hang over us if this Federal Government had such
    physical force; if its character was changed from a
    representative agent of States to a central Government, with a
    military power to be used at discretion against the States.
    To-day it may be the idea that it will be used against some
    State which nullifies the Constitution and the laws; some State
    which passes laws to obstruct or repeal the laws of the United
    States; some State which, in derogation of our rights of transit
    under the Constitution, passes laws to punish a citizen found
    there with property recognized by the Constitution of the United
    States, but prohibited by the laws of that State.

    "But how long might it be before that same military force would
    be turned against the minority section which had sought its
    protection; and that minority thus become mere subjugated
    provinces under the great military government that it had thus
    contributed to establish? The minority, incapable of aggression,
    is, of necessity, always on the defensive, and often the victim
    of the desertion of its followers and the faithlessness of its
    allies. It therefore must maintain, not destroy, barriers.

    "I do not know that I fully appreciate the purpose of my friend
    from Missouri; whether, when he spoke of establishing military
    posts along the borders of the States, and arming the Federal
    Government with adequate physical power to enforce
    constitutional rights (I suppose he meant obligations), he meant
    to confer upon this Federal Government a power which it does not
    now possess to coerce a State. If he did, then, in the language
    of Mr. Madison, he is providing, not for a union of States, but
    for the destruction of States; he is providing, under the name
    of Union, to carry on a war against States; and I care not
    whether it be against Massachusetts or Missouri, it is equally
    objectionable to me; and I will resist it alike in the one case
    and in the other, as subversive of the great principle on which
    our Government rests; as a heresy to be confronted at its first
    presentation, and put down there, lest it grow into proportions
    which will render us powerless before it.

    "The theory of our Constitution, Mr. President, is one of peace,
    of equality of sovereign States. It was made by States and made
    for States; and for greater assurance they passed an amendment,
    doing that which was necessarily implied by the nature of the
    instrument, as it was a mere instrument of grants. But, in the
    abundance of caution, they declared that everything which had
    not been delegated was reserved to the States, or to the
    people--that is, to the State governments as instituted by the
    people of each State, or to the people in their sovereign
    capacity.

    "I need not, then, go on to argue from the history and nature of
    our Government that no power of coercion exists in it. It is
    enough for me to demand the clause of the Constitution which
    confers the power. If it is not there, the Government does not
    possess it. That is the plain construction of the
    Constitution--made plainer, if possible, by its amendment.

    "This Union is dear to me as a Union of fraternal States. It
    would lose its value if I had to regard it as a Union held
    together by physical force. I would be happy to know that every
    State now felt that fraternity which made this Union possible;
    and, if that evidence could go out, if evidence satisfactory to
    the people of the South could be given that that feeling existed
    in the hearts of the Northern people, you might burn your
    statute-books and we would cling to the Union still. But it is
    because of their conviction that hostility, and not fraternity,
    now exists in the hearts of the people, that they are looking to
    their reserved rights and to their independent powers for their
    own protection. If there be any good, then, which we can do, it
    is by sending evidence to them of that which I fear does not
    exist--the purpose of your constituents to fulfill in the spirit
    of justice and fraternity all their constitutional obligations.
    If you can submit to them that evidence, I feel confidence that,
    with the assurance that aggression is henceforth to cease, will
    terminate all the measures for defense. Upon you of the majority
    section it depends to restore peace and perpetuate the Union of
    equal States; upon us of the minority section rests the duty to
    maintain our equality and community rights; and the means in one
    case or the other must be such as each can control."

The resolution of Mr. Powell was eventually adopted on the 18th of
December, and on the 20th the Committee was appointed, consisting of
Messrs. Powell and Crittenden, of Kentucky; Hunter, of Virginia; Toombs,
of Georgia; Davis, of Mississippi; Douglas, of Illinois; Bigler, of
Pennsylvania; Rice, of Minnesota; Collamer, of Vermont; Seward, of New
York; Wade, of Ohio; Doolittle, of Wisconsin; and Grimes, of Iowa. The
first five of the list, as here enumerated, were Southern men; the next
three were Northern Democrats, or Conservatives; the last five, Northern
"Republicans," so called.

The supposition was that any measure agreed upon by the representatives
of the three principal divisions of public opinion would be approved by
the Senate and afterward ratified by the House of Representatives. The
Committee therefore determined that a majority of each of its three
divisions should be required in order to the adoption of any proposition
presented. The Southern members declared their readiness to accept any
terms that would secure the honor of the Southern States and guarantee
their future safety. The Northern Democrats and Mr. Crittenden generally
cooeperated with the State-Rights Democrats of the South; but the
so-called "Republican" Senators of the North rejected every proposition
which it was hoped might satisfy the Southern people, and check the
progress of the secession movement. After fruitless efforts, continued
for some ten days, the Committee determined to report the journal of
their proceedings, and announce their inability to attain any
satisfactory conclusion. This report was made on the 31st of
December--the last day of that memorable and fateful year, 1860.

Subsequently, on the floor of the Senate, Mr. Douglas, who had been a
member of the Committee, called upon the opposite side to state what
they were willing to do. He referred to the fact that they had rejected
every proposition that promised pacification; stated that Toombs, of
Georgia, and Davis, of Mississippi, as members of the Committee, had
been willing to renew the Missouri Compromise, as a measure of
conciliation, but had met no responsive willingness on the part of their
associates of the opposition; and he pressed the point that, as they had
rejected every overture made by the friends of peace, it was now
incumbent upon _them_ to make a positive and affirmative declaration of
their purposes.

Mr. Seward, of New York, as we have seen, was a member of that
Committee--the man who, in 1858, had announced the "irrepressible
conflict," and who, in the same year, speaking of and for abolitionism,
had said: "It has driven you back in California and in Kansas; it will
invade your soil." He was to be the Secretary of State in the incoming
Administration, and was very generally regarded as the "power behind the
throne," greater than the throne itself. He was present in the Senate,
but made no response to Mr. Douglas's demand for a declaration of
policy.

Meantime the efforts for an adjustment made in the House of
Representatives had been equally fruitless. Conspicuous among these
efforts had been the appointment of a committee of thirty-three
members--one from each State of the Union--charged with a duty similar
to that imposed upon the Committee of Thirteen in the Senate, but they
had been alike unsuccessful in coming to any agreement. It is true that,
a few days afterward, they submitted a majority and two minority
reports, and that the report of the majority was ultimately adopted by
the House; but, even if this action had been unanimous, and had been
taken in due time, it would have been practically futile on account of
its absolute failure to provide or suggest any solution of the
territorial question, which was the vital point in controversy.

No wonder, then, that, under the shadow of the failure of every effort
in Congress to find any common ground on which the sections could be
restored to amity, the close of the year should have been darkened by a
cloud in the firmament, which had lost even the silver lining so long
seen, or thought to be seen, by the hopeful.


[Footnote 19: The following extract from a letter of the Hon. O. R.
Singleton, then a Representative of Mississippi in the United States
Congress, in regard to the subject treated, is herewith annexed:

    "Canton, Mississippi, _July 14, 1877_.

    "In 1860, about the time the ordinance of secession was passed
    by the South Carolina Convention, and while Mississippi,
    Alabama, and other Southern States were making active
    preparations to follow her example, a conference of the
    Mississippi delegation in Congress, Senators and
    Representatives, was asked for by Governor J. J. Pettus, for
    consultation as to the course Mississippi ought to take in the
    premises.

    "The meeting took place in the fall of 1860, at Jackson, the
    capital; the whole delegation being present, with perhaps the
    exception of one Representative.

    "The main question for consideration was: 'Shall Mississippi, as
    soon as her Convention can meet, pass an ordinance of secession,
    thus placing herself by the side of South Carolina, regardless
    of the action of other States; or shall she endeavor to hold
    South Carolina in check, and delay action herself, until other
    States can get ready, through their conventions, to unite with
    them, and then, on a given day and at a given hour, by concert
    of action, all the States willing to do so, secede in a body?'

    "Upon the one side, it was argued that South Carolina could not
    be induced to delay action a single moment beyond the meeting of
    her Convention, and that our fate should be hers, and to delay
    action would be to have her crushed by the Federal Government;
    whereas, by the earliest action possible, we might be able to
    avert this calamity. On the other side, it was contended that
    delay might bring the Federal Government to consider the
    emergency of the case, and perhaps a compromise could be
    effected; but, if not, then the proposed concert of action would
    at least give dignity to the movement, and present an undivided
    Southern front.

    "The debate lasted many hours, and Mr. Davis, with perhaps one
    other gentleman in that conference, opposed immediate and
    separate State action, declaring himself opposed to secession as
    long as the hope of a peaceable remedy remained. He did not
    believe we ought to precipitate the issue, as he felt certain
    from his knowledge of the people, North and South, that, once
    there was a clash of arms, the contest would be one of the most
    sanguinary the world had ever witnessed.

    "A majority of the meeting decided that no delay should be
    interposed to separate State action, Mr. Davis being on the
    other side; but, after the vote was taken and the question
    decided, Mr. Davis declared he would stand by whatever action
    the Convention representing the sovereignty of the State of
    Mississippi might think proper to take.

    "After the conference was ended, several of its members were
    dissatisfied with the course of Mr. Davis, believing that he was
    entirely opposed to secession, and was seeking to delay action
    upon the part of Mississippi, with the hope that it might be
    entirely averted.

    "In some unimportant respects my memory may be at fault, and
    possibly some of the inferences drawn may be incorrect; but
    every material statement made, I am sure, is true, and if need,
    can be, easily substantiated by other persons.

    "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,"

    (Signed) "O. R. Singleton."
]

[Footnote 20: Mr. Crittenden had been a life-long Whig. His first
entrance into the Senate was in 1817, and he was a member of that body
at various periods during the ensuing forty-four years. He was
Attorney-General in the Whig Cabinets of both General Harrison and Mr.
Fillmore, and supported the Bell and Everett ticket in 1860.]

[Footnote 21: The vote was nineteen yeas to twenty nays; total,
thirty-nine. As the consent of two thirds of each House is necessary to
propose an amendment for action by the States, twenty-six of the votes
cast in the Senate would have been necessary to sustain the proposition.
It actually failed, therefore, by _seven_ votes, instead of _one_.]




CHAPTER IX.

    Preparations for withdrawal from the Union.--Northern
    Precedents.--New England Secessionists.--Cabot, Pickering,
    Quincy, etc.--On the Acquisition of Louisiana.--The Hartford
    Convention.--The Massachusetts Legislature on the Annexation of
    Texas, etc., etc.


The Convention of South Carolina had already (on the 20th of December,
1860) unanimously adopted an ordinance revoking her delegated powers and
withdrawing from the Union. Her representatives, on the following day,
retired from their seats in Congress. The people of the other planting
States had been only waiting in the lingering hope that some action
might be taken by Congress to avert the necessity for action similar to
that of South Carolina. In view of the failure of all overtures for
conciliation during the first month of the session, they were now making
their final preparations for secession. This was generally admitted to
be an unquestionable right appertaining to their sovereignty as States,
and the only _peaceable_ remedy that remained for the evils already felt
and the dangers apprehended.

In the prior history of the country, repeated instances are found of the
assertion of this right, and of a purpose entertained at various times
to put it in execution. Notably is this true of Massachusetts and other
New England States. The acquisition of Louisiana, in 1803, had created
much dissatisfaction in those States, for the reason, expressed by an
eminent citizen of Massachusetts,[22] that "the influence of our [the
Northeastern] part of the Union must be diminished by the acquisition of
more weight at the other extremity." The project of a separation was
freely discussed, with no intimation, in the records of the period, of
any idea among its advocates that it could be regarded as treasonable or
revolutionary.

Colonel Timothy Pickering, who had been an officer of the war of the
Revolution, afterward successively Postmaster-General, Secretary of War,
and Secretary of State, in the Cabinet of General Washington, and, still
later, long a representative of the State of Massachusetts in the Senate
of the United States, was one of the leading secessionists of his day.
Writing from Washington to a friend, on the 24th of December, 1803, he
says:

    "I will not yet despair. I will rather anticipate a _new
    confederacy_, exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence
    and oppression of the aristocratic democrats of the South. There
    will be (and our children, at farthest, will see it) a
    separation. The white and black population will mark the
    boundary."[23]

In another letter, written a few weeks afterward (January 29, 1804),
speaking of what he regarded as wrongs and abuses perpetrated by the
then existing Administration, he thus expresses his views of the remedy
to be applied:

    "The principles of our Revolution point to the remedy--_a
    separation_. That this can be accomplished, and without spilling
    one drop of blood, I have little doubt....

    "I do not believe in the practicability of a long-continued
    Union. A _Northern Confederacy_ would unite congenial characters
    and present a fairer prospect of public happiness; while the
    Southern States, having a similarity of habits, might be left to
    'manage their own affairs in their own way.' If a separation
    were to take place, our mutual wants would render a friendly and
    commercial intercourse inevitable. The Southern States would
    require the naval protection of the _Northern Union_, and the
    products of the former would be important to the navigation and
    commerce of the latter....

    "It [the separation] must begin, in Massachusetts. The
    proposition would be welcomed in Connecticut; and could we doubt
    of New Hampshire? But New York must be associated; and how is
    her concurrence to be obtained? She must be made the center of
    the Confederacy. Vermont and New Jersey would follow of course,
    and Rhode Island of necessity."[24]

Substituting South Carolina for Massachusetts; Virginia for New York;
Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama, for New Hampshire, Vermont, and Rhode
Island; Kentucky for New Jersey, etc., etc., we find the suggestions of
1860-'61 only a reproduction of those thus outlined nearly sixty years
earlier.

Mr. Pickering seems to have had a correct and intelligent perception of
the altogether pacific character of the secession which he proposed, and
of the mutual advantages likely to accrue to both sections from a
peaceable separation. Writing in February, 1804, he explicitly disavows
the idea of hostile feeling or action toward the South, expressing
himself as follows:

    "While thus contemplating the only means of maintaining our
    ancient institutions in morals and religion, and our equal rights,
    we wish no ill to the Southern States and those naturally connected
    with them. The public debts might be equitably apportioned
    between the new confederacies, and a separation somewhere
    about the line above suggested would divide the different characters
    of the existing Union. The manners of the Eastern portion
    of the States would be sufficiently congenial to form a Union, and
    their interests are alike intimately connected with agriculture and
    commerce. A friendly and commercial intercourse would be maintained
    with the States in the Southern Confederacy as at present.
    Thus all the advantages which have been for a few years depending
    on the general Union would be continued to its respective portions,
    without the jealousies and enmities which now afflict both,
    and which peculiarly embitter the condition of that of the North.
    It is not unusual for two friends, when disagreeing about the mode
    of conducting a common concern, to separate and manage, each in
    his own way, his separate interest, and thereby preserve a useful
    friendship, which without such separation would infallibly be
    destroyed."[25]

Such were the views of an undoubted patriot who had participated in the
formation of the Union, and who had long been confidentially associated
with Washington in the administration of its Government, looking at the
subject from a Northern standpoint, within fifteen years after the
organization of that Government under the Constitution. Whether his
reasons for advocating a dissolution of the Union were valid and
sufficient, or not, is another question which it is not necessary to
discuss. His authority is cited only as showing the opinion prevailing
in the North at that day with regard to the _right_ of secession from
the Union, if deemed advisable by the ultimate and irreversible judgment
of the people of a sovereign State.

In 1811, on the bill for the admission of Louisiana as a State of the
Union, the Hon. Josiah Quincy, a member of Congress from Massachusetts,
said

    "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is
    virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the
    States from their moral obligation; and as it will be the right
    of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare
    for a separation--amicably if they can, violently if they must."

Mr. Poindexter, delegate from what was then the Mississippi Territory,
took exception to these expressions of Mr. Quincy, and called him to
order. The Speaker (Mr. Varnum, of Massachusetts) sustained Mr.
Poindexter, and decided that the suggestion of a dissolution of the
Union was out of order. An appeal was taken from this decision, _and it
was reversed_. Mr. Quincy proceeded to vindicate the propriety of his
position in a speech of some length, in the course of which he said:

    "Is there a principle of public law better settled or more
    conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason than that the
    violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered
    as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private
    life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to
    admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three;
    would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership after
    so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more in
    the political partnership, where the admission of new
    associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with
    obvious dangers and evils!"

It is to be remembered that these men--Cabot, Pickering. Quincy, and
others--whose opinions and expressions have been cited, were not
Democrats, misled by extreme theories of State rights, but leaders and
expositors of the highest type of "Federalism, and of a strong central
Government." This fact gives their support of the right of secession the
greater significance.

The celebrated Hartford Convention assembled in December, 1814. It
consisted of delegates chosen by the Legislatures of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut, with an irregular or imperfect
representation from the other two New England States, New Hampshire and
Vermont,[26] convened for the purpose of considering the grievances
complained of by those States in connection with the war with Great
Britain. They sat with closed doors, and the character of their
deliberations and discussions has not been authentically disclosed. It
was generally understood, however, that the chief subject of their
considerations was the question of the withdrawal of the States they
represented from the Union. The decision, as announced in their
published report, was adverse to the expediency of such a measure at
that time, and under the then existing conditions; but they proceeded to
indicate the circumstances in which a dissolution of the Union might
become expedient, and the mode in which it should be effected; and their
theoretical plan of separation corresponds very nearly with that
actually adopted by the Southern States nearly fifty years afterward.
They say:

    "If the Union be destined to dissolution by reason of the
    multiplied abuses of bad administration, it should, if possible,
    be the work of peaceable times and deliberate consent. Some _new
    form of confederacy_ should be substituted among those States
    which shall intend to maintain a federal relation to each other.
    Events may prove that the causes of our calamities are deep and
    permanent. They may be found to proceed, not merely from the
    blindness of prejudice, pride of opinion, violence of party
    spirit, or the confusion of the times; but they may be traced to
    implacable combinations of individuals or of States to
    monopolize power and office, and to trample without remorse upon
    the rights and interests of commercial sections of the Union.
    Whenever it shall appear that the causes are radical and
    permanent, a separation by equitable arrangement will be
    preferable to an alliance by constraint among nominal friends,
    but real enemies."

The omission of the single word "commercial," which does not affect the
principle involved, is the only modification necessary to adapt this
extract exactly to the condition of the Southern States in 1860-'61.

The obloquy which has attached to the members of the Hartford Convention
has resulted partly from a want of exact knowledge of their proceedings,
partly from the secrecy by which they were veiled, but mainly because it
was a recognized effort to paralyze the arm of the Federal Government
while engaged in a war arising from outrages committed upon American
seamen on the decks of American ships. The indignation felt was no doubt
aggravated by the fact that those ships belonged in a great extent to
the people who were now plotting against the war-measures of the
Government, and indirectly, if not directly, giving aid and comfort to
the public enemy. Time, which has mollified passion, and revealed many
things not then known, has largely modified the first judgment passed on
the proceedings and purposes of the Hartford Convention; and, but for
the circumstances of existing war which surrounded it, they might have
been viewed as political opinions merely, and have received
justification instead of censure.

Again, in 1844-'45 the measures taken for the annexation of Texas evoked
remonstrances, accompanied by threats of a dissolution of the Union from
the Northeastern States. The Legislature of Massachusetts, in 1844,
adopted a resolution, declaring, in behalf of that State, that "the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, faithful to the compact between the
people of the United States, according to the plain meaning and intent
in which it was understood by them, is sincerely anxious for its
preservation; but that it is determined, as it doubts not the other
States are, _to submit to undelegated powers in no body of men on
earth_"; and that "the project of the annexation of Texas, unless
arrested on the threshold, _may tend to drive these States into a
dissolution of the Union_."

Early in the next year (February 11, 1845), the same Legislature adopted
and communicated to Congress a series of resolutions on the same
subject, in one of which it was declared that, "as the powers of
legislation granted in the Constitution of the United States to Congress
do not embrace a case of the admission of a foreign state or foreign
territory, by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admission
would have _no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts_"--
language which must have meant that the admission of Texas would be a
justifiable ground for secession, unless it was intended to announce the
purpose of nullification.

It is evident, therefore, that the people of the South, in the crisis
which confronted them in 1860, had no lack either of precept or of
precedent for their instruction and guidance in the teaching and the
example of our brethren of the North and East. The only practical
difference was, that the North threatened and the South acted.


[Footnote 22: George Cabot, who had been United States Senator from
Massachusetts for several years during the Administration of
Washington.--(See "Life of Cabot," by Lodge, p. 334.)]

[Footnote 23: See "Life of Cabot," p. 491; letter of Pickering to
Higginson.]

[Footnote 24: Pickering to Cabot, "Life of Cabot," pp. 338-340.]

[Footnote 25: Letter to Theodore Lyman, "Life of Cabot," pp. 445, 446.]

[Footnote 26: Maine was not then a State.]




CHAPTER X.

    False Statements of the Grounds for Separation.--Slavery not the
    Cause, but an Incident.--The Southern People not "Propagandists"
    of Slavery.--Early Accord among the States with regard to
    African Servitude.--Statement of the Supreme Court.--Guarantees
    of the Constitution.--Disregard of Oaths.--Fugitives from
    Service and the "Personal Liberty Laws."--Equality in the
    Territories the Paramount Question.--The Dred Scott
    Case.--Disregard of the Decision of the Supreme
    Court.--Culmination of Wrongs.--Despair of their
    Redress.--Triumph of Sectionalism.


At the period to which this review of events has advanced, one State had
already withdrawn from the Union. Seven or eight others were preparing
to follow her example, and others yet were anxiously and doubtfully
contemplating the probably impending necessity of taking the same
action. The efforts of Southern men in Congress, aided by the
cooeperation of the Northern friends of the Constitution, had failed, by
the stubborn refusal of a haughty majority, controlled by "radical"
purposes, to yield anything to the spirit of peace and conciliation.
This period, coinciding, as it happens, with the close of a calendar
year, affords a convenient point to pause for a brief recapitulation of
the causes which had led the Southern States into the attitude they then
held, and for a more full exposition of the constitutional questions
involved.

The reader of many of the treatises on these events, which have been put
forth as historical, if dependent upon such alone for information, might
naturally enough be led to the conclusion that the controversies which
arose between the States, and the war in which they culminated, were
caused by efforts on the one side to extend and perpetuate human
slavery, and on the other to resist it and establish human liberty. The
Southern States and Southern people have been sedulously represented as
"propagandists" of slavery, and the Northern as the defenders and
champions of universal freedom, and this view has been so arrogantly
assumed, so dogmatically asserted, and so persistently reiterated, that
its authors have, in many cases, perhaps, succeeded in bringing
themselves to believe it, as well as in impressing it widely upon the
world.

The attentive reader of the preceding chapters--especially if he has
compared their statements with contemporaneous records and other
original sources of information--will already have found evidence enough
to enable him to discern the falsehood of these representations, and to
perceive that, to whatever extent the question of slavery may have
served as an _occasion_, it was far from being the _cause_ of the
conflict.

I have not attempted, and shall not permit myself to be drawn into any
discussion of the merits or demerits of slavery as an ethical or even as
a political question. It would be foreign to my purpose, irrelevant to
my subject, and would only serve--as it has invariably served, in the
hands of its agitators--to "darken counsel" and divert attention from
the genuine issues involved.

As a mere historical fact, we have seen that African servitude among
us--confessedly the mildest and most humane of all institutions to which
the name "slavery" has ever been applied--existed in all the original
States, and that it was recognized and protected in the fourth article
of the Constitution. Subsequently, for climatic, industrial, and
economical--not moral or sentimental--reasons, it was abolished in the
Northern, while it continued to exist in the Southern States. Men
differed in their views as to the abstract question of its right or
wrong, but for two generations after the Revolution there was no
geographical line of demarkation for such differences. The African
slave-trade was carried on almost exclusively by New England merchants
and Northern ships. Mr. Jefferson--a Southern man, the founder of the
Democratic party, and the vindicator of State rights--was in theory a
consistent enemy to every form of slavery. The Southern States took the
lead in prohibiting the slave-trade, and, as we have seen, one of them
(Georgia) was the first State to incorporate such a prohibition in her
organic Constitution. Eleven years after the agitation on the Missouri
question, when the subject first took a sectional shape, the abolition
of slavery was proposed and earnestly debated in the Virginia
Legislature, and its advocates were so near the accomplishment of their
purpose, that a declaration in its favor was defeated only by a small
majority, and that on the ground of expediency. At a still later period,
abolitionist lecturers and teachers were mobbed, assaulted, and
threatened with tar and feathers in New York, Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and other States. One of them
(Lovejoy) was actually killed by a mob in Illinois as late as 1837.

These facts prove incontestably that the sectional hostility which
exhibited itself in 1820, on the application of Missouri for admission
into the Union, which again broke out on the proposition for the
annexation of Texas in 1844, and which reappeared after the Mexican war,
never again to be suppressed until its fell results had been fully
accomplished, was not the consequence of any difference on the abstract
question of slavery. It was the offspring of sectional rivalry and
political ambition. It would have manifested itself just as certainly if
slavery had existed in all the States, or if there had not been a negro
in America. No such pretension was made in 1803 or 1811, when the
Louisiana purchase, and afterward the admission into the Union of the
State of that name, elicited threats of disunion from the
representatives of New England. The complaint was not of slavery, but of
"the acquisition of more weight at the other extremity" of the Union. It
was not slavery that threatened a rupture in 1832, but the unjust and
unequal operation of a protective tariff.

It happened, however, on all these occasions, that the line of
demarkation of sectional interests coincided exactly or very nearly with
that dividing the States in which negro servitude existed from those in
which it had been abolished. It corresponded with the prediction of Mr.
Pickering, in 1803, that, in the separation certainly to come, "the
white and black population would mark the boundary"--a prediction made
without any reference to slavery as a source of dissension.

Of course, the diversity of institutions contributed, in some minor
degree, to the conflict of interests. There is an action and reaction of
cause and consequence, which limits and modifies any general statement
of a political truth. I am stating general principles--not defining
modifications and exceptions with the precision of a mathematical
proposition or a bill in chancery. The truth remains intact and
incontrovertible, that the existence of African servitude was in no wise
the cause of the conflict, but only an incident. In the later
controversies that arose, however, its effect in operating as a lever
upon the passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind, was so potent
that it has been spread, like a thick cloud, over the whole horizon of
historic truth.

As for the institution of negro servitude, it was a matter entirely
subject to the control of the States. No power was ever given to the
General Government to interfere with it, but an obligation was imposed
to protect it. Its existence and validity were distinctly recognized by
the Constitution in at least three places:

First, in that part of the second section of the first article which
prescribes that "representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective members, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and, excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other persons." "_Other_ persons" than "_free_ persons"
and those "bound to service for a term of years" must, of course, have
meant those permanently bound to service.

Secondly, it was recognized by the ninth section of the same article,
which provided that "the migration or importation of such persons as any
of the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be
prohibited by Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and
eight." This was a provision inserted for the protection of the
interests of the slave-trading New England States, forbidding any
prohibition of the trade by Congress for twenty years, and thus
virtually giving sanction to the legitimacy of the demand which that
trade was prosecuted to supply, and which was its only object.

Again, and in the third place, it was specially recognized, and an
obligation imposed upon every State, not only to refrain from
interfering with it in any other State, but in certain cases to aid in
its enforcement, by that clause, or paragraph, of the second section of
the fourth article which provides as follows:

    "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
    thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law
    or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor,
    but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
    service or labor may be due."

The President and Vice-President of the United States, every Senator and
Representative in Congress, the members of every State Legislature, and
"all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of
the several States," were required to take an oath (or affirmation) to
support the Constitution containing these provisions. It is easy to
understand how those who considered them in conflict with the "higher
law" of religion or morality might refuse to take such an oath or hold
such an office--as the members of some religious sects refuse to take
any oath at all or to bear arms in the service of their country--but it
is impossible to reconcile with the obligations of honor or honesty the
conduct of those who, having taken such an oath, made use of the powers
and opportunities of the offices held under its sanctions to nullify its
obligations and neutralize its guarantees. The halls of Congress
afforded the vantage-ground from which assaults were made upon these
guarantees. The Legislatures of various Northern States enacted laws to
hinder the execution of the provisions made for the rendition of
fugitives from service; State officials lent their aid to the work of
thwarting them; and city mobs assailed the officers engaged in the duty
of enforcing them.

With regard to the provision of the Constitution above quoted, for the
restoration of fugitives from service or labor, my own view was, and is,
that it was not a proper subject for legislation by the Federal
Congress, but that its enforcement should have been left to the
respective States, which, as parties to the compact of union, should
have been held accountable for its fulfillment. Such was actually the
case in the earlier and better days of the republic. No fugitive
slave-law existed, or was required, for two years after the organization
of the Federal Government, and, when one was then passed, it was merely
as an incidental appendage to an act regulating the mode of rendition of
fugitives from _justice_--not from service or labor.[27]

In 1850 a more elaborate law was enacted as part of the celebrated
compromise of that year. But the very fact that the Federal Government
had taken the matter into its own hands, and provided for its execution
by its own officers, afforded a sort of pretext to those States which
had now become hostile to this provision of the Constitution, not only
to stand aloof, but in some cases to adopt measures (generally known as
"personal liberty laws") directly in conflict with the execution of the
provisions of the Constitution.

The preamble to the Constitution declared the object of its founders to
be, "to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity." Now, however (in 1860), the people of a portion of the
States had assumed an attitude of avowed hostility, not only to the
provisions of the Constitution itself, but to the "domestic
tranquillity" of the people of other States. Long before the formation
of the Constitution, one of the charges preferred in the Declaration of
Independence against the Government of Great Britain, as justifying the
separation of the colonies from that country, was that of having
"excited domestic insurrections among us." Now, the mails were burdened
with incendiary publications, secret emissaries had been sent, and in
one case an armed invasion of one of the States had taken place for the
very purpose of exciting "domestic insurrection."

It was not the passage of the "personal liberty laws," it was not the
circulation of incendiary documents, it was not the raid of John Brown,
it was not the operation of unjust and unequal tariff laws, nor all
combined, that constituted the intolerable grievance, but it was the
systematic and persistent struggle to deprive the Southern States of
equality in the Union--generally to discriminate in legislation against
the interests of their people; culminating in their exclusion from the
Territories, the common property of the States, as well as by the
infraction of their compact to promote domestic tranquillity.

The question with regard to the Territories has been discussed in the
foregoing chapters, and the argument need not be repeated. There was,
however, one feature of it which has not been specially noticed,
although it occupied a large share of public attention at the time, and
constituted an important element in the case. This was the action of the
Federal judiciary thereon, and the manner in which it was received.

In 1854 a case (the well-known "Dred Scott case") came before the
Supreme Court of the United States, involving the whole question of the
_status_ of the African race and the rights of citizens of the Southern
States to migrate to the Territories, temporarily or permanently, with
their slave property, on a footing of equality with the citizens of
other States with _their_ property of any sort. This question, as we
have seen, had already been the subject of long and energetic
discussion, without any satisfactory conclusion. All parties, however,
had united in declaring, that a decision by the Supreme Court of the
United States--the highest judicial tribunal in the land--would be
accepted as final. After long and patient consideration of the case, in
1857, the decision of the Court was pronounced in an elaborate and
exhaustive opinion, delivered by Chief-Justice Taney--a man eminent as a
lawyer, great as a statesman, and stainless in his moral
reputation--seven of the nine judges who composed the Court, concurring
in it. The salient points established by this decision were:

    1. That persons of the African race were not, and could not be,
    acknowledged as "part of the people," or citizens, under the
    Constitution of the United States;

    2. That Congress had no right to exclude citizens of the South
    from taking their negro servants, as any other property, into
    any part of the common territory, and that they were entitled to
    claim its protection therein;

    3. And, finally, as a consequence of the principle just above
    stated, that the Missouri Compromise of 1820, in so far as it
    prohibited the existence of African servitude north of a
    designated line, was unconstitutional and void.[28] (It will be
    remembered that it had already been declared "inoperative and
    void" by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854.)

Instead of accepting the decision of this then august tribunal--the
ultimate authority in the interpretation of constitutional questions--as
conclusive of a controversy that had so long disturbed the peace and was
threatening the perpetuity of the Union, it was flouted, denounced, and
utterly disregarded by the Northern agitators, and served only to
stimulate the intensity of their sectional hostility.

What resource for justice--what assurance of tranquillity--what
guarantee of safety--now remained for the South? Still forbearing, still
hoping, still striving for peace and union, we waited until a sectional
President, nominated by a sectional convention, elected by a sectional
vote--and that the vote of a minority of the people--was about to be
inducted into office, under the warning of his own distinct announcement
that the Union could not permanently endure "half slave and half free";
meaning thereby that it could not continue to exist in the condition in
which it was formed and its Constitution adopted. The leader of his
party, who was to be the chief of his Cabinet, was the man who had first
proclaimed an "irrepressible conflict" between the North and the South,
and who had declared that abolitionism, having triumphed in the
Territories, would proceed to the invasion of the States. Even then the
Southern people did not finally despair until the temper of the
triumphant party had been tested in Congress and found adverse to any
terms of reconciliation consistent with the honor and safety of all
parties.

No alternative remained except to seek the security out of the Union
which they had vainly tried to obtain within it. The hope of our people
may be stated in a sentence. It was to escape from injury and strife in
the Union, to find prosperity and peace out of it. The mode and
principles of their action will next be presented.


[Footnote 27: "There was but little necessity in those times, nor long
after, for an act of Congress to authorize the recovery of fugitive
slaves. The laws of the free States and, still more, the force of public
opinion were the owners' best safeguards. Public opinion was against the
abduction of slaves; and, if any one was seduced from his owner, it was
done furtively and secretly, without show or force, and as any other
moral offense would be committed. State laws favored the owner, and to a
greater extent than the act of Congress did or could. In Pennsylvania
there was an act (it was passed in 1780, and only repealed in 1847)
discriminating between the traveler and sojourner and the permanent
resident, allowing the former to remain six months in the State before
his slaves would become subject to the emancipation laws; and, in the
case of a Federal officer, allowing as much more time as his duties
required him to remain. New York had the same act, only varying in time,
which was nine months. While these two acts were in force, and supported
by public opinion, the traveler and sojourner was safe with his slaves
in those States, and the same in the other free States. There was no
trouble about fugitive slaves in those times."--(Note to Benton's
"Abridgment of Debates," vol. i, p. 417.)]

[Footnote 28: The Supreme Court of the United States in stating (through
Chief-Justice Taney) their decision in the "Dred Scott case," in 1857,
say: "In that portion of the United States where the labor of the negro
race was found to be unsuited to the climate and unprofitable to the
master, but few slaves were held at the time of the Declaration of
Independence; and, when the Constitution was adopted, it had entirely
worn out in one of them, and measures had been taken for its gradual
abolition in several others. But this change had not been produced by
any change of opinion in relation to this race, but because it was
discovered from experience that slave-labor was unsuited to the climate
and productions of these States; for some of these States, when it had
ceased, or nearly ceased, to exist, were actively engaged in the
slave-trade; procuring cargoes on the coast of Africa, and transporting
them for sale to those parts of the Union where their labor was found to
be profitable and suited to the climate and productions. And this
traffic was openly carried on, and fortunes accumulated by it, without
reproach from the people of the States where they resided."

This statement, it must be remembered, does not proceed from any
partisan source, but is extracted from a judicial opinion pronounced by
the highest court in the country. In illustration of the truthfulness of
the latter part of it, may be mentioned the fact that a citizen of Rhode
Island (James D'Wolf), long and largely concerned in the slave-trade,
was sent from that State to the Senate of the United States as late as
the year 1821. In 1825 he resigned his seat in the Senate and removed to
Havana, where he lived for many years, actively engaged in the same
pursuit, as president of a slave-trading company. The story is told of
him that, on being informed that the "trade" was to be declared piracy,
he smiled and said, "So much the better for us--the Yankees will be the
only people not scared off by such a declaration."]




PART II.

THE CONSTITUTION.

CHAPTER I.

    The Original Confederation.--"Articles of Confederation and
    Perpetual Union."--Their Inadequacy ascertained.--Commercial
    Difficulties.--The Conference at Annapolis.--Recommendation of a
    General Convention.--Resolution of Congress.--Action of the
    Several States.--Conclusions drawn therefrom.


When certain American colonies of Great Britain, each acting for itself,
although in concert with the others, determined to dissolve their
political connection with the mother-country, they sent their
representatives to a general Congress of those colonies, and through
them made a declaration that the Colonies were, and of right ought to
be, "free and independent States." As such they contracted an alliance
for their "common defense," successfully resisted the effort to reduce
them to submission, and secured the recognition by Great Britain of
their separate independence; each State being distinctly recognized
under its own name--not as one of a group or nation. That this was not
merely a foreign view is evident from the second of the "Articles of
Confederation" between the States, adopted subsequently to the
Declaration of Independence, which is in these words: "Each State
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."

These "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the
States," as they were styled in their title, were adopted by eleven of
the original States in 1778, and by the other two in the course of the
three years next ensuing, and continued in force until 1789. During this
period the General Government was vested in the Congress alone, in which
each State, through its representatives, had an equal vote in the
determination of all questions whatever. The Congress exercised all the
executive as well as legislative powers delegated by the States. When
not in session the general management of affairs was intrusted to a
"Committee of the States," consisting of one delegate from each State.
Provision was made for the creation, by the Congress, of courts having a
certain specified jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases, and for
the settlement of controversies between two or more States in a mode
specifically prescribed.

The Government thus constituted was found inadequate for some necessary
purposes, and it became requisite to reorganize it. The first idea of
such reorganization arose from the necessity of regulating the
commercial intercourse of the States with one another and with foreign
countries, and also of making some provision for payment of the debt
contracted during the war for independence. These exigencies led to a
proposition for a meeting of commissioners from the various States to
consider the subject. Such a meeting was held at Annapolis in September,
1786; but, as only five States (New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia) were represented, the Commissioners declined
to take any action further than to recommend another Convention, with a
wider scope for consideration. As they expressed it, it was their
"unanimous conviction that it may essentially tend to advance the
interests of the Union, if the States, by whom they have been
respectively delegated, would themselves concur, and use their endeavors
to procure the concurrence of the other States, in the appointment of
commissioners, to meet at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next,
to take into consideration the situation of the United States, to devise
such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the
Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the
Union, and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States
in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterward
confirmed by the Legislatures of every State, will effectually provide
for the same."

It is scarcely necessary to remind the well-informed reader that the
terms, "Constitution of the Federal Government," employed above, and
"Federal Constitution," as used in other proceedings of that period, do
not mean the instrument to which we now apply them; and which was not
then in existence. They were applied to the system of government
formulated in the Articles of Confederation. This is in strict accord
with the definition of the word constitution, given by an eminent
lexicographer:[29] "The body of fundamental laws, as contained in
written documents or prescriptive usage, which constitute the form of
government for a nation, state, community, association, or society."[30]
Thus we speak of the British Constitution, which is an unwritten system
of "prescriptive usage"; of the Constitution of Massachusetts or of
Mississippi, which is the fundamental or organic law of a particular
State embodied in a written instrument; and of the Federal Constitution
of the United States, which is the fundamental law of an association of
States, at first as embraced in the Articles of Confederation, and
afterward as revised, amended, enlarged, and embodied in the instrument
framed in 1787, and subsequently adopted by the various States. The
manner in which this revision was effected was as follows. Acting on the
suggestion of the Annapolis Convention, the Congress, on the 21st of the
ensuing February (1787), adopted the following resolution:

    "_Resolved_, That, in the opinion of Congress, it is expedient
    that, on the second Monday in May next, a convention of
    delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several States,
    be held at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of
    revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to
    Congress and the several Legislatures, such alterations and
    provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress and
    confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution
    adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of
    the Union."

The language of this resolution, substantially according with that of
the recommendation made by the commissioners at Annapolis a few months
before, very clearly defines the objects of the proposed Convention and
the powers which it was thought advisable that the States should confer
upon their delegates. These were, "solely and expressly," as follows:

    1. "To revise the Articles of Confederation with reference to
    the 'situation of the United States';

    2. "To devise such alterations and provisions therein as should
    seem to them requisite in order to render 'the Federal
    Constitution,' or 'Constitution of the Federal Government,'
    adequate to 'the exigencies of the Union,' or 'the exigencies of
    the Government and the preservation of the Union';

    3. "To report the result of their deliberations--that is, the
    'alterations and provisions' which they should agree to
    recommend--to Congress and the Legislatures of the several
    States."

Of course, their action could be only advisory until ratified by the
States. The "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union," under which
the States were already united, provided that no alteration should be
made in any of them, "unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress
of the United States, and afterward confirmed by the Legislatures of
every State."

The Legislatures of the various States, with the exception of Rhode
Island, adopted and proceeded to act upon these suggestions by the
appointment of delegates--some of them immediately upon the
recommendation of the Annapolis Commissioners in advance of that of the
Congress, and the others in the course of a few months after the
resolution adopted by Congress. The instructions given to these
delegates in all cases conformed to the recommendations which have been
quoted, and in one case imposed an additional restriction or limitation.
As this is a matter of much importance, in order to a right
understanding of what follows, it may be advisable to cite in detail the
action of the several States, italicizing such passages as are specially
significant of the duties and powers of the delegates to the Convention.

The General Assembly of Virginia, after reciting the recommendation made
at Annapolis, enacted: "That seven commissioners be appointed by joint
ballot of both Houses of Assembly, who, or any three of them, are hereby
authorized, as deputies from this Commonwealth, to meet such deputies as
may be appointed and authorized by other States, to assemble in
convention at Philadelphia, as above recommended, and to join with them
in devising and discussing _all such alterations and further provisions
as may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of the Union, and in reporting such an act for that purpose
to the United States in Congress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly
confirmed by the several States_, will effectually provide for the
same."

The Council and Assembly of New Jersey issued commissions to their
delegates to meet such commissioners as have been, or may be, appointed
by _the other States of the Union_, at the city of Philadelphia, in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on the second Monday in May next, "_for the
purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade
and other important objects, and of devising such other provisions as
shall appear to be necessary to render the Constitution of the Federal
Government adequate to the exigencies thereof_."

The act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania constituted and
appointed certain deputies, designated by name, "with powers to meet
such deputies as may be _appointed and authorized by the other States_
... and to join with them in devising, deliberating on, and discussing
_all such alterations and further provisions_ as may be necessary _to
render the Federal Constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the
Union_, and in reporting such act or acts for that purpose, to the
United States in Congress assembled, as, _when agreed to by them and
duly confirmed by the several States_, will effectually provide for the
same."

The General Assembly of North Carolina enacted that commissioners should
be appointed by joint ballot of both Houses, "to meet and confer with
such deputies as may be _appointed by the other States_ for similar
purposes, and with them to discuss and decide upon _the most effectual
means to remove the defects of our Federal Union, and to procure the
enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect; and that they report
such an act to the General Assembly of this State, as, when agreed to by
them_, will effectually provide for the same." (In the case of this
State alone nothing is said of a report to Congress. Neither North
Carolina nor any other State, however, fails to make mention of the
necessity of a submission of any action taken to the several States for
ratification.)

The commissions issued to the representatives of South Carolina, by the
Governor, refer to an act of the Legislature of that State authorizing
their appointment "to meet such deputies or commissioners as may be
_appointed and authorized by other of the United States_," at the time
and place designated, and to join with them "in devising and discussing
all _such alterations, clauses, articles, and provisions_, as may be
thought necessary _to render the Federal Constitution entirely adequate_
to the actual situation and future good government of the _Confederate
States_," and to "join in reporting such an act to the United States in
Congress assembled, as, _when approved and agreed to by them, and duly
ratified and confirmed by the several States_, will effectually provide
for the exigencies of the Union." In these commissions the expression,
"alterations, clauses, articles, and provisions," clearly indicates the
character of the duties which the deputies were expected to discharge.

The General Assembly of Georgia "ordained" the appointment of certain
commissioners, specified by name, who were "authorized, as deputies from
this State, to meet such deputies as may be _appointed and authorized by
other States_, to assemble in convention at Philadelphia, and to join
with them in devising and discussing _all such alterations and further
provisions_ as may be necessary _to render the Federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of the Union_, and in reporting such an act
for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, _when
agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several States_, will
effectually provide for the same."

The authority conferred upon their delegates by the Assembly of New York
and the General Court of Massachusetts was in each case expressed in the
exact words of the advisory resolution of Congress: they were instructed
to meet the delegates of the other States "for the sole and express
purpose of _revising the Articles of Confederation_, and reporting to
Congress and to the several Legislatures _such alterations and
provisions therein_ as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed
by the several States, _render the Federal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of the Union_."

The General Assembly of Connecticut designated the delegates of that
State by name, and empowered them, in conference with the delegates of
other States, "to discuss upon such alterations and provisions,
agreeable to the general principles of republican government, as they
shall think proper to render the Federal Constitution adequate to the
exigencies of the Government and the preservation of the Union," and
"_to report such alterations and provisions as may be agreed to by a
majority of the United States in convention_, to the Congress of the
United States and to the General Assembly of this State."

The General Court of New Hampshire authorized and empowered the deputies
of that State, _in conference with those of other States_, "to discuss
and decide upon the most effectual means _to remedy the defects of our
Federal Union, and to procure and secure the enlarged purposes which it
was intended to effect_"--language almost identical with that of North
Carolina, but, like the other States in general, instructed them to
report the result of their deliberations to Congress for the action of
that body, and subsequent confirmation "by the several States."

The delegates from Maryland were appointed by the General Assembly of
that State, and instructed "to meet such deputies as may be appointed
and authorized _by any other of the United States_, to assemble in
convention at Philadelphia, _for the purpose of revising the Federal
system_, and to join with them in considering such alterations and
further provisions," etc.--the remainder of their instructions being in
the same words as those given to the Georgia delegates.

The instructions given to the deputies of Delaware were substantially in
accord with the others--being almost literally identical with those of
Pennsylvania--but the following proviso was added: "So, always, and
provided, that such alterations or further provisions, or any of them,
do not extend to that part of the fifth article of the Confederation of
the said States, finally ratified on the first day of March, in the year
1781, which declares that, '_in determining questions in the United
States in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote_.'"

Rhode Island, as has already been mentioned, sent no delegates.

From an examination and comparison of the enactments and instructions
above quoted, we may derive certain conclusions, so obvious that they
need only to be stated:

1. In the first place, it is clear that the delegates to the Convention
of 1787 represented, not _the people of the United States_ in mass, as
has been most absurdly contended by some political writers, but _the
people_ of the several States, _as States_--just as in the Congress of
that period--Delaware, with her sixty thousand inhabitants, having
entire equality with Pennsylvania, which had more than four hundred
thousand, or Virginia, with her seven hundred and fifty thousand.

2. The object for which they were appointed was not to organize a _new_
Government, but "solely and expressly" to amend the "Federal
Constitution" already existing; in other words, "to revise the Articles
of Confederation," and to suggest such "alterations" or additional
"provisions" as should be deemed necessary to render them "adequate to
the exigencies of the Union."

3. It is evident that the term "Federal Constitution," or its
equivalent, "Constitution of the Federal Government," was as freely and
familiarly applied to the system of government established by the
Articles of Confederation--undeniably a league or compact between States
expressly retaining their sovereignty and independence--as to that
amended system which was substituted for it by the Constitution that
superseded those articles.

4. The functions of the delegates to the Convention were, of course,
only to devise, deliberate, and discuss. No validity could attach to any
action taken, unless and until it should be afterward ratified by the
several States. It is evident, also, that what was contemplated was the
process provided in the Articles of Confederation for their own
amendment--first, a recommendation by the Congress; and, afterward,
ratification "by the Legislatures of every State," before the amendment
should be obligatory upon any. The departure from this condition, which
actually occurred, will presently be noticed.


[Footnote 29: Dr. Worcester.]

[Footnote 30: This definition is very good as far as it goes, but "the
form of government" is a phrase which falls short of expressing all that
should be comprehended. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say, "which
constitute the form, _define the powers, and prescribe the functions_ of
government," etc. The words in italics would make the definition more
complete.]




CHAPTER II.

    The Convention of 1787.--Diversity of Opinion.--Luther Martin's
    Account of the Three Parties.--The Question of
    Representation.--Compromise effected.--Mr. Randolph's
    Resolutions.--The Word "National" condemned.--Plan of Government
    framed.--Difficulty with Regard to Ratification, and its
    Solution.--Provision for Secession from the Union.--Views of Mr.
    Gerry and Mr. Madison.--False Interpretations.--Close of the
    Convention.


When the Convention met in Philadelphia, in May, 1787, it soon became
evident that the work before it would take a wider range and involve
more radical changes in the "Federal Constitution" than had at first
been contemplated. Under the Articles of Confederation the General
Government was obliged to rely upon the governments of the several
States for the execution of its enactments. Except its own officers and
employees, and in time of war the Federal army and navy, it could
exercise no control upon individual citizens. With regard to the States,
no compulsory or coercive measures could be employed to enforce its
authority, in case of opposition or indifference to its exercise. This
last was a feature of the Confederation which it was not desirable nor
possible to change, and no objection was made to it; but it was
generally admitted that some machinery should be devised to enable the
General Government to exercise its legitimate functions by means of a
mandatory authority operating directly upon the individual citizens
within the limits of its constitutional powers. The necessity for such
provision was undisputed.

Beyond the common ground of a recognition of this necessity there was a
wide diversity of opinion among the members of the Convention. Luther
Martin, a delegate from Maryland, in an account of its proceedings,
afterward given to the Legislature of that State, classifies these
differences as constituting three parties in the Convention, which he
describes as follows:

    "One party, whose object and wish it was to abolish and
    annihilate all State governments, and to bring forward one
    General Government over this extensive continent of a
    monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and limitations.
    Those who openly avowed this sentiment were, it is true, but
    few; yet it is equally true that there was a considerable
    number, who did not openly avow it, who were, by myself and many
    others of the Convention, considered as being in reality
    favorers of that sentiment....

    "The second party was not for the abolition of the State
    governments nor for the introduction of a monarchical government
    under any form; but they wished to establish such a system as
    could give their own States undue power and influence in the
    government over the other States.

    "A third party was what I considered truly federal and
    republican. This party was nearly equal in number with the other
    two, and was composed of the delegates from Connecticut, New
    York, New Jersey, Delaware, and in part from Maryland; also of
    some individuals from other representations. This party were for
    proceeding upon terms of federal equality: they were for taking
    our present federal system as the basis of their proceedings,
    and, as far as experience had shown that other powers were
    necessary to the Federal Government, to give those powers. They
    considered this the object for which they were sent by their
    States, and what their States expected from them."

In his account of the second party above described, Mr. Martin refers to
those representatives of the larger States who wished to establish a
numerical basis of representation in the Congress, instead of the equal
representation of the States (whether large or small) which existed
under the Articles of Confederation. There was naturally much
dissatisfaction on the part of the greater States--Virginia,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Massachusetts--whose population at
that period exceeded that of all the others combined, but which, in the
Congress, constituted less than one third of the voting strength. On the
other hand, the smaller States were tenacious of their equality in the
Union. Of the very smallest, one, as we have seen, had sent no
representatives to the Convention, and the other had instructed her
delegates, unconditionally, to insist upon the maintenance of absolute
equality in the Congress. This difference gave more trouble than any
other question that came before the Convention, and for some time
threatened to prove irreconcilable and to hinder any final agreement. It
was ultimately settled by a compromise. Provision was made for the
representation of the people of the States in one branch of the Federal
Legislature (the House of Representatives) in proportion to their
numbers; in the other branch (the Senate), for the equal representation
of the States as such. The perpetuity of this equality was furthermore
guaranteed by a stipulation that no State should ever be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate without its own consent.[31] This
compromise required no sacrifice of principle on either side, and no
provision of the Constitution has in practice proved more entirely
satisfactory.

It is not necessary, and would be beyond the scope of this work, to
undertake to give a history of the proceedings of the Convention of
1787. That may be obtained from other sources. All that is requisite for
the present purpose is to notice a few particulars of special
significance or relevancy to the subject of inquiry.

Early in the session of the Convention a series of resolutions was
introduced by Mr. Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, embodying a proposed
plan of government, which were considered in committee of the whole
House, and formed the basis of a protracted discussion. The first of
these resolutions, as amended before a vote was taken, was in these
words:

    "_Resolved_, That it is the opinion of this committee that a
    national Government ought to be established, consisting of a
    supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary."

This was followed by other resolutions--twenty-three in all, as adopted
and reported by the committee--in which the word "national" occurred
twenty-six times.

The day after the report of the committee was made, Mr. Ellsworth, of
Connecticut, moved to strike out the words "national Government" in the
resolution above quoted, and to insert the words "Government of the
United States," which he said was the proper title. "He wished also the
plan to go forth as an amendment of the Articles of Confederation."[32]
That is to say, he wished to avoid even the appearance of undertaking to
form a _new_ government, instead of reforming the old one, which was the
proper object of the Convention. This motion was agreed to without
opposition, and, as a consequence, the word "national" was stricken out
wherever it occurred, and nowhere makes its appearance in the
Constitution finally adopted. The prompt rejection, after introduction,
of this word "national," is obviously much more expressive of the intent
and purpose of the authors of the Constitution than its mere absence
from the Constitution would have been. It is a clear indication that
they did not mean to give any countenance to the idea which, "scotched,
not killed," has again reared its mischievous crest in these latter
days--that the government which they organized was a consolidated
_nationality_, instead of a confederacy of sovereign members.

Continuing their great work of revision and reorganization, the
Convention proceeded to construct the framework of a government for the
Confederacy, strictly confined to certain specified and limited powers,
but complete in all its parts, legislative, executive, and judicial, and
provided with the means for discharging all its functions without
interfering with the "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" of the
constituent States.

All this might have been done without going beyond the limits of their
commission "to revise the Articles of Confederation," and to consider
and report such "alterations and provisions" as might seem necessary to
"render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of
government and the preservation of the Union." A serious difficulty,
however, was foreseen. The thirteenth and last of the aforesaid articles
had this provision, which has already been referred to: "The Articles of
this Confederation _shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the
union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration, at any time
hereafter, be made in any of them_, unless such alteration be agreed to
in a Congress of the United States, and be afterward confirmed by the
Legislatures of _every State_."

It is obvious, from an examination of the records, as has already been
shown, that the original idea in calling a Convention was, that their
recommendations should take the course prescribed by this
article--first, a report to the Congress, and then, if approved by that
body, a submission to the various Legislatures for final action. There
was no reason to apprehend the non-concurrence of Congress, in which a
mere majority would determine the question; but the consent of the
Legislatures of "_every State_" was requisite in order to final
ratification, and there was serious reason to fear that this consent
could not be obtained. Rhode Island, as we have seen, had declined to
send any representatives to the Convention; of the three delegates from
New York, two had withdrawn; and other indications of dissatisfaction
had appeared. In case of the failure of a single Legislature to ratify,
the labors of the Convention would go for naught, under a strict
adherence to the letter of the article above cited. The danger of a
total frustration of their efforts was imminent.

In this emergency the Convention took the responsibility of transcending
the limits of their instructions, and recommending a procedure which was
in direct contravention of the letter of the Articles of Confederation.
This was the introduction of a provision into the new Constitution, that
the ratification of _nine_ States should be sufficient for its
establishment among themselves. In order to validate this provision, it
was necessary to refer it to authority higher than that of Congress and
the State Legislatures--that is, to the People of the States, assembled,
by their representatives, in convention. Hence it was provided, by the
seventh and last article of the new Constitution, that "the ratification
of the _Conventions_ of nine States" should suffice for its
establishment "between the States so ratifying the same."

There was another reason, of a more general and perhaps more controlling
character, for this reference to conventions for ratification, even if
entire unanimity of the State Legislatures could have been expected.
Under the American theory of republican government, conventions of the
people, duly elected and accredited as such, are invested with the
plenary power inherent in the people of an organized and independent
community, assembled in mass. In other words, they represent and
exercise what is properly the _sovereignty_ of the people. State
Legislatures, with restricted powers, do not possess or represent
sovereignty. Still less does the Congress of a union or confederacy of
States, which is by two degrees removed from the seat of sovereignty. We
sometimes read or hear of "delegated sovereignty," "divided
sovereignty," with other loose expressions of the same sort; but no such
thing as a division or delegation of sovereignty is possible.

In order, therefore, to supersede the restraining article above cited
and to give the highest validity to the compact for the delegation of
important powers and functions of government to a common agent, an
authority above that of the State Legislatures was necessary. Mr.
Madison, in the "Federalist,"[33] says: "It has been heretofore noted
among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it
had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification."
This objection would of course have applied with greater force to the
proposed Constitution, which provided for additional grants of power
from the States, and the conferring of larger and more varied powers
upon a General Government, which was to act upon individuals instead of
States, if the question of its confirmation had been submitted merely to
the several State Legislatures. Hence the obvious propriety of referring
it to the respective _people_ of the States in their sovereign capacity,
as provided in the final article of the Constitution.

In this article provision was deliberately made for the _secession_ (if
necessary) of a part of the States from a union which, when formed, had
been declared "perpetual," and its terms and articles to be "inviolably
observed by every State."

Opposition was made to the provision on this very ground--that it was
virtually a dissolution of the Union, and that it would furnish a
precedent for future secessions. Mr. Gerry, a distinguished member from
Massachusetts--afterward Vice-President of the United States--said, "If
nine out of thirteen (States) can dissolve the compact, six out of nine
will be just as able to dissolve the future one hereafter."

Mr. Madison, who was one of the leading members of the Convention,
advocating afterward, in the "Federalist," the adoption of the new
Constitution, asks the question, "On what principle the Confederation,
which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be
superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?" He
answers this question "by recurring to the absolute necessity of the
case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent
law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and
happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions
aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed." He
proceeds, however, to give other grounds of justification:

    "It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that
    all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a
    breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and
    that a breach committed by either of the parties absolves the
    others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the
    compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to
    appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for
    dispensing with the consent of particular States to a
    dissolution of the Federal pact, will not the complaining
    parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and
    important infractions with which they may be confronted? _The
    time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas
    which this paragraph exhibits._ The scene is now changed, and
    with it the part which the same motives dictate."

Mr. Madison's idea of the propriety of _veiling_ any statement of the
right of secession until the occasion arises for its exercise, whether
right or wrong in itself, is eminently suggestive as explanatory of the
caution exhibited by other statesmen of that period, as well as himself,
with regard to that "delicate truth."

The only possible alternative to the view here taken of the seventh
article of the Constitution, as a provision for the secession of any
nine States, which might think proper to avail themselves of it, from
union with such as should refuse to do so, and the formation of an
amended or "more perfect union" with one another, is to regard it as a
provision for the continuance of the old Union, or Confederation, under
altered conditions, by the majority which should accede to them, with a
recognition of the right of the recusant minority to withdraw, secede,
or stand aloof. The idea of compelling any State or States to enter into
or to continue in union with the others by _coercion_, is as absolutely
excluded under the one supposition as under the other--with reference to
one State or a minority of States, as well as with regard to a majority.
The article declares that "the ratification of the Conventions of nine
States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this
Constitution"--not between all, but--"_between the States so ratifying
the same_." It is submitted whether a fuller justification of this right
of the nine States to form a new Government is not found in the fact of
the sovereignty in each of them, making them "a law unto themselves,"
and therefore the final judge of what the necessities of each community
demand.

Here--although, perhaps, in advance of its proper place in the
argument--the attention of the reader may be directed to the refutation,
afforded by this article of the Constitution, of that astonishing
fiction, which has been put forward by some distinguished writers of
later date, that the Constitution was established by the people of the
United States "in the aggregate." If such had been the case, the will of
a majority, duly ascertained and expressed, would have been binding upon
the minority. No such idea existed in its formation. It was not even
established by the _States in the aggregate_, nor was it proposed that
it should be. It was submitted for the acceptance of each separately,
the time and place at their own option, so that the dates of
ratification did extend from December 7, 1787, to May 29, 1790. The long
period required for these ratifications makes manifest the absurdity of
the assertion, that it was a decision by the votes of one people, or one
community, in which a majority of the votes cast determined the result.

We have seen that the delegates to the Convention of 1787 were chosen by
the several States, _as States_--it is hardly necessary to add that they
voted in the Convention, as in the Federal Congress, by States--each
State casting one vote. We have seen, also, that they were sent for the
"sole and express purpose" of revising the Articles of Confederation and
devising means for rendering the Federal Constitution, "adequate to the
exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union"; that the
terms "Union," "United States," "Federal Constitution;" and
"Constitution of the Federal Government," were applied to the old
Confederation in precisely the same sense in which they are used under
the new; that the proposition to constitute a "national" Government was
distinctly rejected by the Convention; that the right of any State, or
States, to withdraw from union with the others was practically
exemplified, and that the idea of coercion of a State, or compulsory
measures, was distinctly excluded under any construction that can be put
upon the action of the Convention.

To the original copy of the Constitution, as set forth by its framers
for the consideration and final action of the people of the States, was
attached the following words:

    "Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States
    present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our
    Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the
    Independence of the United States of America, the twelfth. In
    witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names."

[Followed by the signatures of "George Washington, President, and deputy
from Virginia," and the other delegates who signed it.]

This attachment to the instrument--a mere attestation of its
authenticity, and of the fact that it had the unanimous consent _of all
the States_ then present by their deputies--not _of all the deputies_,
for some of them refused to sign it--has been strangely construed by
some commentators as if it were a part of the Constitution, and implied
that it was "done," in the sense of completion of the work.[34]

But the work was not _done_ when the Convention closed its labors and
adjourned. It was scarcely begun. There was no validity or binding force
whatever in what had been already "done." It was still to be submitted
to the States for approval or rejection. Even if a majority of eight out
of thirteen States had ratified it, the refusal of the ninth would have
rendered it null and void. Mr. Madison, who was one of the most
distinguished of its authors and signers, writing after it was completed
and signed, but before it was ratified, said: "It is time now to
recollect that the powers [of the Convention] were merely advisory and
recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so understood
by the Convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and
proposed a Constitution, which is to be of no more consequence than the
paper on which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation
of those to whom it is addressed."--("Federalist," No. XL.)

The mode and terms in which this approval was expressed will be
considered in the next chapter.


[Footnote 31: Constitution, Article V.]

[Footnote 32: See Elliott's "Debates," vol. v, p. 214. This reference is
taken from "The Republic of Republics," Part III, chapter vii, p. 217.
This learned, exhaustive, and admirable work, which contains a wealth of
historical and political learning, will be freely used, by kind consent
of the author, without the obligation of a repetition of special
acknowledgment in every case. A like liberty will be taken with the late
Dr. Bledsoe's masterly treatise on the right of secession, published in
1866, under the title, "Is Davis a Traitor? or, Was Secession a
Constitutional Right?"]

[Footnote 33: No. xliii.]

[Footnote 34: See "Republic of Republics," Part II, chapters xiii and
xiv.]




CHAPTER III.

    Ratification of the Constitution by the States.--Organization of
    the New Government.--Accession of North Carolina and Rhode
    Island.--Correspondence between General Washington and the
    Governor of Rhode Island.


The amended system of union, or confederation (the terms are employed
indiscriminately and interchangeably by the statesmen of that period),
devised by the Convention of 1787, and embodied, as we have seen, in the
Constitution which they framed and have set forth, was now to be
considered and acted on by the people of the several States. This they
did in the highest and most majestic form in which the sanction of
organized communities could be given or withheld--not through
ambassadors, or Legislatures, or deputies with limited powers, but
through conventions of delegates chosen expressly for the purpose and
clothed with the plenary authority of sovereign people. The action of
these conventions was deliberate, cautious, and careful. There was much
debate, and no little opposition to be conciliated. Eleven States,
however, ratified and adopted the new Constitution within the twelve
months immediately following its submission to them. Two of them
positively rejected it, and, although they afterward acceded to it,
remained outside of the Union in the exercise of their sovereign right,
which nobody then denied--North Carolina for nine months, Rhode Island
for nearly fifteen, after the new Government was organized and went into
operation. In several of the other States the ratification was effected
only by small majorities.

The terms in which this action was expressed by the several States and
the declarations with which it was accompanied by some of them are
worthy of attention.

Delaware was the first to act. Her Convention met on December 3, 1787,
and ratified the Constitution on the 7th. The readiness of this least in
population, and next to the least in territorial extent, of all the
States, to accept that instrument, is a very significant fact when we
remember the jealous care with which she had guarded against any
infringement of her sovereign Statehood. Delaware alone had given
special instructions to her deputies in the Convention not to consent to
any sacrifice of the principle of equal representation in Congress. The
promptness and unanimity of her people in adopting the new Constitution
prove very clearly, not only that they were satisfied with the
preservation of that principle in the Federal Senate, but that they did
not understand the Constitution, in any of its features, as compromising
the "sovereignty, freedom, and independence" which she had so especially
cherished. The ratification of their Convention is expressed in these
words:

    "We, the deputies of _the people of the Delaware State_, in
    convention met, having taken into our serious consideration the
    Federal Constitution proposed and agreed upon by the deputies of
    the United States at a General Convention held at the city of
    Philadelphia on the 17th day of September, A. D. 1787, have
    _approved of, assented to, and ratified and confirmed_, and by
    these presents do, in virtue of the powers and authority to us
    given for that purpose, for and in behalf of ourselves and our
    constituents, fully, freely, and entirely, _approve of, assent
    to, ratify, and confirm_ the said Constitution.

    "Done in convention at Dover, December 7, 1787."

This, and twelve other like acts, gave to the Constitution "all the life
and validity it ever had, or could have, as to the thirteen united or
associated States."

Pennsylvania acted next (December 12, 1787), the ratification not being
finally accomplished without strong opposition, on grounds which will be
referred to hereafter. In announcing its decision, the Convention of
this State began as follows:

    "In the name of _the people of Pennsylvania_. Be it known unto
    all men that we, _the delegates of the people of the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania_, in General Convention assembled,"
    etc., etc., concluding with these words: "By these presents, do,
    _in the name and by the authority of the same people_, and for
    ourselves, assent to and ratify the foregoing Constitution for
    the United States of America."

In New Jersey the ratification, which took place on the 18th of
December, was unanimous. This is no less significant and instructive
than the unanimity of Delaware, from the fact that the New Jersey
delegation, in the Convention that framed the Constitution, had taken
the lead in behalf of the federal, or State-rights, idea, in opposition
to that of nationalism, or consolidation. William Patterson, a
distinguished citizen (afterward Governor) of New Jersey, had introduced
into that Convention what was known as "the Jersey plan," embodying
these State-rights principles, as distinguished from the various
"national" plans presented. In defending them, he had said, after
calling for the reading of the credentials of delegates:

    "Can we, on this ground, form a national Government? I fancy
    not. Our commissions give a complexion to the business; and can
    we suppose that, when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the
    people will approve our proceedings?

    "We are met here as the deputies of _thirteen independent,
    sovereign States, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their
    sovereignty and form one nation_, and annihilate the
    sovereignties of our States, who have sent us here for other
    purposes?"

Again, on a subsequent day, after stating that he was not there to
pursue his own sentiments of government, but of those who had sent him,
he had asked:

    "Can we, _as representatives of independent States_, annihilate
    the essential powers of independency? Are not the votes of this
    Convention taken on every question under the idea of
    independency?"

The fact that this State, which, through her representatives, had taken
so conspicuous a part in the maintenance of the principle of State
sovereignty, ratified the Constitution with such readiness and
unanimity, is conclusive proof that, in her opinion, that principle was
not compromised thereby. The conclusion of her ordinance of ratification
is in these words:

    "Now be it known that we, the delegates of _the State of New
    Jersey_, chosen by the people thereof for the purpose aforesaid,
    having maturely deliberated on and considered the aforesaid
    proposed Constitution, do hereby, for and on behalf of the
    _people of the said State of New Jersey_, agree to, ratify, and
    confirm the same, and every part thereof.

    "Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the members
    present, this 18th day of December, A. D. 1787."

Georgia next, and also unanimously, on January 2, 1788, declared,
through "_the delegates of the State of Georgia_, in convention met,
pursuant to the provisions of the [act of the] Legislature aforesaid ...
in virtue of the powers and authority given us [them] by _the people of
the said State_, for that purpose," that they did "fully and entirely
assent to, ratify, and adopt the said Constitution."

Connecticut (on the 9th of January) declares her assent with equal
distinctness of assertion as to the source of the authority: "In the
name of _the people of the State of Connecticut_, we, the delegates of
_the people of the said State_, in General Convention assembled,
pursuant to an act of the Legislature in October last ... do assent to,
ratify, and adopt the Constitution reported by the Convention of
delegates in Philadelphia."

In Massachusetts there was a sharp contest. The people of that State
were then--as for a long time afterward--exceedingly tenacious of their
State independence and sovereignty. The proposed Constitution was
subjected to a close, critical, and rigorous examination with reference
to its bearing upon this very point. The Convention was a large one, and
some of its leading members were very distrustful of the instrument
under their consideration. It was ultimately adopted by a very close
vote (187 to 168), and then only as accompanied by certain proposed
amendments, the object of which was to guard more expressly against any
sacrifice or compromise of State sovereignty, and under an assurance,
given by the advocates of the Constitution, of the certainty that those
amendments would be adopted. The most strenuously urged of these was
that ultimately adopted (in substance) as the tenth amendment to the
Constitution, which was intended to take the place of the second Article
of Confederation, as an emphatic assertion of the continued freedom,
sovereignty, and independence of the States. This will be considered
more particularly hereafter.

In terms substantially identical with those employed by the other
States, Massachusetts thus announced her ratification:

    "In convention of the delegates of _the people of the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts_, 1788. The Convention having
    impartially discussed and fully considered the Constitution for
    the United States of America, reported [etc.] ... do, in the
    name and in behalf of _the people of the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts_, assent to and ratify the said Constitution for
    the United States of America."

This was accomplished on February 7, 1788.

Maryland followed on the 28th of April, and South Carolina on the 23d of
May, in equivalent expressions, the ratification of the former being
made by "the delegates of _the people of Maryland_," speaking, as they
declared, for ourselves, and in the name and on the behalf of _the
people of this State_; that of the latter, "in convention of _the people
of the State of South Carolina_, by their representatives, ... in the
name and behalf of _the people of this State_."

But South Carolina, like Massachusetts, demanded certain amendments, and
for greater assurance accompanied her ordinance of ratification with the
following distinct assertion of the principle afterward embodied in the
tenth amendment:

    "This Convention doth also declare that _no section or
    paragraph_ of the said Constitution warrants a construction that
    _the States do not retain every power not expressly relinquished
    by them_ and vested in the General Government of the Union."

"The delegates of _the people of the State of New Hampshire_," in
convention, on the 21st of June, "in the name and behalf of _the people
of the State of New Hampshire_," declared their approval and adoption of
the Constitution. In this State, also, the opposition was formidable
(the final vote being 57 to 46), and, as in South Carolina, it was
"explicitly declared that all powers not expressly and particularly
delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the several
States, to be by them exercised."

The debates in the Virginia Convention were long and animated. Some of
the most eminent and most gifted men of that period took part in them,
and they have ever since been referred to for the exposition which they
afford of the interpretation of the Constitution by its authors and
their contemporaries. Among the members were Madison, Mason, and
Randolph, who had also been members of the Convention at Philadelphia.
Mr. Madison was one of the most earnest advocates of the new
Constitution, while Mr. Mason was as warmly opposed to its adoption; so
also was Patrick Henry, the celebrated orator. It was assailed with
great vehemence at every vulnerable or doubtful point, and was finally
ratified June 26, 1788, by a vote of 89 to 79--a majority of only ten.

This ratification was expressed in the same terms employed by other
States, by "the delegates of _the people of Virginia_ ... in the name
and in behalf of _the people of Virginia_." In so doing, however, like
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, Virginia demanded
certain amendments as a more explicit guarantee against consolidation,
and accompanied the demand with the following declaration:

    "That the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived
    from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them,
    whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or
    oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains
    with them and at their will," etc., etc.

Whether, in speaking of a possible _resumption_ of powers by "the people
of the United States," the Convention had in mind the action of such a
people _in the aggregate_--political community which did not exist, and
of which they, could hardly have entertained even an ideal
conception--or of the people of Virginia, for whom they were speaking,
and of the other United States then taking similar action--is a question
which scarcely admits of argument, but which will be more fully
considered in the proper place.

New York, the eleventh State to signify her assent, did so on July 26,
1788, after an arduous and protracted discussion, and then by a majority
of but three votes--30 to 27. Even this small majority was secured only
by the recommendation of certain material amendments, the adoption of
which by the other States it was at first proposed to make a condition
precedent to the validity of the ratification. This idea was abandoned
after a correspondence between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison, and,
instead of conditional ratification, New York provided for the
resumption of her grants; but the amendments were put forth with a
circular letter to the other States, in which it was declared that
"nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision" of the
objectionable features of the Constitution, "and an invincible
reluctance to separating from our sister States, could have prevailed
upon a sufficient number to ratify it without stipulating for previous
amendments."

The ratification was expressed in the usual terms, as made "_by the
delegates of the people of the State of New York_ ... in the name and in
behalf of the people" of the said State. Accompanying it was a
declaration of the principles in which the assent of New York was
conceded, one paragraph of which runs as follows:

    "That the powers of government may be _reassumed_ by the people,
    whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that
    every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not, by the said
    Constitution, clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
    States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to
    the people of the several _States_, or to their respective State
    governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and that
    those clauses in the said Constitution which declare that
    Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply
    that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
    Constitution, but such clauses are to be construed either as
    exceptions to certain specified powers or as inserted for
    greater caution."

The acceptance of these eleven States having been signified to the
Congress, provision was made for putting the new Constitution in
operation. This was effected on March 4, 1789, when the Government was
organized, with George Washington as President, and John Adams,
Vice-President; the Senators and Representatives elected by the States
which had acceded to the Constitution, organizing themselves as a
Congress.

Meantime, two States were standing, as we have seen, unquestioned and
unmolested, in an attitude of absolute independence. The Convention of
North Carolina, on August 2, 1788, had rejected the proposed
Constitution, or, more properly speaking, had withheld her ratification
until action could be taken upon the subject-matter of the following
resolution adopted by her Convention:

    "_Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and
    securing from encroachment the great principles of civil and
    religious liberty, and the unalienable rights of the people,
    together with amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptionable
    parts of the said Constitution of government, ought to be laid
    before Congress and the Convention of the States that shall or
    may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution,
    for their consideration, previous to the ratification of the
    Constitution aforesaid on the part of the State of North
    Carolina."

More than a year afterward, when the newly organized Government had been
in operation for nearly nine months, and when--although no convention of
the States had been called to revise the Constitution--North Carolina
had good reason to feel assured that the most important provisions of
her proposed amendments and "declaration of rights" would be adopted,
she acceded to the amended compact. On November 21, 1789, her Convention
agreed, "in behalf of the freemen, citizens, and inhabitants of _the
State of North Carolina_," to "adopt and ratify" the Constitution.

In Rhode Island the proposed Constitution was at first submitted to a
direct vote of the people, who rejected it by an overwhelming majority.
Subsequently--that is, on May 29, 1790, when the reorganized Government
had been in operation for nearly fifteen months, and when it had become
reasonably certain that the amendments thought necessary would be
adopted--a convention of the people of Rhode Island acceded to the new
Union, and ratified the Constitution, though even then by a majority of
only two votes in sixty-six--34 to 32. The ratification was expressed in
substantially the same language as that which has now been so repeatedly
cited:

    "We, the delegates of the people of the State of Rhode Island
    and Providence Plantations, duly elected and met in convention,
    ... in the name and behalf of _the people of Rhode Island and
    Providence Plantations_, do, by these presents, assent to and
    ratify the said Constitution."

It is particularly to be noted that, during the intervals between the
organization of the Federal Government under the new Constitution and
the ratification of that Constitution by, North Carolina and Rhode
Island, respectively, those States were absolutely independent and
unconnected with any other political community, unless they be
considered as still representing the "United States of America," which
by the Articles of Confederation had been declared a "perpetual union."
The other States had seceded from the former union--not in a body, but
separately, each for itself--and had formed a new association, leaving
these two States in the attitude of foreign though friendly powers.
There was no claim of any right to control their action, as if they had
been mere geographical or political divisions of one great consolidated
community or "nation." Their accession to the Union was desired, but
their freedom of choice in the matter was never questioned. And then it
is to be noted, on _their_ part, that, like the house of Judah, they
refrained from any attempt to force the seceding sisters to return.

As illustrative of the relations existing during this period between the
United States and Rhode Island, it may not be uninstructive to refer to
a letter sent by the government of the latter to the President and
Congress, and transmitted by the President to the Senate, with the
following note:

    "United States, _September 26, 1789_.

    "Gentlemen of the Senate: Having yesterday received a letter
    written in this month by the Governor of Rhode Island, at the
    request and in behalf of the General Assembly of that State,
    addressed to the President, the Senate, and the House of
    Representatives of the eleven United States of America in
    Congress assembled, I take the earliest opportunity of laying a
    copy of it before you."

    (Signed) "GEORGE WASHINGTON."

Some extracts from the communication referred to are annexed:

    "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, _In General
    Assembly, September Session, 1789_.

    "_To the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives
    of the eleven United States of America in Congress assembled:_

    "The critical situation in which the people of this State are
    placed engages us to make these assurances, on their behalf, of
    their attachment and friendship to their sister States, and of
    their disposition to cultivate mutual harmony and friendly
    intercourse. They know themselves to be a handful, comparatively
    viewed, and, although they now stand as it were alone, they have
    not separated themselves or departed from the principles of that
    Confederation, which was formed by the sister States in their
    struggle for freedom and in the hour of danger....

    "Our not having acceded to or adopted the new system of
    government formed and adopted by most of our sister States, we
    doubt not, has given uneasiness to them. That we have not seen
    our way clear to it, consistently with our idea of the
    principles upon which we all embarked together, has also given
    pain to us. We have not doubted that we might thereby avoid
    present difficulties, but we have apprehended future
    mischief....

    "Can it be thought strange that, with these impressions, they
    [the people of this State] should wait to see the proposed
    system organized and in operation?--to see what further checks
    and securities would be agreed to and established by way of
    amendments, before they could adopt it as a Constitution of
    government for themselves and their posterity?...

    "We are induced to hope that we shall not be altogether
    considered as foreigners having no particular affinity or
    connection with the United States; but that trade and commerce,
    upon which the prosperity of this State much depends, will be
    preserved as free and open between this State and the United
    States, as our different situations at present can possibly
    admit....

    "We feel ourselves attached by the strongest ties of friendship,
    kindred, and interest, to our sister States; and we can not,
    without the greatest reluctance, look to any other quarter for
    those advantages of commercial intercourse which we conceive to
    be more natural and reciprocal between them and us.

    "I am, at the request and in behalf of the General Assembly,
    your most obedient, humble servant."

    (Signed) "John Collins, _Governor_.

    "_His Excellency, the President of the United States._"

    [American State Papers, _Vol. I_, Miscellaneous.]




CHAPTER IV.

    The Constitution not adopted by one People "in the
    Aggregate."--A Great Fallacy exposed.--Mistake of Judge
    Story.--Colonial Relations.--The United Colonies of New
    England.--Other Associations.--Independence of Communities
    traced from Germany to Great Britain, and from Great Britain to
    America.--Mr. Everett's "Provincial People."--Origin and
    Continuance of the Title "United States."--No such Political
    Community as the "People of the United States."


The historical retrospect of the last three chapters and the extracts
from the records of a generation now departed have been presented as
necessary to a right understanding of the nature and principles of the
compact of 1787, on which depended the questions at issue in the
secession of 1861 and the contest that ensued between the States.

We have seen that the united colonies, when they declared their
independence, formed a league or alliance with one another as "United
States." This title antedated the adoption of the Articles of
Confederation. It was assumed immediately after the Declaration of
Independence, and was continued under the Articles of Confederation; the
first of which declared that "the style of this confederacy shall be
'The United States of America'"; and this style was retained--without
question--in the formation of the present Constitution. The name was not
adopted as antithetical to, or distinctive from, "confederate," as some
seem to have imagined. If it has any significance now, it must have had
the same under the Articles of Confederation, or even before they were
adopted.

It has been fully shown that the States which thus became and continued
to be "united," whatever form their union assumed, acted and continued
to act as distinct and sovereign political communities. The monstrous
fiction that they acted as _one people "in their aggregate capacity"_
has not an atom of fact to serve as a basis.

To go back to the very beginning, the British colonies never constituted
one people. Judge Story, in his "Commentaries" on the Constitution,
seems to imply the contrary, though he shrinks from a direct assertion
of it, and clouds the subject by a confusion of terms. He says: "Now, it
is apparent that none of the colonies before the Revolution were, in the
most large and general sense, independent or sovereign communities. They
were all originally settled under and subjected to the British Crown."
And then he proceeds to show that they were, in their colonial
condition, not _sovereign_--a proposition which nobody disputed. As
colonies, they had no claim, and made no pretension, to sovereignty.
They were subject to the British Crown, unless, like the Plymouth
colony, "a law unto themselves," but they were _independent of each
other_--the only point which has any bearing upon their subsequent
relations. There was no other bond between them than that of their
common allegiance to the Government of the mother-country. As an
illustration of this may be cited the historical fact that, when John
Stark, of Bennington memory, was before the Revolution engaged in a
hunting expedition in the Indian country, he was captured by the savages
and brought to Albany, in the colony of New York, for a ransom; but,
inasmuch as he belonged to New Hampshire, the government of New York
took no action for his release. There was not even enough community of
feeling to induce individual citizens to provide money for the purpose.

There were, however, local and partial confederacies among the New
England colonies, long before the Declaration of Independence. As early
as the year 1643 a Congress had been organized of delegates from
Massachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven, and Connecticut, under the style of
"The United Colonies of New England." The objects of this confederacy,
according to Mr. Bancroft, were "protection against the encroachments of
the Dutch and French, security against the tribes of savages, the
liberties of the gospel in purity and in peace."[35] The general affairs
of the company were intrusted to commissions, two from each colony; but
the same historian tells us that "to each its respective local
jurisdiction was carefully reserved," and he refers to this as evidence
that the germ-principle of State-rights was even then in existence.
"Thus remarkable for unmixed simplicity" (he proceeds) "was the form of
the first confederated government in America.... There was no president,
except as a moderator of its meetings, and the larger State [_sic_],
Massachusetts, superior to all the rest in territory, wealth, and
population, had no greater number of votes than New Haven. But the
commissioners were in reality little more than a deliberative body; they
possessed no executive power, and, while they could decree a war and a
levy of troops, it remained for the States to carry their votes into
effect."[36]

This confederacy continued in existence for nearly fifty years. Between
that period and the year 1774, when the first Continental Congress met
in Philadelphia, several other temporary and provisional associations of
colonies had been formed, and the people had been taught the advantages
of union for a common purpose; but they had never abandoned or
compromised the great principle of community independence. That form of
self-government, generated in the German forests before the days of the
Caesars, had given to that rude people a self-reliance and patriotism
which first checked the flight of the Roman eagles, which elsewhere had
been the emblem of their dominion over the known world. This
principle--the great preserver of all communal freedom and of mutual
harmony--was transplanted by the Saxons into England, and there
sustained those personal rights which, after the fall of the Heptarchy,
were almost obliterated by the encroachments of Norman despotism; but,
having the strength and perpetuity of truth and right, were reasserted
by the mailed hands of the barons at Runnymede for their own benefit and
that of their posterity. Englishmen, the early settlers, brought this
idea to the wilds of America, and it found expression in many forms
among the infant colonies.

Mr. Edward Everett, in his Fourth-of-July address, delivered in New York
in 1861, following the lead of Judge Story, and with even less caution,
boldly declares that, "before their independence of England was
asserted, they [the colonies] constituted _a provincial people_." To
sustain this position--utterly contrary to all history as it is--he is
unable to adduce any valid American authority, but relies almost
exclusively upon loose expressions employed in debate in the British
Parliament about the period of the American Revolution--such as "that
people," "that loyal and respectable people," "this enlightened and
spirited people," etc., etc. The speakers who made use of this
colloquial phraseology concerning the inhabitants of a distant
continent, in the freedom of extemporaneous debate, were not framing
their ideas with the exactitude of a didactic treatise, and could little
have foreseen the extraordinary use to be made of their expressions
nearly a century afterward, in sustaining a theory contradictory to
history as well as to common sense. It is as if the familiar expressions
often employed in our own time, such as "the people of Africa," or "the
people of South America," should be cited, by some ingenious theorist of
a future generation, as evidence that the subjects of the Khedive and
those of the King of Dahomey were but "one people," or that the
Peruvians and the Patagonians belonged to the same political community.

Mr. Everett, it is true, quotes two expressions of the Continental
Congress to sustain his remarkable proposition that the colonies were "a
people." One of these is found in a letter addressed by the Congress to
General Gage in October, 1774, remonstrating against the erection of
fortifications in Boston, in which they say, "We entreat your Excellency
to consider what a tendency this conduct must have to irritate and force
_a free people_, hitherto well disposed to peaceable measures, into
hostilities." From this expression Mr. Everett argues that the Congress
considered themselves the representatives of "a people." But, by
reference to the proceedings of the Congress, he might readily have
ascertained that the letter to General Gage was written in behalf of
"_the town of Boston and Province of Massachusetts Bay_," the people of
which were "considered by all America as suffering in the common cause
for their noble and spirited opposition to oppressive acts of
Parliament." The avowed object was "to entreat his Excellency, from the
assurance we have of the peaceable disposition of _the inhabitants of
the town of Boston and of the Province of Massachusetts Bay_, to
discontinue his fortifications."[37] These were the "people" referred to
by the Congress; and the children of the Pilgrims, who occupied at that
period the town of Boston and Province of Massachusetts Bay, would have
been not a little astonished to be reckoned as "one people," in any
other respect than that of the "common cause," with the Roman Catholics
of Maryland, the Episcopalians of Virginia, the Quakers of Pennsylvania,
or the Baptists of Rhode Island.

The other citation of Mr. Everett is from the first sentence of the
Declaration of Independence: "When in the course of human events it
becomes necessary for _one people_ to dissolve the political bands which
have connected them with another," etc., etc. This, he says,
characterizes "the good people" of the colonies as "one people."

Plainly, it does no such thing. The misconception is so palpable as
scarcely to admit of serious answer. The Declaration of Independence
opens with a general proposition. "One people" is equivalent to saying
"_any_ people." The use of the correlatives "one" and "another" was the
simple and natural way of stating this general proposition. "One people"
applies, and was obviously intended to apply, to all cases of the same
category--to that of New Hampshire, or Delaware, or South Carolina, or
of any other people existing or to exist, and whether acting separately
or in concert. It applies to any case, and all cases, of dissolution of
political bands, as well as to the case of the British colonies. It does
not, either directly or by implication, assert their unification, and
has no bearing whatever upon the question.

When the colonies united in sending representatives to a Congress in
Philadelphia, there was no purpose--no suggestion of a purpose--to merge
their separate individuality in one consolidated mass. No such idea
existed, or with their known opinions could have existed. They did not
assume to become a united colony or province, but styled themselves
"united colonies"--colonies united for purposes of mutual counsel and
defense, as the New England colonies had been united more than a hundred
years before. It was as "_United States_"--not as a state, or united
people--that these colonies--still distinct and politically independent
of each other--asserted and achieved their independence of the
mother-country. As "United States" they adopted the Articles of
Confederation, in which the separate sovereignty, freedom, and
independence of each was distinctly asserted. They were "united States"
when Great Britain acknowledged the absolute freedom and independence of
each, distinctly and separately recognized by name. France and Spain
were parties to the same treaty, and the French and Spanish idioms still
express and perpetuate, more exactly than the English, the true idea
intended to be embodied in the title--_les Etats Unis_, or _los Estados
Unidos_--the States united.

It was without any change of title--still as "United States"--without
any sacrifice of individuality--without any compromise of
sovereignty--that the same parties entered into a new and amended
compact with one another under the present Constitution. Larger and more
varied powers were conferred upon the common Government for the purpose
of insuring "a more perfect union"--not for that of destroying or
impairing the integrity of the contracting members.

The point which now specially concerns the argument is the historical
fact that, in all these changes of circumstances and of government,
there has never been one single instance of action by the "people of the
United States in the aggregate," or as one body. Before the era of
independence, whatever was done by the people of the colonies was done
by the people of each colony separately and independently of each other,
although in union by their delegates for certain specified purposes.
Since the assertion of their independence, the people of the United
States have never acted otherwise than as the people of each State,
severally and separately. The Articles of Confederation were established
and ratified by the several States, either through conventions of their
people or through the State Legislatures. The Constitution which
superseded those articles was framed, as we have seen, by delegates
chosen and empowered by the several States, and was ratified by
conventions of the people of the same States--all acting in entire
independence of one another. This ratification alone gave it force and
validity. Without the approval and ratification of the people of the
States, it would have been, as Mr. Madison expressed it, "of no more
consequence than the paper on which it was written." It was never
submitted to "the people of the United States in the aggregate," or _as
a people_. Indeed, no such political community as the people of the
United States in the aggregate exists at this day or ever did exist.
Senators in Congress confessedly represent the States as equal units.
The House of Representatives is not a body of representatives of "the
people of the United States," as often erroneously asserted; but the
Constitution, in the second section of its first article, expressly
declares that it "shall be composed of members chosen by _the people of
the several States_."

Nor is it true that the President and Vice-President are elected, as it
is sometimes vaguely stated, by vote of the "whole people" of the Union.
Their election is even more unlike what such a vote would be than that
of the representatives, who in numbers at least represent the strength
of their respective States. In the election of President and
Vice-President the Constitution (Article II) prescribes that "_each
State_ shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a number of electors" for the purpose of choosing a President
and Vice-President. The number of these electors is based partly upon
the equal sovereignty, partly upon the unequal population of the
respective States.

It is, then, absolutely true that there has never been any such thing as
a vote of "the people of the United States in the aggregate"; no such
people is recognized by the Constitution; and no such political
community has ever existed. It is equally true that no officer or
department of the General Government formed by the Constitution derives
authority from a majority of the whole people of the United States, or
has ever been chosen by such majority. As little as any other is the
United States Government a government of a majority of the mass.


[Footnote 35: Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol. i, chap.
ix.]

[Footnote 36: Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol. i, chap.
ix.]

[Footnote 37: "American Archives," fourth series, vol. i, p. 908.]




CHAPTER V.

    The Preamble to the Constitution.--"We, the People."


The preamble to the Constitution proposed by the Convention of 1787 is
in these words:

    "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more
    perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity,
    provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and
    secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,
    do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
    of America."

The phraseology of this preamble has been generally regarded as the
stronghold of the advocates of consolidation. It has been interpreted as
meaning that "we, the people of the United States," as a collective
body, or as a "nation," in our aggregate capacity, had "ordained and
established" the Constitution _over_ the States.

This interpretation constituted, in the beginning, the most serious
difficulty in the way of the ratification of the Constitution. It was
probably this to which that sturdy patriot, Samuel Adams, of
Massachusetts, alluded, when he wrote to Richard Henry Lee, "I stumble
at the threshold." Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention, on the
third day of the session, and in the very opening of the debate,
attacked it vehemently. He said, speaking of the system of government
set forth in the proposed Constitution:

    "That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear;
    and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very
    striking. I have the highest veneration for those gentlemen [its
    authors]; but, sir, give me leave to demand, What right had they
    to say, _We, the people_? My political curiosity, exclusive of
    my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask,
    Who authorized them to speak the language of '_We, the people_,'
    instead of _We, the States_? States are the characteristics and
    the soul of a confederation. If the States be not the agents of
    this compact, it must be one great consolidated national
    government of the people of all the States."[38]

Again, on the next day, with reference to the same subject, he said:
"When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation
was obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend on
this. Have they said, We, the States? Have they made a proposal of a
compact between States? If they had, this would be a confederation: it
is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns,
sir, on that poor little thing--the expression, 'We, the people,'
instead of the States of America."[39]

The same difficulty arose in other minds and in other conventions.

The scruples of Mr. Adams were removed by the explanations of others,
and by the assurance of the adoption of the amendments thought
necessary--especially of that declaratory safeguard afterward embodied
in the tenth amendment--to be referred to hereafter.

Mr. Henry's objection was thus answered by Mr. Madison:

    "Who are parties to it [the Constitution]? The people--but _not
    the people as composing one great body_; but the people as
    composing _thirteen sovereignties_: were it, as the gentleman
    [Mr. Henry] asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a
    majority of the people would be sufficient for its
    establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the
    remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even
    if they unanimously reprobated it: were it such a government as
    is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this
    State, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it;
    but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own
    consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a
    government established by the thirteen States of America, not
    through the intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people
    at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the
    existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing
    system has been derived from the dependent, derivative authority
    of the Legislatures of the States, whereas this is derived from
    the superior power of the people."[40]

It must be remembered that this was spoken by one of the leading members
of the Convention which formed the Constitution, within a few months
after that instrument was drawn up. Mr. Madison's hearers could readily
appreciate his clear answer to the objection made. The "people" intended
were those of the respective States--the only organized communities of
people exercising sovereign powers of government; and the idea intended
was the ratification and "establishment" of the Constitution by direct
act of the people in their conventions, instead of by act of their
Legislatures, as in the adoption of the Articles of Confederation. The
explanation seems to have been as satisfactory as it was simple and
intelligible. Mr. Henry, although he fought to the last against the
ratification of the Constitution, did not again bring forward this
objection, for the reason, no doubt, that it had been fully answered.
Indeed, we hear no more of the interpretation which suggested it, from
that period, for nearly half a century, when it was revived, and has
since been employed, to sustain that theory of a "great consolidated
national government" which Mr. Madison so distinctly repudiated.

But _we_ have access to sources of information, not then available,
which make the intent and meaning of the Constitution still plainer.
When Mr. Henry made his objection, and Mr. Madison answered it, the
journal of the Philadelphia Convention had not been published. That body
had sat with closed doors, and among its rules had been the following:

    "That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the
    sitting of the House, without the leave of the House.

    "That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.

    "That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise
    published or communicated, without leave."[41]

We can understand, by reference to these rules, how Mr. Madison should
have felt precluded from making allusion to anything that had occurred
during the proceedings of the Convention. But the secrecy then covering
those proceedings has long since been removed. The manuscript journal,
which was intrusted to the keeping of General Washington, President of
the Convention, was deposited by him, nine years afterward, among the
archives of the State Department. It has since been published, and we
can trace for ourselves the origin, and ascertain the exact
significance, of that expression, "We, the people," on which Patrick
Henry thought the fate of America might depend, and which has been so
grossly perverted in later years from its true intent.

The original language of the preamble, reported to the Convention by a
committee of five appointed to prepare the Constitution, as we find it
in the proceedings of August 6, 1787, was as follows:

    "We, the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
    Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York,
    New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
    Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and
    establish, the following Constitution for the government of
    ourselves and our posterity."

There can be no question here what was meant: it was "_the people of the
States_," designated by name, that were to "ordain, declare, and
establish" the compact of union for themselves and their posterity.
There is no ambiguity nor uncertainty in the language; nor was there any
difference in the Convention as to the use of it. The preamble, as
perfected, was submitted to vote on the next day, and, as the journal
informs us, "it passed _unanimously_ in the affirmative."

There was no subsequent change of opinion on the subject. The reason for
the modification afterward made in the language is obvious. It was found
that unanimous ratification of all the States could not be expected, and
it was determined, as we have already seen, that the consent of _nine_
States should suffice for the establishment of the new compact "between
the States so ratifying the same." _Any_ nine would be sufficient to put
the proposed government in operation as to them, thus leaving the
remainder of the thirteen to pursue such course as might be to each
preferable. When this conclusion was reached, it became manifestly
impracticable to designate beforehand the consenting States by name.
Hence, in the final revision, the specific enumeration of the thirteen
States was omitted, and the equivalent phrase "people of the United
States" inserted in its place--plainly meaning the people of such States
as should agree to unite on the terms proposed. The imposing fabric of
political delusion, which has been erected on the basis of this simple
transaction, disappears before the light of historical record.

Could the authors of the Constitution have foreseen the perversion to be
made of their obvious meaning, it might have been prevented by an easy
periphrasis--such as, "We, the people of the States hereby united," or
something to the same effect. The word "people" in 1787, as in 1880,
was, as it is, a collective noun, employed indiscriminately, either as a
unit in such expressions as "this people," "a free people," etc., or in
a distributive sense, as applied to the citizens or inhabitants of one
state or country or a number of states or countries. When the Convention
of the colony of Virginia, in 1774, instructed their delegates to the
Congress that was to meet in Philadelphia, "to obtain a redress of those
grievances, without which _the people of America_ can neither be safe,
free, nor happy," it was certainly not intended to convey the idea that
the people of the American Continent, or even of the British colonies in
America, constituted one political community. Nor did Edmund Burke have
any such meaning when he said, in his celebrated speech in Parliament,
in 1775, "The people of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen."

We need go no further than to the familiar language of King James's
translation of the Bible for multiplied illustrations of this
indiscriminate use of the term, both in its collective and distributive
senses. For example, King Solomon prays at the dedication of the temple:

    "That thine eyes may be open unto the supplication ... of _thy
    people_ Israel, to hearken unto them in all that they call for
    unto thee. For thou didst separate them from among _all the
    people_ of the earth, to be thine inheritance." (1 Kings viii,
    52, 53.)

Here we have both the singular and plural senses of the same word--_one
people_, Israel, and _all the people of the earth_--in two consecutive
sentences. In "the people of the earth," the word _people_ is used
precisely as it is in the expression "the people of the United States"
in the preamble to the Constitution, and has exactly the same force and
effect. If in the latter case it implies that the people of
Massachusetts and those of Virginia were mere fractional parts of one
political community, it must in the former imply a like unity among the
Philistines, the Egyptians, the Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians,
and all other "people of the earth," except the Israelites. Scores of
examples of the same sort might be cited if it were necessary.[42]

In the Declaration of Independence we find precisely analogous instances
of the employment of the singular form for both singular and plural
senses--"one people," "a free people," in the former, and "the good
people of these colonies" in the latter. Judge Story, in the excess of
his zeal in behalf of a theory of consolidation, bases upon this last
expression the conclusion that the assertion of independence was the act
of "_the whole people_ of the united colonies" as a unit; overlooking or
suppressing the fact that, in the very same sentence, the colonies
declare themselves "free and independent _States_"--not a free and
independent _state_--repeating the words "independent States" three
times.

If, however, the Declaration of Independence constituted one "_whole
people_" of the colonies, then that geographical section of it, formerly
known as the colony of Maryland, was in a state of revolt or "rebellion"
against the others, as well as against Great Britain, from 1778 to 1781,
during which period Maryland refused to ratify or be bound by the
Articles of Confederation, which, according to this theory, was binding
upon her, as a majority of the "whole people" had adopted it. _A
fortiori_, North Carolina and Rhode Island were in a state of rebellion
in 1789-'90, while they declined to ratify and recognize the
Constitution adopted by the other eleven fractions of this united
people. Yet no hint of any such pretension--of any claim of authority
over them by the majority--of any assertion of "the supremacy of the
Union"--is to be found in any of the records of that period.

It might have been unnecessary to bestow so much time and attention in
exposing the absurdity of the deductions from a theory so false, but for
the fact that it has been specious enough to secure the countenance of
men of such distinction as Webster, Story, and Everett; and that it has
been made the plea to justify a bloody war against that principle of
State sovereignty and independence, which was regarded by the fathers of
the Union as the corner-stone of the structure and the basis of the hope
for its perpetuity.


[Footnote 38: Elliott's "Debates" (Washington edition, 1836), vol. iii,
p. 54.]

[Footnote 39: Ibid., p. 72.]

[Footnote 40: Elliott's "Debates" (Washington edition, 1836), vol. iii,
pp. 114, 115.]

[Footnote 41: Journal of the Federal Convention, May 29, 1787, 1
Elliott's "Debates."]

[Footnote 42: For a very striking illustration, see Deuteronomy vii, 6,
7.]




CHAPTER VI.

    The Preamble to the Constitution--subject continued.--Growth of
    the Federal Government and Accretions of Power.--Revival of Old
    Errors.--Mistakes and Misstatements.--Webster, Story, and
    Everett.--Who "ordained and established" the Constitution?


In the progressive growth of the Government of the United States in
power, splendor, patronage, and consideration abroad, men have been led
to exalt the place of the _Government_ above that of the _States_ which
_created_ it. Those who would understand the true principles of the
Constitution can not afford to lose sight of the essential _plurality_
of idea invariably implied in the term "United States," wherever it is
used in that instrument. No such unit as the United States is ever
mentioned therein. We read that "no title of nobility shall be granted
by the United States, and no person holding any office of profit or
trust under _them_ shall, without the consent of Congress, accept,"
etc.[43] "The President ... shall not receive, within that period, any
other emolument from the United States, or any of _them_."[44] "The laws
of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under
_their_ authority," etc.[45] "Treason against the United States shall
consist only in levying war against _them_, or in adhering to _their_
enemies."[46] The Federal character of the Union is expressed by this
very phraseology, which recognizes the distinct integrity of its
members, not as fractional parts of one great unit, but as component
units of an association. So clear was this to contemporaries, that it
needed only to be pointed out to satisfy their scruples. We have seen
how effectual was the answer of Mr. Madison to the objections raised by
Patrick Henry. Mr. Tench Coxe, of Pennsylvania, one of the ablest
political writers of his generation, in answering a similar objection,
said: "If the Federal Convention had meant to exclude the idea of
'union'--that is, of several and separate sovereignties joining in a
confederacy--they would have said, 'We, the people of America'; for
union necessarily involves the idea of competent States, which complete
consolidation excludes."[47]

More than forty years afterward, when the gradual accretions to the
power, _prestige_, and influence of the central Government had grown to
such extent as to begin to hide from view the purposes for which it was
founded, those very objections, which in the beginning had been
answered, abandoned, and thrown aside, were brought to light again, and
presented to the country as expositions of the true meaning of the
Constitution. Mr. Webster, one of the first to revive some of those
early misconceptions so long ago refuted as to be almost forgotten, and
to breathe into them such renewed vitality as his commanding genius
could impart, in the course of his well-known debate in the Senate with
Mr. Hayne, in 1830, said:

    "It can not be shown that the Constitution is a compact between
    State governments. The Constitution itself, in its very front,
    refutes that proposition: it declares that it is ordained and
    established by the people of the United States. So far from
    saying that it is established by the governments of the several
    States, it does not even say that it is established by the
    people of the several States; but it pronounces that it is
    established by the people of the United States in the
    aggregate."[48]

Judge Story about the same time began to advance the same theory, but
more guardedly and with less rashness of statement. It was not until
thirty years after that it attained its full development in the
annunciations of sectionists rather than statesmen. Two such may suffice
as specimens:

Mr. Edward Everett, in his address delivered on the 4th of July, 1861,
and already referred to, says of the Constitution: "That instrument does
not purport to be a 'compact,' but a constitution of government. It
appears, in its first sentence, not to have been entered into by the
States, but to have been ordained and established by the people of the
United States for themselves and their 'posterity.' The States are not
named in it; nearly all the characteristic powers of sovereignty are
expressly granted to the General Government and expressly prohibited to
the States."[49] Mr. Everett afterward repeats the assertion that "the
States are not named in it."[50]

But a yet more extraordinary statement of the "one people" theory is
found in a letter addressed to the London "Times," in the same year,
1861, on the "Causes of the Civil War," by Mr. John Lothrop Motley,
afterward Minister to the Court of St. James. In this letter Mr. Motley
says of the Constitution of the United States:

    "It was not a compact. Who ever heard of a compact to which
    there were no parties? or who ever heard of a compact made by a
    single party with himself? Yet the name of no State is mentioned
    in the whole document; the States themselves are only mentioned
    to receive commands or prohibitions; and the 'people of the
    United States' is the single party by whom alone the instrument
    is executed.

    "The Constitution was not drawn up by the States, it was not
    promulgated in the name of the States, it was not ratified by
    the States. The States never acceded to it, and possess no power
    to secede from it. It was 'ordained and established' over the
    States by a power superior to the States; by the people of the
    whole land in their aggregate capacity," etc.

It would be very hard to condense a more amazing amount of audacious and
reckless falsehood in the same space. In all Mr. Motley's array of bold
assertions, there is not one single truth--unless it be, perhaps, that
"the Constitution was not drawn up by the States." Yet it was drawn up
by their delegates, and it is of such material as this, derived from
writers whose reputation gives a semblance of authenticity to their
statements, that history is constructed and transmitted.

One of the most remarkable--though, perhaps, the least important--of
these misstatements is that which is also twice repeated by Mr.
Everett--that the name of no State is mentioned in the whole document,
or, as he puts it, "the States are not named in it." Very little careful
examination would have sufficed to find, in the second section of the
very first article of the Constitution, the names of every one of the
thirteen then existent States distinctly mentioned, with the number of
representatives to which each would be entitled, in case of acceding to
the Constitution, until a census of their population could be taken. The
mention there made of the States by name is of no special significance;
it has no bearing upon any question of principle; and the denial of it
is a purely gratuitous illustration of the recklessness of those from
whom it proceeds, and the low estimate put on the intelligence of those
addressed. It serves, however, to show how much credence is to be given
to their authority as interpreters and expounders.

The reason why the names of the ratifying States were not mentioned has
already been given: it was simply because it was not known which States
would ratify. But, as regards mention of "the several States," "each
State," "any State," "particular States," and the like, the Constitution
is full of it. I am informed, by one who has taken the pains to examine
carefully that document with reference to this very point, that--without
including any mention of "the United States" or of "foreign states," and
excluding also the amendments--the Constitution, in its original draft,
makes mention of the States, _as_ States, no less than _seventy_ times;
and of these seventy times, only _three_ times in the way of prohibition
of the exercise of a power. In fact, it is full of statehood. Leave out
all mention of the States--I make no mere verbal point or quibble, but
mean the States in their separate, several, distinct capacity--and what
would remain would be of less account than the play of the Prince of
Denmark with the part of _Hamlet_ omitted.

But, leaving out of consideration for the moment all minor questions,
the vital and essential point of inquiry now is, by what authority the
Constitution was "ordained and established." Mr. Webster says it was
done "by the people of the United States in the aggregate;" Mr. Everett
repeats substantially the same thing; and Mr. Motley, taking a step
further, says that "it was 'ordained and established' by a _power
superior to the States_--by the people of the whole land in their
aggregate capacity."

The advocates of this mischievous dogma assume the existence of an
unauthorized, undefined power of a "whole people," or "people of the
whole land," operating through the agency of the Philadelphia
Convention, to impose its decrees upon the States. They forget, in the
first place, that this Convention was composed of delegates, not of any
one people, but of distinct States; and, in the second place, that their
action had no force or validity whatever--in the words of Mr. Madison,
that it was of no more consequence than the paper on which it was
written--until approved and ratified by a sufficient number of States.
The meaning of the preamble, "We, the people of the United States ... do
ordain and establish this Constitution," is ascertained, fixed, and
defined by the final article: "The ratification of the conventions of
_nine States_ shall be sufficient for the _establishment_ of this
Constitution between _the States so ratifying_ the same." If it was
already established, what need was there of further establishment? It
was not ordained or established at all, until ratified by the requisite
number of States. The announcement in the preamble of course had
reference to that expected ratification, without which the preamble
would have been as void as the body of the instrument. The assertion
that "it was not ratified by the States" is so plainly and positively
contrary, to well-known fact--so inconsistent with the language of the
Constitution itself--that it is hard to imagine what was intended by it,
unless it was to take advantage of the presumed ignorance of the subject
among the readers of an English journal, to impose upon them, a
preposterous fiction. It was State ratification alone--the ratification
of the _people_ of each State, independently of all other people--that
gave force, vitality, and validity to the Constitution.

Judge Story, referring to the fact that the voters assembled in the
several States, asks where else they could have assembled--a pertinent
question on our theory, but the idea he evidently intended to convey was
that the voting of "the people" by States was a mere matter of
geographical necessity, or local convenience; just as the people of a
State vote by counties; the people of a county by towns, "beats," or
"precincts"; and the people of a city by wards. It is hardly necessary
to say that, in all organized republican communities, majorities govern.
When we speak of the will of the people of a community, we mean the will
of a majority, which, when constitutionally expressed, is binding on any
minority of the same community.

If, then, we can conceive, and admit for a moment, the possibility that,
when the Constitution was under consideration, the people of the United
States were politically "one people"--a collective unit--two deductions
are clearly inevitable: In the first place, each geographical division
of this great community would have been entitled to vote according to
its relative population; and, in the second, the expressed will of the
legal majority would have been binding upon the whole. A denial of the
first proposition would be a denial of common justice and equal rights;
a denial of the second would be to destroy all government and establish
mere anarchy.

Now, _neither_ of these principles was practiced or proposed or even
imagined in the case of the action of the people of the United States
(if they were one political community) upon the proposed Constitution.
On the contrary, seventy thousand people in the State of Delaware had
precisely the same weight--one vote--in its ratification, as seven
hundred thousand (and more) in Virginia, or four hundred thousand in
Pennsylvania. Would not this have been an intolerable grievance and
wrong--would no protest have been uttered against it--if these had been
fractional parts of one community of people?

Again, while the will of the consenting majority _within_ any State was
binding on the opposing minority in the same, no majority, or
majorities, of States or people had any control whatever upon the people
of _another_ State. The Constitution was established, not "_over_ the
States," as asserted by Motley, but "_between_ the States," and only
"between _the States so ratifying_ the same." Little Rhode Island, with
her seventy thousand inhabitants, was not a mere fractional part of "the
people of the whole land," during the period for which she held aloof,
but was as free, independent, and unmolested, as any other sovereign
power, notwithstanding the majority of more than three millions of "the
whole people" on the other side of the question.

Before the ratification of the Constitution--when there was some excuse
for an imperfect understanding or misconception of the terms
proposed--Mr. Madison thus answered, in advance, the objections made on
the ground of this misconception, and demonstrated its fallacy. He
wrote:

    "That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these
    terms are understood by objectors--the act of the people, as
    forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate
    nation--is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to
    result neither from the decision of a _majority_ of the people
    of the Union nor from that of a _majority_ of _the States_. It
    must result from the _unanimous_ assent of the several _States
    that are parties to it_, differing no otherwise from their
    ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the
    legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves.
    Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming one
    nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
    United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the
    majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of
    the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the
    individual votes or by considering the will of the majority of
    the States as evidence of the will of a majority of the people
    of the United States. Neither of these has been adopted. Each
    State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a
    sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound
    by its own voluntary act."[51]

It is a tedious task to have to expose the misstatements, both of fact
and of principle, which have occupied so much attention, but it is
rendered necessary by the extent to which they have been imposed upon
the acceptance of the public, through reckless assertion and confident
and incessant repetition.

    "'I remember,' says Mr. Webster, 'to have heard Chief-Justice
    Marshall ask counsel, who was insisting upon the authority of an
    act of legislation, _if he thought an act of legislation could
    create or destroy a fact, or change the truth of history_?
    "Would it alter the fact," said he, "if a Legislature should
    solemnly enact that Mr. Hume never wrote the History of
    England?" A Legislature may alter the law,' continues Mr.
    Webster, 'but no power can reverse a fact.' Hence, if the
    Convention of 1787 had expressly declared that the Constitution
    was [to be] ordained by 'the people of the United States _in the
    aggregate_,' or by the people of America as one nation, this
    would not have destroyed the fact that it was ratified by each
    State for itself, and that each State was bound only by 'its own
    voluntary act.'" (Bledsoe.)

But the Convention, as we have seen, said no such thing. No such
community as "the people of the United States in the aggregate" is known
to it, or ever acted on it. It was ordained, established, and ratified
by the people of the several States; and no theories or assertions of a
later generation can change or conceal this fixed fact, as it stands
revealed in the light of contemporaneous records.


[Footnote 43: Article I, section 9, clause 8.]

[Footnote 44: Article II, section 1, clause 6.]

[Footnote 45: Article III, section 2.]

[Footnote 46: Article III, section 3.]

[Footnote 47: "American Museum," February, 1788.]

[Footnote 48: Benton's "Abridgment," vol. x, p. 448.]

[Footnote 49: See address by Edward Everett at the Academy of Music, New
York, July 4, 1861.]

[Footnote 50: Ibid.]

[Footnote 51: "Federalist," No. xxxix.]




CHAPTER VII.

    Verbal Cavils and Criticisms.--"Compact," "Confederacy,"
    "Accession," etc.--The "New Vocabulary."--The Federal
    Constitution a Compact, and the States acceded to it.--Evidence
    of the Constitution itself and of Contemporary Records.


I have habitually spoken of the Federal Constitution as a compact, and
of the parties to it as sovereign States. These terms should not, and in
earlier times would not, have required explanation or vindication. But
they have been called in question by the modern school of consolidation.
These gentlemen admit that the Government under the Articles of
Confederation was a compact. Mr. Webster, in his rejoinder to Mr. Hayne,
on the 27th of January, 1830, said:

    "When the gentleman says the Constitution is a compact between
    the States, he uses language exactly applicable to the old
    Confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789.
    He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The
    Confederation was, in strictness, a compact; the States, as
    States, were parties to it. We had no other General Government.
    But that was found insufficient and inadequate to the public
    exigencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and undertook
    to establish a better. They undertook to form a General
    Government, which should stand on a new basis--not a
    confederacy, not a league, not a compact between States, but a
    Constitution."[52]

Again, in his discussion with Mr. Calhoun, three years afterward, he
vehemently reiterates the same denial. Of the Constitution, he says:
"Does it call itself a compact? Certainly not. It uses the word
'compact' but once, and that when it declares that the States shall
enter into no compact.[53] Does it call itself a league, a confederacy,
a subsisting treaty between the States? Certainly not. There is not a
particle of such language in all its pages."[54]

The artist, who wrote under his picture the legend "This is a horse,"
made effectual provision against any such cavil as that preferred by Mr.
Webster and his followers, that the Constitution is not a compact,
because it is not "so nominated in the bond." As well as I can
recollect, there is no passage in the "Iliad" or the "AEneid" in which
either of those great works "calls itself," or is called by its author,
an epic poem, yet this would scarcely be accepted as evidence that they
are not epic poems. In an examination of Mr. Webster's remarks, I do not
find that he announces them to be either a speech or an argument; yet
their claim to both these titles will hardly be disputed--
notwithstanding the verbal criticism on the Constitution just quoted.

The distinction attempted to be drawn between the language proper to a
confederation and that belonging to a constitution, as indicating two
different ideas, will not bear the test of examination and application
to the case of the United States. It has been fully shown, in previous
chapters, that the terms "Union," "Federal Union," "Federal
Constitution," "Constitution of the Federal Government," and the like,
were used--not merely in colloquial, informal speech, but in public
proceedings and official documents--with reference to the Articles of
Confederation, as freely as they have since been employed under the
present Constitution. The former Union was--as Mr. Webster expressly
admits--as nobody denies--a compact between States, yet it nowhere
"calls itself" "a compact"; the word does not occur in it even the one
time that it occurs in the present Constitution, although the
contracting States are in both prohibited from entering into any
"treaty, confederation, or alliance" with one another, or with any
foreign power, without the consent of Congress; and the contracting or
constituent parties are termed "United States" in the one just as in the
other.

Mr. Webster is particularly unfortunate in his criticisms upon what he
terms the "new vocabulary," in which the Constitution is styled a
compact, and the States which ratified it are spoken of as having
"acceded" to it. In the same speech, last quoted, he says:

    "This word 'accede,' not found either in the Constitution itself
    or in the ratification of it by any one of the States, has been
    chosen for use here, doubtless not without a well-considered
    purpose. The natural converse of accession is secession; and
    therefore, when it is stated that the people of the States
    acceded to the Union, it may be more plausibly argued that they
    may secede from it. If, in adopting the Constitution, nothing
    was done but acceding to a compact, nothing would seem
    necessary, in order to break it up, but to secede from the same
    compact. But the term is wholly out of place. Accession, as a
    word applied to political associations, implies coming into a
    league, treaty, or confederacy, by one hitherto a stranger to
    it; and secession implies departing from such league or
    confederacy. The people of the United States have used no such
    form of expression in establishing the present Government."[55]

Repeating and reiterating in many forms what is substantially the same
idea, and attributing the use of the terms which he attacks to an
ulterior purpose, Mr. Webster says:

    "This is the reason, sir, which makes it necessary to abandon
    the use of constitutional language for a new vocabulary, and to
    substitute, in the place of plain, historical facts, a series of
    assumptions. This is the reason why it is necessary to give new
    names to things; to speak of the Constitution, not as a
    constitution, but as a compact; and of the ratifications by the
    people, not as ratifications, but as acts of accession."[56]

In these and similar passages, Mr. Webster virtually concedes that, if
the Constitution _were_ a compact; if the Union _were_ a confederacy; if
the States _had_, as States, severally acceded to it--all which
propositions he denies--then the sovereignty of the States and their
right to secede from the Union would be deducible.

Now, it happens that these very terms--"compact," "confederacy,"
"accede," and the like--were the terms in familiar use by the authors of
the Constitution and their associates with reference to that instrument
and its ratification. Other writers, who have examined the subject since
the late war gave it an interest which it had never commanded before,
have collected such an array of evidence in this behalf that it is
necessary only to cite a few examples.

The following language of Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, in the Convention
of 1787, has already been referred to: "If nine out of thirteen States
can dissolve _the compact_, six out of nine will be just as able to
dissolve _the new one_ hereafter."

Mr. Gouverneur Morris, one of the most pronounced advocates of a strong
central government, in the Convention, said: "He came here to form _a
compact_ for the good of Americans. He was ready to do so with all the
States. He hoped and believed they all would enter into such a
_compact_. If they would not, he would be ready to join with any States
that would. But, as the _compact_ was to be voluntary, it is in vain for
the Eastern States to insist on what the Southern States will never
agree to."[57]

Mr. Madison, while inclining to a strong government, said: "In the case
of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of _the pact_
has always been understood," etc.[58]

Mr. Hamilton, in the "Federalist," repeatedly speaks of the new
government as a "_confederate republic_" and a "_confederacy_," and
calls the Constitution a "compact." (See especially Nos. IX. and LXXXV.)

General Washington--who was not only the first President under the new
Constitution, but who had presided over the Convention that drew it
up--in letters written soon after the adjournment of that body to
friends in various States, referred to the Constitution as a _compact_
or treaty, and repeatedly uses the terms "accede" and "accession," and
once the term "secession."

He asks what the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia would do, "if
nine other States should _accede_ to the Constitution."

Luther Martin, of Maryland, informs us that, in a committee of the
General Convention of 1787, protesting against the proposed violation of
the principles of the "perpetual union" already formed under the
Articles of Confederation, he made use of such language as this:

    "Will you tell us we ought to trust you because you now enter
    into a solemn _compact_ with us? This you have done before, and
    now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you now make an appeal
    to the Supreme Being, and call on Him to guarantee your
    observance of this _compact_? The same you have formerly done
    for your observance of the Articles of Confederation, which you
    are now violating in the most wanton manner."[59]

It is needless to multiply the proofs that abound in the writings of the
"fathers" to show that Mr. Webster's "new vocabulary" was the very
language they familiarly used. Let two more examples suffice, from
authority higher than that of any individual speaker or writer, however
eminent--from authority second only, if at all inferior, to that of the
text of the Constitution itself--that is, from the acts or ordinances of
ratification by the States. They certainly ought to have been
conclusive, and should not have been unknown to Mr. Webster, for they
are the language of Massachusetts, the State which he represented in the
Senate, and of New Hampshire, the State of his nativity.

The ratification of Massachusetts is expressed in the following terms:

    "COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

    "The Convention, having impartially discussed and fully
    considered a Constitution for the United States of America,
    reported to Congress by the convention of delegates from the
    United States of America, and submitted to us by a resolution of
    the General Court of the said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day
    of October last past, and acknowledging with grateful hearts the
    goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the
    people of the United States, in the course of his Providence, an
    opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or
    surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn COMPACT with
    each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in
    order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure
    domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote
    the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
    themselves and their posterity--do, in the name and in behalf of
    the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, assent to and
    ratify the said Constitution for the United States of America."

The ratification of New Hampshire is expressed in precisely the same
words, save only the difference of date of the resolution of the
Legislature (or "General Court") referred to, and also the use of the
word "State" instead of "Commonwealth." Both distinctly accept it as a
_compact_ of the States "with each other"--which Mr. Webster, a son of
New Hampshire and a Senator from Massachusetts, declared it was not; and
not only so, but he repudiated the very "vocabulary" from which the
words expressing the doctrine were taken.

It would not need, however, this abounding wealth of contemporaneous
exposition--it does not require the employment of any particular words
in the Constitution--to prove that it was drawn up as a compact between
sovereign States entering into a confederacy with each other, and that
they ratified and acceded to it separately, severally, and
independently. The very structure of the whole instrument and the facts
attending its preparation and ratification would suffice. The language
of the final article would have been quite enough: "The ratification of
the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment
of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." This is
not the "language" of a superior imposing a mandate upon subordinates.
The consent of the contracting parties is necessary to its validity, and
then it becomes not the acceptance and recognition of an authority
"_over_" them--as Mr. Motley represents--but of a compact _between_
them. The simple word "between" is incompatible with any other idea than
that of a compact by independent parties.

If it were possible that any doubt could still exist, there is one
provision in the Constitution which stamps its character as a compact
too plainly for cavil or question. The Constitution, which had already
provided for the representation of the States in both Houses of
Congress, thereby bringing the matter of representation within the power
of amendment, in its fifth article contains a stipulation that "no
State, without its [own] consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate." If this is not a compact between the States,
the smaller States have no guarantee for the preservation of their
equality of representation in the United States Senate. If the
obligation of a contract does not secure it, the guarantee itself is
liable to amendment, and may be swept away at the will of three fourths
of the States, without wrong to any party--for, according to this
theory, there is no party of the second part.


[Footnote 52: Gales and Seaton's "Register of Congressional Debates,"
vol. vi, Part I, p. 93.]

[Footnote 53: The words "with another State or with a foreign power"
should have been added to make this statement accurate.]

[Footnote 54: "Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part I, p. 563.]

[Footnote 55: "Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part I, p. 566.]

[Footnote 56: Ibid., pp. 557, 558.]

[Footnote 57: "Madison Papers," pp. 1081, 1082.]

[Footnote 58: Ibid., p. 1184.]

[Footnote 59: Luther Martin's "Genuine Information," in Wilbur Curtiss's
"Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention," p. 29.]




CHAPTER VIII.

    Sovereignty.


"The term 'sovereign' or 'sovereignty,'" says Judge Story, "is used in
different senses, which often leads to a confusion of ideas, and
sometimes to very mischievous and unfounded conclusions." Without any
disrespect for Judge Story, or any disparagement of his great learning
and ability, it may safely be added that he and his disciples have
contributed not a little to the increase of this confusion of ideas and
the spread of these mischievous and unfounded conclusions. There is no
good reason whatever why it should be used in different senses, or why
there should be any confusion of ideas as to its meaning. Of all the
terms employed in political science, it is one of the most definite and
intelligible. The definition of it given by that accurate and lucid
publicist, Burlamaqui, is simple and satisfactory--that "sovereignty is
a right of commanding in the last resort in civil society."[60] The
original seat of this sovereignty he also declares to be in the people.
"But," he adds, "when once the people have transferred their right to a
sovereign [i.e., a monarch], they can not, without contradiction, be
supposed to continue still masters of it."[61] This is in strict accord
with the theory of American republicanism, the peculiarity of which is
that the people _never do_ transfer their right of sovereignty, either
in whole or in part. They only delegate to their governments the
exercise of such of its functions as may be necessary, subject always to
their own control, and to reassumption whenever such government fails to
fulfill the purposes for which it was instituted.

I think it has already been demonstrated that, in this country, the only
political community--the only independent corporate unit through which
the people can exercise their sovereignty, is the State. Minor
communities--as those of counties, cities, and towns--are merely
fractional subdivisions of the State; and these do not affect the
evidence that there was not such a political community as the "people of
the United States in the aggregate."

That the States were severally sovereign and independent when they were
united under the Articles of Confederation, is distinctly asserted in
those articles, and is admitted even by the extreme partisans of
consolidation. Of right, they are still sovereign, unless they have
surrendered or been divested of their sovereignty; and those who deny
the proposition have been vainly called upon to point out the process by
which they have divested themselves, or have been divested of it,
otherwise than by usurpation.

Since Webster spoke and Story wrote upon the subject, however, the
sovereignty of the States has been vehemently denied, or explained away
as only a partial, imperfect, mutilated sovereignty. Paradoxical
theories of "divided sovereignty" and "delegated sovereignty" have
arisen, to create that "confusion of ideas" and engender those
"mischievous and unfounded conclusions," of which Judge Story speaks.
Confounding the sovereign authority of the _people_ with the delegated
powers conferred by them upon their _governments_, we hear of a
Government of the United States "sovereign within its sphere," and of
State governments "sovereign in _their_ sphere"; of the surrender by the
States of _part_ of their sovereignty to the United States, and the
like. Now, if there be any one great principle pervading the Federal
Constitution, the State Constitutions, the writings of the fathers, the
whole American system, as clearly as the sunlight pervades the solar
system, it is that _no_ government is sovereign--that all governments
derive their powers from the people, and exercise them in subjection to
the will of the people--not a will expressed in any irregular, lawless,
tumultuary manner, but the will of the organized political community,
expressed through authorized and legitimate channels. The founders of
the American republics never conferred, nor intended to confer,
sovereignty upon either their State or Federal Governments.

If, then, the people of the States, in forming a Federal Union,
surrendered--or, to use Burlamaqui's term, transferred--or if they meant
to surrender or transfer--_part_ of their sovereignty, to whom was the
transfer made? Not to "the people of the United States in the
aggregate"; for there was no such people in existence, and they did not
create or constitute such a people by merger of themselves. Not to the
Federal Government; for they disclaimed, as a fundamental principle, the
sovereignty of any government. There was no such surrender, no such
transfer, in whole or in part, expressed or implied. They retained, and
intended to retain, their sovereignty in its integrity--undivided and
indivisible.

"But, indeed," says Mr. Motley, "the words 'sovereign' and 'sovereignty'
are purely inapplicable to the American system. In the Declaration of
Independence the provinces declare themselves 'free and independent
States,' but the men of those days knew that the word 'sovereign' was a
term of feudal origin. When their connection with a time-honored feudal
monarchy was abruptly severed, the word 'sovereign' had no meaning for
us."[62]

If this be true, "the men of those days" had a very extraordinary way of
expressing their conviction that the word "had no meaning for us." We
have seen that, in the very front of their Articles of Confederation,
they set forth the conspicuous declaration that each State retained "its
_sovereignty_, freedom, and independence."

Massachusetts--the State, I believe, of Mr. Motley's nativity and
citizenship--in her original Constitution, drawn up by "men of those
days," made this declaration:

    "The people inhabiting the territory formerly called the
    Province of Massachusetts Bay do hereby solemnly and mutually
    agree with each other to form themselves into a free,
    _sovereign_, and independent body politic, or State, by the name
    of _The Commonwealth of Massachusetts_."

New Hampshire, in her Constitution, as revised in 1792, had identically
the same declaration, except as regards the name of the State and the
word "State" instead of "Commonwealth."

Mr. Madison, one of the most distinguished of the men of that day and of
the advocates of the Constitution, in a speech already once referred to,
in the Virginia Convention of 1788, explained that "We, the people," who
were to establish the Constitution, were the people of "thirteen
SOVEREIGNTIES."[63]

In the "Federalist," he repeatedly employs the term--as, for example,
when he says: "Do they [the fundamental principles of the Confederation]
require that, in the establishment of the Constitution, the States
should be regarded as distinct and independent SOVEREIGNS? They _are_ so
regarded by the Constitution proposed."[64]

Alexander Hamilton--another contemporary authority, no less
illustrious--says, in the "Federalist":

    "It is inherent in the nature of _sovereignty_, not to be
    amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. This
    is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
    the exemption, as one of the attributes of _sovereignty_, is now
    enjoyed by the government of _every State_ in the Union."[65]

In the same paragraph he uses these terms, "sovereign" and
"sovereignty," repeatedly--always with reference to the States,
respectively and severally.

Benjamin Franklin advocated equality of suffrage in the Senate as a
means of securing "the _sovereignties_ of the individual States."[66]
James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said sovereignty "is in the people before
they make a Constitution, and remains in them," and described the people
as being "thirteen independent sovereignties."[67] Gouverneur Morris,
who was, as well as Wilson, one of the warmest advocates in the
Convention of a strong central government, spoke of the Constitution as
"a _compact_," and of the parties to it as "each enjoying _sovereign_
power."[68] Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, declared that the Government
"was instituted by a number of _sovereign States_."[69] Oliver
Ellsworth, of the same State, spoke of the States as "sovereign
bodies."[70] These were all eminent members of the Convention which
formed the Constitution.

There was scarcely a statesman of that period who did not leave on
record expressions of the same sort. But why multiply citations? It is
very evident that the "men of those days" entertained very different
views of sovereignty from those set forth by the "new lights" of our
day. Far from considering it a term of feudal origin, "purely
inapplicable to the American system," they seem to have regarded it as a
very vital principle in that system, and of necessity belonging to the
several States--and I do not find a single instance in which they
applied it to any political organization, except the States.

Their ideas were in entire accord with those of Vattel, who, in his
chapter "Of Nations or Sovereign States," writes, "Every _nation_ that
governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on
foreign power, is a _sovereign state_."[71]

In another part of the same chapter he gives a lucid statement of the
nature of a confederate republic, such as ours was designed to be. He
says:

    "Several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves
    together by a perpetual confederacy, without each in particular
    ceasing to be _a perfect state_. They will form together a
    federal republic: the deliberations in common will offer no
    violence to _the sovereignty of each member_, though they may,
    in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it,
    in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to
    be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfill the
    engagements into which he has very willingly entered."[72]

What this celebrated author means here by a person, is explained by a
subsequent passage: "The law of nations is the law of sovereigns; states
free and independent are moral persons."[73]


[Footnote 60: "Principes du Droit Politique," chap. v, section I; also,
chap. vii, section 1.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid., chap. vii, section 12.]

[Footnote 62: "Rebellion Record," vol. i, Documents, p. 211.]

[Footnote 63: Elliott's "Debates," vol. iii, p. 114, edition of 1836.]

[Footnote 64: "Federalist," No. xl.]

[Footnote 65: Ibid, No. lxxxi.]

[Footnote 66: See Elliott's "Debates," vol. v, p. 266.]

[Footnote 67: Ibid., vol. ii, p. 443.]

[Footnote 68: See "Life of Gouverneur Morris," vol. iii, p. 193.]

[Footnote 69: See "Writings of John Adams," vol. vii, letter of Roger
Sherman.]

[Footnote 70: See Eliott's "Debates," vol. ii, p. 197.]

[Footnote 71: "Law of Nations," Book I, chap. i, section 4.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid., section 10.]

[Footnote 73: Ibid., section 12.]




CHAPTER IX.

    The same Subject continued.--The Tenth Amendment.--Fallacies
    exposed.--"Constitution," "Government," and "People"
    distinguished from each other.--Theories refuted by
    Facts.--Characteristics of Sovereignty.--Sovereignty
    identified.--Never thrown away.


If any lingering doubt could have existed as to the reservation of their
entire sovereignty by the people of the respective States, when they
organized the Federal Union, it would have been removed by the adoption
of the tenth amendment to the Constitution, which was not only one of
the amendments proposed by various States when ratifying that
instrument, but the particular one in which they substantially agreed,
and upon which they most urgently insisted. Indeed, it is quite certain
that the Constitution would never have received the assent and
ratification of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
and perhaps other States, but for a well-grounded assurance that the
substance of this amendment would be adopted as soon as the requisite
formalities could be complied with. That amendment is in these words:

    "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
    Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to
    the States respectively, or to the people."

The full meaning of this article may not be as clear to us as it was to
the men of that period, on account of the confusion of ideas by which
the term "people"--plain enough to them--has since been obscured, and
also the ambiguity attendant upon the use of the little conjunction
_or_, which has been said to be the most equivocal word in our language,
and for that reason has been excluded from indictments in the English
courts. The true intent and meaning of the provision, however, may be
ascertained from an examination and comparison of the terms in which it
was expressed by the various States which proposed it, and whose ideas
it was intended to embody.

Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in their ordinances of ratification,
expressing the opinion "that certain amendments and alterations in the
said Constitution would remove the fears and quiet the apprehensions of
many of the good people of this Commonwealth [State (New Hampshire)],
and more effectually guard against an undue administration of the
Federal Government," each recommended several such amendments, putting
this at the head in the following form:

    "That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly
    delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are _reserved to the
    several States_, to be by them exercised."

Of course, those stanch republican communities meant _the people of the
States_--not their _governments_, as something distinct from their
people.

New York expressed herself as follows:

    "That the powers of government may be reassumed by the people
    whenever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that
    every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
    Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
    States, or the departments of the Government thereof, remains to
    _the people of the several States, or to their respective State
    governments, to whom they may have granted the same_; and that
    those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that
    Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply
    that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
    Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as
    exceptions to certain specified powers or as inserted merely for
    greater caution."

South Carolina expressed the idea thus:

    "This Convention doth also declare that no section or paragraph
    of the said Constitution warrants a construction that _the
    States do not retain_ every power not expressly relinquished by
    them and vested in the General Government of the Union."

North Carolina proposed it in these terms:

    "Each State in the Union shall respectively retain every power,
    jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Constitution
    delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the
    departments of the General Government."

Rhode Island gave in her long-withheld assent to the Constitution, "in
full confidence" that certain proposed amendments would be adopted, the
first of which was expressed in these words:

    "That Congress shall guarantee _to each State_ its SOVEREIGNTY,
    _freedom, and independence_, and every power, jurisdiction, and
    right, which is not by this Constitution expressly delegated to
    the United States."

This was in May, 1790, when nearly three years had been given to
discussion and explanation of the new Government by its founders and
others, when it had been in actual operation for more than a year, and
when there was every advantage for a clear understanding of its nature
and principles. Under such circumstances, and in the "full confidence"
that this language expressed its meaning and intent, the people of Rhode
Island signified their "accession" to the "Confederate Republic" of the
States already united.

No objection was made from any quarter to the principle asserted in
these various forms; or to the amendment in which it was finally
expressed, although many thought it unnecessary, as being merely
declaratory of what would have been sufficiently obvious without
it--that the functions of the Government of the United States were
strictly limited to the exercise of such powers as were expressly
delegated, and that the people of the several States retained all
others.

Is it compatible with reason to suppose that people so chary of the
delegation of specific powers or functions could have meant to surrender
or transfer the very basis and origin of all power--their inherent
sovereignty--and this, not by express grant, but by implication?

Mr. Everett, following, whether consciously or not, in the line of Mr.
Webster's ill-considered objection to the term "compact," takes
exception to the sovereignty of the States on the ground that "the
_word_ 'sovereignty' does not occur" in the Constitution. He admits that
the States were sovereign under the Articles of Confederation. How could
they relinquish or be deprived of their sovereignty without even a
mention of it--when the tenth amendment confronts us with the
declaration that _nothing_ was surrendered by implication--that
everything was reserved unless expressly delegated to the United States
or prohibited to the States? Here is an attribute which they certainly
possessed--which nobody denies, or can deny, that they _did_
possess--and of which Mr. Everett says no mention is made in the
Constitution. In what conceivable way, then, was it lost or alienated?

Much has been said of the "prohibition" of the exercise by the States of
certain functions of sovereignty; such as, making treaties, declaring
war, coining money, etc. This is only a part of the general compact, by
which the contracting parties covenant, one with another, to abstain
from the separate exercise of certain powers, which they agree to
intrust to the management and control of the union or general agency of
the parties associated. It is not a prohibition imposed upon them from
without, or from above, by any external or superior power, but is
self-imposed by their free consent. The case is strictly analogous to
that of individuals forming a mercantile or manufacturing copartnership,
who voluntarily agree to refrain, as individuals, from engaging in other
pursuits or speculations, from lending their individual credit, or from
the exercise of any other right of a citizen, which they may think
proper to subject to the consent, or intrust to the management of the
firm.

The prohibitory clauses of the Constitution referred to are not at all a
denial of the full sovereignty of the States, but are merely an
agreement among them to exercise certain powers of sovereignty in
concert, and not separately and apart.

There is one other provision of the Constitution, which is generally
adduced by the friends of centralism as antagonistic to State
sovereignty. This is found in the second clause of the sixth article, as
follows:

    "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
    shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or
    which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
    shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
    State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
    laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

This enunciation of a principle, which, even if it had not been
expressly declared, would have been a necessary deduction from the
acceptance of the Constitution itself, has been magnified and perverted
into a meaning and purpose entirely foreign to that which plain
interpretation is sufficient to discern. Mr. Motley thus dilates on the
subject:

    "Could language be more imperial? Could the claim to State
    'sovereignty' be more completely disposed of at a word? How can
    that be sovereign, acknowledging no superior, supreme, which has
    voluntarily accepted a supreme law from something which it
    acknowledges as superior?"[74]

The mistake which Mr. Motley--like other writers of the same
school--makes is one which is disposed of by a very simple correction.
The States, which ordained and established the Constitution, _accepted_
nothing besides what they themselves _prescribed_. They acknowledged no
superior. The supremacy was both in degree and extent only that which
was delegated by the States to their common agent.

There are some other considerations which may conduce to a clearer
understanding of this supremacy of the Constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof:

1. In the first place, it must be remembered that, when the Federal
Constitution was formed, each then existing State already had its own
Constitution and code of statute laws. It was, no doubt, primarily with
reference to these that the provision was inserted, and not in the
expectation of future conflicts or discrepancies. It is in this light
alone that Mr. Madison considers it in explaining and vindicating it in
the "Federalist."[75]

2. Again, it is to be observed that the supremacy accorded to the
general laws of the United States is expressly limited to those enacted
in conformity with the Constitution, or, to use the exact language,
"made in pursuance thereof." Mr. Hamilton, in another chapter of the
"Federalist," calls particular attention to this, saying (and the
italics are all his own) "that the laws of the Confederacy, as to the
_enumerated_ and _legitimate_ objects of its jurisdiction, will become
the supreme law of the land," and that the State functionaries will
cooeperate in their observance and enforcement with the General
Government, "_as far as its just and constitutional authority
extends_."[76]

3. In the third place, it is not the _Government_ of the United States
that is declared to be supreme, but the _Constitution_ and the laws and
treaties made in accordance with it. The proposition was made in the
Convention to organize a government consisting of "supreme legislative,
executive, and judicial powers," but it was not adopted. Its deliberate
rejection is much more significant and conclusive than if it had never
been proposed. Correction of so gross an error as that of confounding
the Government with the Constitution ought to be superfluous, but so
crude and confused are the ideas which have been propagated on the
subject, that no misconception seems to be too absurd to be possible.
Thus, it has not been uncommon, of late years, to hear, even in the
highest places, the oath to support the Constitution, which is taken by
both State and Federal officers, spoken of as an oath "to support _the
Government_"--an obligation never imposed upon any one in this country,
and which the men who made the Constitution, with their recent
reminiscences of the Revolution, the battles of which they had fought
with halters around their necks, would have been the last to prescribe.
Could any assertion be less credible than that they proceeded to
institute another supreme government which it would be treason to
resist?

This confusion of ideas pervades the treatment of the whole subject of
sovereignty. Mr. Webster has said, and very justly so far as these
United States are concerned: "The sovereignty of government is an idea
belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is known in
North America. Our governments are all limited. In Europe sovereignty is
of feudal origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign.
It comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and powers.
But with us all power is with the people. They alone are sovereign, and
they erect what governments they please, and confer on them such powers
as they please. None of these governments are sovereign, in the European
sense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions."[77]

But the same intellect, which can so clearly discern and so lucidly
define the general proposition, seems to be covered by a cloud of thick
darkness when it comes to apply it to the particular case in issue.
Thus, a little afterward, we have the following:

    "There is no language in the whole Constitution applicable to a
    confederation of States. If the States be parties, as States,
    what are their rights, and what their respective covenants and
    stipulations? and where are their rights, covenants, and
    stipulations expressed? In the Articles of Confederation they
    did make promises, and did enter into engagements, and did
    plight the faith of each State for their fulfillment; but in the
    Constitution there is nothing of that kind. The reason is that,
    in the Constitution, it is the people who speak and not the
    States. The people ordain the Constitution, and therein address
    themselves to the States and to the Legislatures of the States
    in the language of injunction and prohibition."[78]

It is surprising that such inconsistent ideas should proceed from a
source so eminent. Its author falls into the very error which he had
just before so distinctly pointed out, in confounding the people of the
States with their governments. In the vehemence of his hostility to
State sovereignty, he seems--as all of his disciples seem--unable even
to comprehend that it means the sovereignty, not of State governments,
but of people who make them. With minds preoccupied by the unreal idea
of one great people of a consolidated nation, these gentlemen are
blinded to the plain and primary truth that the only way in which the
people ordained the Constitution was as the people of States. When Mr.
Webster says that "in the Constitution it is the people who speak, and
not the States," he says what is untenable. The States _are_ the people.
The people do not speak, never have spoken, and never can speak, in
their sovereign capacity (without a subversion of our whole system),
otherwise than as the people of States.

There are but two modes of expressing their sovereign will known to the
people of this country. One is by direct vote--the mode adopted by Rhode
Island in 1788, when she rejected the Constitution. The other is the
method, more generally pursued, of acting by means of conventions of
delegates elected expressly as representatives of the sovereignty of the
people. Now, it is not a matter of opinion or theory or speculation, but
a plain, undeniable, historical _fact_, that there never has been any
act or expression of sovereignty in either of these modes by that
imaginary community, "the people of the United States in the aggregate."
_Usurpations of power_ by the _Government_ of the United States, there
may have been, and may be again, but there has never been either a
sovereign convention or a direct vote of the "whole people" of the
United States to demonstrate its existence as a corporate unit. Every
exercise of sovereignty by any of the people of this country that has
actually taken place has been by the people of States _as_ States. In
the face of this fact, is it not the merest self-stultification to admit
the sovereignty of the people and deny it to the States, in which alone
they have community existence?

This subject is one of such vital importance to a right understanding of
the events which this work is designed to record and explain, that it
can not be dismissed without an effort in the way of recapitulation and
conclusion, to make it clear beyond the possibility of misconception.

According to the American theory, every individual is endowed with
certain unalienable rights, among which are "life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness." He is entitled to all the freedom, in these and
in other respects, that is consistent with the safety and the rights of
others and the weal of the community, but political sovereignty, which
is the source and origin of all the powers of _government_--legislative,
executive, and judicial--belongs to, and inheres in, the people of an
organized political community. It is an attribute of the _whole people_
of such a community. It includes the power and necessarily the duty of
protecting the rights and redressing the wrongs of individuals, of
punishing crimes, enforcing contracts, prescribing rules for the
transfer of property and the succession of estates, making treaties with
foreign powers, levying taxes, etc. The enumeration of particulars might
be extended, but these will suffice as illustrations.

These powers are of course exercised through the agency of governments,
but the governments are _only_ agents of the sovereign--responsible to
it, and subject to its control. This sovereign--the people, in the
aggregate, of each political community--delegates to the government the
exercise of such powers, or functions, as it thinks proper, but in an
American republic never transfers or surrenders sovereignty. _That_
remains, unalienated and unimpaired. It is by virtue of this sovereignty
alone that the Government, its authorized agent, commands the obedience
of the individual citizen, to the extent of its derivative, dependent,
and delegated authority. The ALLEGIANCE of the citizen is due to the
sovereign alone.

Thus far, I think, all will agree. No American statesman or publicist
would venture to dispute it. Notwithstanding the inconsiderate or
ill-considered expressions thrown out by some persons about the unity of
the American people from the beginning, no respectable authority has
ever had the hardihood to deny that, before the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, the only sovereign political community was the people of
the State--the people of _each State_. The ordinary exercise of what are
generally termed the powers of sovereignty was by and through their
respective governments; and, when they formed a confederation, a portion
of those powers was intrusted to the General Government, or agency.
Under the Confederation, the Congress of the United States represented
the collective power of the States; but the people of each State alone
possessed sovereignty, and consequently were entitled to the allegiance
of the citizen.

When the Articles of Confederation were amended, when the new
Constitution was substituted in their place and the General Government
reorganized, its structure was changed, additional powers were conferred
upon it, and thereby subtracted from the powers theretofore exercised by
the State governments; but the seat of sovereignty--the source of all
those delegated and dependent powers--was not disturbed. There was a new
Government or an amended Government--it is entirely immaterial in which
of these lights we consider it--but no new PEOPLE was created or
constituted. The people, in whom alone sovereignty inheres, remained
just as they had been before. The only change was in the form,
structure, and relations of their governmental agencies.

No doubt, the States--the people of the States--if they had been so
disposed, might have merged themselves into one great consolidated
State, retaining their geographical boundaries merely as matters of
convenience. But such a merger must have been distinctly and formally
stated, not left to deduction or implication.

Men do not alienate even an estate, without positive and express terms
and stipulations. But in this case not only was there no express
transfer--no formal surrender--of the preexisting sovereignty, but it
was expressly provided that nothing should be _understood_ as even
_delegated_--that everything was reserved, unless granted in express
terms. The monstrous conception of the creation of a new people,
invested with the whole or a great part of the sovereignty which had
previously belonged to the people of each State, has not a syllable to
sustain it in the Constitution, but is built up entirely upon the
palpable misconstruction of a single expression in the preamble.

In denying that there is any such collective unit as the people of the
United States in the aggregate, of course I am not to be understood as
denying that there is such a political organization as the United
States, or that there exists, with large and distinct powers, a
_Government_ of the United States; but it is claimed that the Union, as
its name implies, is constituted of States. As a British author,[79]
referring to the old Teutonic system, has expressed the same idea, the
States are the integers, the United States the multiple which results
from them. The Government of the United States derives its existence
from the same source, and exercises its functions by the will of the
same sovereignty that creates and confers authority upon the State
governments. The people of each State are, in either case, the source.
The only difference is that, in the creation of the State governments,
each sovereign acted alone; in that of the Federal Government, they
acted in cooeperation with the others. Neither the whole nor any part of
their sovereignty has been surrendered to either Government.

To whom, in fine, _could_ the States have surrendered their sovereignty?
Not to the mass of the people inhabiting the territory possessed by all
the States, for there was no such community in existence, and they took
no measures for the organization of such a community. If they had
intended to do so, the very style, "United States," would have been a
palpable misnomer, nor would treason have been defined as levying war
against _them_. Could it have been transferred to the Government of the
Union? Clearly not, in accordance with the ideas and principles of those
who made the Declaration of Independence, adopted the Articles of
Confederation, and established the Constitution of the United States;
for in each and all of these the corner-stone is the inherent and
inalienable sovereignty of the people. To have transferred sovereignty
from the people to a Government would have been to have fought the
battles of the Revolution in vain--not for the freedom and independence
of the States, but for a mere change of masters. Such a thought or
purpose could not have been in the heads or hearts of those who molded
the Union, and could have found lodgment only when the ebbing tide of
patriotism and fraternity had swept away the landmarks which they
erected who sought by the compact of union to secure and perpetuate the
liberties then possessed. The men who had won at great cost the
independence of their respective States were deeply impressed with the
value of union, but they could never have consented, like "the base
Judean," to fling away the priceless pearl of State sovereignty for any
possible alliance.


[Footnote 74: "Rebellion Record," vol. i, Documents, p. 213.]

[Footnote 75: "Federalist," No. xliv.]

[Footnote 76: "Federalist," No. xxvii.]

[Footnote 77: "Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part I, p. 565.]

[Footnote 78: Ibid., p. 566.]

[Footnote 79: Sir Francis Palgrave, quoted by Mr. Calhoun,
"Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part I, p. 541.]




CHAPTER X.

    A Recapitulation.--Remarkable Propositions of Mr. Gouverneur
    Morris in the Convention of 1787, and their Fate.--Further
    Testimony.--Hamilton, Madison, Washington, Marshall, etc.--Later
    Theories.--Mr. Webster: his Views at Various Periods.--Speech at
    Capon Springs.--State Rights not a Sectional Theory.


Looking back for a moment at the ground over which we have gone, I think
it may be fairly asserted that the following propositions have been
clearly and fully established:

1. That the States of which the American Union was formed, from the
moment when they emerged from their colonial or provincial condition,
became severally sovereign, free, and independent States--not one State,
or nation.

2. That the union formed under the Articles of Confederation was a
compact between the States, in which these attributes of "sovereignty,
freedom, and independence," were expressly asserted and guaranteed.

3. That, in forming the "more perfect union" of the Constitution,
afterward adopted, the same contracting powers formed an _amended
compact_, without any surrender of these attributes of sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, either expressed or implied: on the contrary,
that, by the tenth amendment to the Constitution, limiting the power of
the Government to its express grants, they distinctly guarded against
the presumption of a surrender of anything by implication.

4. That political sovereignty resides, neither in individual citizens,
nor in unorganized masses, nor in fractional subdivisions of a
community, but in the people of an organized political body.

5. That no "republican form of government," in the sense in which that
expression is used in the Constitution, and was generally understood by
the founders of the Union--whether it be the government of a State or of
a confederation of States--is possessed of any sovereignty whatever, but
merely exercises certain powers delegated by the sovereign authority of
the people, and subject to recall and reassumption by the same authority
that conferred them.

6. That the "people" who organized the first confederation, the people
who dissolved it, the people who ordained and established the
Constitution which succeeded it, the only people, in fine, known or
referred to in the phraseology of that period--whether the term was used
collectively or distributively--were the people of the respective
States, each acting separately and with absolute independence of the
others.

7. That, in forming and adopting the Constitution, the States, or the
people of the States--terms which, when used with reference to acts
performed in a sovereign capacity, are precisely equivalent to each
other--formed a new _Government_, but no new _people_; and that,
consequently, no new sovereignty was created--for sovereignty in an
American republic can belong only to a people, never to a
government--and that the Federal Government is entitled to exercise only
the powers delegated to it by the people of the respective States.

8. That the term "people," in the preamble to the Constitution and in
the tenth amendment, is used distributively; that the only "people of
the United States" known to the Constitution are the people of each
State in the Union; that no such political community or corporate unit
as one people of the United States then existed, has ever been
organized, or yet exists; and that no political action by the people of
the United States in the aggregate has ever taken place, or ever can
take place, under the Constitution.

The fictitious idea of _one_ people of the United States, contradicted
in the last paragraph, has been so impressed upon the popular mind by
false teaching, by careless and vicious phraseology, and by the
ever-present spectacle of a great Government, with its army and navy,
its custom-houses and post-offices, its multitude of office-holders, and
the splendid prizes which it offers to political ambition, that the
tearing away of these illusions and presentation of the original fabric,
which they have overgrown and hidden from view, have no doubt been
unwelcome, distasteful, and even repellent to some of my readers. The
artificial splendor which makes the deception attractive is even
employed as an argument to prove its reality.

The glitter of the powers delegated to the agent serves to obscure the
perception of the sovereign power of the principal by whom they are
conferred, as, by the unpracticed eye, the showy costume and conspicuous
functions of the drum-major are mistaken for emblems of
chieftaincy--while the misuse or ambiguous use of the term "Union" and
its congeners contributes to increase the confusion.

So much the more need for insisting upon the elementary truths which
have been obscured by these specious sophistries. The reader really
desirous of ascertaining truth is, therefore, again cautioned against
confounding two ideas so essentially distinct as that of _government_,
which is derivative, dependent, and subordinate, with that of the
_people_, as an organized political community, which is sovereign,
without any other than self-imposed limitations, and such as proceed
from the general principles of the personal rights of man.

It has been said, in a foregoing chapter, that the authors of the
Constitution could scarcely have anticipated the idea of such a
community as the people of the United States in one mass. Perhaps this
expression needs some little qualification, for there is rarely a
fallacy, however stupendous, that is wholly original. A careful
examination of the records of the Convention of 1787 exhibits one or
perhaps two instances of such a suggestion--both by the same person--and
the result in each case is strikingly significant.

The original proposition made concerning the office of President of the
United States contemplated his election by the Congress, or, as it was
termed by the proposer, "the national Legislature." On the 17th of July,
this proposition being under consideration, Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved
that the words "national Legislature" be stricken out, and "citizens of
the United States" inserted. The proposition was supported by Mr. James
Wilson--both of these gentlemen being delegates from Pennsylvania, and
both among the most earnest advocates of centralism in the Convention.

Now, it is not at all certain that Mr. Morris had in view an election by
the citizens of the United States "in the aggregate," voting as _one
people_. The language of his proposition is entirely consistent with the
idea of as election by the citizens of each State, voting separately and
independently, though it is ambiguous, and may admit of the other
construction. But this is immaterial. The proposition was submitted to a
vote, and received the approval of only _one State_--Pennsylvania, of
which Mr. Morris and Mr. Wilson were both representatives. _Nine_ States
voted against it.[80]

Six days afterward (July 23d), in a discussion of the proposed
ratification of the Constitution by Conventions of the people of each
State, Mr. Gouverneur Morris--as we learn from Mr. Madison--"moved that
the reference of the plan [i.e., of the proposed Constitution] be made
to one General Convention, chosen and authorized by the people, to
consider, amend, and establish the same."[81]

Here the issue seems to have been more distinctly made between the two
ideas of people of the States and one people in the aggregate. The fate
of the latter is briefly recorded in the two words, "not seconded." Mr.
Morris was a man of distinguished ability, great personal influence, and
undoubted patriotism, but, out of all that assemblage--comprising, as it
did, such admitted friends of centralism as Hamilton, King, Wilson,
Randolph, Pinckney, and others--there was not one to sustain him in the
proposition to incorporate into the Constitution that theory which now
predominates, the theory on which was waged the late bloody war, which
was called a "war for the Union." It failed for want of a second, and
does not even appear in the official journal of the Convention. The very
fact that such a suggestion was made would be unknown to us but for the
record kept by Mr. Madison.

The extracts which have been given, in treating of special branches of
the subject, from the writings and speeches of the framers of the
Constitution and other statesmen of that period, afford ample proof of
their entire and almost unanimous accord with the principles which have
been established on the authority of the Constitution itself, the acts
of ratification by the several States, and other attestations of the
highest authority and validity. I am well aware that isolated
expressions may be found in the reports of debates on the General and
State Conventions and other public bodies, indicating the existence of
individual opinions seemingly inconsistent with these principles; that
loose and confused ideas were sometimes expressed with regard to
sovereignty, the relations between governments and people, and kindred
subjects; and that, while the plan of the Constitution was under
discussion, and before it was definitely reduced to its present shape,
there were earnest advocates in the Convention of a more consolidated
system, with a stronger central government. But these expressions of
individual opinion only prove the existence of a small minority of
dissentients from the principles generally entertained, and which
finally prevailed in the formation of the Constitution. None of these
ever avowed such extravagances of doctrine as are promulgated in this
generation. No statesman of that day would have ventured to risk his
reputation by construing an obligation to support the Constitution as an
obligation to adhere to the Federal Government--a construction which
would have insured the sweeping away of any plan of union embodying it,
by a tempest of popular indignation from every quarter of the country.
None of them suggested such an idea as that of the amalgamation of the
people of the States into one consolidated mass--unless it was suggested
by Mr. Gouverneur Morris in the proposition above referred to, in which
he stood alone among the delegates of twelve sovereign States assembled
in convention.

As to the features of centralism, or nationalism, which they did
advocate, all the ability of this little minority of really gifted men
failed to secure the incorporation of any one of them into the
Constitution, or to obtain their recognition by any of the ratifying
States. On the contrary, the very men who had been the leading advocates
of such theories, on failing to secure their adoption, loyally accepted
the result, and became the ablest and most efficient supporters of the
principles which had prevailed. Thus, Mr. Hamilton, who had favored the
plan of a President and Senate, both elected to hold office for life (or
during good behavior), with a veto power in Congress on the action of
the State Legislatures, became, through the "Federalist," in conjunction
with his associates, Mr. Madison and Mr. Jay, the most distinguished
expounder and advocate of the Constitution, as then proposed and
afterward ratified, with all its Federal and State-rights features. In
the ninth number of that remarkable series of political essays, he
quotes, adopts, and applies to the then proposed Constitution,
Montesquieu's description of a "CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC," a term which he
(Hamilton) repeatedly employs.

In the eighty-first number of the same series, replying to apprehensions
expressed by some that a State might be brought before the Federal
courts to answer as defendant in suits instituted against her, he repels
the idea in these plain and conclusive terms. The italics are my own:

    "It is inherent in the nature of _sovereignty_ not to be
    amenable to the suit of any individual without its consent. This
    is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
    the exemption, as one of the _attributes of sovereignty_, is now
    enjoyed by the government of _every State in the Union_. Unless,
    therefore, there is _a surrender of this immunity_ in the plan
    of the Convention, _it will remain with the States_, and the
    danger intimated must be merely ideal.... The contracts between
    _a nation_ and individuals are only binding on the conscience of
    _the sovereign_, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
    They confer no right of action, independent of _the sovereign
    will_. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against
    States for the debts they owe? How could recoveries be enforced?
    It is evident that it could not be done without _waging war_
    against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the Federal
    courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting
    right of the State governments, a power which would involve such
    a consequence, would be altogether forced and unwarranted."[82]

This extract is very significant, clearly showing that Mr. Hamilton
assumed as undisputed propositions, in the first place, that the State
was _the_ "SOVEREIGN"; secondly, that this sovereignty could not be
alienated, unless by express surrender; thirdly, that no such surrender
had been made; and, fourthly, that the idea of applying coercion to a
State, even to enforce the fulfillment of a duty, would be equivalent to
waging war against a State--it was "altogether forced and
unwarrantable."

In a subsequent number, Mr. Hamilton, replying to the objection that the
Constitution contains no bill or declaration of rights, argues that it
was entirely unnecessary, because in reality the people--that is, of
course, the people, respectively, of the several States, who were the
only people known to the Constitution or to the country--had surrendered
nothing of their inherent sovereignty, but retained it unimpaired. He
says: "Here, in strictness, the people _surrender nothing_; and, as they
_retain everything_, they have no need of particular reservations." And
again: "I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and
to the extent they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the
proposed Constitution, but would be absolutely dangerous. They would
contain various exceptions to _powers not granted_, and on this very
account would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were
granted. For why declare that things shall not be done, which there is
no power to do?"[83] Could language be more clear or more complete in
vindication of the principles laid down in this work? Mr. Hamilton
declares, in effect, that the grants to the Federal Government in the
Constitution are not surrenders, but delegations of power by the people
of the States; that sovereignty remains intact where it was before; and
that the delegations of power were strictly limited to those expressly
granted--in this, merely anticipating the tenth amendment, afterward
adopted.

Finally, in the concluding article of the "Federalist," he bears
emphatic testimony to the same principles, in the remark that "every
Constitution for the United States must inevitably consist of a great
variety of particulars, in which _thirteen independent States_ are to be
accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest.... Hence the
necessity of molding and arranging all the particulars, which are to
compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy _all the parties_ to
the compact."[84] There is no intimation here, or anywhere else, of the
existence of any such idea as that of the aggregated people of one great
consolidated state. It is an incidental enunciation of the same truth
soon afterward asserted by Madison in the Virginia Convention--that the
people who ordained and established the Constitution were "not the
people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen
sovereignties".

Mr. Madison, in the Philadelphia Convention, had at first held views of
the sort of government which it was desirable to organize, similar to
those of Mr. Hamilton, though more moderate in extent. He, too, however,
cordially conformed to the modifications in them made by his colleagues,
and was no less zealous and eminent in defending and expounding the
Constitution as finally adopted. His interpretation of its fundamental
principles is so fully shown in the extracts which have already been
given from his contributions to the "Federalist" and speeches in the
Virginia Convention, that it would be superfluous to make any additional
citation from them.

The evidence of Hamilton and Madison--two of the most eminent of the
authors of the Constitution, and the two preeminent contemporary
expounders of its meaning--is the most valuable that could be offered
for its interpretation. That of all the other statesmen of the period
only tends to confirm the same conclusions. The illustrious Washington,
who presided over the Philadelphia Convention, in his correspondence,
repeatedly refers to the proposed Union as a "Confederacy" of States, or
a "confederated Government," and to the several States as "acceding," or
signifying their "accession," to it, in ratifying the Constitution. He
refers to the Constitution itself as "a compact or treaty," and
classifies it among compacts or treaties between "men, bodies of men, or
countries." Writing to Count Rochambeau, on January 8, 1788, he says
that the proposed Constitution "is to be submitted to conventions chosen
by _the people in the several States_, and by them approved or
rejected"--showing what _he_ understood by "the people of the United
States," who were to ordain and establish it. These same people--that
is, "the people of the several States"--he says, in a letter to
Lafayette, April 28, 1788, "retain everything they do not, by express
terms, give up." In a letter written to Benjamin Lincoln, October 26,
1788, he refers to the expectation that North Carolina will accede to
the Union, and adds, "Whoever shall be found to enjoy the confidence of
_the States_ so far as to be elected Vice-President," etc.--showing that
in the "confederated Government," as he termed it, the States were still
to act independently, even in the selection of officers of the General
Government. He wrote to General Knox, June 17, 1788, "I can not but hope
that the States which may be disposed to make a secession will think
often and seriously on the consequences." June 28, 1788, he wrote to
General Pinckney that New Hampshire "had acceded to the new
Confederacy," and, in reference to North Carolina, "I should be
astonished if that State should withdraw from the Union."

I shall add but two other citations. They are from speeches of John
Marshall, afterward the most distinguished Chief Justice of the United
States--who has certainly never been regarded as holding high views of
State rights--in the Virginia Convention of 1788. In the first case, he
was speaking of the power of the States over the militia, and is thus
reported:

    "The State governments did not derive their powers from the
    General Government; but each government derived its powers from
    the people, and each was to act according to the powers given
    it. Would any gentleman deny this?... Could any man say that
    this power was not retained by the States, as they had not given
    it away? For (says he) does not a power remain till it is given
    away? The State Legislatures had power to command and govern
    their militia before, and have it still, undeniably, unless
    there be something in this Constitution that takes it away....

    "He concluded by observing that the power of governing the
    militia was not vested in the States by implication, because,
    being possessed of it antecedently to the adoption of the
    Government, and not being divested of it by any grant or
    restriction in the Constitution, they must necessarily be as
    fully possessed of it as ever they had been, and it could not be
    said that the States derived any powers from that system, but
    retained them, though not acknowledged in any part of it."[85]

In the other case, the special subject was the power of the Federal
judiciary. Mr. Marshall said, with regard to this: "I hope that no
gentleman will think that a State can be called at the bar of the
Federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not many
cases, in which the Legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the
State is not sued? Is it rational to suppose that the sovereign power
shall be dragged before a court?"[86]

Authorities to the same effect might be multiplied indefinitely by
quotation from nearly all the most eminent statesmen and patriots of
that brilliant period. My limits, however, permit me only to refer those
in quest of more exhaustive information to the original records, or to
the "Republic of Republics," in which will be found a most valuable
collection and condensation of the teaching of the fathers on the
subject. There was no dissent, at that period, from the interpretation
of the Constitution which I have set forth, as given by its authors,
except in the objections made by its adversaries. Those objections were
refuted and silenced, until revived, long afterward, and presented as
the true interpretation, by the school of which Judge Story was the most
effective founder.

At an earlier period--but when he had already served for several years
in Congress, and had attained the full maturity of his powers--Mr.
Webster held the views which were presented in a memorial to Congress of
citizens of Boston, December 15, 1819, relative to the admission of
Missouri, drawn up and signed by a committee of which he was chairman,
and which also included among its members Mr. Josiah Quincy. He speaks
of the States as enjoying "_the exclusive possession of sovereignty_"
over their own territory, calls the United States "the American
Confederacy," and says, "The only _parties to the Constitution_,
contemplated by it originally, were the _thirteen confederated States_."
And again: "As between the original States, the representation rests on
_compact and plighted faith_; and your memorialists have no wish that
that compact should be disturbed, or that plighted faith in the
slightest degree violated."

It is satisfactory to know that in the closing year of his life, when
looking retrospectively, with judgment undisturbed by any extraneous
influence, he uttered views of the Government which must stand the test
of severest scrutiny and defy the storms of agitation, for they are
founded on the rock of truth. In letters written and addresses delivered
during the Administration of Mr. Fillmore, he repeatedly applies to the
Constitution the term "compact," which, in 1833, he had so vehemently
repudiated. In his speech at Capon Springs, Virginia, in 1851, he says:

    "If the South were to violate any part of the Constitution
    intentionally and systematically, and persist in so doing year
    after year, and no remedy could be had, would the North be any
    longer bound by the rest of it? And if the North were,
    deliberately, habitually, and of fixed purpose, to disregard one
    part of it, would the South be bound any longer to observe its
    other obligations?...

    "How absurd it is to suppose that, when different parties enter
    into a compact for certain purposes, either can disregard any
    one provision, and expect, nevertheless, the other to observe
    the rest!...

    "I have not hesitated to say, and I repeat, that, if the
    Northern States refuse, willfully and deliberately, to carry
    into effect that part of the Constitution which respects the
    restoration of fugitive slaves, and Congress provide no remedy,
    the South would no longer be bound to observe the compact. A
    bargain can not be broken on one side, and still bind the other
    side."[87]

The principles which have been set forth in the foregoing chapters,
although they had come to be considered as peculiarly Southern, were not
sectional in their origin. In the beginning and earlier years of our
history they were cherished as faithfully and guarded as jealously in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire as in Virginia or South Carolina. It was
in these principles that I was nurtured. I have frankly proclaimed them
during my whole life, always contending in the Senate of the United
States against what I believed to be the mistaken construction of the
Constitution taught by Mr. Webster and his adherents. While I honored
the genius of that great man, and held friendly personal relations with
him, I considered his doctrines on these points--or rather the doctrines
advocated by him during the most conspicuous and influential portions of
his public career--to be mischievous, and the more dangerous to the
welfare of the country and the liberties of mankind on account of the
signal ability and magnificent eloquence with which they were argued.


[Footnote 80: Elliott's "Debates," vol. i, p. 239; "Madison Papers," pp.
1119-1124.]

[Footnote 81: "Madison Papers," p. 1184.]

[Footnote 82: "Federalist," No. lxxxi.]

[Footnote 83: "Federalist," No. lxxxiv.]

[Footnote 84: Ibid., No. lxxxv.]

[Footnote 85: Elliott's "Debates," vol. iii, pp. 389-391.]

[Footnote 86: Elliott's "Debates," vol. iii, p. 503.]

[Footnote 87: Curtis's "Life of Webster," chap. xxxvii, vol. ii, pp.
518, 519.]




CHAPTER XI.

    The Right of Secession.--The Law of Unlimited Partnerships.--The
    "Perpetual Union" of the Articles of Confederation and the "More
    Perfect Union" of the Constitution.--The Important Powers
    conferred upon the Federal Government and the Fundamental
    Principles of the Compact the same in both Systems.--The Right
    to resume Grants, when failing to fulfill their Purposes,
    expressly and distinctly asserted in the Adoption of the
    Constitution.


The Right of Secession--that subject which, beyond all others,
ignorance, prejudice, and political rancor have combined to cloud with
misstatements and misapprehensions--is a question easily to be
determined in the light of what has already been established with regard
to the history and principles of the Constitution. It is not something
standing apart by itself--a factious creation, outside of and
antagonistic to the Constitution--as might be imagined by one deriving
his ideas from the political literature most current of late years. So
far from being against the Constitution or incompatible with it, we
contend that, if the right to secede is not prohibited to the States,
and no power to prevent it expressly delegated to the United States, it
remains as reserved to the States or the people, from whom all the
powers of the General Government were derived.

The compact between the States which formed the Union was in the nature
of a partnership between individuals without limitation of time, and the
recognized law of such partnerships is thus stated by an eminent lawyer
of Massachusetts in a work intended for popular use:

    "If the articles between the partners do not contain an
    agreement that the partnership shall continue for a specified
    time, it may be dissolved at the pleasure of either partner. But
    no partner can exercise this power wantonly and injuriously to
    the other partners, without making himself responsible for the
    damage he thus causes. If there be a provision that the
    partnership shall continue a certain time, this is binding."[88]

We have seen that a number of "sovereign, free, and independent" States,
during the war of the Revolution, entered into a partnership with one
another, which was not only unlimited in duration, but expressly
declared to be a "perpetual union." Yet, when that Union failed to
accomplish the purposes for which it was formed, the parties withdrew,
separately and independently, one after another, without any question
made of their right to do so, and formed a new association. One of the
declared objects of this new partnership was to form "a more perfect
union." This certainly did not mean more perfect in respect of duration;
for the former union had been declared perpetual, and perpetuity admits
of no addition. It did not mean that it was to be more indissoluble; for
the delegates of the States, in ratifying the former compact of union,
had expressed themselves in terms that could scarcely be made more
stringent. They then said:

    "And we do further _solemnly plight and engage the faith of our
    respective constituents_, that they shall abide by the
    determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on
    all questions which, by the said confederation, are submitted to
    them; and that the articles thereof shall be _inviolably
    observed_ by the States we respectively represent; and that _the
    Union shall be perpetual_."[89]

The formation of a "more perfect union" was accomplished by the
organization of a government more complete in its various branches,
legislative, executive, and judicial, and by the delegation to this
Government of certain additional powers or functions which had
previously been exercised by the Governments of the respective
States--especially in providing the means of operating directly upon
individuals for the enforcement of its legitimately delegated authority.
There was no abandonment nor modification of the essential principle of
a _compact_ between sovereigns, which applied to the one case as fully
as to the other. There was not the slightest intimation of so radical a
revolution as the surrender of the sovereignty of the contracting
parties would have been. The additional powers conferred upon the
Federal Government by the Constitution were merely transfers of some of
those possessed by the State governments--not subtractions from the
reserved and inalienable sovereignty of the political communities which
conferred them. It was merely the institution of a new agent who,
however enlarged his powers might be, would still remain subordinate and
responsible to the source from which they were derived--that of the
sovereign people of each State. It was an amended Union, not a
consolidation.

It is a remarkable fact that the very powers of the Federal Government
and prohibitions to the States, which are most relied upon by the
advocates of centralism as incompatible with State sovereignty, were in
force under the old Confederation when the sovereignty of the States was
expressly recognized. The General Government had then, as now, the
exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, making
treaties and alliances, maintaining an army and navy, granting letters
of marque and reprisal, regulating coinage, establishing and controlling
the postal service--indeed, nearly all the so-called "characteristic
powers of sovereignty" exercised by the Federal Government under the
existing Constitution, except the regulation of commerce, and of levying
and collecting its revenues directly, instead of through the
interposition of the State authorities. The exercise of these
first-named powers was prohibited to the States under the old compact,
"without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled," but no
one has claimed that the Confederation had thereby acquired sovereignty.

Entirely in accord with these truths are the arguments of Mr. Madison in
the "Federalist," to show that the great principles of the Constitution
are substantially the same as those of the Articles of Confederation. He
says:

    "I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that, in the
    establishment of the Constitution, the States should be regarded
    as distinct and independent sovereigns? They _are_ so regarded
    by the Constitution proposed.... Do these principles, in fine,
    require that the powers of the General Government should be
    limited, and that, beyond this limit, the States should be left
    in possession of their sovereignty and independence? We have
    seen that, in the new Government as in the old, the general
    powers are limited; and that the States, in all unenumerated
    cases, are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and
    independent jurisdiction."

"The truth is," he adds, "that the great principles of the Constitution
proposed by the Convention may be considered _less as absolutely new,
than as the expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of
Confederation_."[90]

In the papers immediately following, he establishes this position in
detail by an analysis of the principal powers delegated to the Federal
Government, showing that the spirit of the original instructions to the
Convention had been followed in revising "the Federal Constitution" and
rendering it "adequate to the exigencies of government and the
preservation of the Union."[91]

The present Union owes its very existence to the dissolution, by
separate secession of its members, of the former Union, which, as we
have thus seen, as to its _organic principles_, rested upon precisely
the same foundation. The right to withdraw from the association results,
in either case, from the same principles--principles which, I think,
have been established on an impregnable basis of history, reason, law,
and precedent.

It is not contended that this right should be resorted to for
insufficient cause, or, as the writer already quoted on the law of
partnership says, "wantonly and injuriously to the other partners,"
without responsibility of the seceding party for any damage thus done.
No association can be dissolved without a likelihood of the occurrence
of incidental questions concerning common property and mutual
obligations--questions sometimes of a complex and intricate sort. If a
wrong be perpetrated, in such case, it is a matter for determination by
the means usually employed among independent and sovereign
powers--negotiation, arbitration, or, in the failure of these, by war,
with which, unfortunately, Christianity and civilization have not yet
been able entirely to dispense. But the suggestion of possible evils
does not at all affect the question of right. There is no great
principle in the affairs either of individuals or of nations that is not
liable to such difficulties in its practical application.

But, we are told, there is no mention made of secession in the
Constitution. Mr. Everett says: "The States are not named in it; the
word sovereignty does not occur in it; the right of secession is as much
ignored in it as the procession of the equinoxes." We have seen how very
untenable is the assertion that the States are not named in it, and how
much pertinency or significance in the omission of the _word_
"sovereignty." The pertinent question that occurs is, Why was so obvious
an attribute of sovereignty not expressly renounced if it was intended
to surrender it? It certainly existed; it was not surrendered; therefore
it still exists. This would be a more natural and rational conclusion
than that it has ceased to exist because it is not mentioned.

The simple truth is, that it would have been a very extraordinary thing
to incorporate into the Constitution any express provision for the
secession of the States and dissolution of the Union. Its founders
undoubtedly desired and hoped that it would be perpetual; against the
proposition for power to coerce a State, the argument was that it would
be a means, not of preserving, but of destroying, the Union. It was not
for them to make arrangements for its termination--a calamity which
there was no occasion to provide for in advance. Sufficient for their
day was the evil thereof. It is not usual, either in partnerships
between men or in treaties between governments, to make provision for a
dissolution of the partnership or a termination of the treaty, unless
there be some special reason for a limitation of time. Indeed, in
treaties, the usual formula includes a declaration of their
_perpetuity_; but in either case the power of the contracting parties,
or of any of them, to dissolve the compact, on terms not damaging to the
rights of the other parties, is not the less clearly understood. It was
not necessary in the Constitution to affirm the right of secession,
because it was an attribute of sovereignty, and the States had reserved
all which they had not delegated.

The right of the people of the several States to resume the powers
delegated by them to the common agency, was not left without positive
and ample assertion, even at a period when it had never been denied. The
ratification of the Constitution by Virginia has already been quoted, in
which the people of that State, through their Convention, did expressly
"declare and make known that the powers granted under the Constitution,
being derived from the people of the United States, _may be resumed by
them_, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or
oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them
and at their will."[92]

New York and Rhode Island were no less explicit, both declaring that
"the powers of government _may be reassumed by the people_ whenever it
shall become necessary to their happiness."[93]

These expressions are not mere _obiter dicta_, thrown out incidentally,
and entitled only to be regarded as an expression of opinion by their
authors. Even if only such, they would carry great weight as the
deliberately expressed judgment of enlightened contemporaries, but they
are more: they are parts of the very acts or ordinances by which these
States ratified the Constitution and acceded to the Union, and can not
be detached from them. If they are invalid, the ratification itself was
invalid, for they are inseparable. By inserting these declarations in
their ordinances, Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island, formally,
officially, and permanently, declared their interpretation of the
Constitution as recognizing the right of secession by the resumption of
their grants. By accepting the ratifications with this declaration
incorporated, the other States as formally accepted the principle which
it asserted.

I am well aware that it has been attempted to construe these
declarations concerning the right of _the people_ to reassume their
delegations of power--especially in the terms employed by Virginia,
"people of the United States"--as having reference to the idea of _one
people_, in mass, or "in the aggregate." But it can scarcely be possible
that any candid and intelligent reader, who has carefully considered the
evidence already brought to bear on the subject, can need further
argument to disabuse his mind of that political fiction. The "people of
the United States," from whom the powers of the Federal Government were
"derived," _could have been_ no other than the people who ordained and
ratified the Constitution; and this, it has been shown beyond the power
of denial, was done by the people of _each State_, severally and
independently. No other _people_ were known to the authors of the
declarations above quoted. Mr. Madison was a leading member of the
Virginia Convention, which made that declaration, as well as of the
general Convention that drew up the Constitution. We have seen what
_his_ idea of "the people of the United States" was--"not the people as
composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen
sovereignties."[94] Mr. Lee, of Westmoreland ("Light-Horse Harry"), in
the same Convention, answering Mr. Henry's objection to the expression,
"We, the people," said: "It [the Constitution] is now submitted to _the
people of Virginia_. If we do not adopt it, it will be always null and
void as to us. Suppose it was found proper for our adoption, and
becoming the government of _the people of Virginia_, by what style
should it be done? Ought we not to make use of the name of the people?
No other style would be proper."[95] It would certainly be superfluous,
after all that has been presented heretofore, to add any further
evidence of the meaning that was attached to these expressions by their
authors. "The people of the United States" were in their minds the
people of Virginia, the people of Massachusetts, and the people of every
other State that should agree to unite. They _could_ have meant only
that the people of their respective States who had delegated certain
powers to the Federal Government, in ratifying the Constitution and
_acceding_ to the Union, reserved to themselves the right, in event of
the failure of their purposes, to "resume" (or "reassume") those powers
by _seceding_ from the same Union.

Finally, the absurdity of the construction attempted to be put upon
these expressions will be evident from a very brief analysis. If the
assertion of the right of reassumption of their powers was meant for the
protection of _the whole people_--the people in mass--the people "in the
aggregate"--of a consolidated republic--against whom or what was it to
protect them? By whom were the powers granted to be perverted to the
injury or oppression of the whole people? By themselves or by some of
the States, all of whom, according to this hypothesis, had been
consolidated into one? As no danger could have been apprehended from
either of these, it must have been against the _Government_ of the
United States that the provision was made; that is to say, the whole
people of a republic make this declaration against a Government
established by themselves and entirely subject to their own control,
under a Constitution which contains provision for its own amendment by
this very same "whole people," whenever they may think proper! Is it not
a libel upon the statesmen of that generation to attribute to their
grave and solemn declarations a meaning so vapid and absurd?

To those who argue that the grants of the Constitution are fatal to the
reservation of sovereignty by the States, the Constitution furnishes a
conclusive answer in the amendment which was coeval with the adoption of
the instrument, and which declares that all powers not delegated to the
Government of the Union were reserved to the States or to the people. As
sovereignty was not delegated by the States, it was necessarily
reserved. It would be superfluous to answer arguments against implied
powers of the States; none are claimed by implication, because all not
delegated by the States remained with them, and it was only in an
abundance of caution that they expressed the right to resume such parts
of their unlimited power as was delegated for the purposes enumerated.
As there be those who see danger to the perpetuity of the Union in the
possession of such power by the States, and insist that our fathers did
not intend to bind the States together by a compact no better than "a
rope of sand," it may be well to examine their position. From what have
dangers to the Union arisen? Have they sprang from too great restriction
on the exercise of the granted powers, or from the assumption by the
General Government of power claimed by implication? The whole record of
our Union answers, from the latter only.

Was this tendency to usurpation caused by the presumption of paramount
authority in the General Government, or by the assertion of the right of
a State to resume the powers it had delegated? Reasonably and honestly
it can not be assigned to the latter. Let it be supposed that the "whole
people" had recognized the right of a State of the Union, peaceably and
independently, to resume the powers which, peaceably and independently,
she had delegated to the Federal Government, would not this have been
potent to restrain the General Government from exercising its functions
to the injury and oppression of such State? To deny that effect would be
to suppose that a dominant majority would be willing to drive a State
from the Union. Would the admission of the right of a State to resume
the grants it had made, have led to the exercise of that right for light
and trivial causes? Surely the evidence furnished by the nations, both
ancient and modern, refutes the supposition. In the language of the
Declaration of Independence, "All experience hath shown that mankind are
more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right
themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed." Would
not real grievances be rendered more tolerable by the consciousness of
power to remove them; and would not even imaginary wrongs be embittered
by the manifestation of a purpose to make them perpetual? To ask these
questions is to answer them.

The wise and brave men who had, at much peril and great sacrifice,
secured the independence of the States, were as little disposed to
surrender the sovereignty of the States as they were anxious to organize
a General Government with adequate powers to remedy the defects of the
Confederation. The Union they formed was not to destroy the States, but
to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."


[Footnote 88: Parsons, "Rights of a Citizen," chap. xx, section 3.]

[Footnote 89: Ratification appended to Articles of Confederation. (See
Elliott's "Debates," vol. i, p. 113.)]

[Footnote 90: "Federalist," No. xl.]

[Footnote 91: Ibid., Nos. xli-xliv.]

[Footnote 92: See Elliott's "Debates," vol. i, p. 360.]

[Footnote 93: Ibid., pp. 361, 369.]

[Footnote 94: Elliott's "Debates," vol. iii, p. 114.]

[Footnote 95: Ibid., p. 71.]




CHAPTER XII.

    Coercion the Alternative to Secession.--Repudiation of it by the
    Constitution and the Fathers of the Constitutional
    Era.--Difference between Mr. Webster and Mr. Hamilton.


The alternative to secession is coercion. That is to say, if no such
right as that of secession exists--if it is forbidden or precluded by
the Constitution--then it is a wrong; and, by a well settled principle
of public law, for every wrong there must be a remedy, which in this
case must be the application of force to the State attempting to
withdraw from the Union.

Early in the session of the Convention which formed the Constitution, it
was proposed to confer upon Congress the power "to call forth the force
of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty
under the articles thereof." When this proposition came to be
considered, Mr. Madison observed that "a union of the States containing
such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of
force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an
infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party
attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be
bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this
recourse unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed." This
motion was adopted _nem. con._, and the proposition was never again
revived.[96] Again, on a subsequent occasion, speaking of an appeal to
force, Mr. Madison said: "Was such a remedy eligible? Was it
practicable?... Any government for the United States, formed on the
supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional
proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as
the government of Congress."[97] Every proposition looking in any way to
the same or a similar object was promptly rejected by the convention.
George Mason, of Virginia, said of such a proposition: "Will not the
citizens of the invaded State assist one another, until they rise as one
man and shake off the Union altogether?"[98]

Oliver Ellsworth, in the ratifying Convention of Connecticut, said:
"This Constitution does not attempt to coerce _sovereign bodies,
States_, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such
bodies but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to execute the
laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent State,
it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same
calamity."[99]

Mr. Hamilton, in the Convention of New York, said: "To coerce the States
is one of the maddest projects that was ever devised.... What picture
does this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with a
non-complying State: Congress marching the troops of one State into the
bosom of another ... Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any
reasonable man be well disposed toward a government which makes war and
carnage the only means of supporting itself--a government that can exist
only by the sword?... But can we believe that one State will ever suffer
itself to be used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream--it
is impossible."[100]

Unhappily, our generation has seen that, in the decay of the principles
and feelings which animated the hearts of all patriots in that day, this
thing, like many others then regarded as impossible dreams, has been
only too feasible, and that States have permitted themselves to be used
as instruments, not merely for the coercion, but for the destruction of
the freedom and independence of their sister States.

Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, although the mover of the
original proposition to authorize the employment of the forces of the
Union against a delinquent member, which had been so signally defeated
in the Federal Convention, afterward, in the Virginia Convention, made
an eloquent protest against the idea of the employment of force against
a State. "What species of military coercion," said he, "could the
General Government adopt for the enforcement of obedience to its
demands? Either an army sent into the heart of a delinquent State, or
blocking up its ports. Have we lived to this, then, that, in order to
suppress and exclude tyranny, it is necessary to render the most
affectionate friends the most bitter enemies, set the father against the
son, and make the brother slay the brother? Is this the happy expedient
that is to preserve liberty? Will it not destroy it? If an army be once
introduced to force us, if once marched into Virginia, figure to
yourselves what the dreadful consequence will be: the most lamentable
civil war must ensue."[101]

We have seen already how vehemently the idea of even _judicial_ coercion
was repudiated by Hamilton, Marshall, and others. The suggestion of
_military_ coercion was uniformly treated, as in the above extracts,
with still more abhorrence. No principle was more fully and firmly
settled on the highest authority than that, under our system, there
could be no coercion of a State.

Mr. Webster, in his elaborate speech of February 16, 1833, arguing
throughout against the sovereignty of the States, and in the course of
his argument sadly confounding the ideas of the Federal Constitution and
the Federal Government, as he confounds the sovereign people of the
States with the State governments, says: "The States _can not_ omit to
appoint Senators and electors. It is not a matter resting in State
discretion or State pleasure.... No member of a State Legislature can
refuse to proceed, at the proper time, to elect Senators to Congress, or
to provide for the choice of electors of President and Vice-President,
any more than the members can refuse, when the appointed day arrives, to
meet the members of the other House, to count the votes for those
officers and ascertain who are chosen."[102] This was before the
invention in 1877 of an electoral commission to relieve Congress of its
constitutional duty to count the vote. Mr. Hamilton, on the contrary,
fresh from the work of forming the Constitution, and familiar with its
principles and purposes, said: "It is certainly true that the State
Legislatures, by forbearing the appointment of Senators, may destroy the
national Government."[103]

It is unnecessary to discuss the particular question on which these two
great authorities are thus directly at issue. I do not contend that the
State Legislatures, of their own will, have a right to forego the
performance of any Federal duty imposed upon them by the Constitution.
But there is a power beyond and above that of either the Federal or
State governments--the power of the people of the State, who ordained
and established the Constitution, as far as it applies to themselves,
reserving, as I think has been demonstrated, the right to reassume the
grants of power therein made, when they deem it necessary for their
safety or welfare to do so. At the behest of this power, it certainly
becomes not only the right, but the duty, of their State Legislature to
refrain from any action implying adherence to the Union, or partnership,
from which the sovereign has withdrawn.


[Footnote 96: "Madison Papers," pp. 732, 761.]

[Footnote 97: Ibid., p. 822.]

[Footnote 98: Ibid., p. 914.]

[Footnote 99: Elliott's "Debates," vol. ii, p. 199.]

[Footnote 100: Ibid., pp. 232, 233.]

[Footnote 101: Elliott's "Debates," vol. iii, p. 117.]

[Footnote 102: "Congressional Debates," vol. ix, Part I, p. 566.]

[Footnote 103: "Federalist," No. lix.]




CHAPTER XIII.

    Some Objections considered.--The New States.--Acquired
    Territory.--Allegiance, false and true.--Difference between
    Nullification and Secession.--Secession a Peaceable Remedy.--No
    Appeal to Arms.--Two Conditions noted.


It would be only adding to a superabundance of testimony to quote
further from the authors of the Constitution in support of the
principle, unquestioned in that generation, that the people who
granted--that is to say, of course, the people of the several
States--might resume their grants. It will require but few words to
dispose of some superficial objections that have been made to the
application of this doctrine in a special case.

It is sometimes said that, whatever weight may attach to principles
founded on the sovereignty and independence of the original thirteen
States, they can not apply to the States of more recent
origin--constituting now a majority of the members of the Union--because
these are but the offspring or creatures of the Union, and must of
course be subordinate and dependent.

This objection would scarcely occur to any instructed mind, though it
may possess a certain degree of specious plausibility for the untaught.
It is enough to answer that the entire equality of the States, in every
particular, is a vital condition of their union. Every new member that
has been admitted into the partnership of States came in, as is
expressly declared in the acts for their admission, on a footing of
perfect equality in every respect with the original members. This
equality is as complete as the equality, before the laws, of the son
with the father, immediately on the attainment by the former of his
legal majority, without regard to the prior condition of dependence and
tutelage. The relations of the original States to one another and to the
Union can not be affected by any subsequent accessions of new members,
as the Constitution fixes those relations permanently, and furnishes the
normal standard which is applicable to all. The Boston memorial to
Congress, referred to in a foregoing chapter, as prepared by a committee
with Mr. Webster at its head, says that the new States "are universally
considered as admitted into the Union upon the same footing as the
original States, and as possessing, in respect to the Union, the same
rights of _sovereignty, freedom, and independence_, as the other
States."

But, with regard to States formed of territory acquired by purchase from
France, Spain, and Mexico, it is claimed that, as they were bought by
the United States, they belong to the same, and have no right to
withdraw at will from an association the property which had been
purchased by the other parties.

Happy would it have been if the equal rights of the people of _all_ the
States to the enjoyment of territory acquired by the common treasure
could have been recognized at the proper time! There would then have
been no secession and no war.

As for the sordid claim of ownership of States, on account of the money
spent for the land which they contain--I can understand the ground of a
claim to some interest in the soil, so long as it continues to be public
property, but have yet to learn in what way the United States ever
became purchaser of the _inhabitants_ or of their political rights.

Any question in regard to property has always been admitted to be matter
for fair and equitable settlement, in case of the withdrawal of a State.

The treaty by which the Louisiana territory was ceded to the United
States expressly provided that the inhabitants thereof should be
"admitted, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the
Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages,
and immunities of citizens of the United States."[104] In all other
acquisitions of territory the same stipulation is either expressed or
implied. Indeed, the denial of the right would be inconsistent with the
character of American political institutions.

Another objection made to the right of secession is based upon obscure,
indefinite, and inconsistent ideas with regard to _allegiance_. It
assumes various shapes, and is therefore somewhat difficult to meet,
but, as most frequently presented, may be stated thus: that the citizen
owes a double allegiance, or a divided allegiance--partly to his State,
partly to the United States: that it is not possible for either of these
powers to release him from the allegiance due to the other: that the
State can no more release him from his obligations to the Union than the
United States can absolve him from his duties to his State. This is the
most moderate way in which the objection is put. The extreme
centralizers go further, and claim that allegiance to the Union, or, as
they generally express it, to _the Government_--meaning thereby the
Federal Government--is paramount, and the obligation to the State only
subsidiary--if, indeed, it exists at all.

This latter view, if the more monstrous, is at least the more consistent
of the two, for it does not involve the difficulty of a divided
allegiance, nor the paradoxical position in which the other places the
citizen, in case of a conflict between his State and the other members
of the Union, of being necessarily a rebel against the General
Government or a traitor to the State of which he is a citizen.

As to _true_ allegiance, in the light of the principles which have been
established, there can be no doubt with regard to it. The primary,
paramount allegiance of the citizen is due to the sovereign only. That
sovereign, under our system, is the people--the people of the State to
which he belongs--the people who constituted the State government which
he obeys, and which protects him in the enjoyment of his personal
rights--the people who alone (as far as he is concerned) ordained and
established the Federal Constitution and Federal Government--the people
who have reserved to themselves sovereignty, which involves the power to
revoke all agencies created by them. The obligation to support the State
or Federal Constitution and the obedience due to either State or Federal
Government are alike derived from and dependent on the allegiance due to
this sovereign. If the sovereign abolishes the State government and
ordains and establishes a new one, the obligation of allegiance requires
him to transfer his obedience accordingly. If the sovereign withdraws
from association with its confederates in the Union, the allegiance of
the citizen requires him to follow the sovereign. Any other course is
rebellion or treason--words which, in the cant of the day, have been so
grossly misapplied and perverted as to be made worse than unmeaning. His
relation to the Union arose from the membership of the State of which he
was a citizen, and ceased whenever his State withdrew from it. He can
not owe obedience--much less allegiance--to an association from which
his sovereign has separated, and thereby withdrawn him.

Every officer of both Federal and State governments is required to take
an oath to support the Constitution, a compact the binding force of
which is based upon the sovereignty of the States--a sovereignty
necessarily carrying with it the principles just stated with regard to
allegiance. Every such officer is, therefore, virtually sworn to
maintain and support the sovereignty of all the States.

Military and naval officers take, in addition, an oath to obey the
lawful orders of their superiors. Such an oath has never been understood
to be eternal in its obligations. It is dissolved by the death,
dismissal, or resignation of the officer who takes it; and such
resignation is not a mere optional right, but becomes an imperative duty
when continuance in the service comes to be in conflict with the
ultimate allegiance due to the sovereignty of the State to which he
belongs.

A little consideration of these plain and irrefutable truths would show
how utterly unworthy and false are the vulgar taunts which attribute
"treason" to those who, in the late secession of the Southern States,
were loyal to the only sovereign entitled to their allegiance, and which
still more absurdly prate of the violation of oaths to support "_the
Government_," an oath which nobody ever could have been legally required
to take, and which must have been ignorantly confounded with the
prescribed oath to support the Constitution.

Nullification and secession are often erroneously treated as if they
were one and the same thing. It is true that both ideas spring from the
sovereign right of a State to interpose for the protection of its own
people, but they are altogether unlike as to both their extent and the
character of the means to be employed. The first was a temporary
expedient, intended to restrain action until the question at issue could
be submitted to a convention of the States. It was a remedy which its
supporters sought to apply within the Union; a means to avoid the last
resort--separation. If the application for a convention should fail, or
if the State making it should suffer an adverse decision, the advocates
of that remedy have not revealed what they proposed as the next
step--supposing the infraction of the compact to have been of that
character which, according to Mr. Webster, dissolved it.

Secession, on the other hand, was the assertion of the inalienable right
of a people to change their government, whenever it ceased to fulfill
the purposes for which it was ordained and established. Under our form
of government, and the cardinal principles upon which it was founded, it
should have been a peaceful remedy. The withdrawal of a State from a
league has no revolutionary or insurrectionary characteristic. The
government of the State remains unchanged as to all internal affairs. It
is only its external or confederate relations that are altered. To term
this action of a sovereign a "rebellion," is a gross abuse of language.
So is the flippant phrase which speaks of it as an appeal to the
"arbitrament of the sword." In the late contest, in particular, there
was no appeal by the seceding States to the arbitrament of arms. There
was on their part no invitation nor provocation to war. They stood in an
attitude of self-defense, and were attacked for merely exercising a
right guaranteed by the original terms of the compact. They neither
tendered nor accepted any challenge to the wager of battle. The man who
defends his house against attack can not with any propriety be said to
have submitted the question of his right to it to the arbitrament of
arms.

Two moral obligations or restrictions upon a seceding State certainly
exist: in the first place, not to break up the partnership without good
and sufficient cause; and, in the second, to make an equitable
settlement with former associates, and, as far as may be, to avoid the
infliction of loss or damage upon any of them. Neither of these
obligations was violated or neglected by the Southern States in their
secession.


[Footnote 104: Ray's "Louisiana Digest," vol. i, p. 24.]




CHAPTER XIV.

    Early Foreshadowings.--Opinions of Mr. Madison and Mr. Rufus
    King.--Safeguards provided.--Their Failure.--State
    Interposition.--The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.--Their
    Endorsement by the People in the Presidential Elections of 1800
    and Ensuing Terms.--South Carolina and Mr. Calhoun.--The
    Compromise of 1833.--Action of Massachusetts in
    1843-'45.--Opinions of John Quincy Adams.--Necessity for
    Secession.


From the earliest period, it was foreseen by the wisest of our statesmen
that a danger to the perpetuity of the Union would arise from the
conflicting interests of different sections, and every effort was made
to secure each of these classes of interests against aggression by the
other. As a proof of this, may be cited the following extract from Mr.
Madison's report of a speech made by himself in the Philadelphia
Convention on the 30th of June, 1787:

    "He admitted that every peculiar interest, whether in any class
    of citizens or any description of States, ought to be secured as
    far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought
    to be given a constitutional power of defense. But he contended
    that the States were divided into different interests, not by
    their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most
    material of which resulted from climate, but principally from
    the effects of their having or not having slaves. These two
    causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in
    the United States. It did not lie between the large and small
    States; it lay between the Northern and Southern; and, if any
    defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to
    these two interests."[105]

Mr. Rufus King, a distinguished member of the Convention from
Massachusetts, a few days afterward, said, to the same effect: "He was
fully convinced that the question concerning a difference of interests
did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the great and
small States, but between the Southern and Eastern. For this reason he
had been ready to yield something, in the proportion of representatives,
for the security of the Southern.... He was not averse to giving them a
still greater security, but did not see how it could be done."[106]

The wise men who formed the Constitution were not seeking to bind the
States together by the material power of a majority; nor were they so
blind to the influences of passion and interest as to believe that paper
barriers would suffice to restrain a majority actuated by either or both
of these motives. They endeavored, therefore, to prevent the conflicts
inevitable from the ascendancy of a sectional or party majority, by so
distributing the powers of government that each interest might hold a
check upon the other. It was believed that the compromises made with
regard to representation--securing to each State an equal vote in the
Senate, and in the House of Representatives giving the States a weight
in proportion to their respective population, estimating the negroes as
equivalent to three fifths of the same number of free whites--would have
the effect of giving at an early period a majority in the House of
Representatives to the South, while the North would retain the
ascendancy in the Senate. Thus it was supposed that the two great
sectional interests would be enabled to restrain each other within the
limits of purposes and action beneficial to both.

The failure of these expectations need not affect our reverence for the
intentions of the fathers, or our respect for the means which they
devised to carry them into effect. That they were mistaken, both as to
the maintenance of the balance of sectional power and as to the fidelity
and integrity with which the Congress was expected to conform to the
letter and spirit of its delegated authority, is perhaps to be ascribed
less to lack of prophetic foresight, than to that over-sanguine
confidence which is the weakness of honest minds, and which was
naturally strengthened by the patriotic and fraternal feelings resulting
from the great struggle through which they had then but recently passed.
They saw, in the sufficiency of the authority delegated to the Federal
Government and in the fullness of the sovereignty retained by the
States, a system the strict construction of which was so eminently
adapted to indefinite expansion of the confederacy as to embrace every
variety of production and consequent diversity of pursuit. Carried out
in the spirit in which it was devised, there was in this system no
element of disintegration, but every facility for an enlargement of the
circle of the family of States (or nations), so that it scarcely seemed
unreasonable to look forward to a fulfillment of the aspiration of Mr.
Hamilton, that it might extend over North America, perhaps over the
whole continent.

Not at all incompatible with these views and purposes was the
recognition of the right of the States to reassume, if occasion should
require it, the powers which they had delegated. On the contrary, the
maintenance of this right was the surest guarantee of the perpetuity of
the Union, and the denial of it sounded the first serious note of its
dissolution. The conservative efficiency of "_State interposition_," for
maintenance of the essential principles of the Union against aggression
or decadence, is one of the most conspicuous features in the debates of
the various State Conventions by which the Constitution was ratified.
Perhaps their ideas of the particular form in which this interposition
was to be made may have been somewhat indefinite; and left to be reduced
to shape by the circumstances when they should arise, but the principle
itself was assumed and asserted as fundamental. But for a firm reliance
upon it, as a sure resort in case of need, it may safely be said that
the Union would never have been formed. It would be unjust to the wisdom
and sagacity of the framers of the Constitution to suppose that they
entirely relied on paper barriers for the protection of the rights of
minorities. Fresh from the defense of violated charters and faithless
aggression on inalienable rights, it might, _a priori_, be assumed that
they would require something more potential than mere promises to
protect them from human depravity and human ambition. That they did so
is to be found in the debates both of the General and the State
Conventions, where State interposition was often declared to be the
bulwark against usurpation.

At an early period in the history of the Federal Government, the States
of Kentucky and Virginia found reason to reassert this right of State
interposition. In the first of the famous resolutions drawn by Mr.
Jefferson in 1798, and with some modification adopted by the Legislature
of Kentucky in November of that year, it is declared that, "whensoever
the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are
_unauthoritative, void, and of no force_; that to this compact each
State acceded as a State, and is an integral party; that this
Government, created by this compact, was not made the exclusive or final
judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would
have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its
powers; but that, as in all other cases of compact among parties having
no common judge, _each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as
well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress_."

In the Virginia resolutions, drawn by Mr. Madison, adopted on the 24th
of December, 1798, and reaffirmed in 1799, the General Assembly of that
State declares that "it views the powers of the Federal Government as
resulting from the compact, to which the States are parties, as limited
by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that
compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants
enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a deliberate, palpable,
and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact,
the States, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty
bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for
maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and
liberties, appertaining to them." Another of the same series of
resolutions denounces the indications of a design "to consolidate the
States by degrees into one sovereignty."

These, it is true, were only the resolves of two States, and they were
dissented from by several other State Legislatures--not so much on the
ground of opposition to the general principles asserted as on that of
their being unnecessary in their application to the alien and sedition
laws, which were the immediate occasion of their utterance.
Nevertheless, they were the basis of the contest for the Presidency in
1800, which resulted in their approval by the people in the triumphant
election of Mr. Jefferson. They became part of the accepted creed of the
Republican, Democratic, State-Rights, or Conservative party, as it has
been variously termed at different periods, and as such they were
ratified by the people in every Presidential election that took place
for sixty years, with two exceptions. The last victory obtained under
them, and when they were emphasized by adding the construction of them
contained in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia Legislature in
1799, was at the election of Mr. Buchanan--the last President chosen by
vote of a party that could with any propriety be styled "national," in
contradistinction to sectional.

At a critical and memorable period, that pure spirit, luminous
intellect, and devoted adherent of the Constitution, the great statesman
of South Carolina, invoked this remedy of State interposition against
the Tariff Act of 1828, which was deemed injurious and oppressive to his
State. No purpose was then declared to coerce the State, as such, but
measures were taken to break the protective shield of her authority and
enforce the laws of Congress upon her citizens, by compelling them to
pay outside of her ports the duties on imports, which the State had
declared unconstitutional, and had forbidden to be collected in her
ports.

There remained at that day enough of the spirit in which the Union had
been founded--enough of respect for the sovereignty of States and of
regard for the limitations of the Constitution--to prevent a conflict of
arms. The compromise of 1833 was adopted, which South Carolina agreed to
accept, the principle for which she contended being virtually conceded.

Meantime there had been no lack, as we have already seen, of assertions
of the sovereign rights of the States from other quarters. The
declaration of these rights by the New England States and their
representatives, on the acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, on the
admission of the State of that name in 1811-'12, and on the question of
the annexation of Texas in 1843-'45, have been referred to in another
place. Among the resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature, in
relation to the proposed annexation of Texas, adopted in February, 1845,
were the following:

    "2. _Resolved_, That there has hitherto been no precedent of the
    admission of a foreign state or foreign territory into the Union
    by legislation. And as the powers of legislation, granted in the
    Constitution of the United States to Congress, do not embrace a
    case of the admission of a foreign state or foreign territory,
    by legislation, into the Union, such an act of admission _would
    have no binding force whatever on the people of Massachusetts_.

    "3. _Resolved_, That the power, _never having been granted by
    the people of Massachusetts_, to admit into the Union States and
    Territories not within the same when the Constitution was
    adopted, _remains with the people, and can only be exercised in
    such way and manner as the people shall hereafter designate and
    appoint_."[107]

To these stanch declarations of principles--with regard to which
(leaving out of consideration the particular occasion that called them
forth) my only doubt would be whether they do not express too decided a
doctrine of nullification--may be added the avowal of one of the most
distinguished sons of Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams, in his discourse
before the New York Historical Society, in 1839:

    "Nations" (says Mr. Adams) "acknowledge no judge between them
    upon earth; and their governments, from necessity, must, in
    their intercourse with each other, decide when the failure of
    one party to a contract to perform its obligations absolves the
    other from the reciprocal fulfillment of its own. But this last
    of earthly powers is not necessary to the freedom or
    independence of States connected together by the immediate
    action of the people of whom they consist. To the people alone
    is there reserved as well the dissolving as the constituent
    power, and that power can be exercised by them only under the
    tie of conscience, binding them to the retributive justice of
    Heaven.

    "With these qualifications, we may admit the same right as
    vested in the _people of every State_ in the Union, with
    reference to the General Government, which was exercised by the
    people of the united colonies with reference to the supreme head
    of the British Empire, of which they formed a part; and under
    these limitations have the people of each State in the Union a
    right to secede from the confederated Union itself.

    "Thus stands the RIGHT. But the indissoluble link of union
    between the people of the several States of this confederated
    nation is, after all, not in the RIGHT, but in the HEART. If the
    day should ever come (may Heaven avert it!) when the affections
    of the people of these States shall be alienated from each
    other, when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold
    indifference, or collision of interests shall fester into
    hatred, the bonds of political association will not long hold
    together parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of
    conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and _far better
    will it be for the people of the disunited States to part in
    friendship with each other than to be held together by
    constraint_. Then will be the time for reverting to the
    precedents which occurred at the formation and adoption of the
    Constitution, to form again a _more perfect Union, by dissolving
    that which could no longer bind_, and to leave the separated
    parts to be reunited by the law of political gravitation to the
    center."

Perhaps it is unfortunate that, in earlier and better times, when the
prospect of serious difficulties first arose, a convention of the States
was not assembled to consider the relations of the various States and
the Government of the Union. As time rolled on, the General Government,
gathering with both hands a mass of undelegated powers, reached that
position which Mr. Jefferson had pointed out as an intolerable evil--the
claim of a right to judge of the extent of its own authority. Of those
then participating in public affairs, it was apparently useless to ask
that the question should be submitted for decision to the parties to the
compact, under the same conditions as those which controlled the
formation and adoption of the Constitution; otherwise, a convention
would have been utterly fruitless, for at that period, when aggression
for sectional aggrandizement had made such rapid advances, it can
scarcely be doubted that more than a fourth, if not a majority of
States, would have adhered to that policy which had been manifested for
years in the legislation of many States, as well as in that of the
Federal Government. What course would then have remained to the Southern
States? Nothing, except either to submit to a continuation of what they
believed and felt to be violations of the compact of union, breaches of
faith, injurious and oppressive usurpation, or else to assert the
sovereign right to reassume the grants they had made, since those grants
had been perverted from their original and proper purposes.

Surely the right to resume the powers delegated and to judge of the
propriety and sufficiency of the causes for doing so are alike
inseparable from the possession of sovereignty. Over sovereigns there is
no common judge, and between them can be no umpire, except by their own
agreement and consent. The necessity or propriety of exercising the
right to withdraw from a confederacy or union must be determined by each
member for itself. Once determined in favor of withdrawal, all that
remains for consideration is the obligation to see that no wanton damage
is done to former associates, and to make such fair settlement of common
interests as the equity of the case may require.


[Footnote 105: "Madison Papers," p. 1006.]

[Footnote 106: Ibid., pp. 1057, 1058.]

[Footnote 107: "Congressional Globe," vol. xiv, p. 299.]




CHAPTER XV.

    A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration of
    Independence.--Articles of Confederation.--The Constitution of
    the United States.--The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of
    Power in both.--The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the
    Powers delegated.--The Power of Amendment merely a Power to
    amend the Delegated Grants.--A Smaller Power was required for
    Amendment than for a Grant.--The Power of Amendment is confined
    to Grants of the Constitution.--Limitations on the Power of
    Amendment.


In July, 1776, the Congress of the thirteen united colonies declared
that "these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent States." The denial of this asserted right and the attempted
coercion made it manifest that a bond of union was necessary, for the
common defense.

In November of the next year, viz., 1777, articles of confederation and
perpetual union were entered into by the thirteen States under the style
of "The United States of America." The government instituted was to be
administered by a congress of delegates from the several States, and
each State to have an equal voice in legislation. The Government so
formed was to act through and by the States, and, having no power to
enforce its requisitions upon the States, embarrassment was early
realized in its efforts to provide for the exigencies of war. After the
treaty of peace and recognition of the independence of the States, the
difficulty of raising revenue and regulating commerce was so great as to
lead to repeated efforts to obtain from the States additional grants of
power. Under the Articles of Confederation no amendment of them could be
made except by the unanimous consent of the States, and this it had not
been found possible to obtain for the powers requisite to the efficient
discharge of the functions intrusted to the Congress. Hence arose the
proceedings for a convention to amend the articles of confederation. The
result was the formation of a new plan of government, entitled "The
Constitution of the United States of America."

This was submitted to the Congress, in order that, if approved by them,
it might be referred to the States for adoption or rejection by the
several conventions thereof, and, if adopted by nine of the States, it
was to be the compact of union between the States so ratifying the same.

The new form of government differed in many essential particulars from
the old one. The delegates, intent on the purpose to give greater
efficiency to the government of the Union, proposed greatly to enlarge
its powers, so much so that it was not deemed safe to confide them to a
single body, and they were consequently distributed between three
independent departments of government, which might be a check upon one
another. The Constitution did not, like the Articles of Confederation,
declare that the States had agreed to a perpetual union, but distinctly
indicated the hope of its perpetuity by the expression in the preamble
of the purpose to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity." The circumstances under which the Union of the Constitution
was formed justified the hope of its perpetuity, but the brief existence
of the Confederation may have been a warning against the renewal of the
assertion that the compact should be perpetual.

A remedy for the embarrassment which had been realized, under the
Articles of Confederation, in obtaining amendments to correct any
defects in grants of power, so as to render them effective for the
purpose for which they were given, was provided by its fifth article. It
is here to be specially noted that new grants of power, as asked for by
the Convention, were under the Articles of Confederation only to be
obtained from the unanimous assent of the States. Therefore it followed
that two of the States which did not ratify the Constitution were, so
long as they retained that attitude, free from its obligations. Thus it
is seen that the same principle in regard to obtaining grants of
additional power for the Federal Government formed the rule for the
Union as it had done for the Confederation; that is, that the consent of
each and every State was a prerequisite. The apprehension which justly
existed that several of the States might reject the Constitution, and
under the rule of unanimity defeat it, led to the seventh article of the
Constitution, which, provided that the ratification by the conventions
of nine States should be sufficient for the establishment of the
Constitution between the States ratifying it, which of course
contemplated leaving the others, more or less in number, separate and
distinct from the nine States forming a new government. Thus was the
Union to be a voluntary compact, and all the powers of its government to
be derived from the assent of each of its members.

These powers as proposed by the Constitution were so extensive as to
create alarm and opposition by some of the most influential men in many
of the States. It is known that the objection of the patriot Samuel
Adams was only overcome by an assurance that such an amendment as the
tenth would be adopted. Like opposition was by like assurance elsewhere
overcome. That article is in these words: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."

Amendment, however, of the delegated powers was made more easy than it
had been under the Confederation. Ratification by three fourths of the
States was sufficient under the Constitution for the adoption of an
amendment to it. As this power of amendment threatens to be the Aaron's
rod which will swallow up the rest, I propose to give it special
examination. What is the Constitution of the United States? The whole
body of the instrument, the history of its formation and adoption, as
well as the tenth amendment, added in an abundance of caution, clearly
show it to be an instrument enumerating the powers delegated by the
States to the Federal Government, their common agent. It is specifically
declared that all which was not so delegated was reserved. On this mass
of reserved powers, those which the States declined to grant, the
Federal Government was expressly forbidden to intrude. Of what value
would this prohibition have been, if three fourths of the States could,
without the assent of a particular State, invade the domain which that
State had reserved for its own exclusive use and control?

It has heretofore, I hope, been satisfactorily demonstrated that the
States were sovereigns before they formed the Union, and that they have
never surrendered their sovereignty, but have only intrusted by their
common agent certain functions of sovereignty to be used for their
common welfare.

Among the powers delegated was one to amend the Constitution, which, it
is submitted, was merely the power to amend the delegated grants, and
these were obtained by the separate and independent action of each State
acceding to the Union. When we consider how carefully each clause was
discussed in the General Convention, and how closely each was
scrutinized in the conventions of the several States, the conclusion can
not be avoided that all was specified which it was intended to bestow,
and not a few of the wisest in that day held that too much power had
been conferred.

Aware of the imperfection of everything devised by man, it was foreseen
that, in the exercise of the functions intrusted to the General
Government, experience might reveal the necessity of modification--i.e.,
amendment--and power was therefore given to amend, in a certain manner,
the delegated trusts so as to make them efficient for the purposes
designed, or to prevent their misconstruction or abuse to the injury or
oppression of any of the people. In support of this view I refer to the
historical fact that the first ten amendments of the Constitution,
nearly coeval with it, all refer either to the powers delegated, or are
directed to the greater security of the rights which were guarded by
express limitations.

The distinction in the mind of the framers of the Constitution between
amendment and delegation of power seems to me clearly drawn by the fact
that the Constitution itself, which was a proposition to the States to
grant enumerated powers, was only to have effect between the ratifying
States; but the fifth article provided that amendments to the
Constitution might be adopted by three fourths of the States, and
thereby be valid as part of the Constitution. It thus appears that a
smaller power was required for an amendment than for a grant, and the
natural if not necessary conclusion is, that it was because an amendment
must belong to, and grow out of, a grant previously made. If a so-called
amendment could have been the means of obtaining a new power, is it to
be supposed that those watchful guardians of community independence, for
which the war of the Revolution had been fought, would have been
reconciled to the adoption of the Constitution, by the declaration that
the powers not delegated are reserved to the States? Unless the power of
amendment be confined to the grants of the Constitution, there can be no
security to the reserved rights of a minority less than a fourth of the
States. I submit that the word "amendment" necessarily implies an
improvement upon something which is possessed, and can have no proper
application to that which did not previously exist.

The apprehension that was felt of this power of amendment by the framers
of the Constitution is shown by the restrictions placed upon the
exercise of several of the delegated powers. For example: power was
given to admit new States, but no new State should be erected within the
jurisdiction of any other State, nor be formed by the junction of two or
more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures
of those States; and the power to regulate commerce was limited by the
prohibition of an amendment affecting, for a certain time, the migration
or importation of persons whom any of the existing States should think
proper to admit; and by the very important provision for the protection
of the smaller States and the preservation of their equality in the
Union, that the compact in regard to the membership of the two Houses of
Congress should not be so amended that any "State, without its consent,
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." These
limitations and prohibitions on the power of amendment all refer to
clauses of the Constitution, to things which existed as part of the
General Government; they were not needed, and therefore not to be found
in relation to the reserved powers of the States, on which the General
Government was forbidden to intrude by the ninth article of the
amendments.

In view of the small territory of the New England States, comparatively
to that of the Middle and Southern States, and the probability of the
creation of new States in the large Territory of some of these latter,
it might well have been anticipated that in the course of time the New
England States would become less than one fourth of the members of the
Union. Nothing is less likely than that the watchful patriots of that
region would have consented to a form of government which should give to
a majority of three fourths of the States the power to deprive them of
their dearest rights and privileges. Yet to this extremity the new-born
theory of the power of amendment would go. Against this insidious
assault, this wooden horse which it is threatened to introduce into the
citadel of our liberties, I have sought to warn the inheritors of our
free institutions, and earnestly do invoke the resistance of all true
patriots.




PART III.

SECESSION AND CONFEDERATION.

CHAPTER I.

    Opening of the New Year.--The People in Advance of their
    Representatives.--Conciliatory Conduct of Southern Members of
    Congress.--Sensational Fictions.--Misstatements of the Count of
    Paris.--Obligations of a Senator.--The Southern Forts and
    Arsenals.--Pensacola Bay and Fort Pickens.--The Alleged "Caucus"
    and its Resolutions.--Personal Motives and Feelings.--The
    Presidency not a Desirable Office.--Letter from the Hon. C. C.
    Clay.


With the failure of the Senate Committee of Thirteen to come to any
agreement, the last reasonable hope of a pacific settlement of
difficulties within the Union was extinguished in the minds of those
most reluctant to abandon the effort. The year 1861 opened, as we have
seen, upon the spectacle of a general belief, among the people of the
planting States, in the necessity of an early secession, as the only
possible alternative left them.

It has already been shown that the calmness and deliberation, with which
the measures requisite for withdrawal were adopted and executed, afford
the best refutation of the charge that they were the result of haste,
passion, or precipitation. Still more contrary to truth is the
assertion, so often recklessly made and reiterated, that the people of
the South were led into secession, against their will and their better
judgment, by a few ambitious and discontented politicians.

The truth is, that the Southern people were in advance of their
representatives throughout, and that these latter were not agitators or
leaders in the popular movement. They were in harmony with its great
principles, but their influence, with very few exceptions, was exerted
to restrain rather than to accelerate their application, and to allay
rather than to stimulate excitement. As sentinels on the outer wall, the
people had a right to look to them for warning of approaching danger;
but, as we have seen, in that last session of the last Congress that
preceded the disruption, Southern Senators, of the class generally
considered extremists, served on a committee of pacification, and strove
earnestly to promote its objects. Failing in this, they still exerted
themselves to prevent the commission of any act that might result in
bloodshed.

Invention has busied itself, to the exhaustion of its resources, in the
creation of imaginary "cabals," "conspiracies," and "intrigues," among
the Senators and Representatives of the South on duty in Washington at
that time. The idle gossip of the public hotels, the sensational rumors
of the streets, the _canards_ of newspaper correspondents--whatever was
floating through the atmosphere of that anxious period--however lightly
regarded at the moment by the more intelligent, has since been drawn
upon for materials to be used in the construction of what has been
widely accepted as authentic history. Nothing would seem to be too
absurd for such uses. Thus, it has been gravely stated that a caucus of
Southern Senators, held in the early part of January, "resolved to
assume to themselves the political power of the South"; that they took
entire control of all political and military operations; that they
issued instructions for the passage of ordinances of secession, and for
the seizure of forts, arsenals, and custom-houses; with much more of the
like groundless fiction. A foreign prince, who served for a time in the
Federal Army, and has since undertaken to write a history of "The Civil
War in America"--a history the incomparable blunders of which are
redeemed from suspicion of willful misstatement only by the writer's
ignorance of the subject--speaks of the Southern representatives as
having "kept their seats in Congress in order to be able to paralyze its
action, forming, at the same time, a center whence they issued
directions to their friends in the South to complete the dismemberment
of the republic."[108] And again, with reference to the secession of
several States, he says that "the word of command issued by _the
committee at Washington was_ promptly obeyed."[109]

Statements such as these are a travesty upon history. That the
representatives of the South held conference with one another and took
counsel together, as men having common interests and threatened by
common dangers, is true, and is the full extent of the truth. That they
communicated to friends at home information of what was passing is to be
presumed, and would have been most obligatory if it had not been that
the published proceedings rendered such communication needless. But that
any such man, or committee of men, should have undertaken to direct the
mighty movement then progressing throughout the South, or to control,
through the telegraph and the mails, the will and the judgment of
conventions of the people, assembled under the full consciousness of the
dignity of that sovereignty which they represented, would have been an
extraordinary degree of folly and presumption.

The absurdity of the statement is further evident from a consideration
of the fact that the movements which culminated in the secession of the
several States began before the meeting of Congress. They were not
inaugurated, prosecuted, or controlled by the Senators and
Representatives in Congress, but by the Governors, Legislatures, and
finally by the delegates of the people in conventions of the respective
States. I believe I may fairly claim to have possessed a full share of
the confidence of the people of the State which I in part represented;
and proof has already been furnished to show how little effect my own
influence could have upon their action, even in the negative capacity of
a brake upon the wheels, by means of which it was hurried on to
consummation.

As for the imputation of holding our seats as a vantage-ground in
plotting for the dismemberment of the Union--in connection with which
the Count of Paris does me the honor to single out my name for special
mention--it is a charge so dishonorable, if true, to its object--so
disgraceful, if false, to its author--as to be outside of the proper
limit of discussion. It is a charge which no accuser ever made in my
presence, though I had in public debate more than once challenged its
assertion and denounced its falsehood. It is enough to say that I always
held, and repeatedly avowed, the principle that a Senator in Congress
occupied the position of an ambassador from the State which he
represented to the Government of the United States, as well as in some
sense a member of the Government; and that, in either capacity, it would
be dishonorable to use his powers and privileges for the destruction or
for the detriment of the Government to which he was accredited. Acting
on this principle, as long as I held a seat in the Senate, my best
efforts were directed to the maintenance of the Constitution, the Union
resulting from it, and to make the General Government an effective agent
of the States for its prescribed purpose. As soon as the paramount
allegiance due to Mississippi forbade a continuance of these efforts, I
withdrew from the position. To say that during this period I did nothing
secretly, in conflict with what was done or professed openly, would be
merely to assert my own integrity, which would be worthless to those who
may doubt it, and superfluous to those who believe in it. What has been
said on the subject for myself, I believe to be also true of my Southern
associates in Congress.

With regard to the forts, arsenals, etc., something more remains to be
said. The authorities of the Southern States immediately after, and in
some cases a few days before, their actual secession, took possession
(in every instance without resistance or bloodshed) of forts, arsenals,
custom-houses, and other public property within their respective limits.
I do not propose at this time to consider the question of their right to
do so; that may be more properly done hereafter. But it may not be out
of place briefly to refer to the statement, often made, that the absence
of troops from the military posts in the South, which enabled the States
so quietly to take such possession, was the result of collusion and
prearrangement between the Southern leaders and the Federal Secretary of
War, John B. Floyd, of Virginia. It is a sufficient answer to this
allegation to state the fact that the absence of troops from these
posts, instead of being exceptional, was, and still is, their ordinary
condition in time of peace. At the very moment when these sentences are
being written (in 1880), although the army of the United States is twice
as large as in 1860; although four years of internal war and a yet
longer period of subsequent military occupation of the South have
habituated the public to the presence of troops in their midst, to an
extent that would formerly have been startling if not offensive;
although allegations of continued disaffection on the part of the
Southern people have been persistently reiterated, for party
purposes--yet it is believed that the forts and arsenals in the States
of the Gulf are in as defenseless a condition, and as liable to quiet
seizure (if any such purpose existed), as in the beginning of the year
1861. Certainly, those within the range of my personal information are
occupied, as they were at that time, only by ordnance-sergeants or
fort-keepers.

There were, however, some exceptions to this general rule--especially in
the defensive works of the harbor of Charleston, the forts at Key West
and the Dry Tortugas, and those protecting the entrance of Pensacola
Bay. The events which occurred in Charleston Harbor will be more
conveniently noticed hereafter. The island forts near the extreme
southern point of Florida were too isolated and too remote from
population to be disturbed at that time; but the situation long
maintained at the mouth of Pensacola Bay affords a signal illustration
of the forbearance and conciliatory spirit that animated Southern
counsels. For a long time, Fort Pickens, on the island of Santa Rosa, at
the entrance to the harbor, was occupied only by a small body of Federal
soldiers and marines--less than one hundred, all told. Immediately
opposite, and in possession of the other two forts and the adjacent
navy-yard, was a strong force of volunteer troops of Florida and Alabama
(which might, on short notice, have been largely increased), ready and
anxious to attack and take possession of Fort Pickens. That they could
have done so is unquestionable, and, if mere considerations of military
advantage had been consulted, it would surely have been done. But the
love of peace and the purpose to preserve it, together with a revulsion
from the thought of engaging in fraternal strife, were more potent than
considerations of probable interest. During the anxious period of
uncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the Southern
Senators in Washington were employed to dissuade (they could not
_command_) from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that might
lead to collision. These efforts were exerted through written and
telegraphic communications to the Governors of Alabama and Florida, the
Commander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near the
scene of operations. The records of the telegraph-office, if preserved,
will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of those
efforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision was
averted; and it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfaction
at the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. It
may be that _they_ were right, and that we, who counseled delay and
forbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the
ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the
perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, our
advice would have been different.

Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senators
held on the evening of the 5th of January,[110] have been magnified, by
the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period,
into something vastly momentous.

The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could
not longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant under the
circumstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final action
on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to
them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we
had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month--that
our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory--that further efforts in
Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that the
States should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of
their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the
formation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early as
possible after their secession--advice the expediency of which could
hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe. As to the "instructions"
asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold their
seats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinion
which then and long afterward continued to exist; and the practical
value of which must have been confined to Senators of States which did
not actually secede. For myself, I can only say that no advice could
have prevailed on me to hold a seat in the Senate after receiving notice
that Mississippi had withdrawn from the Union. The best evidence that my
associates thought likewise is the fact that, although no instructions
were given them, they promptly withdrew on the receipt of official
information of the withdrawal of the States which they represented.

It will not be amiss here briefly to state what were my position and
feelings at the period now under consideration, as they have been the
subject of gross and widespread misrepresentation. It is not only
untrue, but absurd, to attribute to me motives of personal ambition to
be gratified by a dismemberment of the Union. Much of my life had been
spent in the military and civil service of the United States. Whatever
reputation I had acquired was identified with their history; and, if
future preferment had been the object, it would have led me to cling to
the Union as long as a shred of it should remain. If any, judging after
the event, should assume that I was allured by the high office
subsequently conferred upon me by the people of the Confederate States,
the answer to any such conclusion has been made by others, to whom it
was well known, before the Confederacy was formed, that I had no desire
to be its President. When the suggestion was made to me, I expressed a
decided objection, and gave reasons of a public and permanent character
against being placed in that position.

Furthermore, I then held the office of United States Senator from
Mississippi--one which I preferred to all others. The kindness of the
people had three times conferred it upon me, and I had no reason to fear
that it would not be given again, as often as desired. So far from
wishing to change this position for any other, I had specially requested
my friends (some of whom had thought of putting me in nomination for the
Presidency of the United States in 1860) not to permit "my name to be
used before the Convention for any nomination whatever."

I had been so near the office for four years, while in the Cabinet of
Mr. Pierce, that I saw it from behind the scenes, and it was to me an
office in no wise desirable. The responsibilities were great; the labor,
the vexations, the disappointments, were greater. Those who have
intimately known the official and personal life of our Presidents can
not fail to remember how few have left the office as happy men as when
they entered it, how darkly the shadows gathered around the setting sun,
and how eagerly the multitude would turn to gaze upon another orb just
rising to take its place in the political firmament.

Worn by incessant fatigue, broken in fortune, debarred by public
opinion, prejudice, or tradition, from future employment, the wisest and
best who have filled that office have retired to private life, to
remember rather the failure of their hopes than the success of their
efforts. He must, indeed, be a self-confident man who could hope to fill
the chair of Washington with satisfaction to himself, with the assurance
of receiving on his retirement the meed awarded by the people to that
great man, that he had "lived enough for life and for glory," or even of
feeling that the sacrifice of self had been compensated by the service
rendered to his country.

The following facts were presented in a letter written several years ago
by the Hon. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, who was one of my most intimate
associates in the Senate, with reference to certain misstatements to
which his attention had been called by one of my friends:

    "The import is, that Mr. Davis, disappointed and chagrined at
    not receiving the nomination of the Democratic party for
    President of the United States in 1860, took the lead on the
    assembling of Congress in December, 1860, in a 'conspiracy' of
    Southern Senators 'which planned the secession of the Southern
    States from the Union,' and 'on the night of January 5, 1861,...
    framed the scheme of revolution which was implicitly and
    promptly followed at the South.' In other words, that Southern
    Senators (and, chief among them, Jefferson Davis), then and
    there, instigated and induced the Southern States to secede.

    "I am quite sure that Mr. Davis neither expected nor desired the
    nomination for the Presidency of the United States in 1860. He
    never evinced any such aspiration, by word or sign, to me--with
    whom he was, I believe, as intimate and confidential as with any
    person outside of his own family. On the contrary, he requested
    the delegation from Mississippi not to permit the use of his
    name before the Convention. And, after the nomination of both
    Douglas and Breckinridge, he conferred with them, at the
    instance of leading Democrats, to persuade them to withdraw,
    that their friends might unite on some second choice--an office
    he would never have undertaken, had he sought the nomination or
    believed he was regarded as an aspirant.

    "Mr. Davis did not take an active part in planning or hastening
    secession. I think he only _regretfully_ consented to it, as a
    political necessity for the preservation of popular and State
    rights, which were seriously threatened by the triumph of a
    sectional party who were pledged to make war on them. I know
    that some leading men, and even Mississippians, thought him too
    moderate and backward, and found fault with him for not taking a
    leading part in secession.

    "No 'plan of secession' or 'scheme of revolution' was, to my
    knowledge, discussed--certainly none matured--at the caucus, 5th
    of January, 1861, unless, forsooth, the resolutions appended
    hereto be so held. They comprise the sum and substance of what
    was said and done. I never heard that the caucus advised the
    South 'to accumulate munitions of war,' or 'to organize and
    equip an army of one hundred thousand men,' or determined 'to
    hold on as long as possible to the Southern seats.' So far from
    it, a majority of Southern Senators seemed to think there would
    be no war; that the dominant party in the North desired
    separation from the South, and would gladly let their 'erring
    sisters go in peace.' I could multiply proofs of such a
    disposition. As to holding on to their seats, no Southern
    Legislature advised it, no Southern Senator who favored
    secession did so but one, and none others wished to do so, I
    believe.

    "The 'plan of secession,' if any, and the purpose of secession,
    unquestionably, originated, not in Washington City, or with the
    Senators or Representatives of the South, but among the people
    of the several States, many months before it was attempted. They
    followed no leaders at Washington or elsewhere, but acted for
    themselves, with an independence and unanimity unprecedented in
    any movement of such magnitude. Before the meeting of the caucus
    of January 5, 1861, South Carolina had seceded, and Alabama,
    Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas had taken the initial
    step of secession, by calling conventions for its
    accomplishment. Before the election of Lincoln, all the Southern
    States, excepting one or two, had pledged themselves to separate
    from the Union upon the triumph of a sectional party in the
    Presidential election, by acts or resolutions of their
    Legislatures, resolves of both Democratic and Whig State
    Conventions, and of primary assemblies of the people--in every
    way in which they could commit themselves to any future act.
    Their purpose was proclaimed to the world through the press and
    telegraph, and criticised in Congress, in the Northern
    Legislatures, in press and pulpit, and on the hustings, during
    many months before Congress met in December, 1860.

    "Over and above all these facts, the reports of the United
    States Senate show that, prior to the 5th of January, 1861,
    Southern Senators united with Northern Democratic Senators in an
    effort to effect pacification and prevent secession, and that
    Jefferson Davis was one of a committee appointed by the Senate
    to consider and report such a measure; that it failed because
    the Northern Republicans opposed everything that looked to
    peace; that Senator Douglas arraigned them as trying to
    precipitate secession, referred to Jefferson Davis as one who
    sought conciliation, and called upon the Republican Senators to
    tell what they would do, if anything, to restore harmony and
    prevent disunion. They did not even deign a response. Thus, by
    their sullen silence, they made confession (without avoidance)
    of their stubborn purpose to hold up no hand raised to maintain
    the Union...."


[Footnote 108: "History of the Civil war," by the Count of Paris;
American translation, vol. i, p. 122.]

[Footnote 109: Ibid, p. 125.]

[Footnote 110: Subjoined are the resolutions referred to, adopted by the
Senators from Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas,
and Arkansas. Messrs. Toombs, of Georgia, and Sebastian, of Arkansas,
are said to have been absent from the meeting:

    "_Resolved_, That, in our opinion, each of the States should, as
    soon as may be, secede from the Union.

    "_Resolved_, That provision should be made for a convention to
    organize a confederacy of the seceding States: the Convention to
    meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of
    Montgomery, in the State of Alabama.

    "_Resolved_, That, in view of the hostile legislation that is
    threatened against the seceding States, and which may be
    consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether
    the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date, for
    the purpose of defeating such legislation.

    "_Resolved_, That a committee be and are hereby appointed,
    consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out
    the objects of this meeting."
]




CHAPTER II.

    Tenure of Public Property ceded by the States.--Sovereignty and
    Eminent Domain.--Principles asserted by Massachusetts, New York,
    Virginia, and other States.--The Charleston Forts.--South
    Carolina sends Commissioners to Washington.--Sudden Movement of
    Major Anderson.--Correspondence of the Commissioners with the
    President.--Interviews of the Author with Mr. Buchanan.--Major
    Anderson.--The Star of the West.--The President's Special
    Message.--Speech of the Author in the Senate.--Further
    Proceedings and Correspondence relative to Fort Sumter.--Mr.
    Buchanan's Rectitude in Purpose and Vacillation in Action.


The sites of forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public property of
the Federal Government were ceded by the States, within whose limits
they were, subject to the condition, either expressed or implied, that
they should be used solely and exclusively for the purposes for which
they were granted. The ultimate ownership of the soil, or eminent
domain, remains with the people of the State in which it lies, by virtue
of their sovereignty. Thus, the State of Massachusetts has declared
that--

    "The sovereignty and jurisdiction of the Commonwealth extend to
    all places within the boundaries thereof, subject only to such
    rights of _concurrent jurisdiction_ as have been or may be
    granted over any places ceded by the Commonwealth to the United
    States."[111]

In the acts of cession of the respective States, the terms and
conditions on which the grant is made are expressed in various forms and
with differing degrees of precision. The act of New York, granting the
use of a site for the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, may serve as a specimen. It
contains this express condition:

    "The United States are to retain such use and jurisdiction, _so
    long as said tract shall be applied to the defense and safety of
    the city and port of New York, and no longer_.... But the
    jurisdiction hereby ceded, and the exemption from taxation
    herein granted, shall continue in respect to said property, and
    to each portion thereof, _so long as the same shall remain the
    property of the United States_, and be used for the purposes
    aforesaid, _and no longer_." The cession of the site of the
    Watervliet Arsenal is made in the same or equivalent terms,
    except that, instead of "defense and safety of the city and port
    of New York," etc., the language is, "defense and safety _of the
    said State_, and no longer."

South Carolina in 1805, by legislative enactment, ceded to the United
States, in Charleston Harbor and on Beaufort River, various forts and
fortifications, and sites for the erection of forts, on the following
conditions, viz.:

    "That, if the United States shall not, within three years from
    the passing of this act, and notification thereof by the
    Governor of this State to the Executive of the United States,
    repair the fortifications now existing thereon or build such
    other forts or fortifications as may be deemed most expedient by
    the Executive of the United States on the same, and keep a
    garrison or garrisons therein; in such case this grant or
    cession shall be void and of no effect."--("Statutes at Large of
    South Carolina," vol. v, p. 501.)

It will hardly be contended that the conditions of this grant were
fulfilled, and, if it be answered that the State did not demand the
restoration of the forts or sites, the answer certainly fails after
1860, when the controversy arose, and the unfounded assertion was made
that those forts and sites had been purchased with the money, and were
therefore the property, of the United States. The terms of the cession
sufficiently manifest that they were free-will offerings of such forts
and sites as belonged to the State; and public functionaries were bound
to know that, by the United States law of March 20, 1794, it was
provided "that no purchase shall be made where such lands are the
property of a State."--(Act to provide for the defense of certain ports
and harbors of the United States.)

The stipulations made by Virginia, in ceding the ground for Fortress
Monroe and the Rip Raps, on the 1st of March, 1821, are as follows:

    "_An Act ceding to the United States the lands on Old Point
    Comfort, and the shoal called the Rip Raps._

    "_Whereas_, It is shown to the present General Assembly that the
    Government of the United States is solicitous that certain lands
    at Old Point Comfort, and at the shoal called the Rip Raps,
    should be, with the right of property and entire jurisdiction
    thereon, vested in the said United States for the purpose of
    fortification and other objects of national defense:

    "1. _Be it enacted by the General Assembly_, That it shall be
    lawful and proper for the Governor of this Commonwealth, by
    conveyance or deeds in writing under his hand and the seal of
    the State, to transfer, assign, and make over unto the said
    United States the right of property and title, as well as all
    the jurisdiction which this Commonwealth possesses over the
    lands and shoal at Old Point Comfort and the Rip Raps:...

    "2. _And be it further enacted_, That, _should the said United
    States at any time abandon the said lands and shoal, or
    appropriate them to any other purposes than those indicated in
    the preamble to this act, that then, and in that case, the same
    shall revert to and revest in this Commonwealth_."[112]

By accepting such grants, under such conditions, the Government of the
United States assented to their propriety, and the principle that holds
good in any one case is of course applicable to all others of the same
sort, whether expressly asserted in the act of cession or not. Indeed,
no express declaration would be necessary to establish a conclusion
resulting so directly from the nature of the case, and the settled
principles of sovereignty and eminent domain.

A State withdrawing from the Union would necessarily assume the control
theretofore exercised by the General Government over all public defenses
and other public property within her limits. It would, however, be but
fair and proper that adequate compensation should be made to the other
members of the partnership, or their common agent, for the value of the
works and for any other advantage obtained by the one party, or loss
incurred by the other. Such equitable settlement, the seceding States of
the South, without exception, as I believe, were desirous to make, and
prompt to propose to the Federal authorities.

On the secession of South Carolina, the condition of the defenses of
Charleston Harbor became a subject of anxiety with all parties. Of the
three forts in or at the entrance of the harbor, two were unoccupied,
but the third (Fort Moultrie) was held by a garrison of but little more
than one hundred men--of whom only sixty-three were said to be
effectives--under command of Major Robert Anderson, of the First
Artillery.

About twelve days before the secession of South Carolina, the
representatives in Congress from that State had called on the President
to assure him, in anticipation of the secession of the State, that no
purpose was entertained by South Carolina to attack, or in any way
molest, the forts held by the United States in the harbor of
Charleston--at least until opportunity could be had for an amicable
settlement of all questions that might arise with regard to these forts
and other public property--provided that no reenforcements should be
sent, and the military _status_ should be permitted to remain unchanged.
The South Carolinians understood Mr. Buchanan as approving of this
suggestion, although declining to make any formal pledge.

It appears, nevertheless, from subsequent developments, that both before
and after the secession of South Carolina preparations were secretly
made for reenforcing Major Anderson, in case it should be deemed
necessary by the Government at Washington.[113] On the 11th of December
instructions were communicated to him, from the War Department, of which
the following is the essential part:

    "You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly
    tend to provoke aggression; and for that reason you are not,
    without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position
    which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile
    attitude, but you are to hold possession of the forts in this
    harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last
    extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you,
    perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an
    attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will
    be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your
    command into either of them which you may deem most proper to
    increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to
    take similar defensive steps, whenever you have tangible
    evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."[114]

These instructions were afterward modified--as we are informed by Mr.
Buchanan--so as, instead of requiring him to defend himself "to the last
extremity," to direct him to do so as long as any reasonable hope
remained of saving the fort.[115]

Immediately after the secession of the State, the Convention of South
Carolina deputed three distinguished citizens of that State--Messrs.
Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, and James L. Orr--to proceed to
Washington, "to treat with the Government of the United States for the
delivery of the forts, magazines, lighthouses, and other real estate,
with their appurtenances, within the limits of South Carolina, and also
for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other
property held by the Government of the United States, as agent of the
confederated States, of which South Carolina was recently a member; and
generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper
to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for
the continuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and the
Government at Washington."

The Commissioners, in the discharge of the duty intrusted to them,
arrived in Washington on the 26th of December. Before they could
communicate with the President, however--indeed, on the morning after
their arrival--they were startled, and the whole country electrified, by
the news that, during the previous night, Major Anderson had "secretly
dismantled Fort Moultrie,"[116] spiked his guns, burned his
gun-carriages, and removed his command to Fort Sumter, which occupied a
more commanding position in the harbor. This movement changed the whole
aspect of affairs. It was considered by the Government and people of
South Carolina as a violation of the implied pledge of a maintenance of
the _status quo_; the remaining forts and other public property were at
once taken possession of by the State; and the condition of public
feeling became greatly exacerbated. An interview between the President
and the Commissioners was followed by a sharp correspondence, which was
terminated on the 1st of January, 1861, by the return to the
Commissioners of their final communication, with an endorsement stating
that it was of such a character that the President declined to receive
it. The negotiations were thus abruptly broken off. This correspondence
may be found in the Appendix.[117]

In the mean time, Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned his
position early in December, on the ground of the refusal of the
President to send reenforcements to Charleston. On the occupation of
Fort Sumter by Major Anderson, Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, taking the
ground that it was virtually a violation of a pledge given or implied by
the Government, had asked that the garrison should be entirely withdrawn
from the harbor of Charleston, and, on the refusal of the President to
consent to this, had tendered his resignation, which was promptly
accepted.[118]

This is believed to be a correct outline of the earlier facts with
regard to the Charleston forts, and in giving it I have done so, as far
as possible, without prejudice, or any expression of opinion upon the
motives of the actors.

The kind relations, both personal and political, which had long existed
between Mr. Buchanan and myself, had led him, occasionally, during his
presidency, to send for me to confer with him on subjects that caused
him anxiety, and warranted me in sometimes calling upon him to offer my
opinion on matters of special interest or importance. Thus it was that I
had communicated with him freely in regard to the threatening aspect of
events in the earlier part of the winter of 1860-'61. When he told me of
the work that had been done, or was doing, at Fort Moultrie--that is,
the elevation of its parapet by crowning it with barrels of sand--I
pointed out to him the impolicy as well as inefficiency of the measure.
It seemed to me impolitic to make ostensible preparations for defense,
when no attack was threatened; and the means adopted were inefficient,
because any ordinary field-piece would knock the barrels off the
parapet, and thus to render them only hurtful to the defenders. He
inquired whether the expedient had not been successful at Fort Brown, on
the Rio Grande, in the beginning of the Mexican war, and was answered
that the attack on Fort Brown had been made with small-arms, or at great
distance.

After the removal of the garrison to the stronger and safer position of
Fort Sumter, I called upon him again to represent, from my knowledge of
the people and the circumstances of the case, how productive the
movement would be of discontent, and how likely to lead to collision.
One of the vexed questions of the day was, by what authority the
collector of the port should be appointed, and the rumor was, that
instructions had been given to the commanding officer at Fort Sumter not
to allow vessels to pass, unless under clearance from the United States
collector. It was easy to understand that, if a vessel were fired upon
under such circumstances, it would be accepted as the beginning of
hostilities--a result which both he and I desired to avert, as the
greatest calamity that could be foreseen or imagined. My opinion was,
that the wisest and best course would be to withdraw the garrison
altogether from the harbor of Charleston.

The President's objection to this was, that it was his bounden duty to
preserve and protect the property of the United States. To this I
replied, with all the earnestness the occasion demanded, that I would
pledge my life that, if an inventory were taken of all the stores and
munitions in the fort, and an ordnance-sergeant with a few men left in
charge of them, they would not be disturbed. As a further guarantee, I
offered to obtain from the Governor of South Carolina full assurance
that, in case any marauders or lawless combination of persons should
attempt to seize or disturb the property, he would send from the citadel
of Charleston an adequate guard to protect it and to secure its keepers
against molestation.

The President promised me to reflect upon this proposition, and to
confer with his Cabinet upon the propriety of adopting it. All Cabinet
consultations are secret; which is equivalent to saying that I never
knew what occurred in that meeting to which my proposition was
submitted. The result was not communicated to me, but the events which
followed proved that the suggestion was not accepted.

Major Anderson, who commanded the garrison, had many ties and
associations that bound him to the South. He performed his part like the
true soldier and man of the finest sense of honor that he was; but that
it was most painful to him to be charged with the duty of holding the
fort as a threat to the people of Charleston is a fact known to many
others as well as to myself. We had been cadets together. He was my
first acquaintance in that corps, and the friendship then formed was
never interrupted. We had served together in the summer and autumn of
1860, in a commission of inquiry into the discipline, course of studies,
and general condition of the United States Military Academy. At the
close of our labors the commission had adjourned, to meet again in
Washington about the end of the ensuing November, to examine the report
and revise it for transmission to Congress. Major Anderson's duties in
Charleston Harbor hindered him from attending this adjourned meeting of
the commission, and he wrote to me, its chairman, to explain the cause
of his absence. That letter was lost when my library and private papers
were "captured" from my home in Mississippi. If any one has preserved it
as a trophy of war, its publication would show how bright was the honor,
how broad the patriotism of Major Anderson, and how fully he sympathized
with me as to the evils which then lowered over the country.

In comparing the past and the present among the mighty changes which
passion and sectional hostility have wrought, one is profoundly and
painfully impressed by the extent to which public opinion has drifted
from the landmarks set up by the sages and patriots who formed the
constitutional Union, and observed by those who administered its
government down to the time when war between the States was inaugurated.
Mr. Buchanan, the last President of the old school, would as soon have
thought of aiding in the establishment of a monarchy among us as of
accepting the doctrine of coercing the States into submission to the
will of a majority, in mass, of the people of the United States. When
discussing the question of withdrawing the troops from the port of
Charleston, he yielded a ready assent to the proposition that the
cession of a site for a fort, for purposes of public defense, lapses,
whenever that fort should be employed by the grantee against the State
by which the cession was made, on the familiar principle that any grant
for a specific purpose expires when it ceases to be used for that
purpose. Whether on this or any other ground, if the garrison of Fort
Sumter had been withdrawn in accordance with the spirit of the
Constitution of the United States, from which the power to apply
coercion to a State was deliberately and designedly excluded, and if
this had been distinctly assigned as a reason for its withdrawal, the
honor of the United States Government would have been maintained intact,
and nothing could have operated more powerfully to quiet the
apprehensions and allay the resentment of the people of South Carolina.
The influence which such a measure would have exerted upon the States
which had not yet seceded, but were then contemplating the adoption of
that extreme remedy, would probably have induced further delay; and the
mellowing effect of time, with a realization of the dangers to be
incurred, might have wrought mutual forbearance--if, indeed, anything
could have checked the madness then prevailing among the people of the
Northern States in their thirst for power and forgetfulness of the
duties of federation.

It would have been easy to concede this point. The little garrison of
Fort Sumter served only as a menace; for it was utterly incapable of
holding the fort if attacked, and the poor attempt soon afterward made
to reenforce and provision it, by such a vessel as the Star of the West,
might by the uncharitable be readily construed as a scheme to provoke
hostilities. Yet, from my knowledge of Mr. Buchanan, I do not hesitate
to say that he had no such wish or purpose. His abiding hope was to
avert a collision, or at least to postpone it to a period beyond the
close of his official term. The management of the whole affair was what
Talleyrand describes as something worse than a crime--a blunder.
Whatever treatment the case demanded, should have been prompt; to wait
was fatuity.

The ill-advised attempt secretly to throw reenforcements and provisions
into Fort Sumter, by means of the steamer Star of the West, resulted in
the repulsion of that vessel at the mouth of the harbor, by the
authorities of South Carolina, on the morning of the 9th of January. On
her refusal to heave-to, she was fired upon, and put back to sea, with
her recruits and supplies. A telegraphic account of this event was
handed me, a few hours afterward, when stepping into my carriage to go
to the Senate-chamber. Although I had then, for some time, ceased to
visit the President, yet, under the impulse of this renewed note of
danger to the country, I drove immediately to the Executive mansion, and
for the last time appealed to him to take such prompt measures as were
evidently necessary to avert the impending calamity. The result was even
more unsatisfactory than that of former efforts had been.

On the same day the special message of the President on the state of the
Union, dated the day previous (8th of January), was submitted to
Congress. This message was accompanied by the _first_ letter of the
South Carolina Commissioners to the President, with his answer, but of
course _not_ by their rejoinder, which he had declined to receive. Mr.
Buchanan, in his memoirs, complains that, immediately after the reading
of his message, this rejoinder (which he terms an "insulting letter")
was presented by me to the Senate, and by that body received and entered
upon its journal.[119] The simple truth is, that, regarding it as
essential to a complete understanding of the transaction, and its
publication as a mere act of justice to the Commissioners, I presented
and had it read in the Senate. But its appearance upon the journal as
part of the proceedings, instead of being merely a document introduced
as part of my remarks, was the result of a discourteous objection, made
by a so-called "Republican" Senator, to the reading of the document by
the Clerk of the Senate at my request. This will be made manifest by an
examination of the debate and proceedings which ensued.[120] The
discourtesy recoiled upon its author and supporters, and gave the letter
a vantage-ground in respect of prominence which I could not have
foreseen or expected.

The next day (January 10th) the speech was delivered, the greater part
of which may be found in the Appendix[121]--the last that I ever made in
the Senate of the United States, except in taking leave, and by the
sentiments of which I am content that my career, both before and since,
should be judged.

The history of Fort Sumter during the remaining period, until the
organization of the Confederate Government, may be found in the
correspondence given in the Appendix.[122] From this it will be seen
that the authorities of South Carolina still continued to refrain from
any act of aggression or retaliation, under the provocation of the
secret attempt to reenforce the garrison, as they had previously under
that of its nocturnal transfer from one fort to another.

Another Commissioner (the Hon. I. W. Hayne) was sent to Washington by
the Governor of South Carolina, to effect, if possible, an amicable and
peaceful transfer of the fort, and settlement of all questions relating
to property. This Commissioner remained for nearly a month, endeavoring
to accomplish the objects of his mission, but was met only by evasive
and unsatisfactory answers, and eventually returned without having
effected anything.

There is one passage in the last letter of Colonel Hayne to the
President which presents the case of the occupancy of Fort Sumter by the
United States troops so clearly and forcibly that it may be proper to
quote it. He writes as follows:

    "You say that the fort was garrisoned for our protection, and is
    held for the same purposes for which it has been ever held since
    its construction. Are you not aware, that to hold, in the
    territory of a foreign power, a fortress against her will,
    avowedly for the purpose of protecting her citizens, is perhaps
    the highest insult which one government can offer to another?
    But Fort Sumter was never garrisoned at all until South Carolina
    had dissolved her connection with your Government. This garrison
    entered it in the night, with every circumstance of secrecy,
    after spiking the guns and burning the gun-carriages and cutting
    down the flag-staff of an adjacent fort, which was then
    abandoned. South Carolina had not taken Fort Sumter into her own
    possession, only because of her misplaced confidence in a
    Government which deceived her."

Thus, during the remainder of Mr. Buchanan's Administration, matters
went rapidly from bad to worse. The old statesman, who, with all his
defects, had long possessed, and was entitled still to retain, the
confidence due to extensive political knowledge and love of his country
in all its parts--who had, in his earlier career, looked steadily to the
Constitution, as the mariner looks to the compass, for guidance--retired
to private life at the expiration of his term of office, having effected
nothing to allay the storm which had been steadily gathering during his
administration.

Timid vacillation was then succeeded by unscrupulous cunning; and, for
futile efforts, without hostile collision, to impose a claim of
authority upon people who repudiated it, were substituted measures which
could be sustained only by force.


[Footnote 111: "Revised Statutes of Massachusetts," 1836, p. 56.]

[Footnote 112: See "Revised Statutes of Virginia."]

[Footnote 113: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. ix, p. 165, and chap.
xi, pp. 212-214.]

[Footnote 114: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. ix, p. 166.]

[Footnote 115: Ibid.]

[Footnote 116: Ibid., chap. x, p. 180.]

[Footnote 117: See Appendix G.]

[Footnote 118: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. x, pp. 187, 188.]

[Footnote 119: "Buchanan's Administration," chap. x, p. 184.]

[Footnote 120: See "Congressional Globe," second session, Thirty-fifth
Congress, Part I, p. 284, _et seq._]

[Footnote 121: See Appendix I.]

[Footnote 122: Ibid.]




CHAPTER III.

    Secession of Mississippi and Other States.--Withdrawal of
    Senators.--Address of the Author on taking Leave of the
    Senate.--Answer to Certain Objections.


Mississippi was the second State to withdraw from the Union, her
ordinance of secession being adopted on the 9th of January, 1861. She
was quickly followed by Florida on the 10th, Alabama on the 11th, and,
in the course of the same month, by Georgia on the 18th, and Louisiana
on the 26th. The Conventions of these States (together with that of
South Carolina) agreed in designating Montgomery, Alabama, as the place,
and the 4th of February as the day, for the assembling of a congress of
the seceding States, to which each State Convention, acting as the
direct representative of the sovereignty of the people thereof,
appointed delegates.

Telegraphic intelligence of the secession of Mississippi had reached
Washington some considerable time before the fact was officially
communicated to me. This official knowledge I considered it proper to
await before taking formal leave of the Senate. My associates from
Alabama and Florida concurred in this view. Accordingly, having received
notification of the secession of these three States about the same time,
on the 21st of January Messrs. Yulee and Mallory, of Florida,
Fitzpatrick and Clay, of Alabama, and myself, announced the withdrawal
of the States from which we were respectively accredited, and took leave
of the Senate at the same time.

In the action which she then took, Mississippi certainly had no purpose
to levy war against the United States, or any of them. As her Senator, I
endeavored plainly to state her position in the annexed remarks
addressed to the Senate in taking leave of the body:

    "I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the
    Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of
    Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention
    assembled, has declared her separation from the United States.
    Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are
    terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I
    should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my
    associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion
    does not invite me to go into argument; and my physical
    condition would not permit me to do so, if it were otherwise;
    and yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of
    the State I here represent on an occasion so solemn as this.

    "It is known to Senators who have served with me here that I
    have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of
    State sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the
    Union. Therefore, if I had not believed there was justifiable
    cause, if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without
    sufficient provocation, or without an existing necessity, I
    should still, under my theory of the Government, because of my
    allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have been bound
    by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do
    think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I
    conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled
    them then that, if the state of things which they apprehended
    should exist when their Convention met, they should take the
    action which they have now adopted.

    "I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine
    with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the
    Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the
    nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification
    and secession, so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic
    principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to
    apply within the Union, and against the agent of the States. It
    is only to be justified when the agent has violated his
    constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to judge for
    itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals
    to the other States of the Union for a decision; but, when the
    States themselves and when the people of the States have so
    acted as to convince us that they will not regard our
    constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises
    the doctrine of secession in its practical application.

    "A great man who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often
    been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the
    doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was
    because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union--his
    determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a
    severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other
    States--that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of
    nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful, to be within
    the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only to
    be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the
    States for their judgment.

    "Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be
    justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There
    was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again
    when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and
    the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent
    any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus
    may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent
    whomsoever.

    "I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of
    Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should
    have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise;
    and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this
    last occasion, to present to the Senate. It is by this
    confounding of nullification and secession that the name of a
    great man whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth has been
    evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase,
    'to execute the laws,' was an expression which General Jackson
    applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while
    yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now
    presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States,
    and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation
    to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms--at least,
    it is a great misapprehension of the case--which cites that
    expression for application to a State which has withdrawn from
    the Union. You may make war on a foreign state. If it be the
    purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a State which
    has withdrawn from the Union; but there are no laws of the
    United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded
    State. A State, finding herself in the condition in which
    Mississippi has judged she is--in which her safety requires that
    she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the
    Union--surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be
    many), deprives herself of the advantages (and they are known to
    be great), severs all the ties of affection (and they are close
    and enduring), which have bound her to the Union; and thus
    divesting herself of every benefit--taking upon herself every
    burden--she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the
    laws of the United States within her limits.

    "I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned
    before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion
    was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue
    of a fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that
    it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not
    influenced in my opinions because the case is my own, I refer to
    that time and that occasion as containing the opinion which I
    then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I
    then said that if Massachusetts--following her purpose through a
    stated line of conduct--chose to take the last step, which
    separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will
    neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but I
    will say to her, Godspeed, in memory of the kind associations
    which once existed between her and the other States.

    "It has been a conviction of pressing necessity--it has been a
    belief that we are to be deprived in the Union of the rights
    which our fathers bequeathed to us--which has brought
    Mississippi to her present decision. She has heard proclaimed
    the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this
    made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions; and
    the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to
    maintain the position of the equality of the races. That
    Declaration of Independence is to be construed by the
    circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The
    communities were declaring their independence; the people of
    those communities were asserting that no man was born--to use
    the language of Mr. Jefferson--booted and spurred, to ride over
    the rest of mankind; that men were created equal--meaning the
    men of the political community; that there was no divine right
    to rule; that no man inherited the right to govern; that there
    were no classes by which power and place descended to families;
    but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each
    member of the body politic. These were the great principles they
    announced; these were the purposes for which they made their
    declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was
    directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how
    happened it that among the items of arraignment against George
    III was that he endeavored to do just what the North has been
    endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our
    slaves? Had the Declaration announced that the negroes were free
    and equal, how was the prince to be arraigned for raising up
    insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among
    the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their
    connection with the mother-country? When our Constitution was
    formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we
    find provision made for that very class of persons as property;
    they were not put upon the footing of equality with white
    men--not even upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as
    representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a
    lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion
    of three fifths. So stands the compact which binds us together.

    "Then, Senators, we recur to the principles upon which our
    Government was founded; and when you deny them, and when you
    deny to us the right to withdraw from a Government which, thus
    perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but
    tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our
    independence and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility
    to others, not to injure any section of the country, not even
    for our own pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solemn
    motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and
    which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children.

    "I find in myself perhaps a type of the general feeling of my
    constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward
    you, Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you,
    whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to
    whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you
    well; and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I
    represent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel
    that I but express their desire when I say I hope, and they
    hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part.
    They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they
    have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring
    disaster on every portion of the country, and, if you will have
    it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered
    them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages
    of the bear; and thus, putting our trust in God and in our firm
    hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we
    may.

    "In the course of my service here, associated at different times
    with a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with
    whom I have served long; there have been points of collision,
    but, whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I
    carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have
    given which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction
    has not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our
    parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat
    of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unencumbered by the
    remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the
    duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury
    offered.

    "Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which
    the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to
    bid you a final adieu."

There are some who contend that we should have retained
our seats and "fought for our rights in the Union." Could
anything be less rational or less consistent than that a Senator,
an ambassador from his State, should insist upon representing
it in a confederacy from which the State has withdrawn?
What was meant by "fighting in the Union" I have never
quite understood. If it be to retain a seat in Congress for the
purpose of crippling the Government and rendering it unable to
perform its functions, I can certainly not appreciate the idea of
honor that sanctions the suggestion. Among the advantages
claimed for this proposition by its supporters was that of thwarting
the President in the appointment of his Cabinet and other
officers necessary for the administration of public affairs.
Would this have been to maintain the Union formed by the
States? Would such have been the Government which Washington
recommended as a remedy for the defects of the original
Confederation, the greatest of which was the paralysis of the
action of the general agent by the opposition or indifference of
the States? Sad as have been the consequences of the war
which followed secession--disastrous in its moral, material, and
political relations--still we have good cause to feel proud that
the course of the Southern States has left no blot nor stain upon
the honor and chivalry of their people.

  "And if our children must obey,
  They must, but--thinking on our day--
  'Twill less debase them to submit."




CHAPTER IV.

    Threats of Arrest.--Departure from Washington.--Indications of
    Public Anxiety.--"Will there be war?"--Organization of the "Army
    of Mississippi."--Lack of Preparations for Defense in the
    South.--Evidences of the Good Faith and Peaceable Purposes of
    the Southern People.


During the interval between the announcement by telegraph of the
secession of Mississippi and the receipt of the official notification
which enabled me to withdraw from the Senate, rumors were in circulation
of a purpose, on the part of the United States Government, to arrest
members of Congress preparing to leave Washington on account of the
secession of the States which they represented. This threat received
little attention from those most concerned. Indeed, it was thought that
it might not be an undesirable mode of testing the question of the right
of a State to withdraw from the Union.

No attempt, however, was made to arrest any of the retiring members;
and, after a delay of a few days in necessary preparations, I left
Washington for Mississippi, passing through southwestern Virginia, East
Tennessee, a small part of Georgia, and north Alabama. A deep interest
in the events which had recently occurred was exhibited by the people of
these States, and much anxiety was indicated as to the future. Many
years of agitation had made them familiar with the idea of separation.
Nearly two generations had risen to manhood since it had begun to be
discussed as a possible alternative. Few, very few, of the Southern
people had ever regarded it as a desirable event, or otherwise than as a
last resort for escape from evils more intolerable. It was a calamity,
which, however threatened, they had still hoped might be averted, or
indefinitely postponed, and they had regarded with contempt, rather than
anger, the ravings of a party in the North, which denounced the
Constitution and the Union, and persistently defamed their brethren of
the South.

Now, however, as well in Virginia and Tennessee, neither of which had
yet seceded, as in the more Southern States, which had already taken
that step, the danger so often prophesied was perceived to be at the
door, and eager inquiries were made as to what would happen
next--especially as to the probability of war between the States.

The course which events were likely to take was shrouded in the greatest
uncertainty. In the minds of many there was the not unreasonable hope
(which had been expressed by the Commissioner sent from Mississippi to
Maryland) that the secession of six Southern States--certainly soon to
be followed by that of others--would so arouse the sober thought and
better feeling of the Northern people as to compel their representatives
to agree to a Convention of the States, and that such guarantees would
be given as would secure to the South the domestic tranquillity and
equality in the Union which were rights assured under the Federal
compact. There were others, and they the most numerous class, who
considered that the separation would be final, but peaceful. For my own
part, while believing that secession was a right, and properly a
peaceable remedy, I had never believed that it would be permitted to be
peaceably exercised. Very few in the South at that time agreed with me,
and my answers to queries on the subject were, therefore, as unexpected
as they were unwelcome.

On my arrival at Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, I found that the
Convention of the State had made provision for a State army, and had
appointed me to the command, with the rank of major-general. Four
brigadier-generals, appointed in like manner by the Convention, were
awaiting my arrival for assignment to duty. After the preparation of the
necessary rules and regulations, the division of the State into
districts, the apportionment among them of the troops to be raised, and
the appointment of officers of the general staff, as authorized by the
ordinance of the Convention, such measures as were practicable were
taken to obtain the necessary arms. The State had few serviceable
weapons, and no establishment for their manufacture or repair. This fact
(which is true of other Southern States as of Mississippi) is a clear
proof of the absence of any desire or expectation of war. If the purpose
of the Northern States to make war upon us because of secession had been
foreseen, preparation to meet the consequences would have been
contemporaneous with the adoption of a resort to that remedy--a remedy
the possibility of which had for many years been contemplated. Had the
Southern States possessed arsenals, and collected in them the requisite
supplies of arms and munitions, such preparation would not only have
placed them more nearly on an equality with the North in the beginning
of the war, but might, perhaps, have been the best conservator of peace.

Let us, the survivors, however, not fail to do credit to the generous
credulity which could not understand how, in violation of the compact of
Union, a war could be waged against the States, or why they should be
invaded because their people had deemed it necessary to withdraw from an
association which had failed to fulfill the ends for which they had
entered into it, and which, having been broken to their injury by the
other parties, had ceased to be binding upon them. It is a satisfaction
to know that the calamities which have befallen the Southern States were
the result of their credulous reliance on the power of the Constitution,
that, if it failed to protect their rights, it would at least suffice to
prevent an attempt at coercion, if, in the last resort, they peacefully
withdrew from the Union.

When, in after times, the passions of the day shall have subsided, and
all the evidence shall have been collected and compared, the
philosophical inquirer, who asks why the majority of the stronger
section invaded the peaceful homes of their late associates, will be
answered by History: "The lust of empire impelled them to wage against
their weaker neighbors a war of subjugation."




CHAPTER V.

    Meeting of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate
    States.--Adoption of a Provisional Constitution.--Election of
    President and Vice-President.--Notification to the Author of his
    Election.--His Views with Regard to it.--Journey to
    Montgomery.--Interview with Judge Sharkey.--False Reports of
    Speeches on the Way.--Inaugural Address.--Editor's Note.


The congress of delegates from the seceding States convened at
Montgomery, Alabama, according to appointment, on the 4th of February,
1861. Their first work was to prepare a provisional Constitution for the
new Confederacy, to be formed of the States which had withdrawn from the
Union, for which the style "Confederate States of America" was adopted.
The powers conferred upon them were adequate for the performance of this
duty, the immediate necessity for which was obvious and urgent. This
Constitution was adopted on the 8th of February, to continue in force
for one year, unless superseded at an earlier date by a permanent
organization. It is printed in an appendix, and for convenience of
reference the permanent Constitution, adopted several weeks afterward,
is exhibited in connection with it, and side by side with the
Constitution of the United States, after which it was modeled.[123] The
attention of the reader is invited to these documents and to a
comparison of them, although a more particular notice of the permanent
Constitution will be more appropriate hereafter.

On the next day (9th of February) an election was held for the chief
executive offices, resulting, as I afterward learned, in my election to
the Presidency, with the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, as
Vice-President. Mr. Stephens was a delegate from Georgia to the
congress.

While these events were occurring, having completed the most urgent of
my duties at the capital of Mississippi, I had gone to my home,
Brierfield, in Warren County, and had begun, in the homely but
expressive language of Mr. Clay, "to repair my fences." While thus
engaged, notice was received of my election to the Presidency of the
Confederate States, with an urgent request to proceed immediately to
Montgomery for inauguration.

As this had been suggested as a probable event, and what appeared to me
adequate precautions had been taken to prevent it, I was surprised, and,
still more, disappointed. For reasons which it is not now necessary to
state, I had not believed my self as well suited to the office as some
others. I thought myself better adapted to command in the field; and
Mississippi had given me the position which I preferred to any
other--the highest rank in her army. It was, therefore, that I afterward
said, in an address delivered in the Capitol, before the Legislature of
the State, with reference to my election to the Presidency of the
Confederacy, that the duty to which I was thus called was temporary, and
that I expected soon to be with the Army of Mississippi again.

While on my way to Montgomery, and waiting in Jackson, Mississippi, for
the railroad train, I met the Hon. William L. Sharkey, who had filled
with great distinction the office of Chief-Justice of the State. He said
he was looking for me to make an inquiry. He desired to know if it was
true, as he had just learned, that I believed there _would_ be war. My
opinion was freely given, that there would be war, long and bloody, and
that it behooved every one to put his house in order. He expressed much
surprise, and said that he had not believed the report attributing this
opinion to me. He asked how I supposed war could result from the
peaceable withdrawal of a sovereign State. The answer was, that it was
not my opinion that war _should_ be occasioned by the exercise of that
right, but that it _would_ be.

Judge Sharkey and I had not belonged to the same political party, he
being a Whig, but we fully agreed with regard to the question of the
sovereignty of the States. He had been an advocate of nullification--a
doctrine to which I had never assented, and which had at one time been
the main issue in Mississippi politics. He had presided over the
well-remembered Nashville Convention in 1849, and had possessed much
influence in the State, not only as an eminent jurist, but as a citizen
who had grown up with it, and held many offices of honor and trust.

On my way to Montgomery, brief addresses were made at various places, at
which there were temporary stoppages of the trains, in response to calls
from the crowds assembled at such points. Some of these addresses were
grossly misrepresented in sensational reports made by irresponsible
persons, which were published in Northern newspapers, and were not
considered worthy of correction under the pressure of the momentous
duties then devolving upon me. These false reports, which represented me
as invoking war and threatening devastation of the North, have since
been adopted by partisan writers as authentic history. It is a
sufficient answer to these accusations to refer to my farewell address
to the Senate, already given, as reported for the press at the time,
and, in connection therewith, to my inaugural address at Montgomery, on
assuming the office of President of the Confederate States, on the 18th
of February. These two addresses, delivered at an interval of a month,
during which no material change of circumstances had occurred, being one
before and the other after the date of the sensational reports referred
to, are sufficient to stamp them as utterly untrue. The inaugural was
deliberately prepared, and uttered as written, and, in connection with
the farewell speech to the Senate, presents a clear and authentic
statement of the principles and purposes which actuated me on assuming
the duties of the high office to which I had been called.

    INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

    "_Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of
    America, Friends, and Fellow-Citizens:_

    "Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief
    Magistrate of the Provisional Government which you have
    instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned to
    me with humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining
    confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in
    the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in
    the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the
    speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place
    of this, which by its greater moral and physical power will be
    better able to combat with many difficulties that arise from the
    conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the
    duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope
    that the beginning of our career, as a Confederacy, may not be
    obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the
    separate existence and independence we have asserted, and which,
    with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

    "Our present political position has been achieved in a manner
    unprecedented in the history of nations. It illustrates the
    American idea that governments rest on the consent of the
    governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or
    abolish them at will whenever they become destructive of the
    ends for which they were established. The declared purpose of
    the compact of the Union from which we have withdrawn was to
    'establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
    the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
    blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity'; and when,
    in the judgment of the sovereign States composing this
    Confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which
    it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was
    established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that,
    so far as they are concerned, the Government created by that
    compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the
    right which the Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776,
    defined to be 'inalienable.' Of the time and occasion of its
    exercise they as sovereigns were the final judges, each for
    itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will
    vindicate the rectitude of our conduct; and He who knows the
    hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we have
    labored to preserve the Government of our fathers in its spirit.

    "The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the United
    States, and which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in
    the Bills of Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the
    Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to
    resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government.
    Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to
    form this Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their
    act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new
    alliance, but within each State its government has remained; so
    that the rights of person and property have not been disturbed.
    The agent through which they communicated with foreign nations
    is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their
    international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the
    transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy has
    not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations,
    or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no
    interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to
    cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not
    hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will
    acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified
    by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on
    the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the
    courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States
    will be found equal to any measure of defense which their honor
    and security may require.

    "An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of
    commodities required in every manufacturing country, our true
    policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will
    permit. It is alike our interest and that of all those to whom
    we would sell, and from whom we would buy, that there should be
    the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of
    these commodities. There can, however, be but little rivalry
    between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such
    as the Northeastern States of the American Union. It must
    follow, therefore, that mutual interest will invite to good-will
    and kind offices on both parts. If, however, passion or lust of
    dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of
    those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency and
    maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position
    which we have assumed among the nations of the earth.

    "We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be
    inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our
    late associates of the Northern States, we have vainly
    endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the
    rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice,
    we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our
    energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and
    the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a
    just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to
    pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire
    will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied to us, and the
    integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will
    but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms and invoke
    the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

    "As a consequence of our new condition and relations, and with a
    view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide
    for the speedy and efficient organization of branches of the
    Executive department having special charge of foreign
    intercourse, finance, military affairs, and the postal service.
    For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under
    ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is
    deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that
    there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more
    numerous than would usually be required on a peace
    establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our
    harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those
    objects will be required. But this, as well as other subjects
    appropriate to our necessities, have doubtless engaged the
    attention of Congress.

    "With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in
    so far as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed
    from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit
    of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that
    States from which we have recently parted may seek to unite
    their fortunes to ours under the Government which we have
    instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision;
    but beyond this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the
    people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated
    is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power,
    develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the
    Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of
    homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim
    of the whole. When this does not exist, antagonisms are
    engendered which must and should result in separation.

    "Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights, and
    promote our own welfare, the separation by the Confederate
    States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and
    followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have
    received no check, the cultivation of our fields has progressed
    as heretofore, and, even should we be involved in war, there
    would be no considerable diminution in the production of the
    staples which have constituted our exports, and in which the
    commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own.
    This common interest of the producer and consumer can only be
    interrupted by exterior force which would obstruct the
    transmission of our staples to foreign markets--a course of
    conduct which would be as unjust, as it would be detrimental, to
    manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

    "Should reason guide the action of the Government from which we
    have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world,
    the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the
    strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but, if the contrary
    should prove true, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it,
    and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly
    and wickedness of our aggressors. In the mean time there will
    remain to us, besides the ordinary means before suggested, the
    well known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an
    enemy.

    "Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this
    which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that toil and
    care and disappointment are the price of official elevation. You
    will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate;
    but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to
    the cause that is to me the highest in hope, and of most
    enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an
    undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired.
    Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and
    patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance
    of the duties required at my hands.

    "We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of
    government. The Constitution framed by our fathers is that of
    these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the
    judicial construction it has received, we have a light which
    reveals its true meaning.

    "Thus instructed as to the true meaning and just interpretation
    of that instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are
    but trusts held for the people, and that powers delegated are to
    be strictly construed, I will hope by due diligence in the
    performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your
    expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the
    good-will and confidence which welcome my entrance into office.

    "It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon
    a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve
    animates and actuates the whole; where the sacrifices to be made
    are not weighed in the balance against honor and right and
    liberty and equality. Obstacles may retard, but they can not
    long prevent, the progress of a movement sanctified by its
    justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us
    invoke the God of our Fathers to guide and protect us in our
    efforts to perpetuate the principles which by his blessing they
    were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their
    posterity. With the continuance of his favor ever gratefully
    acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to
    peace, and to prosperity."

Note, _relative to the Election of President of the Confederate States
under the Provisional Constitution, and some Other Subjects referred to
in the Foregoing Chapters._

Statements having been made, seeming to imply that I was a candidate
"for the Presidency of the Confederate States; that my election was the
result of a misunderstanding, or of accidental complications"; and also
that I held "extreme views," and entertained at that period an
inadequate conception of the magnitude of the war probably to be waged,
information on the subject has been contributed by several distinguished
members of the Provisional Congress, who still survive. From a number of
their letters which have been published, the annexed extracts are given,
parts being omitted which refer to matters not of historical interest.

From a communication of the Hon. Alexander M. Clayton, of Mississippi,
to the Memphis "Appeal" of June 21, 1870:

    "... I was at the time a member of the Provisional Congress from
    Mississippi. Believing that Mr. Davis was the choice of the
    South for the position of President, before repairing to
    Montgomery I addressed him a letter to ascertain if he would
    accept it. He replied that it was not the place he desired;
    that, if he could have his choice, he would greatly prefer to be
    in active service as commander-in-chief of the army, but that he
    would give himself to the cause in any capacity whatever. That
    was the only letter of which I have any knowledge that he wrote
    on the subject, and that was shown to only a very few persons,
    and only when I was asked if Mr. Davis would accept the
    presidency....

    "There was no electioneering, no management, on the part of any
    one. Each voter was left to determine for himself in whose hands
    the destinies of the infant Confederacy should be placed. By a
    law as fixed as gravitation itself, and as little disturbed by
    outside influences, the minds of members centered upon Mr.
    Davis.

    "After a few days of anxious, intense labor, the Provisional
    Constitution was framed, and it became necessary to give it
    vitality by putting some one at the head of the new
    Government....

    "Without any effort on the part of the friends of either
    [Messrs. Davis or Stephens], the election was made without the
    slightest dissent. Of the accidental complications referred to,
    I have not the least knowledge, and always thought that the
    election of Mr. Davis arose from the spontaneous conviction of
    his peculiar fitness. I have consulted no one on the subject,
    and have appended my name only to avoid resting an important
    fact upon anonymous authority. Very respectfully yours,"

    (Signed) "Alexander M. Clayton."

From the Hon. J. A. P. Campbell, of Mississippi, now a Justice of the
Supreme Court of that State:

    "... If there was a delegate from Mississippi, or any other
    State, who was opposed to the election of Jefferson Davis as
    President of the Confederate States, I never heard of the fact.
    I had the idea that Mr. Davis did not desire to be President,
    and preferred to be in the military service, but no other man
    was spoken of for President within my hearing....

    "It is within my personal knowledge that the statement of the
    interview, that Mr. Davis did not have a just appreciation of
    the serious character of the contest between the seceding States
    and the Union, is wholly untrue. Mr. Davis, more than any man I
    ever heard talk on the subject, had a correct apprehension of
    the consequences of secession and of the magnitude of the war to
    be waged to coerce the seceding States. While at Montgomery, he
    expressed the belief that heavy fighting must occur, and that
    Virginia was to be the chief battle-ground. Years prior to
    secession, in his address before the Legislature and people of
    Mississippi, Mr. Davis had earnestly advised extensive
    preparation for the possible contingency of secession.

    "After the formation of the Confederate States, he was far in
    advance of the Constitutional Convention and the Provisional
    Congress, and, as I believe, of any man in it, in his views of
    the gravity of the situation and the probable extent and
    duration of the war, and of the provision which should be made
    for the defense of the seceding States. Before secession, Mr.
    Davis thought war would result from it; and, after secession, he
    expressed the view that the war commenced would be an extensive
    one. What he may have thought at a later day than the early part
    of 1862, I do not know; but it is inconceivable that the
    'interview' can be correct as to that.

    "The idea that Mr. Davis was so 'extreme' in his views is a new
    one. He was extremely conservative on the subject of secession.

    "The suggestion that Mississippi would have preferred General
    Toombs or Mr. Cobb for President has no foundation in fact. My
    opinion is, that no man could have obtained a single vote in the
    Mississippi delegation against Mr. Davis, who was then, as he is
    now, the most eminent and popular of all the citizens of
    Mississippi.... Very respectfully,"

    (Signed) "J. A. P. Campbell."

From the Hon. Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana:

    "....My recollections of what transpired at the time are very
    vivid and positive....

    "Who should be President, was the absorbing question of the day.
    It engaged the attention of all present, and elicited many
    letters from our respective constituencies. The general
    inclination was strongly in favor of Mr. Davis. In fact, no
    other name was so prominently or so generally mentioned. The
    name of Mr. Rhett, of South Carolina, was probably more
    frequently mentioned than that of any other person, next to Mr.
    Davis.

    "The rule adopted at our election was that each State should
    have one vote, to be delivered in open session, _viva voce_, by
    one of the delegates as spokesman for his colleagues. The
    delegates of the different States met in secret session to
    select their candidate and spokesman.

    "Of what occurred in these various meetings I can not speak
    authoritatively as to other States, as their proceedings were
    considered secret. I can speak positively, however, of what took
    place at a meeting of the delegates from Louisiana. We, the
    Louisiana delegates, without hesitation, and unanimously, after
    a very short session, decided in favor of Mr. Davis. No other
    name was mentioned; the claims of no one else were considered,
    or even alluded to. There was not the slightest opposition to
    Mr. Davis on the part of any of our delegation; certainly none
    was expressed; all appeared enthusiastic in his favor, and, I
    have no reason to doubt, felt so. Nor was the feeling induced by
    any solicitation on the part of Mr. Davis or his friends. Mr.
    Davis was not in or near Montgomery at the time. He was never
    heard from on this subject, so far as I knew. He was never
    announced as a candidate. We were seeking the best man to fill
    the position, and the conviction at the time, in the minds of a
    large majority of the delegates, that Mr. Davis was the best
    qualified, from both his civil and military knowledge and
    experience, induced many to look upon Mr. Davis as the best
    selection that could be made.

    "This conviction, coupled with his well-recognized conservative
    views--for in no sense did we consider Mr. Davis extreme, either
    in his views or purposes--was the deciding consideration which
    controlled the votes of the Louisiana delegation. Of this I have
    not the least doubt. I remain, respectfully, very truly yours,
    etc."

    (Signed) "Duncan F. Kenner."

From the Hon. James Chesnut, of South Carolina:

    ".... Before leaving home I had made up my mind as to who was
    the fittest man to be President, and who to be Vice-President;
    Mr. Davis for the first, and Mr. Stephens for the second. And
    this was known to all my friends as well as to my colleagues.

    "Mr. Davis, then conspicuous for ability, had long experience in
    civil service, was reputed a most successful organizer and
    administrator of the military department of the United States
    when he was Secretary of War, and came out of the Mexican war
    with much _eclat_ as a soldier. Possessing a combination of
    these high and needful qualities, he was regarded by nearly the
    whole South as the fittest man for the position. I certainly so
    regarded him, and did not change my mind on the way to
    Montgomery....

    "Georgia was a great State--great in numbers, comparatively
    great in wealth, and great in the intellectual gifts and
    experiences of many of her sons. Conspicuous among them were
    Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb. In view of these facts, it was
    thought by all of us expedient--nay, more, positively right and
    just--that Georgia should have a corresponding weight in the
    counsels and conduct of the new Government.

    "Mr. Stephens was also a man of conceded ability, of high
    character, conservative, devoted to the rights of the States,
    and known to be a power in his own State; hence all eyes turned
    to him to fill the second place.

    "Howell Cobb became President of the Convention, and General
    Toombs Secretary of State. These two gifted Georgians were
    called to these respective positions because of their
    experience, ability, and ardent patriotism....

    "Mr. Rhett was a very bold and frank man. So was Colonel Keitt;
    and they, as always, avowed their opinions and acted upon them
    with energy. Nevertheless, the vote of the delegation was cast
    for Mr. Davis...."

    (Signed) "James Chesnut."

From the Hon. W. Porcher Miles, of Virginia, formerly of South Carolina,
and a member of the Provisional Congress of 1861:

    "Oak Ridge, _January 27, 1880_.

    "....To the best of my recollection there was entire unanimity
    in the South Carolina delegation at Montgomery on the subject of
    the choice of a President. I think it very likely that Keitt,
    from his warm personal friendship for Mr. Toombs, may at first
    have preferred him. I have no recollections of Chesnut's
    predilections. I think there was no question that Mr. Davis was
    the choice of our delegation and of the whole people of South
    Carolina.... I do not think Mr. Rhett ever attempted to
    influence the course of his colleagues, either in this or in
    matters generally before the Congress. Nor do I think his
    personal influence in the delegation was as great as that of
    some other members of it. If I were to select any one as having
    a special influence with us, I would consider Mr. Robert
    Barnwell as the one. His singularly pure and elevated character,
    entire freedom from all personal ambition or desire for place or
    position (he declined Mr. Davis's offer of a seat in the
    Cabinet), as well as his long experience in public life and
    admirably calm and well-balanced mind, all combined to make his
    influence with his colleagues very great. But neither could he
    be said 'to lead' the delegation. He had no desire, and never
    made any attempt to do so. I think there was no delegation in
    the Congress, the individual members of which were more
    independent in coming to their own conclusions of what was right
    and expedient to be done. There was always the frankest and
    freest interchange of opinions among them, but every one
    determined his own course for himself."


[Footnote 123: See Appendix K.]




CHAPTER VI.

    The Confederate Cabinet.


After being inaugurated, I proceeded to the formation of my Cabinet,
that is, the heads of the executive departments authorized by the laws
of the Provisional Congress. The unanimity existing among our people
made this a much easier and more agreeable task than where the rivalries
in the party of an executive have to be consulted and accommodated,
often at the expense of the highest capacity and fitness. Unencumbered
by any other consideration than the public welfare, having no friends to
reward or enemies to punish, it resulted that not one of those who
formed my first Cabinet had borne to me the relation of close personal
friendship, or had political claims upon me; indeed, with two of them I
had no previous acquaintance.

It was my wish that the Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, of South Carolina,
should be Secretary of State. I had known him intimately during a trying
period of our joint service in the United States Senate, and he had won
alike my esteem and regard. Before making known to him my wish in this
connection, the delegation of South Carolina, of which he was a member,
had resolved to recommend one of their number to be Secretary of the
Treasury, and Mr. Barnwell, with characteristic delicacy, declined to
accept my offer to him.

I had intended to offer the Treasury Department to Mr. Toombs, of
Georgia, whose knowledge on subjects of finance had particularly
attracted my notice when we served together in the United States Senate.
Mr. Barnwell having declined the State Department, and a colleague of
his, said to be peculiarly qualified for the Treasury Department, having
been recommended for it, Mr. Toombs was offered the State Department,
for which others believed him to be well qualified.

Mr. Mallory, of Florida, had been chairman of the Committee on Naval
Affairs in the United States Senate, was extensively acquainted with the
officers of the navy, and for a landsman had much knowledge of nautical
affairs; therefore he was selected for Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Benjamin, of Louisiana, had a very high reputation as a lawyer, and
my acquaintance with him in the Senate had impressed me with the
lucidity of his intellect, his systematic habits and capacity for labor.
He was therefore invited to the post of Attorney-General.

Mr. Reagan, of Texas, I had known for a sturdy, honest Representative in
the United States Congress, and his acquaintance with the territory
included in the Confederate States was both extensive and accurate.
These, together with his industry and ability to labor, indicated him as
peculiarly fit for the office of Postmaster-General.

Mr. Memminger, of South Carolina, had a high reputation for knowledge of
finance. He bore an unimpeachable character for integrity and close
attention to duties, and, on the recommendation of the delegation from
South Carolina, he was appointed Secretary of the Treasury, and proved
himself entirely worthy of the trust.

Mr. Walker, of Alabama, was a distinguished member of the bar of north
Alabama, and was eminent among the politicians of that section. He was
earnestly recommended by gentlemen intimately and favorably known to me,
and was therefore selected for the War Department. His was the only name
presented from Alabama.

The executive departments having been organized, my attention was first
directed to preparation for military defense, for, though I, in common
with others, desired to have a peaceful separation, and sent
commissioners to the United States Government to effect, if possible,
negotiations to that end, I did not hold the common opinion that we
would be allowed to depart in peace, and therefore regarded it as an
imperative duty to make all possible preparation for the contingency of
war.




CHAPTER VII.

    Early Acts of the Confederate Congress.--Laws of the United
    States continued in Force.--Officers of Customs and Revenue
    continued in Office.--Commission to the United
    States.--Navigation of the Mississippi.--Restrictions on the
    Coasting-Trade removed.--Appointment of Commissioners to
    Washington.


The legislation of the Confederate Congress furnishes the best evidence
of the temper and spirit which prevailed in the organization of the
Confederate Government. The very first enactment, made on the 9th of
February, 1861--the day after the adoption of the Provisional
Constitution--was this:

    "That all the laws of the United States of America in force and
    in use in the Confederate States of America on the first day of
    November last, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the
    Confederate States, be and the same are hereby continued in
    force until altered or repealed by the Congress."[124]

The next act, adopted on the 14th of February, was one continuing in
office until the 1st of April next ensuing all officers connected with
the collection of customs and the assistant treasurers intrusted with
the keeping of the moneys arising therefrom, who were engaged in the
performance of such duties within any of the Confederate States, with
the same powers and functions which they had been exercising under the
Government of the United States.[125]

The Provisional Constitution itself, in the second section of its sixth
article, had ordained as follows:

    "The Government hereby instituted shall take immediate steps for
    the settlement of all matters between the States forming it and
    their other late confederates of the United States, in relation
    to the public property and public debt at the time of their
    withdrawal from them; these States hereby declaring it to be
    their wish and earnest desire to adjust everything pertaining to
    the common property, common liabilities, and common obligations
    of that Union, upon the principles of right, justice, equity,
    and good faith."[126]

In accordance with this requirement of the Constitution, the Congress,
on the 15th of February--before my arrival at Montgomery--passed a
resolution declaring "that it is the sense of this Congress that a
commission of three persons be appointed by the President-elect, as
early as may be convenient after his inauguration, and sent to the
Government of the United States of America, for the purpose of
negotiating friendly relations between that Government and the
Confederate States of America, and for the settlement of all questions
of disagreement between the two Governments, upon principles of right,
justice, equity, and good faith."[127]

Persistent and to a great extent successful efforts were made to inflame
the minds of the people of the Northwestern States by representing to
them that, in consequence of the separation of the States, they would
lose the free navigation of the Mississippi River. At that early period
in the life of the Confederacy, the intercourse between the North and
South had been so little interrupted, that the agitators, whose vocation
it was to deceive the masses of the people, could not, or should not,
have been ignorant that, as early as the 25th of February, 1861, an act
was passed by the Confederate Congress, and approved by the President,
"to declare and establish the free navigation of the Mississippi River."
That act began with the announcement that "the peaceful navigation of
the Mississippi River is hereby declared free to the citizens of any of
the States upon its borders, or upon the borders of its navigable
tributaries," and its provisions secure that freedom for "all ships,
boats, or vessels," with their cargoes, "without any duty or hindrance,
except light-money, pilotage, and other like charges."[128]

By an act approved on the 26th of February, all laws which forbade the
employment in the coasting-trade of vessels not enrolled or licensed,
and all laws imposing discriminating duties on foreign vessels or goods
imported in them, were repealed.[129] These acts and all other
indications manifest the well-known wish of the people of the
Confederacy to preserve the peace and encourage the most unrestricted
commerce with all nations, surely not least with their late associates,
the Northern States. Thus far, the hope that peace might be maintained
was predominant; perhaps, the wish was father to the thought that there
would be no war between the States lately united. Indeed, all the laws
enacted during the first session of the Provisional Congress show how
consistent were the purposes and actions of its members with their
original avowal of a desire peacefully to separate from those with whom
they could not live in tranquillity, albeit the Government had been
established to promote the common welfare. Under this state of feeling
the Government of the Confederacy was instituted.

My own views and inclinations, as has already been fully shown, were in
entire accord with the disposition manifested by the requirement of the
Provisional Constitution and the resolution of the Congress above
recited, for the appointment of a commission to negotiate friendly
relations with the United States and an equitable and peaceable
settlement of all questions which would necessarily arise under the new
relations of the States toward one another. Next to the organization of
a Cabinet, that of such a commission was accordingly one of the very
first objects of attention. Three discreet, well-informed, and
distinguished citizens were selected as said Commissioners, and
accredited to the President of the Northern States, Mr. Lincoln, to the
end that by negotiation all questions between the two Governments might
be so adjusted as to avoid war, and perpetuate the kind relations which
had been cemented by the common trials, sacrifices, and glories of the
people of all the States. If sectional hostility had been engendered by
dissimilarity of institutions, and by a mistaken idea of moral
responsibilities, and by irreconcilable creeds--if the family could no
longer live and grow harmoniously together--by patriarchal teaching
older than Christianity, it might have been learned that it was better
to part, to part peaceably, and to continue, from one to another, the
good offices of neighbors who by sacred memories were forbidden ever to
be foes. The nomination of the members of the commission was made on the
25th of February--within a week after my inauguration--and confirmed by
Congress on the same day. The Commissioners appointed were Messrs. A. B.
Roman, of Louisiana; Martin J. Crawford, of Georgia; and John Forsyth,
of Alabama. Mr. Roman was an honored citizen, and had been Governor of
his native State. Mr. Crawford had served with distinction in Congress
for several years. Mr. Forsyth was an influential journalist, and had
been Minister to Mexico under appointment of Mr. Pierce near the close
of his term, and continued so under that of Mr. Buchanan. These
gentlemen, moreover, represented the three great parties which had
ineffectually opposed the sectionalism of the so-called "Republicans."
Ex-Governor Roman had been a Whig in former years, and one of the
"Constitutional Union," or Bell-and-Everett, party in the canvass of
1860. Mr. Crawford, as a State-rights Democrat, had supported Mr.
Breckinridge; and Mr. Forsyth had been a zealous advocate of the claims
of Mr. Douglas. The composition of the commission was therefore such as
should have conciliated the sympathy and cooeperation of every element of
conservatism with which they might have occasion to deal. Their
commissions authorized and empowered them, "in the name of the
Confederate States, to meet and confer with any person or persons duly
authorized by the Government of the United States, being furnished with
like power and authority, and with him or them to agree, treat, consult,
and negotiate" concerning all matters in which the parties were both
interested. No secret instructions were given them, for there was
nothing to conceal. The objects of their mission were open and avowed,
and its inception and conduct throughout were characterized by frankness
and good faith. How this effort was received, how the Commissioners were
kept waiting, and, while fair promises were held to the ear, how
military preparations were pushed forward for the unconstitutional,
criminal purpose of coercing States, let the shameful record of that
transaction attest.


[Footnote 124: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate
States of America, p. 27.]

[Footnote 125: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate
States of America, pp. 27, 28.]

[Footnote 126: See Provisional Constitution, Appendix K, _in loco_.]

[Footnote 127: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate
States of America, p. 92.]

[Footnote 128: Statutes at Large, Provisional Government, Confederate
States of America, pp. 36-38.]

[Footnote 129: Ibid., p. 38.]




CHAPTER VIII.

    The Peace Conference.--Demand for "a Little Bloodletting."--Plan
    proposed by the Conference.--Its Contemptuous Reception and
    Treatment in the United States Congress.--Failure of Last
    Efforts at Reconciliation and Reunion.--Note.--Speech of General
    Lane, of Oregon.


While the events which have just been occupying our attention were
occurring, the last conspicuous effort was made within the Union to stay
the tide of usurpation which was driving the Southern States into
secession. This effort was set on foot by Virginia, the General Assembly
of which State, on the 19th of January, 1861, adopted a preamble and
resolutions, deprecating disunion, and inviting all such States as were
willing to unite in an earnest endeavor to avert it by an adjustment of
the then existing controversies to appoint commissioners to meet in
Washington, on the 4th of February, "to consider, and, if practicable,
agree upon some suitable adjustment." Ex-President John Tyler, and
Messrs. William C. Rives, John W. Brockenbrugh, George W. Summers, and
James A. Seddon--five of the most distinguished citizens of the
State--were appointed to represent Virginia in the proposed conference.
If they could agree with the Commissioners of other States upon any plan
of settlement requiring amendments to the Federal Constitution, they
were instructed to communicate them to Congress, with a view to their
submission to the several States for ratification.

The "border States" in general promptly acceded to this proposition of
Virginia, and others followed, so that in the "Peace Congress," or
conference, which assembled, according to appointment, on the 4th, and
adjourned on the 27th of February, twenty-one States were eventually
represented, of which fourteen were Northern, or "non-slaveholding," and
seven slaveholding States. The six States which had already seceded were
of course not of the number represented; nor were Texas and Arkansas,
the secession of which, although not consummated, was obviously
inevitable. Three of the Northwestern States--Michigan, Wisconsin, and
Minnesota--and the two Pacific States--Oregon and California--also held
aloof from the conference. In the case of these last two, distance and
lack of time perhaps hindered action. With regard to the other three,
their reasons for declining to participate in the movement were not
officially assigned, and are therefore only subjects for conjecture.
Some remarkable revelations were afterward made, however, with regard to
the action of one of them. It appears, from correspondence read in the
Senate on the 27th of February, that the two Senators from Michigan had
at first opposed the participation of that State in the conference, on
the ground that it was, as one of them expressed it, "a step toward
obtaining that concession which the imperious slave power so insolently
demands."[130]--that is to say, in plain terms, they objected to it
because it might lead to a compromise and pacification. Finding,
however, that most of the other Northern States were represented--some
of them by men of moderate and conciliatory temper--that writer had
subsequently changed his mind, and at a late period of the session of
the conference recommended the sending of delegations of "true,
unflinching men," who would be "in favor of the Constitution as it
is"--that is, who would oppose any amendment proposed in the interests
of harmony and pacification.

The other Senator exhibits a similar alarm at the prospect of compromise
and a concurrent change of opinion. He urges the sending of
"stiff-backed" men, to thwart the threatened success of the friends of
peace, and concludes with an expression of the humane and patriotic
sentiment that "without a little bloodletting" the Union would not be
"worth a rush."[131] With such unworthy levity did these leaders of
sectional strife express their exultation in the prospect of the
conflict, which was to drench the land with blood and enshroud thousands
of homes in mourning!

It is needless to follow the course of the deliberations of the Peace
Conference. It included among its members many men of distinction and
eminent ability, and some of unquestionable patriotism, from every part
of the Union. The venerable John Tyler presided, and took an active and
ardent interest in the efforts made to effect a settlement and avert the
impending disasters. A plan was finally agreed upon by a majority of the
States represented, for certain amendments to the Federal Constitution,
which it was hoped might be acceptable to all parties and put an end to
further contention. In its leading features this plan resembled that of
Mr. Crittenden, heretofore spoken of, which was still pending in the
Senate, though with some variations, which were regarded as less
favorable to the South. It was reported immediately to both Houses of
the United States Congress. In the Senate, Mr. Crittenden promptly
expressed his willingness to accept it as a substitute for his own
proposition, and eloquently urged its adoption. But the arrogance of a
sectional majority inflated by recent triumph was too powerful to be
allayed by the appeals of patriotism or the counsels of wisdom. The plan
of the Peace Conference was treated by the majority with the
contemptuous indifference shown to every other movement for
conciliation. Its mere consideration was objected to by the extreme
radicals, and, although they failed in this, it was defeated on a vote,
as were the Crittenden propositions.

With the failure of these efforts, which occurred on the eve of the
inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession to power of a party
founded on a basis of sectional aggression, and now thoroughly committed
to its prosecution and perpetuation, expired the last hopes of
reconciliation and union.

Note.--In the course of the debate in the Senate on these grave
propositions, a manly and eloquent speech was made on the 2d of March,
1861, by the Hon. Joseph Lane, a Senator from Oregon, who had been the
candidate of the Democratic State-rights party for the Vice-Presidency
of the United States, in the canvass of 1860. Some passages of this
speech seem peculiarly appropriate for insertion here. General Lane was
replying to a speech of Mr. Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, afterward
President of the United States:

    "Mr. President, the Senator from Tennessee complains of my
    remarks on his speech. He complains of the tone and temper of
    what I said. He complains that I replied at all, as I was a
    Northern Senator. Mr. President, I am a citizen of this Union
    and a Senator of the United States. My residence is in the
    North, but I have never seen the day, and I never shall, when I
    will refuse justice as readily to the South as to the North. I
    know nothing but my country, the whole country, the
    Constitution, and the equality of the States--the equal right of
    every man in the common territory of the whole country; and by
    that I shall stand.

    "The Senator complains that I replied at all, as I was a
    Northern Senator, and a Democrat whom he had supported at the
    last election for a high office. Now, I was, as I stated at the
    time, surprised at the Senator's speech, because I understood it
    to be for coercion, as I think it was understood by almost
    everybody else, except, as we are now told, by the Senator
    himself; and I still think it amounted to a coercion speech,
    notwithstanding the soft and plausible phrases by which he
    describes it--a speech for the execution of the laws and the
    protection of the Federal property. Sir, if there is, as I
    contend, the right of secession, then, whenever a State
    exercises that right, this Government has no laws in that State
    to execute, nor has it any property in any such State that can
    be protected by the power of this Government. In attempting,
    however, to substitute the smooth phrases 'executing the laws'
    and 'protecting public property' for coercion, for civil war, we
    have an important concession: that is, that this Government dare
    not go before the people with a plain avowal of its real
    purposes and of their consequences. No, sir; the policy is to
    inveigle the people of the North into civil war, by masking the
    design in smooth and ambiguous terms."--("Congressional Globe,"
    second session, Thirty-sixth Congress, p. 1347.)


[Footnote 130: See letter of Hon. S. K. Bingham to Governor Blair, of
Michigan, in "Congressional Globe," second session, Thirty-sixth
Congress, Part II, p. 1247.]

[Footnote 131: See "Congressional Globe," _ut supra_. As this letter,
last referred to, is brief and characteristic of the temper of the
typical so-called Republicans of the period, it may be inserted entire:

    "Washington, _February_ 11, 1861.

    "My dear Governor: Governor Bingham and myself telegraphed you
    on Saturday, at the request of Massachusetts and New York, to
    send delegates to the Peace or Compromise Congress. They admit
    that we were right, and that they were wrong; that no Republican
    State should have sent delegates; but they are here, and can not
    get away; Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and
    there is danger of Illinois; and now they beg us, for God's
    sake, to come to their rescue, and save the Republican party
    from rupture. I hope you will send _stiff-backed_ men, or none.
    The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment and advice,
    and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope, as a matter of
    courtesy to some of our erring brethren, that you will send the
    delegates.

    "Truly your friend,

    "(Signed) Z. Chandler.

    "His Excellency Austin Blair."

    "P.S.--Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would
    be awful. Without a _little bloodletting_, this Union will not,
    in my estimation, be worth a rush."

The reader should not fall into the mistake of imagining that the
"erring brethren," toward whom a concession of courtesy is recommended
by the writer of this letter, were the people of the seceding, or even
of the border, States. It is evident from the context that he means the
people of those so-called "Republican" States which had fallen into the
error of taking part in a plan for peace, which might have averted the
bloodletting recommended.]




CHAPTER IX.

    Northern Protests against Coercion.--The "New York Tribune,"
    Albany "Argus," and "New York Herald."--Great Public Meeting in
    New York.--Speeches of Mr. Thayer, ex-Governor Seymour,
    ex-Chancellor Walworth, and Others.--The Press in February,
    1861.--Mr. Lincoln's Inaugural.--The Marvelous Change or
    Suppression of Conservative Sentiment.--Historic Precedents.


It is a great mistake, or misstatement of fact, to assume that, at the
period under consideration, the Southern States stood alone in the
assertion of the principles which have been laid down in this work, with
regard to the right of secession and the wrong of coercion. Down to the
formation of the Confederate Government, the one was distinctly
admitted, the other still more distinctly disavowed and repudiated, by
many of the leaders of public opinion in the North of both
parties--indeed, any purpose of direct coercion was disclaimed by nearly
all. If presented at all, it was in the delusive and ambiguous guise of
"the execution of the laws" and "protection of the public property."

The "New York Tribune"--the leading organ of the party which triumphed
in the election of 1860--had said, soon after the result of that
election was ascertained, with reference to secession: "We hold, with
Jefferson, to the inalienable right of communities to alter or abolish
forms of government that have become oppressive or injurious; and, if
the cotton States shall decide that they can do better out of the Union
than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede
may be a revolutionary right, _but it exists nevertheless_; and we do
not see how one party can have _a right to do what another party has a
right to prevent_. We must ever resist the asserted right of any State
to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the laws thereof: _to
withdraw from the Union is quite another matter_. And, whenever a
considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out,
_we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep her in. We hope
never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue
by bayonets_."[132]

The only liberty taken with this extract has been that of presenting
certain parts of it in italics. Nothing that has ever been said by the
author of this work, in the foregoing chapters, on the floor of the
Senate, or elsewhere, more distinctly asserted the right of secession.
Nothing that has been quoted from Hamilton, or Madison, or Marshall, or
John Quincy Adams, more emphatically repudiates the claim of right to
restrain or coerce a State in the exercise of its free choice. Nothing
that has been said since the war which followed could furnish a more
striking condemnation of its origin, prosecution, purposes, and results.
A comparison of the sentiments above quoted, with the subsequent career
of the party, of which that journal was and long had been the recognized
organ, would exhibit a striking incongruity and inconsistency.

The "Tribune" was far from being singular among its Northern
contemporaries in the entertainment of such views, as Mr. Greeley, its
chief editor, has shown by many citations in his book, "The American
Conflict." The Albany "Argus," about the same time, said, in language
which Mr. Greeley characterizes as "clear and temperate": "We sympathize
with and justify the South as far as this: their rights have been
invaded to the extreme limit possible within the forms of the
Constitution; and, beyond this limit, their feelings have been insulted
and their interests and honor assailed by almost every possible form of
denunciation and invective; and, if we deemed it certain that the real
_animus_ of the Republican party could be carried into the
administration of the Federal Government, and become the permanent
policy of the nation, we should think that all the instincts of
self-preservation and of manhood rightfully impelled them to a resort to
revolution and a separation from the Union, and we would applaud them
and wish them godspeed in the adoption of such a remedy."

Again, the same paper said, a day or two afterward: "If South Carolina
or any other State, through a convention of her people, shall formally
separate herself from the Union, probably both the present and the next
Executive will simply let her alone and _quietly allow all the functions
of the Federal Government within her limits to be suspended. Any other
course would be madness_; as it would at once enlist all the Southern
States in the controversy and plunge the whole country into a civil
war.... As a matter of policy and wisdom, therefore, independent of the
question of right, we should deem resort to force most disastrous."

The "New York Herald"--a journal which claimed to be independent of all
party influences--about the same period said: "Each State is organized
as a complete government, holding the purse and wielding the sword,
possessing the right to break the tie of the confederation as a nation
might break a treaty, and to repel coercion as a nation might repel
invasion.... Coercion, if it were possible, is out of the question."

On the 31st of January, 1861--after six States had already seceded--a
great meeting was held in the city of New York, to consider the perilous
condition of the country. At this meeting Mr. James S. Thayer, "an
old-line Whig," made a speech, which was received with great applause.
The following extracts from the published report of Mr. Thayer's speech
will show the character of the views which then commanded the cordial
approval of that metropolitan audience:

    "We can at least, in an authoritative way and a practical
    manner, arrive at the basis of a _peaceable separation_.
    [Cheers.] We can at least by discussion enlighten, settle, and
    concentrate the public sentiment in the State of New York upon
    this question, and save it from that fearful current, which
    circuitously but certainly sweeps madly on, through the narrow
    gorge of 'the enforcement of the laws,' to the shoreless ocean
    of civil war! [Cheers.] Against this, under all circumstances,
    in every place and form, we must now and at all times oppose a
    resolute and unfaltering resistance. The public mind will bear
    the avowal, and let us make it--that, if a revolution of force
    is to begin, _it shall be inaugurated at home_. And if the
    incoming Administration shall attempt to carry out the line of
    policy that has been foreshadowed, we announce that, when the
    hand of Black Republicanism turns to blood-red, and seeks _from
    the fragment of the Constitution to construct a scaffolding for
    coercion--another name for execution_--we will reverse the order
    of the French Revolution, and save the blood of the people by
    making those who would inaugurate a reign of terror the first
    victims of a national guillotine!" [Enthusiastic applause.]

And again:

    "It is announced that the Republican Administration will enforce
    the laws against and in all the seceding States. A nice
    discrimination must be exercised in the performance of this
    duty. You remember the story of William Tell.... Let an arrow
    winged by the Federal bow strike the heart of an American
    citizen, and who can number the avenging darts that will cloud
    the heavens in the conflict that will ensue? [Prolonged
    applause.] What, then, is the duty of the State of New York?
    What shall we say to our people when we come to meet this state
    of facts? That the Union must be preserved? But, if that can not
    be, what then? _Peaceable separation._ [Applause.] Painful and
    humiliating as it is, let us temper it with all we can of love
    and kindness, so that we may yet be left in a comparatively
    prosperous condition, in friendly relations with another
    Confederacy." [Cheers.]

At the same meeting ex-Governor Horatio Seymour asked the question--on
which subsequent events have cast their own commentary--whether
"successful coercion by the North is less revolutionary than successful
secession by the South? Shall we prevent revolution [he added] by being
foremost in over-throwing the principles of our Government, and all that
makes it valuable to our people and distinguishes it among the nations
of the earth?"

The venerable ex-Chancellor Walworth thus expressed himself:

    "It would be as brutal, in my opinion, to send men to butcher
    our own brothers of the Southern States as it would be to
    massacre them in the Northern States. We are told, however, that
    it is our duty to, and we must, enforce the laws. But why--and
    what laws are to be enforced? There were laws that were to be
    enforced in the time of the American Revolution.... Did Lord
    Chatham go for enforcing those laws? No, he gloried in defense
    of the liberties of America. He made that memorable declaration
    in the British Parliament, 'If I were an American citizen,
    instead of being, as I am, an Englishman, I never would submit
    to such laws--never, never, never!'" [Prolonged applause.]

Other distinguished speakers expressed themselves in similar
terms--varying somewhat in their estimate of the propriety of the
secession of the Southern States, but all agreeing in emphatic and
unqualified reprobation of the idea of coercion. A series of
conciliatory resolutions was adopted, one of which declares that "civil
war will not restore the Union, but will defeat for ever its
reconstruction."

At a still later period--some time in the month of February--the "Free
Press," a leading paper in Detroit, had the following:

    "If there shall not be a change in the present seeming purpose
    to yield to no accommodation of the national difficulties, and
    if troops shall be raised in the North to march against the
    people of the South, _a fire in the rear will be opened upon
    such troops_, which will either stop their march altogether or
    wonderfully accelerate it."

The "Union," of Bangor, Maine, spoke no less decidedly to the same
effect:

    "The difficulties between the North and the South must be
    compromised, or the separation of the States _shall be
    peaceable_. If the Republican party refuse to go the full length
    of the Crittenden amendment--_which is the very least the South
    can or ought to take_--then, here in Maine, not a Democrat will
    be found who will raise his arm against his brethren of the
    South. From one end of the State to the other let the cry of the
    Democracy be, Compromise or Peaceable Separation!"

That these were not expressions of isolated or exceptional sentiment is
evident from the fact that they were copied with approval by other
Northern journals.

Mr. Lincoln, when delivering his inaugural address, on the 4th of March,
1861, had not so far lost all respect for the consecrated traditions of
the founders of the Constitution and for the majesty of the principle of
State sovereignty as openly to enunciate the claim of coercion. While
arguing against the right to secede, and asserting his intention "to
hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government, and collect the duties and imposts," he says that, "beyond
what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no
using of force against or among the people anywhere," and appends to
this declaration the following pledge:

    "Where hostility to the United States shall be so great as to
    prevent competent resident citizens from holding the Federal
    offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers
    among the people for that object. While the strict legal right
    may exist of the Government to enforce the exercise of these
    offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so
    nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for
    the time the uses of such offices."

These extracts will serve to show that the people of the South were not
without grounds for cherishing the hope, to which they so fondly clung,
that the separation would, indeed, be as peaceable in fact as it was, on
their part, in purpose; that the conservative and patriotic feeling
still existing in the North would control the elements of sectional
hatred and bloodthirsty fanaticism; and that there would be really "no
war."

And here the ingenuous reader may very naturally ask, What became of all
this feeling? How was it that, in the course of a few weeks, it had
disappeared like a morning mist? Where was the host of men who had
declared that an army marching to invade the Southern States should
first pass over their dead bodies? No _new_ question had arisen--no
change in the attitude occupied by the seceding States--no cause for
controversy not already existing when these utterances were made. And
yet the sentiments which they expressed were so entirely swept away by
the tide of reckless fury which soon afterward impelled an armed
invasion of the South, that (with a few praiseworthy but powerless
exceptions) scarcely a vestige of them was left. Not only were they
obliterated, but seemingly forgotten.

I leave to others to offer, if they can, an explanation of this strange
phenomenon. To the student of human nature, however, it may not seem
altogether without precedent, when he remembers certain other instances
on record of mutations in public sentiment equally sudden and
extraordinary. Ten thousand swords that would have leaped from their
scabbards--as the English statesman thought--to avenge even a look of
insult to a lovely queen, hung idly in their places when she was led to
the scaffold in the midst of the vilest taunts and execrations. The case
that we have been considering was, perhaps, only an illustration of the
general truth that, in times of revolutionary excitement, the higher and
better elements are crushed and silenced by the lower and baser--not so
much on account of their greater extent, as of their greater violence.


[Footnote 132: "New York Tribune" of November 9, 1860, quoted in "The
American Conflict," vol. i, chap. xxiii, p. 359.]




CHAPTER X.

    Temper of the Southern People indicated by the Action of the
    Confederate Congress.--The Permanent Constitution.--Modeled
    after the Federal Constitution.--Variations and Special
    Provisions.--Provisions with Regard to Slavery and the
    Slave-Trade.--A False Assertion refuted.--Excellence of the
    Constitution.--Admissions of Hostile or Impartial Criticism.


The conservative temper of the people of the Confederate States was
conspicuously exhibited in the most important product of the early
labors of their representatives in Congress assembled. The Provisional
Constitution, although prepared only for temporary use, and necessarily
in some haste, was so well adapted for the purposes which it was
intended to serve, that many thought it would have been wise to continue
it in force indefinitely, or at least until the independency of the
Confederacy should be assured. The Congress, however, deeming it best
that the system of Government should emanate from the people,
accordingly, on the 11th of March, prepared the permanent Constitution,
which was submitted to and ratified by the people of the respective
States.

Of this Constitution--which may be found in an appendix,[133] side by
side with the Constitution of the United States--the Hon. Alexander H.
Stephens, who was one of its authors, very properly says:

    "The whole document utterly negatives the idea, which so many
    have been active in endeavoring to put in the enduring form of
    history, that the Convention at Montgomery was nothing but a set
    of 'conspirators,' whose object was the overthrow of the
    principles of the Constitution of the United States, and the
    erection of a great 'slavery oligarchy,' instead of the free
    institutions thereby secured and guaranteed. This work of the
    Montgomery Convention, with that of the Constitution for a
    Provisional Government, will ever remain, not only as a monument
    of the wisdom, forecast, and statesmanship of the men who
    constituted it, but an everlasting refutation of the charges
    which have been brought against them. These works together show
    clearly that their only leading object was to sustain, uphold,
    and perpetuate the fundamental principles of the Constitution of
    the United States."[134]

The Constitution of the United States was the model followed throughout,
with only such changes as experience suggested for better practical
working or for greater perspicuity. The preamble to both instruments is
the same in substance, and very nearly identical in language. The words
"We, the people of the United States," in one, are replaced by "We, the
people of the Confederate States," in the other; and the gross
perversion which has been made of the former expression is precluded in
the latter merely by the addition of the explanatory clause, "each State
acting in its sovereign and independent character"--an explanation
which, at the time of the formation of the Constitution of the United
States, would have been deemed entirely superfluous.

The official term of the President was fixed at six instead of four
years, and it was provided that he should not be eligible for
reelection. This was in accordance with the original draft of the
Constitution of 1787.[135]

The President was empowered to remove officers of his Cabinet, or those
engaged in the diplomatic service, at his discretion, but in all other
cases removal from office could be made only for cause, and the cause
was to be reported to the Senate.[136]

Congress was authorized to provide by law for the admission of "the
principal officer in each of the executive departments" (or Cabinet
officers) to a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege
of taking part in the discussion of subjects pertaining to his
department.[137] This wise and judicious provision, which would have
tended to obviate much delay and misunderstanding, was, however, never
put into execution by the necessary legislation.

Protective duties for the benefit of special branches of industry, which
had been so fruitful a source of trouble under the Government of the
United States, were altogether prohibited.[138] So, also, were bounties
from the Treasury,[139] and extra compensation for services rendered by
officers, contractors, or employees, of any description.[140]

A vote of two thirds of each House was requisite for the appropriation
of money from the Treasury, unless asked for by the chief of a
department and submitted to Congress by the President, or for payment of
the expenses of Congress, or of claims against the Confederacy
judicially established and declared.[141] The President was also
authorized to approve any one appropriation and disapprove any other in
the same bill.[142]

With regard to the impeachment of Federal officers, it was intrusted, as
formerly, to the discretion of the House of Representatives, with the
additional provision, however, that, in the case of any judicial or
other officer exercising his functions solely within the limits of a
particular State, impeachment might be made by the Legislature of such
State--the trial in all cases to be by the Senate of the Confederate
States.[143]

Any two or more States were authorized to enter into compacts with each
other for the improvement of the navigation of rivers flowing between or
through them.[144] A vote of two thirds of each House--the Senate voting
by States--was required for the admission of a new State.[145]

With regard to amendments of the Constitution, it was made obligatory
upon Congress, on the demand of any three States, concurring in the
proposed amendment or amendments, to summon a convention of all the
States to consider and act upon them, voting by States, but restricted
in its action to the particular propositions thus submitted. If approved
by such convention, the amendments were to be subject to final
ratification by two thirds of the States.[146]

Other changes or modifications, worthy of special notice, related to
internal improvements, bankruptcy laws, duties on exports, suits in the
Federal courts, and the government of the Territories.[147]

With regard to slavery and the slave-trade, the provisions of this
Constitution furnish an effectual answer to the assertion, so often
made, that the Confederacy was founded on slavery, that slavery was its
"corner-stone," etc. Property in slaves, _already existing_, was
recognized and guaranteed, just as it was by the Constitution of the
United States; and the rights of such property in the common Territories
were protected against any such hostile discrimination as had been
attempted in the Union. But the "extension of slavery," in the only
practical sense of that phrase, was more distinctly and effectually
precluded by the Confederate than by the Federal Constitution. This will
be manifest on a comparison of the provisions of the two relative to the
slave-trade. These are found at the beginning of the ninth section of
the first article of each instrument. The Constitution of the United
States has the following:

    "The migration or importation of such persons as any of the
    States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
    prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight
    hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such
    importations, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."

The Confederate Constitution, on the other hand, ordained as follows:

    "1. The importation of negroes of the African race from any
    foreign country, other than the slaveholding States or
    Territories of the United States of America, is hereby
    forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall
    effectually prevent the same.

    "2. Congress shall also have the power to prohibit the
    introduction of slaves from any state not a member of, or
    Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy."

In the case of the United States, the only prohibition is against any
interference by Congress with the slave-trade for a term of years, and
it was further legitimized by the authority given to impose a duty upon
it. The term of years, it is true, had long since expired, but there was
still no prohibition of the trade by the Constitution; it was after 1808
entirely within the discretion of Congress either to encourage,
tolerate, or prohibit it.

Under the Confederate Constitution, on the contrary, the African
slave-trade was "_hereby forbidden_," positively and unconditionally,
from the beginning. Neither the Confederate Government nor that of any
of the States could permit it, and the Congress was expressly "required"
to enforce the prohibition. The only discretion in the matter intrusted
to the Congress was, whether or not to permit the introduction of slaves
from any of the United States or their Territories.

Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, had said: "I have no purpose,
directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in
the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so,
and I have no inclination to do so." Now, if there was no purpose on the
part of the Government of the United States to interfere with the
institution of slavery within its already existing limits--a proposition
which permitted its propagation within those limits by natural
increase--and inasmuch as the Confederate Constitution precluded any
other than the same natural increase, we may plainly perceive the
disingenuousness and absurdity of the pretension by which a factitious
sympathy has been obtained in certain quarters for the war upon the
South, on the ground that it was a war in behalf of freedom against
slavery.[148] I had no direct part in the preparation of the Confederate
Constitution. No consideration of delicacy forbids me, therefore, to
say, in closing this brief review of that instrument, that it was a
model of wise, temperate, and liberal statesmanship. Intelligent
criticism, from hostile as well as friendly sources, has been compelled
to admit its excellences, and has sustained the judgment of a popular
Northern journal which said, a few days after it was adopted and
published:

    "The new Constitution is the Constitution of the United States
    with various modifications and some very important and most
    desirable improvements. We are free to say that the invaluable
    reforms enumerated should be adopted by the United States, with
    or without a reunion of the seceded States, and as soon as
    possible. But why not accept them with the propositions of the
    Confederate States on slavery as a basis of reunion?"[149]


[Footnote 133: See Appendix K.]

[Footnote 134: "War between the States," vol. ii, col. xix, p. 389.]

[Footnote 135: See Article II, section 1.]

[Footnote 136: Ibid., section 2, ¶ 3.]

[Footnote 137: Article I, section 6, ¶ 2.]

[Footnote 138: Article I, section 8, ¶ 1.]

[Footnote 139: Ibid.]

[Footnote 140: Ibid., section 9, ¶ 10.]

[Footnote 141: Ibid., ¶ 9.]

[Footnote 142: Ibid., section 7, ¶ 2.]

[Footnote 143: Ibid., section 2, ¶ 5.]

[Footnote 144: Ibid., section 10, ¶ 3.]

[Footnote 145: Article IV, section 3, ¶ 1.]

[Footnote 146: Article V.]

[Footnote 147: Article I, section 8, ¶¶ 1 and 4, section 9, ¶ 6; Article
III, section 2, ¶ 1; Article IV, section 3, ¶ 3.]

[Footnote 148: As late as the 22d of April, 1861, Mr. Seward, United
States Secretary of State, in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, Minister to
France, since made public, expressed the views and purposes of the
United States Government in the premises as follows. It may be proper to
explain that, by what he is pleased to term "the revolution," Mr. Seward
means the withdrawal of the Southern States; and that the words
italicized are, perhaps, not so distinguished in the original. He says:
"The Territories will remain in all respects the same, whether the
revolution shall succeed or shall fail. _The condition of slavery in the
several States will remain just the same, whether it succeed or fail._
There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected
States are to be conquered by the United States if the revolution fails;
for the rights of the States and _the condition of every being in them_
will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of
administration, whether the revolution shall succeed or whether it shall
fail. In the one case, the States would be federally connected with the
new Confederacy; in the other, they would, as now, be members of the
United States; _but their Constitutions and laws, customs, habits, and
institutions, in either ease, will remain the same_."]

[Footnote 149: "New York Herald," March 19, 1861.]




CHAPTER XI.

    The Commission to Washington City.--Arrival of Mr.
    Crawford.--Mr. Buchanan's Alarm.--Note of the Commissioners to
    the New Administration.--Mediation of Justices Nelson and
    Campbell.--The Difficulty about Forts Sumter and Pickens.--Mr.
    Secretary Seward's Assurances.--Duplicity of the Government at
    Washington.--Mr. Fox's Visit to Charleston.--Secret Preparations
    for Coercive Measures.--Visit of Mr. Lamon.--Renewed Assurances
    of Good Faith.--Notification to Governor Pickens.--Developments
    of Secret History.--Systematic and Complicated Perfidy exposed.


The appointment of Commissioners to proceed to Washington, for the
purpose of establishing friendly relations with the United States and
effecting an equitable settlement of all questions relating to the
common property of the States and the public debt, has already been
mentioned. No time was lost in carrying this purpose into execution. Mr.
Crawford--first of the Commissioners--left Montgomery on or about the
27th of February, and arrived in Washington two or three days before the
expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term of office as President of the United
States. Besides his official credentials, he bore the following letter
to the President, of a personal or semi-official character, intended to
facilitate, if possible, the speedy accomplishment of the objects of his
mission:

    "_To the President of the United States._

    "Sir: Being animated by an earnest desire to unite and bind
    together our respective countries by friendly ties, I have
    appointed Martin J. Crawford, one of our most esteemed and
    trustworthy citizens, as special Commissioner of the Confederate
    States to the Government of the United States; and I have now
    the honor to introduce him to you, and to ask for him a
    reception and treatment corresponding to his station, and to the
    purposes for which he is sent.

    "Those purposes he will more particularly explain to you. Hoping
    that through his agency these may be accomplished, I avail
    myself of this occasion to offer to you the assurance of my
    distinguished consideration."

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

    "Montgomery, _February 27, 1861_."

It may here be mentioned, in explanation of my desire that the
commission, or at least a part of it, should reach Washington before the
close of Mr. Buchanan's term, that I had received an intimation from
him, through a distinguished Senator of one of the border States,[150]
that he would be happy to receive a Commissioner or Commissioners from
the Confederate States, and would refer to the Senate any communication
that might be made through such a commission.

Mr. Crawford--now a Judge of the Supreme Court of Georgia, and the only
surviving member of the commission--in a manuscript account, which he
has kindly furnished, of his recollections of events connected with it,
says that, on arriving in Washington at the early hour of half-past four
o'clock in the morning, he was "surprised to see Pennsylvania Avenue,
from the old National to Willard's Hotel, crowded with men hurrying,
some toward the former, but most of the faces in the direction of the
latter, where the new President [Mr. Lincoln, President-elect], the
great political almoner, for the time being, had taken up his lodgings.
At this point," continues Judge Crawford, "the crowd swelled to
astonishing numbers of expectant and hopeful men, awaiting an
opportunity, either to see Mr. Lincoln himself, or to communicate with
him through some one who might be so fortunate as to have access to his
presence."

Describing his reception in the Federal capital, Judge Crawford says:

    "The feverish and emotional condition of affairs soon made the
    presence of the special Commissioner at Washington known
    throughout the city. Congress was still, of course, in session;
    Senators and members of the House of Representatives, excepting
    those of the Confederate States, who had withdrawn, were in
    their seats, and the manifestations of anxious care and gloomy
    forebodings were plainly to be seen on all sides. This was not
    confined to sections, but existed among the men of the North and
    West as well as those of the South....

    "Mr. Buchanan, the President, was in a state of most thorough
    alarm, not only for his home at Wheatland, but for his personal
    safety.[151] In the very few days which had elapsed between the
    time of his promise to receive a Commissioner from the
    Confederate States and the actual arrival of the Commissioner,
    he had become so fearfully panic-stricken, that he declined
    either to receive him or to send any message to the Senate
    touching the subject-matter of his mission.

    "The Commissioner had been for several years in Congress before
    the Administration of Mr. Buchanan, as well as during his
    official term, and had always been in close political and social
    relations with him; yet he was afraid of a public visit from
    him. He said that he had only three days of official life left,
    and could incur no further dangers or reproaches than those he
    had already borne from the press and public speakers of the
    North.

    "The intensity of the prevalent feeling increased as the vast
    crowds, arriving by every train, added fresh material; and
    hatred and hostility toward our new Government were manifested
    in almost every conceivable manner."

Another of the Commissioners (Mr. Forsyth) having arrived in Washington
on the 12th of March--eight days after the inauguration of Mr.
Lincoln--the two Commissioners then present, Messrs. Forsyth and
Crawford, addressed to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, a note informing
him of their presence, stating the friendly and peaceful purposes of
their mission, and requesting the appointment of a day, as early as
possible, for the presentation to the President of the United States of
their credentials and the objects which they had in view. This letter
will be found in the Appendix,[152] with other correspondence which
ensued, published soon after the events to which it relates. The
attention of the reader is specially invited to these documents, but, as
additional revelations have been made since they were first published,
it will be proper, in order to a full understanding of the transactions
to which they refer, to give here a brief statement of the facts.

No _written_ answer to the note of the Commissioners was delivered to
them for twenty-seven days after it was written. The paper of Mr.
Seward, in reply, without signature or address, dated March 15th,[153]
was "filed," as he states, on that day, in the Department of State, but
a copy of it was not handed to the Commissioners until the 8th of April.
But an oral answer had been made to the note of the Commissioners at a
much earlier date, for the significance of which it will be necessary to
bear in mind the condition of affairs at Charleston and Pensacola.

Fort Sumter was still occupied by the garrison under command of Major
Anderson, with no material change in the circumstances since the failure
of the attempt made in January to reenforce it by means of the Star of
the West. This standing menace at the gates of the chief harbor of South
Carolina had been tolerated by the government and people of that State,
and afterward by the Confederate authorities, in the abiding hope that
it would be removed without compelling a collision of forces. Fort
Pickens, on one side of the entrance to the harbor of Pensacola, was
also occupied by a garrison of United States troops, while the two forts
(Barrancas and McRee) on the other side were in possession of the
Confederates. Communication by sea was not entirely precluded, however,
in the case of Fort Pickens; the garrison had been strengthened, and a
fleet of Federal men-of-war was lying outside of the harbor. The
condition of affairs at these forts--especially at Fort Sumter--was a
subject of anxiety with the friends of peace, and the hope of settling
by negotiation the questions involved in their occupation had been one
of the most urgent motives for the prompt dispatch of the Commissioners
to Washington.

The letter of the Commissioners to Mr. Seward was written, as we have
seen, on the 12th of March. The oral message, above mentioned, was
obtained and communicated to the Commissioners through the agency of two
Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States--Justices Nelson, of
New York, and Campbell, of Alabama. On the 15th of March, according to
the statement of Judge Campbell,[154] Mr. Justice Nelson visited the
Secretaries of State and of the Treasury and the Attorney-General
(Messrs. Seward, Chase, and Bates), to dissuade them from undertaking to
put in execution any policy of coercion. "During the term of the Supreme
Court he had very carefully examined the laws of the United States to
enable him to attain his conclusions, and from time to time he had
consulted the Chief Justice [Taney] upon the questions which his
examination had suggested. His conclusion was that, without very serious
violations of Constitution and statutes, coercion could not be
successfully effected by the executive department. I had made [continues
Judge Campbell] a similar examination, and I concurred in his
conclusions and opinions. As he was returning from his visit to the
State Department, we casually met, and he informed me of what he had
done. He said he had spoken to these officers at large; that he was
received with respect and listened to with attention by all, with
approbation by the Attorney-General, and with great cordiality by the
Secretary of State; that the Secretary had expressed gratification to
find so many impediments to the disturbance of peace, and only wished
there had been more. He stated that the Secretary told him there was a
present cause of embarrassment: that the Southern Commissioners had
demanded recognition, and a refusal would lead to irritation and
excitement in the Southern States, and would cause a counter-irritation
and excitement in the Northern States, prejudicial to a peaceful
adjustment. Justice Nelson suggested that I might be of service."

The result of the interview between these two distinguished gentlemen,
we are informed, was another visit, by both of them, to the State
Department, for the purpose of urging Mr. Seward to reply to the
Commissioners, and assure them of the desire of the United States
Government for a friendly adjustment. Mr. Seward seems to have objected
to an immediate recognition of the Commissioners, on the ground that the
state of public sentiment in the North would not sustain it, in
connection with the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, which had
been determined on. "The evacuation of Sumter," he said, "is as much as
the Administration can bear."

Judge Campbell adds: "I concurred in the conclusion that the evacuation
of Sumter involved responsibility, and stated that there could not be
too much caution in the adoption of measures so as not to shock or to
irritate the public sentiment, and that the evacuation of Sumter was
sufficient for the present in that direction. I stated that I would see
the Commissioners, and I would write to Mr. Davis to that effect. I
asked him what I should say as to Sumter and as to Pickens. _He
authorized me to say that, before that letter could reach him_ [Mr.
Davis], _he would learn by telegraph that the order for the evacuation
of Sumter had been made_. He said the condition of Pickens was
satisfactory, and there would be no change made there." The italics in
this extract are my own.

The letter in which this promise was communicated to me has been lost,
but it was given in substantially the terms above stated as authorized
by Mr. Seward--that the order for the evacuation of the fort would be
issued before the letter could reach me. The same assurance was given,
on the same day, to the Commissioners. Judge Campbell tells us that Mr.
Crawford was slow to consent to refrain from pressing the demand for
recognition. "It was only after some discussion and the expression of
some objections that he consented" to do so. This consent was clearly
one part of a stipulation, of which the other part was the pledge that
the fort would be evacuated in the course of a few days. Mr. Crawford
required the pledge of Mr. Seward to be reduced to writing, with Judge
Campbell's personal assurance of its genuineness and accuracy.[155] This
written statement was exhibited to Judge Nelson, before its delivery,
and approved by him. The fact that the pledge had been given in his name
and behalf was communicated to Mr. Seward the same evening by letter. He
was cognizant of, consenting to, and in great part the author of, the
whole transaction.

It will be observed that not only the Commissioners in Washington, but
the Confederate Government at Montgomery also, were thus assured on the
highest authority--that of the Secretary of State of the United States,
the official organ of communication of the views and purposes of his
Government--of the intention of that Government to order the evacuation
of Fort Sumter within a few days from the 15th of March, and not to
disturb the existing _status_ at Fort Pickens. Moreover, this was not
the mere statement of a fact, but a _pledge_, given as the consideration
of an appeal to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners to
refrain from embarrassing the Federal Administration by prosecuting any
further claims at the same time. As such a pledge, it was accepted, and,
while its fulfillment was quietly awaited, the Commissioners forbore to
make any further demand for reply to their note of the 12th of March.

Five days having elapsed in this condition of affairs, the Commissioners
in Washington telegraphed Brigadier-General Beauregard, commander of the
Confederate forces at Charleston, inquiring whether the fort had been
evacuated, or any action taken by Major Anderson indicating the
probability of an evacuation. Answer was made to this dispatch, that the
fort had not been evacuated, that there were no indications of such a
purpose, but that Major Anderson was still working on its defenses. This
dispatch was taken to Mr. Seward by Judge Campbell. Two interviews
occurred in relation to it, at both of which Judge Nelson was also
present. Of the result of these interviews, Judge Campbell states: "The
last was full and satisfactory. The Secretary was buoyant and sanguine;
he spoke of his ability to carry through his policy with confidence. He
accounted for the delay as accidental, and _not involving the integrity
of his assurance that the evacuation would take place_, and that I
should know whenever any change was made in the resolution in reference
to Sumter or to Pickens. I repeated this assurance in writing to Judge
Crawford, _and informed Governor Seward in writing what I had
said_."[156]

It would be incredible, but for the ample proofs which have since been
brought to light, that, during all this period of reiterated assurances
of a purpose to withdraw the garrison from Fort Sumter, and of excuses
for delay on account of the difficulties which embarrassed it, the
Government of the United States was assiduously engaged in devising
means for furnishing supplies and reenforcements to the garrison, with
the view of retaining possession of the fort!

Mr. G. V. Fox, afterward Assistant Secretary of the United States Navy,
had proposed a plan for reenforcing and furnishing supplies to the
garrison of Fort Sumter in February, during the Administration of Mr.
Buchanan. In a letter published in the newspapers since the war, he
gives an account of the manner in which the proposition was renewed to
the new Administration and its reception by them, as follows:

    "On the 12th of March I received a telegram from
    Postmaster-General Blair to come to Washington. I arrived there
    on the 13th. Mr. Blair having been acquainted with the
    proposition I presented to General Scott, under Mr. Buchanan's
    Administration, sent for me to tender the same to Mr. Lincoln,
    informing me that Lieutenant-General Scott had advised the
    President that the fort could not be relieved, and must be given
    up. Mr. Blair took me at once to the White House, and I
    explained the plan to the President. Thence we adjourned to
    Lieutenant-General Scott's office, where a renewed discussion of
    the subject took place. The General informed the President that
    my plan was practicable in February, but that the increased
    number of batteries erected at the mouth of the harbor since
    that time rendered it impossible in March.

    "Finding that there was great opposition to any attempt at
    relieving Fort Sumter, and that Mr. Blair alone sustained the
    President in his policy of refusing to yield, I judged that my
    arguments in favor of the practicability of sending in supplies
    would be strengthened by a visit to Charleston and the fort. The
    President readily agreed to my visit, if the Secretary of War
    and General Scott raised no objection.

    "Both these gentlemen consenting, I left Washington on the 19th
    of March, and, passing through Richmond and Wilmington, reached
    Charleston on the 21st."

Thus we see that, at the very moment when Mr. Secretary Seward was
renewing to the Confederate Government, through Judge Campbell, his
positive assurance that "the evacuation _would_ take place," this
emissary was on his way to Charleston to obtain information and devise
measures by means of which this promise might be broken.

On his arrival in Charleston, Mr. Fox tells us that he sought an
interview with Captain Hartstein, of the Confederate Navy, and through
this officer obtained from Governor Pickens permission to visit Fort
Sumter. He fails, in his narrative, to state what we learn from Governor
Pickens himself,[157] that this permission was obtained "expressly upon
the pledge of 'pacific purposes.'" Notwithstanding this pledge, he
employed the opportunity afforded by his visit to mature the details of
his plan for furnishing supplies and reenforcements to the garrison. He
did not, he says, communicate his plan or purposes to Major Anderson,
the commanding officer of the garrison, having discernment enough,
perhaps, to divine that the instincts of that brave and honest soldier
would have revolted at and rebuked the duplicity and perfidy of the
whole transaction. The result of his visit was, however, reported at
Washington, his plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sent
to New York to make arrangements for putting it in execution.

    "In a very few days after" (says Governor Pickens, in the
    message already quoted above), "another confidential agent,
    Colonel Lamon, was sent by the President [Mr. Lincoln], who
    informed me that he had come to try and arrange for the removal
    of the garrison, and, when he returned from the fort, asked if a
    war-vessel could not be allowed to remove them. I replied that
    no war-vessel could be allowed to enter the harbor on any terms.
    He said he believed Major Anderson preferred an ordinary
    steamer, and I agreed that the garrison might be thus removed.
    He said he hoped to return in a very few days for that purpose."

This, it will be remembered, occurred while Mr. Fox was making active,
though secret, preparations for his relief expedition.

Colonel, or Major, Lamon, as he is variously styled in the
correspondence, did not return to Charleston, as promised. About the
30th of March (which was Saturday) a telegram from Governor Pickens was
received by the Commissioners in Washington, making inquiry with regard
to Colonel Lamon, and the meaning of the protracted delay to fulfill the
promise of evacuation. This was fifteen days after the original
assurance of Mr. Seward that the garrison would be withdrawn
immediately, and ten days after his explanation that the delay was
"accidental." The dispatch of Governor Pickens was taken by Judge
Campbell to Mr. Seward, who appointed the ensuing Monday (1st of April)
for an interview and answer. At that interview Mr. Seward informed Judge
Campbell that "the President was concerned about the contents of the
telegram--_there was a point of honor involved_; that Lamon had no
agency from him, nor title to speak."[158] (This late suggestion of the
point of _honor_ would seem, under the circumstances, to have been made
in a spirit of sarcastic pleasantry, like Sir John Falstaff's celebrated
discourse on the same subject.) The only substantial result of the
conversation, however, was the written assurance of Mr. Seward, to be
communicated to the Commissioners, that "the Government will not
undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor
Pickens."

This, it will be observed, was a very material variation from the
positive pledge previously given, and reiterated, to the Commissioners,
to Governor Pickens, and to myself directly, that the fort was to be
forthwith evacuated. Judge Campbell, in his account of the interview,
says: "I asked him [Mr. Seward] whether I was to understand that there
had been a change in his former communications. His answer was,
'None.'"[159]

About the close of the same week (the first in April), the patience of
the Commissioners having now been wellnigh exhausted, and the hostile
preparations of the Government of the United States, notwithstanding the
secrecy with which they were conducted, having become matter of general
rumor, a letter was addressed to Mr. Seward, upon the subject, by Judge
Campbell, in behalf of the Commissioners, again asking whether the
assurances so often given were well or ill founded. To this the
Secretary returned answer in writing: "_Faith as to Sumter fully kept.
Wait and see._"

This was on the 7th of April.[160] The very next day (the 8th) the
following official notification (without date or signature) was read to
Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, and General Beauregard, in
Charleston, by Mr. Chew, an official of the _State Department_ (Mr.
Seward's) in Washington, who said--as did a Captain or Lieutenant
Talbot, who accompanied him--that it was from the President of the
United States, and delivered by him to Mr. Chew on the 6th--the day
_before_ Mr. Seward's assurance of "_faith fully kept_."

    "I am directed by the President of the United States to notify
    you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with
    provisions only; and that, if such an attempt be not resisted,
    no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, will be made,
    without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the
    fort."[161]

Thus disappeared the last vestige of the plighted faith and pacific
pledges of the Federal Government.

In order fully to appreciate the significance of this communication, and
of the time and circumstances of its delivery, it must be borne in mind
that the naval expedition which had been secretly in preparation for
some time at New York, under direction of Captain Fox, was now ready to
sail, and might reasonably be expected to be at Charleston almost
immediately after the notification was delivered to Governor Pickens,
and before preparation could be made to receive it. Owing to
cross-purposes or misunderstandings in the Washington Cabinet, however,
and then to the delay caused by a severe storm at sea, this expectation
was disappointed, and the Confederate commander at Charleston had
opportunity to communicate with Montgomery and receive instructions for
his guidance, before the arrival of the fleet, which had been intended
to be a surprise.

In publications made since the war by members of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet,
it has been represented that, during the period of the disgraceful
transactions above detailed, there were dissensions and divisions in the
Cabinet--certain members of it urging measures of prompt and decided
coercion; the Secretary of State favoring a pacific or at least a
dilatory policy; and the President vacillating for a time between the
two, but eventually adopting the views of the coercionists. In these
statements it is represented that the assurances and pledges, given by
Mr. Seward to the Confederate Government and its Commissioners, were
given on his own authority, and without the consent or approval of the
President of the United States. The absurdity of any such attempt to
disassociate the action of the President from that of his Secretary, and
to relieve the former of responsibility for the conduct of the latter,
is too evident to require argument or comment. It is impossible to
believe that, during this whole period of nearly a month, Mr. Lincoln
was ignorant of the communications that were passing between the
Confederate Commissioners and Mr. Seward, through the distinguished
member of the Supreme Court--still holding his seat as such--who was
acting as intermediary. On one occasion, Judge Campbell informs us that
the Secretary, in the midst of an important interview, excused himself
for the purpose of conferring with the President before giving a final
answer, and left his visitor for some time, awaiting his return from
that conference, when the answer was given, avowedly and directly
proceeding from the President.

If, however, it were possible to suppose that Mr. Seward was acting on
his own responsibility, and practicing a deception upon his own chief,
as well as upon the Confederate authorities, in the pledges which he
made to the latter, it is nevertheless certain that the principal facts
were brought to light within a few days after the close of the efforts
at negotiation. Yet the Secretary of State was not impeached and brought
to trial for the grave offense of undertaking to conduct the most
momentous and vital transactions that had been or could be brought
before the Government of the United States, without the knowledge and in
opposition to the will of the President, and for having involved the
Government in dishonor, if not in disaster. He was not even dismissed
from office, but continued to be the chief officer of the Cabinet and
confidential adviser of the President, as he was afterward of the
ensuing Administration, occupying that station during two consecutive
terms. No disavowal of his action, no apology nor explanation, was ever
made. Politically and legally, the President is unquestionably
responsible in all cases for the action of any member of his Cabinet,
and in this case it is as preposterous to attempt to dissever from him
the moral, as it would be impossible to relieve him of the legal,
responsibility that rests upon the Government of the United States for
the systematic series of frauds perpetrated by its authority.

On the other hand, Mr. Seward, throughout the whole negotiation, was
fully informed of the views of his colleagues in the Cabinet and of the
President. Whatever his real hopes or purposes may have been in the
beginning, it is positively certain that long before the end, and while
still reiterating his assurances that the garrison would be withdrawn,
he knew that it had been _determined_, and that active preparations were
in progress, to strengthen it.

Mr. Gideon Welles, who was Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Lincoln's
Cabinet, gives the following account of one of the transactions of the
period:

    "One evening in the latter part of the month of March, there was
    a small gathering at the Executive Mansion, while the Sumter
    question was still pending. The members of the Cabinet were soon
    individually and quietly invited to the council-chamber, where,
    as soon as assembled, the President informed them he had just
    been advised by General Scott that it was expedient to evacuate
    Fort Pickens, as well as Fort Sumter, which last was assumed at
    military headquarters to be a determined fact, in conformity
    with the views of Secretary Seward and the General-in-Chief....

    "A brief silence followed the announcement of the amazing
    recommendation of General Scott, when Mr. Blair, who had been
    much annoyed by the vacillating course of the General-in-Chief
    in regard to Sumter, remarked, looking earnestly at Mr. Seward,
    that it was evident the old General was playing politician in
    regard to both Sumter and Pickens; for it was not possible, if
    there was a defense, for the rebels to take Pickens; and the
    Administration would not be justified if it listened to his
    advice and evacuated either. Very soon thereafter, I think at
    the next Cabinet meeting, the President announced his decision
    that _supplies should be sent to Sumter_, and issued
    confidential orders to that effect. All were gratified with this
    decision, except Mr. Seward, who still remonstrated, _but
    preparations were immediately commenced to fit out an expedition
    to forward supplies_."[162]

This account is confirmed by a letter of Mr. Montgomery Blair.[163] The
date of the announcement of the President's final purpose is fixed by
Mr. Welles, in the neat paragraph to that above quoted, as the 28th of
March. This was four days before Mr. Seward's assurance given Judge
Campbell--after conference with the President--that there would be no
departure from the pledges previously given (which were that the fort
_would be evacuated_), and ten days before his written renewal of the
assurance--"_Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see!_" This
assurance, too, was given at the very moment when a messenger from his
own department was on the way to Charleston to notify the Governor of
South Carolina that faith would _not_ be kept in the matter.

It is scarcely necessary to say that the Commissioners had, with good
reason, ceased to place any confidence in the promises of the United
States Government, before they ceased to be made. On the 8th of April
they sent the following dispatch to General Beauregard:

    "Washington, _April 8, 1861_.

    "General G. T. Beauregard: Accounts uncertain, because of the
    constant vacillation of this Government. We were reassured
    yesterday that the status of Sumter would not be changed without
    previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have no faith in
    them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this time.

    "M. J. Crawford."

On the same day the announcement made to Governor Pickens through Mr.
Chew was made known. The Commissioners immediately applied for a
definitive answer to their note of March 12th, which had been permitted
to remain in abeyance. The paper of the Secretary of State, dated March
15th, was thereupon delivered to them. This paper, with the final
rejoinder of the Commissioners and Judge Campbell's letters to the
Secretary of April 13th and April 20th, respectively, will be found in
the Appendix.

Negotiation was now at an end, and the Commissioners withdrew from
Washington and returned to their homes. Their last dispatch, before
leaving, shows that they were still dependent upon public rumor and the
newspapers for information as to the real purposes and preparations of
the Federal Administration. It was in these words:

    "Washington, _April 10, 1861_.

    "General G. T. Beauregard: The 'Tribune' of to-day declares the
    main object of the expedition to be the relief of Sumter, and
    that a force will be landed which will overcome all opposition.

    "Roman, Crawford, and Forsyth."

The annexed extracts from my message to the Confederate Congress at the
opening of its special session, on the 29th of April, will serve as a
recapitulation of the events above narrated, with all of comment that it
was then, or is now, considered necessary to add:

    [_Extracts from President's Message to the Confederate Congress,
    of April 29, 1861._]

    "... Scarce had you assembled in February last, when, prior even
    to the inauguration of the Chief Magistrate you had elected, you
    expressed your desire for the appointment of Commissioners, and
    for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the
    two Governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and
    good faith.

    "It was my pleasure, as well as my duty, to cooeperate with you
    in this work of peace. Indeed, in my address to you, on taking
    the oath of office, and before receiving from you the
    communication of this resolution, I had said that, as a
    necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of
    separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the
    conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the
    Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual
    interest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate
    political career, my most earnest desire will then have been
    fulfilled.

    "It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress
    and the Executive, that I made choice of three discreet, able,
    and distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. Aided by
    their cordial cooeperation and that of the Secretary of State,
    every effort compatible with self-respect and the dignity of the
    Confederacy was exhausted, before I allowed myself to yield to
    the conviction that the Government of the United States was
    determined to attempt the conquest of this people, and that our
    cherished hopes of peace were unobtainable.

    "On the arrival of our Commissioners in Washington on the 5th of
    March,[164] they postponed, at the suggestion of a friendly
    intermediator, doing more than giving informal notice of their
    arrival. This was done with a view to afford time to the
    President of the United States, who had just been inaugurated,
    for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the
    organization of his Administration, before engaging his
    attention to the object of their mission.

    "It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially
    addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose
    of their arrival, and stating in the language of their
    instructions their wish to make to the Government of the United
    States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the
    Government of the United States that the President, Congress,
    and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution
    of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor
    their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the
    strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure
    their late confederates.

    "To this communication, no formal reply was received until the
    8th of April. During the interval, the Commissioners had
    consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve
    to avoid war, if possible. They went so far even as to hold,
    during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an
    intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the
    hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were
    received from the Government of the United States of its
    peaceful intentions--of its determination to evacuate Fort
    Sumter; and, further, that no measure would be introduced
    changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate
    States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort
    Pickens, notice would be given to the Commissioners.

    "The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example
    so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the
    course of the United States Government toward our Commissioners
    in Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed
    documents marked, (?) taken in connection with further facts,
    which I now proceed to relate.

    "Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted
    to extraordinary preparations, in New York and other Northern
    ports, for an extensive military and naval expedition. These
    preparations were commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose
    destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly
    completed; and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and
    vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies,
    sailed from Northern ports, bound southward.

    "Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the Commissioners
    requested the delivery of an answer to their official
    communication of the 12th of March, and the reply, dated on the
    15th of the previous month, was obtained, from which it appears
    that, during the whole interval, while the Commissioners were
    receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success
    of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of
    the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse
    with them whatever, to refuse even to listen to any proposals
    they had to make; and had profited by the delay created by their
    own assurances, in order to prepare secretly the means for
    effective hostile operations.

    "That these assurances were given, has been virtually confessed
    by the Government of the United States, by its act of sending a
    messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use
    force, if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter.

    "No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the
    conduct of the Government of the United States toward the
    Confederacy can be required, than is contained in the
    circumstances which accompanied this notice.

    "According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels
    composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort
    Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of
    April. Yet our Commissioners in Washington were detained under
    assurances that notice should be given of any military movement.
    The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent
    to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina,
    and the notice was so given at a late hour on the 8th of April,
    the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to
    arrive.

    "That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of
    those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of
    the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at
    Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the Government."
    ...

[Footnote 150: Mr. Hunter, of Virginia.]

[Footnote 151: This statement is in accord with a remark which Mr.
Buchanan made to the author at an earlier period of the same session,
with regard to the violence of Northern sentiment then lately indicated,
that he thought it not impossible that his homeward route would be
lighted by burning effigies of himself, and that on reaching his home he
would find it a heap of ashes.]

[Footnote 152: See Appendix L.]

[Footnote 153: Ibid.]

[Footnote 154: See letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel George W. Munford
in "Papers of the Southern Historical Society," appended to "Southern
Magazine" for February, 1874.]

[Footnote 155: "In the course of this conversation I told Judge Crawford
that it was fair to tell him that the opinion at Washington was, the
secession movements were short-lived; that his Government would wither
under sunshine, and that the effect of these measures might be as
supposed; that they might have a contrary effect, but that I did not
consider the effect. I wanted, above all other things, peace. I was
willing to accept whatever peace might bring, whether union or disunion.
I did not look beyond peace. He said he was willing to take all the
risks of sunshine."--(Letter of Judge Campbell to Colonel Munford, as
above.)]

[Footnote 156: Letter to Colonel Munford, above quoted. The italics are
not in the original.]

[Footnote 157: Message to the Legislature of South Carolina, November,
1861.]

[Footnote 158: Letter to Colonel Munford, above cited.]

[Footnote 159: Letter to Munford.]

[Footnote 160: Judge Campbell, in his letter to Mr. Seward of April 13,
1861 (see Appendix L), written a few days after the transaction, gives
this date. In his letter to Colonel Munford, written more than twelve
years afterward, he says "Sunday, April 8th."]

[Footnote 161: For this and other documents quoted relative to the
transactions of the period, see "The Record of Fort Sumter," compiled by
W. A. Harris, Columbia, South Carolina, 1862.]

[Footnote 162: "Lincoln and Seward," New York, 1874, pp. 57, 58. The
italics are not in the original.]

[Footnote 163: Ibid., pp. 64-69.]

[Footnote 164: Mr. Crawford, as we have seen, had arrived some days
earlier. The statement in the message refers to the arrival of the full
commission, or a majority of it.]




CHAPTER XII.

    Protests against the Conduct of the Government of the United
    States.--Senator Douglas's Proposition to evacuate the Forts,
    and Extracts from his Speech in Support of it.--General Scott's
    Advice.--Manly Letter of Major Anderson, protesting against the
    Action of the Federal Government.--Misstatements of the Count of
    Paris.--Correspondence relative to Proposed Evacuation of the
    Fort.--A Crisis.


The course pursued by the Government of the United States with regard to
the forts had not passed without earnest remonstrance from the most
intelligent and patriotic of its own friends during the period of the
events which constitute the subject of the preceding chapter. In the
Senate of the United States, which continued in executive session for
several weeks after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it was the subject
of discussion. Mr. Douglas, of Illinois--who was certainly not suspected
of sympathy with secession, or lack of devotion to the Union--on the
15th of March offered a resolution recommending the withdrawal of the
garrisons from all forts within the limits of the States which had
seceded, except those at Key West and the Dry Tortugas. In support of
this resolution he said:

    "We certainly can not justify the holding of forts there, much
    less the recapturing of those which have been taken, unless we
    intend to reduce those States themselves into subjection. I take
    it for granted, no man will deny the proposition, that whoever
    permanently holds Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to
    the possession of Fort Sumter. Whoever permanently holds
    Pensacola and Florida is entitled to the possession of Fort
    Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limits those forts
    are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there is
    something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that
    makes it important for us to hold it for the general defense of
    the whole country, its commerce and interests, instead of being
    useful only for the defense of a particular city or locality. It
    is true that Forts Taylor and Jefferson, at Key West and
    Tortugas, are so situated as to be essentially national, and
    therefore important to us without reference to our relations
    with the seceded States. Not so with Moultrie, Johnson, Castle
    Pinckney, and Sumter, in Charleston Harbor; not so with Pulaski,
    on the Savannah River; not so with Morgan and other forts in
    Alabama; not so with those other forts that were intended to
    guard the entrance of a particular harbor for local defense....

    "We can not deny that there is a Southern Confederacy, _de
    facto_, in existence, with its capital at Montgomery. We may
    regret it. _I_ regret it most profoundly; but I can not deny the
    truth of the fact, painful and mortifying as it is.... I
    proclaim boldly the policy of those with whom I act. We are for
    peace."

Mr. Douglas, in urging the maintenance of _peace_ as a motive for the
evacuation of the forts, was no doubt aware of the full force of his
words. He knew that their continued occupation was virtually a
declaration of war.

The General-in-Chief of the United States Army, also, it is well known,
urgently advised the evacuation of the forts. But the most striking
protest against the coercive measures finally adopted was that of Major
Anderson himself. The letter in which his views were expressed has been
carefully suppressed in the partisan narratives of that period and
wellnigh lost sight of, although it does the highest honor to his
patriotism and integrity. It was written on the same day on which the
announcement was made to Governor Pickens of the purpose of the United
States Government to send supplies to the fort, and is worthy of
reproduction here:[165]

    [_Letter of Major Anderson, United States Army, protesting
    against Fox's Plan for relieving Fort Sumter_.]

    "Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 8, 1861_.

    "_To Colonel L. Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army_.

    "Colonel: I have the honor to report that the resumption of work
    yesterday (Sunday) at various points on Morris Island, and the
    vigorous prosecution of it this morning, apparently
    strengthening all the batteries which are under the fire of our
    guns, shows that they either have just received some news from
    Washington which has put them on the _qui vive_, or that they
    have received orders from Montgomery to commence operations
    here. I am preparing, by the side of my barbette guns,
    protection for our men from the shells which will be almost
    continually bursting over or in our work.

    "I had the honor to receive, by yesterday's mail, the letter of
    the Honorable Secretary of War, dated April 4th, and confess
    that what he there states surprises me very greatly--following,
    as it does, and contradicting so positively, the assurance Mr.
    Crawford telegraphed he was 'authorized' to make. I trust that
    this matter will be at once put in a correct light, as a
    movement made now, when the South has been erroneously informed
    that none such would be attempted, would produce most disastrous
    results throughout our country. It is, of course, now too late
    for me to give any advice in reference to the proposed scheme of
    Captain Fox. I fear that its result can not fail to be
    disastrous to all concerned. Even with his boat at our walls,
    the loss of life (as I think I mentioned to Mr. Fox) in
    unloading her will more than pay for the good to be accomplished
    by the expedition, which keeps us, if I can maintain possession
    of this work, out of position, surrounded by strong works which
    must be carried to make this fort of the least value to the
    United States Government.

    "We have not oil enough to keep a light in the lantern for one
    night. The boats will have to, therefore, rely at night entirely
    upon other marks. I ought to have been informed that this
    expedition was to come. Colonel Lamon's remark convinced me that
    the idea, merely hinted at to me by Captain Fox, would not be
    carried out.[166]

    "We shall strive to do our duty, though I frankly say that my
    heart is not in this war, which I see is to be thus commenced.
    That God will still avert it, and cause us to resort to pacific
    means to maintain our rights, is my ardent prayer!

    "I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

    "Your obedient servant,

    "Robert Anderson,

    "_Major 1st Artillery, commanding_."

This frank and manly letter, although written with the reserve
necessarily belonging to a communication from an officer to his military
superiors, expressing dissatisfaction with orders, fully vindicates
Major Anderson from all suspicion of complicity or sympathy with the bad
faith of the Government which he was serving. It accords entirely with
the sentiments expressed in his private letter to me, already mentioned
as lost or stolen, and exhibits him in the attitude of faithful
performance of a duty inconsistent with his domestic ties and repugnant
to his patriotism.

The "relief squadron," as with unconscious irony it was termed, was
already under way for Charleston, consisting, according to their own
statement, of eight vessels, carrying twenty-six guns and about fourteen
hundred men, including the troops sent for reenforcement of the
garrison.

These facts became known to the Confederate Government, and it was
obvious that no time was to be lost in preparing for, and if possible
anticipating the impending assault. The character of the instructions
given General Beauregard in this emergency may be inferred from the
ensuing correspondence, which is here reproduced from contemporary
publications:

    "Charleston, _April 8th_.

    "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_.

    "An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed
    Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort
    Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force.

    (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."

    "Montgomery, _10th_.

    "General G. T. Beauregard, _Charleston_.

    "If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent
    who communicated to you the intention of the Washington
    Government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once
    demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed, in such
    a manner as you may determine, to reduce it. Answer.

    (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."

    "Charleston, _April 10th_.

    "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_.

    "The demand will be made to-morrow at twelve o'clock.

    (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."

    "Montgomery, _April 10th_.

    "General Beauregard, _Charleston_.

    "Unless there are especial reasons connected with your own
    condition, it is considered proper that you should make the
    demand at an early hour.

    (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."

    "Charleston, _April 10th_.

    "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War, Montgomery_.

    "The reasons are special for twelve o'clock.

    (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard."

    "Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A.,

    "Charleston, S.C., _April 11, 1861, 2_ P. M.

    "Sir: The Government of the Confederate States has hitherto
    forborne from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter, in
    the hope that the Government of the United States, with a view
    to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two
    Governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would
    voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to believe
    that such would be the course pursued by the Government of the
    United States; and, under that impression, my Government has
    refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort.

    "But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual
    possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of
    their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security.

    "I am ordered by the Government of the Confederate States to
    demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aides, Colonel Chesnut
    and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All
    proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself
    and command, together with company arms and property, and all
    private property, to any post in the United States which you may
    elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much
    fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted
    by you on taking it down.

    "Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time,
    await your answer.

    "I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard,

    "_Brigadier-General commanding_.

    "Major Robert Anderson,

    "_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C._"

    "Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 11, 1861_.

    "General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
    communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say
    in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my
    sense of honor and of my obligations to my Government prevents
    my compliance.

    "Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed,
    and for the high compliment paid me,

    "I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "Robert Anderson,

    "_Major U. S. Army, commanding_.

    "To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard,

    "_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A._"

    "Montgomery, _April 11th_.

    "General Beauregard, _Charleston_.

    "We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter, if Major
    Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he
    will evacuate, and agree that, in the mean time, he will not use
    his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort
    Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or
    its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment
    decides to be most practicable.

    (Signed) "L. P. Walker, _Secretary of War_."

    "Headquarters Provisional Army, C. S. A.,

    "Charleston, _April 11, 1861, 11_ P. M.

    "Major: In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to
    my aides, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition
    of your supplies, and that you would in a few days be starved
    out if our guns did not batter you to pieces--or words to that
    effect--and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I
    communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer
    to my Government.

    "If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort
    Sumter, and agree that in the mean time you will not use your
    guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort
    Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel
    Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such
    an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to
    communicate to them an open answer.

    "I remain, Major, very respectfully,

    "Your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "G. T. Beauregard,

    "_Brigadier-General commanding_.

    "Major Robert Anderson,

    "_Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C._"

    "Headquarters Fort Sumter, S. C., _2.30_ A. M., _April 12,
    1861_.

    "General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
    second communication of the 11th instant, by Colonel Chesnut,
    and to state, in reply, that, cordially uniting with you in the
    desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if
    provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation,
    evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th instant, should I not
    receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my
    Government, or additional supplies; and that I will not, in the
    mean time, open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do
    so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my
    Government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion
    of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile
    intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears.

    "I have the honor to be, General,

    "Your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "Robert Anderson,

    "_Major U. S. Army, commanding_.

    "To Brigadier-General G. T. Beauregard,

    "_Commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A._"

    "Fort Sumter, S. C., _April 12, 1861, _3.20_ A. M.

    "Sir: By authority of Brigadier-General Beauregard, commanding
    the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the
    honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries
    on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time.

    "We have the honor to be, very respectfully,

    "Your obedient servants,

    (Signed) "James Chesnut, Jr,

    "_Aide-de-camp_.

    (Signed) "Stephen D. Lee,

    "_Captain S. C. Army, and Aide-de-camp_.

    "Major Robert Anderson,

    "_United States Army, commanding Fort Sumter_."

It is essential to a right understanding of the last two letters to give
more than a superficial attention to that of Major Anderson, bearing in
mind certain important facts not referred to in the correspondence.
Major Anderson had been requested to state the time at which he _would
evacuate_ the fort, if unmolested, agreeing in the mean time not to use
his guns against the city and the troops defending it unless _Fort
Sumter_ should be first attacked by them. On these conditions General
Beauregard offered to refrain from opening fire upon him. In his reply
Major Anderson promises to evacuate the fort on the 15th of April,
_provided_ he should not, before that time, receive "controlling
instructions" or "additional supplies" from his Government. He
furthermore offers to pledge himself not to open fire upon the
Confederates, unless in the mean time compelled to do so by some hostile
act against the fort _or the flag of his Government_.

Inasmuch as it was known to the Confederate commander that the
"controlling instructions" were already issued, and that the "additional
supplies" were momentarily expected; inasmuch, also, as any attempt to
introduce the supplies would compel the opening of fire upon the vessels
bearing them under the flag of the United States--thereby releasing
Major Anderson from his pledge--it is evident that his conditions could
not be accepted. It would have been merely, after the avowal of a
hostile determination by the Government of the United States, to await
an inevitable conflict with the guns of Fort Sumter and the naval forces
of the United States in combination; with no possible hope of averting
it, unless in the improbable event of a delay of the expected fleet for
nearly four days longer. (In point of fact, it arrived off the harbor on
the same day, but was hindered by a gale of wind from entering it.)
There was obviously no other course to be pursued than that announced in
the answer given by General Beauregard.

It should not be forgotten that, during the early occupation of Fort
Sumter by a garrison the attitude of which was at least offensive, no
restriction had been put upon their privilege of purchasing in
Charleston fresh provisions, or any delicacies or comforts not directly
tending to the supply of the means needful to hold the fort for an
indefinite time.


[Footnote 165: See "The Record of Fort Sumter," p. 37.]

[Footnote 166: The Count of Paris libels the memory of Major Anderson,
and perverts the truth of history in this, as he has done in other
particulars, by saying, with reference to the visit of Captain Fox to
the fort, that, "having visited Anderson at Fort Sumter, _a plan had
been agreed upon between them for revictualing the garrison_."--("Civil
War in America," authorized translation, vol. i, chap. iv, p. 137.) Fox
himself says, in his published letter, "I made no arrangements with
Major Anderson in for supplying the fort, nor did I inform him of my
plan"; and Major Anderson, in the letter above, says the idea had been
"merely hinted at" by Captain Fox, and that Colonel Lamon had led him to
believe that it had been abandoned.]




CHAPTER XIII.

    A Pause and a Review.--Attitude of the Two Parties.--Sophistry
    exposed and Shams torn away.--Forbearance of the Confederate
    Government.--Who was the Aggressor?--Major Anderson's View, and
    that of a Naval Officer.--Mr. Horace Greeley on the Fort Sumter
    Case.--The Bombardment and Surrender.--Gallant Action of
    ex-Senator Wigfall.--Mr. Lincoln's Statement of the Case.


Here, in the brief hour immediately before the outburst of the
long-gathering storm, although it can hardly be necessary for the reader
who has carefully considered what has already been written, we may pause
for a moment to contemplate the attitude of the parties to the contest
and the grounds on which they respectively stand. I do not now refer to
the original causes of controversy--to the comparative claims of
Statehood and Union, or to the question of the right or the wrong of
secession--but to the proximate and immediate causes of conflict.

The fact that South Carolina _was_ a State--whatever her relations may
have been to the other States--is not and can not be denied. It is
equally undeniable that the ground on which Fort Sumter was built was
ceded by South Carolina to the United States _in trust_ for the defense
of her own soil and her own chief harbor. This has been shown, by ample
evidence, to have been the principle governing all cessions by the
States of sites for military purposes, but it applies with special force
to the case of Charleston. The streams flowing into that harbor, from
source to mouth, lie entirely within the limits of the State of South
Carolina. No other State or combination of States could have any
distinct interest or concern in the maintenance of a fortress at that
point, unless as a means of aggression against South Carolina herself.
The practical view of the case was correctly stated by Mr. Douglas, when
he said: "I take it for granted that whoever permanently holds
Charleston and South Carolina is entitled to the possession of Fort
Sumter. Whoever permanently holds Pensacola and Florida is entitled to
the possession of Fort Pickens. Whoever holds the States in whose limits
those forts are placed is entitled to the forts themselves, unless there
is something peculiar in the location of some particular fort that makes
it important for us to hold it for the general defense of the whole
country, its commerce and interests, instead of being useful only for
the defense of a particular city or locality."

No such necessity could be alleged with regard to Fort Sumter. The claim
to hold it as "public property" of the United States was utterly
untenable and unmeaning, apart from a claim of coercive control over the
State. If South Carolina was a mere province, in a state of open
rebellion, the Government of the United States had a right to retain its
hold of any fortified place within her limits which happened to be in
its possession, and it would have had an equal right to acquire
possession of any other. It would have had the same right to send an
army to Columbia to batter down the walls of the State Capitol. The
subject may at once be stripped of the sophistry which would make a
distinction between the two cases. The one was as really an act of war
as the other would have been. The right or the wrong of either depended
entirely upon the question of the rightful power of the Federal
Government to coerce a State into submission--a power which, as we have
seen, was unanimously rejected in the formation of the Federal
Constitution, and which was still unrecognized by many, perhaps by a
majority, even of those who denied the right of a State to secede.

If there existed any hope or desire for a peaceful settlement of the
questions at issue between the States, either party had a right to
demand that, pending such settlement, there should be no hostile grasp
upon its throat. This grip had been held on the throat of South Carolina
for almost four months from the period of her secession, and no forcible
resistance to it had yet been made. Remonstrances and patient,
persistent, and reiterated attempts at negotiation for its removal had
been made with two successive Administrations of the Government of the
United States--at first by the State of South Carolina, and by the
Government of the Confederate States after its formation. These efforts
had been met, not by an open avowal of coercive purposes, but by
evasion, prevarication, and perfidy. The agreement of one Administration
to maintain the _status quo_ at the time when the question arose, was
violated in December by the removal of the garrison from its original
position to the occupancy of a stronger. Another attempt was made to
violate it, in January, by the introduction of troops concealed below
the deck of the steamer Star of the West,[167] but this was thwarted by
the vigilance of the State service. The protracted course of fraud and
prevarication practiced by Mr. Lincoln's Administration in the months of
March and April has been fully exhibited. It was evident that no
confidence whatever could be reposed in any pledge or promise of the
Federal Government as then administered. Yet, notwithstanding all this,
no resistance, other than that of pacific protest and appeals for an
equitable settlement, was made, until after the avowal of a purpose of
coercion, and when it was known that a hostile fleet was on the way to
support and enforce it. At the very moment when the Confederate
commander gave the final notice to Major Anderson of his purpose to open
fire upon the fort, that fleet was lying off the mouth of the harbor,
and hindered from entering only by a gale of wind.

The forbearance of the Confederate Government, under the circumstances,
is perhaps unexampled in history. It was carried to the extreme verge,
short of a disregard of the safety of the people who had intrusted to
that government the duty of their defense against their enemies. The
attempt to represent us as the _aggressors_ in the conflict which ensued
is as unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb in
the familiar fable. He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that
strikes the first blow or fires the first gun. To have awaited further
strengthening of their position by land and naval forces, with hostile
purpose now declared, for the sake of having them "fire the first gun,"
would have been as unwise as it would be to hesitate to strike down the
arm of the assailant, who levels a deadly weapon at one's breast, until
he has actually fired. The disingenuous rant of demagogues about "firing
on the flag" might serve to rouse the passions of insensate mobs in
times of general excitement, but will be impotent in impartial history
to relieve the Federal Government from the responsibility of the assault
made by sending a hostile fleet against the harbor of Charleston, to
cooeperate with the menacing garrison of Fort Sumter. After the assault
was made by the hostile descent of the fleet, the reduction of Fort
Sumter was a measure of defense rendered absolutely and immediately
necessary.

Such clearly was the idea of the commander of the Pawnee, when he
declined, as Captain Fox informs us, without orders from a superior, to
make any effort to enter the harbor, "there to inaugurate civil war."
The straightforward simplicity of the sailor had not been perverted by
the shams of political sophistry. Even Mr. Horace Greeley, with all his
extreme partisan feeling, is obliged to admit that, "whether the
bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter shall or shall not be justified
by posterity, it is clear that the Confederacy had no alternative but
its own dissolution."[168]

According to the notice given by General Beauregard, fire was opened
upon Fort Sumter, from the various batteries which had been erected
around the harbor, at half-past four o'clock on the morning of Friday,
the 12th of April, 1861. The fort soon responded. It is not the purpose
of this work to give minute details of the military operation, as the
events of the bombardment have been often related, and are generally
well known, with no material discrepancy in matters of fact among the
statements of the various participants. It is enough, therefore, to add
that the bombardment continued for about thirty-three or thirty-four
hours. The fort was eventually set on fire by shells, after having been
partly destroyed by shot, and Major Anderson, after a resolute defense,
finally surrendered on the 13th--the same terms being accorded to him
which had been offered two days before. It is a remarkable
fact--probably without precedent in the annals of war--that,
notwithstanding the extent and magnitude of the engagement, the number
and caliber of the guns, and the amount of damage done to inanimate
material on both sides, especially to Fort Sumter, nobody was injured on
either side by the bombardment. The only casualty attendant upon the
affair was the death of one man and the wounding of several others by
the explosion of a gun in the firing of a salute to their flag by the
garrison on evacuating the fort the day after the surrender.

A striking incident marked the close of the bombardment. Ex-Senator
Louis T. Wigfall, of Texas--a man as generous as he was recklessly
brave--when he saw the fort on fire, supposing the garrison to be
hopelessly struggling for the honor of its flag, voluntarily and without
authority, went under fire in an open boat to the fort, and climbing
through one of its embrasures asked for Major Anderson, and insisted
that he should surrender a fort which it was palpably impossible that he
could hold. Major Anderson agreed to surrender on the same terms and
conditions that had been offered him before his works were battered in
breach, and the agreement between them to that effect was promptly
ratified by the Confederate commander. Thus unofficially was inaugurated
the surrender and evacuation of the fort.

The President of the United States, in his message of July 4, 1861, to
the Federal Congress convened in extra session, said:

    "It is thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort
    Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of
    the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort
    could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They
    knew--they were expressly notified--that the giving of bread to
    the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would
    on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting
    so much, should provoke more."

Mr. Lincoln well knew that, if the brave men of the garrison were
hungry, they had only him and his trusted advisers to thank for it. They
had been kept for months in a place where they ought not to have been,
contrary to the judgment of the General-in-Chief of his army, contrary
to the counsels of the wisest statesmen in his confidence, and the
protests of the commander of the garrison. A word from him would have
relieved them at any moment in the manner most acceptable to them and
most promotive of peaceful results.

But, suppose the Confederate authorities had been disposed to yield, and
to consent to the introduction of supplies for the maintenance of the
garrison, what assurance would they have had that nothing further would
be attempted? What reliance could be placed in any assurances of the
Government of the United States after the experience of the attempted
_ruse_ of the Star of the West and the deceptions practiced upon the
Confederate Commissioners in Washington? He says we were "expressly
notified" that nothing more "would _on that occasion_ be attempted"--the
words in italics themselves constituting a very significant though
unobtrusive and innocent-looking limitation. But we had been just as
expressly notified, long before, that the garrison would be withdrawn.
It would be as easy to violate the one pledge as it had been to break
the other.

Moreover, the so-called notification was a mere memorandum, without
date, signature, or authentication of any kind, sent to Governor
Pickens, not by an accredited agent, but by a subordinate employee of
the State Department. Like the oral and written pledges of Mr. Seward,
given through Judge Campbell, it seemed to be carefully and purposely
divested of every attribute that could make it binding and valid, in
case its authors should see fit to repudiate it. It was as empty and
worthless as the complaint against the Confederate Government based upon
it, is disingenuous.


[Footnote 167: See the report of her commander, Captain McGowan, who
says he took on board, in the harbor of New York, four officers and two
hundred soldiers. Arriving off Charleston, he says, "_The soldiers were
now all put below_, and no one allowed on deck except our own crew."]

[Footnote 168: "American Conflict," vol. i, chap, xxix, p. 449.]




PART IV.

_THE WAR._

CHAPTER I.

    Failure of the Peace Congress.--Treatment of the
    Commissioners.--Their Withdrawal.--Notice of an Armed
    Expedition.--Action of the Confederate Government.--Bombardment
    and Surrender of Fort Sumter.--Its Reduction required by the
    Exigency of the Case.--Disguise thrown off.--President Lincoln's
    Call for Seventy-five Thousand Men.--His Fiction of
    "Combinations."--Palpable Violation of the Constitution.--Action
    of Virginia.--Of Citizens of Baltimore.--The Charge of
    Precipitation against South Carolina.--Action of the Confederate
    Government.--The Universal Feeling.


The Congress, initiated by Virginia for the laudable purpose of
endeavoring, by constitutional means, to adjust all the issues which
threatened the peace of the country, failed to achieve anything that
would cause or justify a reconsideration by the seceded States of their
action to reclaim the grants they had made to the General Government,
and to maintain for themselves a separate and independent existence.

The Commissioners sent by the Confederate Government, after having been
shamefully deceived, as has been heretofore fully set forth, left the
United States capital to report the result of their mission to the
Confederate Government.

The notice received, that an armed expedition had sailed for operations
against the State of South Carolina in the harbor of Charleston, induced
the Confederate Government to meet, as best it might, this assault, in
the discharge of its obligation to defend each State of the Confederacy.
To this end the bombardment of the formidable work, Fort Sumter, was
commenced, in anticipation of the reenforcement which was then moving to
unite with its garrison for hostilities against South Carolina.

The bloodless bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter occurred on April
13, 1861. The garrison was generously permitted to retire with the
honors of war. The evacuation of that fort, commanding the entrance to
the harbor of Charleston, which, if in hostile hands, was destructive of
its commerce, had been claimed as the right of South Carolina. The
voluntary withdrawal of the garrison by the United States Government had
been considered, and those best qualified to judge believed it had been
promised. Yet, when instead of the fulfillment of just expectations,
instead of the withdrawal of the garrison, a hostile expedition was
organized and sent forward, the urgency of the case required its
reduction before it should be reenforced. Had there been delay, the more
serious conflict between larger forces, land and naval, would scarcely
have been bloodless, as the bombardment fortunately was. The event,
however, was seized upon to inflame the mind of the Northern people, and
the disguise which had been worn in the communications with the
Confederate Commissioners was now thrown off, and it was cunningly
attempted to show that the South, which had been pleading for peace and
still stood on the defensive, had by this bombardment inaugurated a war
against the United States. But it should be stated that the threats
implied in the declarations that the Union could not exist part slave
and part free, and that the Union should be preserved, and the denial of
the right of a State peaceably to withdraw, were virtually a declaration
of war, and the sending of an army and navy to attack was the result to
have been anticipated as the consequence of such declaration of war.

On the 15th day of the same month, President Lincoln, introducing his
farce "of combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings," called forth the military of the
several States to the number of seventy-five thousand, and commanded
"the persons composing the combinations" to disperse, etc. It can but
surprise any one in the least degree conversant with the history of the
Union, to find States referred to as "persons composing combinations,"
and that the sovereign creators of the Federal Government, the States of
the Union, should be commanded by their agent to disperse. The levy of
so large an army could only mean war; but the power to declare war did
not reside in the President--it was delegated to the Congress only. If,
however, it had been a riotous combination or an insurrection, it must
have been, according to the Constitution, against the State; and the
power of the President to call forth the militia to suppress it, was
dependent upon an application from the State for that purpose; it could
not precede such application, and still less could it be rightfully
exercised against the will of a State. The authorities on this subject
have been heretofore cited, and need not be referred to again.

Suffice it to say that, by section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution,
the United States are bound to protect each State against invasion and
against domestic violence, whenever application shall have been made by
the Legislature, or by the Executive when the Legislature can not be
convened; and that to fail to give protection against any invasion
whatsoever would be a dereliction of duty. To add that there could be no
justification for the invasion of a State by an army of the United
States, is but to repeat what has been said, on the absence of any
authority in the General Government to coerce a State. In any possible
view of the case, therefore, the conclusion must be, that the calling on
some of the States for seventy-five thousand militia to invade other
States which were asserted to be still in the Union, was a palpable
violation of the Constitution, and the usurpation of undelegated power,
or, in other words, of power reserved to the States or to the people.

It might, therefore, have been anticipated that Virginia--one of whose
sons wrote the Declaration of Independence, another of whose sons led
the armies of the United States in the Revolution which achieved their
independence, and another of whose sons mainly contributed to the
adoption of the Constitution of the Union--would not have been slow, in
the face of such events, to reclaim the grants she had made to the
General Government, and to withdraw from the Union, to the establishment
of which she had so largely contributed.

Two days had elapsed between the surrender of Fort Sumter and the
proclamation of President Lincoln calling for seventy-five thousand
militia as before stated. Two other days elapsed, and Virginia passed
her ordinance of secession, and two days thereafter the citizens of
Baltimore resisted the passage of troops through that city on their way
to make war upon the Southern States. Thus rapidly did the current of
events bear us onward from peace to the desolating war which was soon to
ensue.

The manly effort of the unorganized, unarmed citizens of Baltimore to
resist the progress of armies for the invasion of her Southern sisters,
was worthy of the fair fame of Maryland; becoming the descendants of the
men who so gallantly fought for the freedom, independence, and
sovereignty of the States.

The bold stand, then and thereafter taken, extorted a promise from the
Executive authorities that no more troops should be sent through the
city of Baltimore, which promise, however, was only observed until, by
artifice, power had been gained to disregard it.

Virginia, as has been heretofore stated, passed her ordinance of
secession on the 17th of April. It was, however, subject to ratification
by the people at an election to be held on the fourth Thursday of May.
She was in the mean time, like her Southern sisters, the object of
Northern hostilities, and, having a common cause with them, properly
anticipated the election of May by forming an alliance with the
Confederate States, which was ratified by the Convention on the 25th of
April.

The Convention for that alliance set forth that Virginia, looking to a
speedy union with the Confederate States, and for the purpose of meeting
pressing exigencies, agreed that "the whole military force and military
operations, offensive and defensive, of said Commonwealth, in the
impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief
control and direction of the President of the said Confederate States."
The whole was made subject to the approval and ratification of the
proper authorities of both governments respectively.

To those who criticise South Carolina as having acted precipitately in
withdrawing from the Union, it may be answered that intervening
occurrences show that her delay could not have changed the result; and,
further, that her prompt action had enabled her better to prepare for
the contingency which it was found impossible to avert. Thus she was
prepared in the first necessities of Virginia to send to her troops
organized and equipped.

Before the convention for cooeperation with the Confederate States had
been adopted by Virginia, that knightly soldier, General Bonham, of
South Carolina, went with his brigade to Richmond; and, throughout the
Southern States, there was a prevailing desire to rush to Virginia,
where it was foreseen that the first great battles of the war were to be
fought; so that, as early as the 22d of April, I telegraphed to Governor
Letcher that, in addition to the forces heretofore ordered, requisitions
had been made for thirteen regiments, eight to rendezvous at Lynchburg,
four at Richmond, and one at Harper's Ferry. Referring to an application
that had been made to him from Baltimore, I wrote: "Sustain Baltimore if
practicable. We will reenforce you." The universal feeling was that of a
common cause and common destiny. There was no selfish desire to linger
around home, no narrow purpose to separate local interests from the
common welfare. The object was to sustain a principle--the broad
principle of constitutional liberty, the right of self-government.

The early demonstrations of the enemy showed that Virginia was liable to
invasion from the north, from the east, and from the west. Though the
larger preparation indicated that the most serious danger to be
apprehended was from the line of the Potomac, the first conflicts
occurred in the east.

The narrow peninsula between the James and York Rivers had topographical
features well adapted to defense. It was held by General John B.
Magruder, who skillfully improved its natural strength by artificial
means, and there, on the ground memorable as the field of the last
battle of the Revolution, in which General Washington compelled Lord
Cornwallis to surrender, Magruder, with a small force, held for a long
time the superior forces of the enemy in check.




CHAPTER II.

    The Supply of Arms; of Men.--Love of the Union.--Secessionists
    few.--Efforts to prevent the Final Step.--Views of the
    People.--Effect on their Agriculture.--Aid from African
    Servitude.--Answer to the Clamors on the Horrors of
    Slavery.--Appointment of a Commissary-General.--His Character
    and Capacity.--Organization, Instruction, and Equipment of the
    Army.--Action of Congress.--The Law.--Its Signification.--The
    Hope of a Peaceful Solution early entertained; rapidly
    diminished.--Further Action of Congress.--Policy of the
    Government for Peace.--Position of Officers of United States
    Army.--The Army of the States, not of the Government.--The
    Confederate Law observed by the Government.--Officers retiring
    from United States Army.--Organization of Bureaus.


The question of supplying arms and munitions of war was the first
considered, because it was the want for which it was the most difficult
to provide. Of men willing to engage in the defense of their country,
there were many more than we could arm.

Though the prevailing sentiment of the Southern people was a cordial
attachment to the Union as it was formed by their fathers, their love
was for the spirit of the compact, for the liberties it was designed to
secure, for the self-government and State sovereignty which had been won
by separation from the mother-country, and transmitted to them by their
Revolutionary sires as a legacy for their posterity for ever. The number
of those who desired to dissolve the Union, even though the Constitution
should be faithfully observed--those who, in the language of the day,
were called "secessionists _per se_"--was so small as not to be felt in
any popular decision; but the number of those who held that the States
had surrendered their sovereignty, and had no right to secede from the
Union, was so inappreciably small, if indeed any such existed, that I
can not recall the fact of a single Southern advocate of that opinion.
The assertion of the right is not to be confounded with a readiness to
exercise it. Many who had no doubt as to the right, looked upon its
exercise with reluctance amounting to sorrow, and claimed that it should
be the last resort, only to be adopted as the alternative to a surrender
of the equality in the Union of States, free, sovereign, and
independent. Of that class, forming a large majority of the people of
Mississippi, I may speak with the confidence of one who belonged to it.
Thus, after the Legislature of Mississippi had enacted a law for a
convention which, representing the sovereignty of the State, should
consider the propriety of passing an ordinance to reassume the grants
made to the General Government, and withdraw from the Union, I, as a
United States Senator of Mississippi, retained my position in the
Senate, and sought by every practicable mode to obtain such measures as
would allay the excitement and afford to the South such security as
would prevent the final step, the ordinance of secession from the Union.

When the last hope of preserving the Union of the Constitution was
extinguished, and the ordinance of secession was enacted by the
Convention of Mississippi, which was the highest authority known under
our form of government, the question of the expediency of adopting that
remedy was no longer open to inquiry by one who acknowledged his
allegiance as due to the State of which he was a citizen. To evade the
responsibilities resulting from the decree of his sovereign, the people,
would be craven; to resist it would be treason. The instincts and
affections of the citizens of Mississippi led them with great unanimity
to the duty of maintaining and defending their State, without pausing to
ask what would be the consequences of refusing obedience to its mandate.
A like feeling pervaded all of the seceding States, and it was not only
for the military service, but for every service which would strengthen
and sustain the Confederacy, that an enthusiasm pervading all classes,
sexes, and ages was manifested.

Though our agricultural products had been mainly for export, insomuch
that in the planting States the necessary food-supplies were to a
considerable extent imported from the West, and it would require that
the habits of the planters should be changed from the cultivation of
staples for export to the production of supplies adequate for home
consumption and the support of armies in the field, yet, even under the
embarrassments of war, this was expected, and for a long time the result
justified the expectation, extraordinary as it must appear when viewed
by comparison with other people who have been subjected to a like
ordeal. Much of our success was due to the much-abused institution of
African servitude, for it enabled the white men to go into the army, and
leave the cultivation of their fields and the care of their flocks, as
well as of their wives and children, to those who, in the language of
the Constitution, were "held to service or labor." A passing remark may
here be appropriate as to the answer thus afforded to the clamor about
the "horrors of slavery."

Had these Africans been a cruelly oppressed people, restlessly
struggling to be freed from their bonds, would their masters have dared
to leave them, as was done, and would they have remained as they did,
continuing their usual duties, or could the proclamation of emancipation
have been put on the plea of a military necessity, if the fact had been
that the negroes were forced to serve, and desired only an opportunity
to rise against their masters? It will be remembered that, when the
proclamation was issued, it was confessed by President Lincoln to be a
nullity beyond the limit within which it could be enforced by the
Federal troops.

To direct the production, preservation, collection, and distribution of
food for the army required a man of rare capacity and character at the
head of the subsistence department. It was our good fortune to have such
an one in Colonel L. B. Northrop, who was appointed commissary-general
at the organization of the bureaus of the executive department of the
Confederate Government. He had been an officer of the United States
Army, had served in various parts of the South, had been for some time
on duty in the commissariat, and, to the special and general knowledge
thus acquired, added strong practical sense and incorruptible integrity.
Of him and the operations of the subsistence department I shall have
more to say hereafter, when treating of the bureaus of the Confederacy.

Assured of an army as large as the population of the Confederate States
could furnish, and a sufficient supply of subsistence for such an army,
at least until the chances of war should interfere with production and
transportation, the immediate object of attention was the organization,
instruction, and equipment of the army.

As heretofore stated, there was a prevailing belief that there would be
no war, or, if any, that it would be of very short duration. Therefore
the first bill which passed the provisional Congress provided for
receiving troops for short periods--as my memory serves, for sixty days.
The chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the heroic Colonel
Bartow, who sealed his devotion to the cause with his life's blood on
the field of Manassas, in deference to my earnest remonstrance against
such a policy, returned with the bill to the House (the Congress then
consisted of but one House), and procured a modification by which the
term of service was extended to twelve months unless sooner discharged.

I had urged upon him, in our conference, the adoption of a much longer
period, but he assured me that one year was as much as the Congress
would agree to. On this, as on other occasions, that Congress showed a
generous desire to yield their preconceived opinions to my objections as
far as they consistently could, and, there being but one House, it was
easier to change the terms of a bill after conference with the Executive
than when, under the permanent organization, objections had to be
formally communicated in a message to that branch of Congress in which
the bill originated, and when the whole proceeding was of record.

This first act to provide for the public defense became a law on the
28th of February, 1861, and its fifth section so clearly indicates the
opinions and expectations prevailing when the Confederation was formed,
that it is inserted here:

    "That the President be further authorized to receive into the
    service of this Government such forces now in the service of
    said States (Confederate States) as may be tendered, or who may
    volunteer by consent of their State, in such numbers as he may
    require for any time not less than twelve months unless sooner
    discharged."

The supremacy of the States is the controlling idea. The President was
authorized to receive from the several States the arms and munitions
which they might desire to transfer to the Government of the Confederate
States, and he was also authorized to receive the forces which the
States might tender, or any which should volunteer by the _consent of
their State_, for any time not less than twelve months unless sooner
discharged; and such forces were to be received with their officers by
companies, battalions, or regiments, and the President, by and with the
advice and consent of Congress, was to appoint such general officer or
officers for said forces as might be necessary for the service.

It will be seen that the arms and munitions within the limits of the
several States were regarded as entirely belonging to them; that the
forces which were to constitute the provisional army could only be drawn
from the several States by their consent, and that these were to be
organized under State authority and to be received with their officers
so appointed; that the lowest organization was to be that of a company
and the highest that of a regiment, and that the appointment of general
officers to command these forces was confided to the Government of the
Confederate States, should the assembling of large bodies of troops
require organization above that of a regiment; and it will also be
observed that provision was made for the discharge of the forces so
provided for, before the term of service fixed by the law. No one will
fail to perceive how little was anticipated a war of the vast
proportions and great duration which ensued, and how tenaciously the
sovereignty and self-government of the States were adhered to. At a
later period (March 16, 1861) the Congress adopted resolutions
recommending to the respective States to "cede the forts, arsenals,
navy-yards, dock-yards, and other public establishments within their
respective limits to the Confederate States," etc.

The hope which was early entertained of a peaceful solution of the
issues pending between the Confederate States and the United States
rapidly diminished, so that we find on the 6th of March that the
Congress, in its preamble to an act to provide for the public defense,
begins with the declaration that, "in order to provide speedily forces
to repel invasion," etc., authorized the President to employ the
militia, and to ask for and accept the services of any number of
volunteers, not exceeding one hundred thousand, and to organize
companies into battalions, battalions into regiments, and regiments into
brigades and divisions. As in the first law, the President was
authorized to appoint the commanding officer of such brigades and
divisions, the commissions only to endure while the brigades were in
service.

On the same day (March 6, 1861) was enacted the law for the
establishment and organization of the Army of the Confederate States of
America, this being in contradistinction to the provisional army, which
was to be composed of troops tendered by the States, as in the first
act, and volunteers received, as in the second act, to constitute a
provisional army. That the wish and policy of the Government was peace
is again manifested in this act, which, in providing for the military
establishment of the Confederacy, fixed the number of enlisted men of
all arms at nine thousand four hundred and twenty. Due care was taken to
prevent the appointment of incompetent or unworthy persons to be
officers of the army, and the right to promotion up to and including the
grade of colonel was carefully guarded, and beyond this the professional
character of the army was recognized as follows: "Appointments to the
rank of brigadier-general, after the army is organized, shall be made by
selection from the army." There being no right of promotion above the
grade of colonel in the Army of the United States, selection for
appointment to the rank of general had no other restriction than the
necessity for confirmation by the Senate. The provision just quoted
imposed the further restriction of requiring the person nominated by
selection to have previously been an officer of the Army of the
Confederate States.

Regarding the Army of the United States as belonging neither to a
section of the Union nor to the General Government, but to the States
conjointly while they remained united, it follows as a corollary of the
proposition that, when disintegration occurred, the undivided
_personnel_ composing the army would be left free to choose their future
place of service. Therefore, provision was made for securing to
officers, who should leave the Army of the United States and join that
of the Confederate States, the same relative rank in the latter which
they held in the former.

    "Be it further enacted that all officers who have resigned, or
    who may within six months tender their resignations, from the
    Army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed
    to original vacancies in the Army of the Confederate States, the
    commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the
    relative rank of officers of each grade shall be determined by
    their former commissions in the United States Army, held
    anterior to the secession of these Confederate States from the
    United States."

The provisions hereof are in the view entertained that the army was of
the States, not of the Government, and was to secure to officers
adhering to the Confederate States the same relative rank which they had
before those States had withdrawn from the Union. It was clearly the
intent of the law to embrace in this provision only those officers who
had resigned or who should resign from the United States Army to enter
the service of the Confederacy, or who, in other words, should thus be
transferred from one service to the other. It is also to be noted that,
in the eleventh section of the act to which this was amendatory, the
right of promotion up to the grade of colonel, in established regiments
and corps, was absolutely secured, but that appointments to the higher
grade should be by selection, at first without restriction, but after
the army had been organized the selection was confined to the army, thus
recognizing the profession of arms, and relieving officers from the
hazard, beyond the limit of their legal right to promotion, of being
superseded by civilians through favoritism or political influence.

How well the Government of the Confederacy observed both the letter and
the spirit of the law will be seen by reference to its action in the
matter of appointments. It is a noteworthy fact that the three highest
officers in rank, and whose fame stands unchallenged either for
efficiency or zeal, were all so indifferent to any question of personal
interest, that they had received their appointment before they were
aware it was to be conferred. Each brought from the Army of the United
States an enviable reputation, such as would have secured to him, had he
chosen to remain in it, after the war commenced, any position his
ambition could have coveted. Therefore, against considerations of
self-interest, and impelled by devotion to principle, they severed the
ties, professional and personal, which had bound them from their youth
up to the time when the Southern States, asserting the consecrated truth
that all governments rest on the consent of the governed, decided to
withdraw from the Union they had voluntarily entered, and the Northern
States resolved to coerce them to remain in it against their will. These
officers were--first, Samuel Cooper, a native of New York, a graduate of
the United States Military Academy in 1815, and who served continuously
in the army until March 7, 1861, with such distinction as secured to him
the appointment of Adjutant-General of the United States Army. Second,
Albert Sidney Johnston, a native of Kentucky, a graduate of the United
States Military Academy in 1826, served conspicuously in the army until
1834, then served in the army of the Republic of Texas, and then in the
United States Volunteers in the war with Mexico. Subsequently he
reentered the United States Army, and for meritorious conduct attained
the rank of brevet brigadier-general. After the secession of Texas, his
adopted State, he resigned his commission in the United States Army, May
3, 1861, and traveled by land from California to Richmond to offer his
services to the Confederacy. Third, Robert E. Lee, a native of Virginia,
a graduate of the United States Military Academy in 1829, when he was
appointed in the Engineer Corps of the United States Army, and served
continuously and with such distinction as to secure for him in 1847
brevets of three grades above his corps commission. He resigned from the
Army of the United States, April 25, 1861, upon the secession of
Virginia, in whose army he served until it was transferred to the
Confederate States.

Samuel Cooper was the first of these to offer his services to the
Confederacy at Montgomery. Having known him most favorably and
intimately as Adjutant-General of the United States Army when I was
Secretary of War, the value of his services in the organization of a new
army was considered so great that I invited him to take the position of
Adjutant-General of the Confederate Army, which he accepted without a
question either as to relative rank or anything else. The highest grade
then authorized by law was that of brigadier-general, and that
commission was bestowed upon him.

When General Albert Sidney Johnston reached Richmond he called upon me,
and for several days at various intervals we conversed with the freedom
and confidence belonging to the close friendship which had existed
between us for many years. Consequent upon a remark made by me, he asked
to what duty I would assign him, and, when answered, to serve in the
West, he expressed his pleasure at service in that section, but inquired
how he was to raise his command, and for the first time learned that he
had been nominated and confirmed as a general in the Army of the
Confederacy.

The third, General Robert E. Lee, had been commissioned by the State of
Virginia as major-general and commander of her army. When that army was
transferred, after the accession of Virginia to the Confederate States,
he was nominated to be brigadier-general in the Confederate Army, but
was left for obvious reasons in command of the forces in Virginia. After
the seat of government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, the
course of events on the Southern Atlantic coast induced me to direct
General Lee to repair thither. Before leaving, he said that, while he
was serving in Virginia, he had never thought it needful to inquire
about his rank; but now, when about to go into other States and to meet
officers with whom he had not been previously connected, he would like
to be informed upon that point. Under recent laws, authorizing
appointments to higher grades than that of his first commission, he had
been appointed a full general; but so wholly had his heart and his mind
been consecrated to the public service, that he had not remembered, if
he ever knew, of his advancement.

In organizing the bureaus, it was deemed advisable to select, for the
chief of each, officers possessing special knowledge of the duties to be
performed. The best assurance of that qualification was believed to be
service creditably rendered in the several departments of the United
States Army before resigning from it. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel A. C.
Myers, who had held many important trusts in the United States
Quartermaster's Department, was appointed Quartermaster-General of the
Confederacy, with the rank of colonel.

Captain L. B. Northrop, a gallant officer of the United States Dragoons,
and who, by reason of a wound disabling him to perform regimental duty,
had been employed in the subsistence department, was, after resigning
from the United States Army, appointed Commissary-General of the
Confederate States Army, with the rank of colonel. I have heretofore
alluded to the difficult task thus imposed on him, and the success with
which he performed it, and would be pleased here to enter into a fuller
recital, but have not the needful information in regard to his
administration of that department.

Surgeon L. P. Moore, an officer of recognized merit in the United States
Medical Department, from which he had resigned to join the Confederacy,
was appointed the Surgeon-General of the Confederate States Army. As in
the case of other departments, there was in this a want of the stores
requisite, as well for the field as the hospital.

To supply medicines which were declared by the enemy to be contraband of
war, our medical department had to seek in the forest for substitutes,
and to add surgical instruments and appliances to the small stock on
hand as best they could.

It would be quite beyond my power to do justice to the skill and
knowledge with which the medical corps performed their arduous task, and
regret that I have no report from the Surgeon-General, Moore, which
would enable me to do justice to the officers of his corps, as well in
regard to their humanity as to their professional skill.

In no branch of our service were our needs so great and our means to
meet them relatively so small as in the matter of ordnance and ordnance
stores. The Chief of Ordnance, General Gorgas, had been an ordnance
officer of the United States Army, and resigned to join the Confederacy.
He has favored me with a succinct though comprehensive statement, which
has enabled me to write somewhat fully of that department; but, for the
better understanding of its operations, the reader is referred to the
ordnance report elsewhere.




CHAPTER III.

    Commissioners to purchase Arms and Ammunition.--My Letter to
    Captain Semmes.--Resignations of Officers of United States
    Navy.--Our Destitution of Accessories for the Supply of Naval
    Vessels.--Secretary Mallory.--Food-Supplies.--The Commissariat
    Department.--The Quartermaster's Department.--The Disappearance
    of Delusions.--The Supply of Powder.--Saltpeter.--Sulphur.--
    Artificial Niter-Beds.--Services of General G. W. Rains.--
    Destruction at Harper's Ferry of Machinery.--The Master
    Armorer.--Machinery secured.--Want of Skillful Employees.--
    Difficulties encountered by Every Department of the Executive
    Branch of the Government.


On the third day after my inauguration at Montgomery, an officer of
extensive information and high capacity was sent to the North, to make
purchases of arms, ammunition, and machinery; and soon afterward another
officer was sent to Europe, to buy in the market as far as possible,
and, furthermore, to make contracts for arms and munitions to be
manufactured. Captain (afterward Admiral) Semmes, the officer who was
sent to the North, would have been quite successful but for the
intervention of the civil authorities, preventing the delivery of the
various articles contracted for. The officer who was sent to Europe,
Major Huse, found few serviceable arms upon the market; he, however,
succeeded in making contracts for the manufacture of large quantities,
being in advance of the agents sent from the Northern Government for the
same purpose. For further and more detailed information, reference is
made to the monograph of the Chief of Ordnance.

My letter of instructions to Captain Semmes was as follows:

    "Montgomery, Alabama, _February 21, 1861_.

    "Dear Sir: As agent of the Confederate States, you are
    authorized to proceed, as hereinafter set forth, to make
    purchases, and contracts for machinery and munitions, or for the
    manufacture of arms and munitions of war.

    "Of the proprietor of the ---- Powder Company, in ----, you will
    probably be able to obtain cannon- and musket-powder--the former
    to be of the coarsest grain; and also to engage with him for the
    establishment of a powder-mill at some point in the limits of
    our territory.

    "The quantity of powder to be supplied immediately will exceed
    his stock on hand, and the arrangement for further supply
    should, if possible, be by manufacture in our own territory; if
    this is not practicable, means must be sought for further
    shipments from any and all sources which are reliable.

    "At the arsenal at Washington you will find an artisan named
    ----, who has brought the cap-making machine to its present
    state of efficiency, and who might furnish a cap-machine, and
    accompany it to direct its operations. If not in this, I hope
    you may in some other way be able to obtain a cap-machine with
    little delay, and have it sent to the Mount Vernon Arsenal,
    Alabama.

    "We shall require a manufactory for friction-primers, and you
    will, if possible, induce some capable person to establish one
    in our country. The demand of the Confederate States will be the
    inducement in this as in the case of the powder-mill proposed.

    "A short time since, the most improved machinery for the
    manufacture of rifles, intended for the Harper's Ferry Armory,
    was, it was said, for sale by the manufacturer. If it be so at
    this time, you will procure it for this Government, and use the
    needful precaution in relation to its transportation. Mr. ----
    ----, of the Harper's Ferry Armory, can give you all the
    information in that connection which you may require. Mr. Ball,
    the master armorer at Harper's Ferry, is willing to accept
    service under our Government, and could probably bring with him
    skilled workmen. If we get the machinery, this will be
    important.

    "Machinery for grooving muskets and heavy guns is, I hope, to be
    purchased ready made. If not, you will contract for its
    manufacture and delivery. You will endeavor to obtain the most
    improved shot for rifled cannon, and persons skilled in the
    preparation of that and other fixed ammunition. Captain G. W.
    Smith and Captain Lovell, late of the United States Army, and
    now of New York City, may aid you in your task; and you will
    please say to them that we will be happy to have their services
    in our army.

    "You will make such inquiries as your varied knowledge will
    suggest in relation to the supply of guns of different calibers,
    especially the largest. I suggest the advantage, if to be
    obtained, of having a few of the fifteen-inch guns, like the one
    cast at Pittsburg.

    "I have not sought to prescribe so as to limit your inquiries,
    either as to object or place, but only to suggest for your
    reflection and consideration the points which have chanced to
    come under my observation. You will use your discretion in
    visiting places where information of persons or things is to be
    obtained for the furtherance of the object in view. Any
    contracts made will be sent to the Hon. L. P. Walker, Secretary
    of War, for his approval; and the contractor need not fear that
    delay will be encountered in the action of this Government.

    "Very respectfully yours, etc.,

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

Captain Semmes had also been directed to seek for vessels which would
serve for naval purposes, and, after his return, reported that he could
not find any vessels which in his judgment were, or could be made,
available for our uses. The Southern officers of the navy who were in
command of United States vessels abroad, under an idea more creditable
to their sentiment than to their knowledge of the nature of our
constitutional Union, brought the vessels they commanded into the ports
of the North, and, having delivered them to the authorities of the
United States Government, generally tendered their resignations, and
repaired to the States from which they had been commissioned in the
navy, to serve where they held their allegiance to be due. The theory
that they owed allegiance to their respective States was founded on the
fact that the Federal Government was of the States; the sequence was,
that the navy belonged to the States, not to their agent the Federal
Government; and, when the States ceased to be united, the naval vessels
and armament should have been divided among the owners. While we honor
the sentiment which caused them to surrender their heart-bound
associations, and the profession to which they were bred, on which they
relied for subsistence, to go, with nothing save their swords and
faithful hearts, to fight, to bleed, and to die if need be, in defense
of their homes and a righteous cause, we can but remember how much was
lost by their view of what their honor and duty demanded. Far, however,
be it from their countrymen, for that or any other consideration, to
wish that their fidelity to the dictates of a conscientious belief
should have yielded to any temptation of interest. The course they
pursued shows how impossible it was that they should have done so, for
what did they not sacrifice to their sense of right! We were doubly
bereft by losing our share of the navy we had contributed to build, and
by having it all employed to assail us. The application of the
appropriations for the Navy of the United States had been such that the
construction of vessels had been at the North, though much of the timber
used and other material employed was transported from the South to
Northern ship-yards. Therefore, we were without the accessories needful
for the rapid supply of naval vessels.

While attempting whatever was practicable at home, we sent a competent,
well-deserving officer of the navy to England to obtain there and
elsewhere, by purchase or by building, vessels which could be
transformed into ships of war. These efforts and their results will be
noticed more fully hereafter.

It may not be amiss to remark here that, if the anticipations of our
people were not realized, it was not from any lack of the zeal and
ability of the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Mallory. As was heretofore
stated, his fondness for and aptitude in nautical affairs had led him to
know much of vessels, their construction and management, and, as
chairman of the Committee on United States Naval Affairs, he had
superadded to this a very large acquaintance with officers of the United
States Navy, which gave him the requisite information for the most
useful employment of the instructed officers who joined our service.

At the North many had been deceived by the fictions of preparations at
the South for the war of the sections, and among ourselves were few who
realized how totally deficient the Southern States were in all which was
necessary to the active operations of an army, however gallant the men
might be, and however able were the generals who directed and led them.
From these causes, operating jointly, resulted undue caution at the
North and overweening confidence at the South. The habits of our people
in hunting, and protecting their stock in fields from the ravages of
ferocious beasts, caused them to be generally supplied with the arms
used for such purposes. The facility with which individuals traveled
over the country led to very erroneous ideas as to the difficulties of
transporting an army. The small amount of ammunition required in time of
peace gave no measure of the amount requisite for warlike operations,
and the products of a country, which insufficiently supplied food for
its inhabitants when peaceful pursuits were uninterrupted, would serve
but a short time to furnish the commissariat of a large army. It was, of
course, easy to foresee that, if war was waged against the seceding
States by all of those which remained in the Union, the large supply of
provisions which had been annually sent from the Northwest to the South
could not, under the altered circumstances, be relied on. That our
people did not more immediately turn their attention to the production
of food-supplies, may be attributed to the prevailing delusion that
secession would not be followed by war. To the able officer then at the
head of the commissariat department, Colonel L. B. Northrop, much credit
is due for his well-directed efforts to provide both for immediate and
prospective wants. It gives me the greater pleasure to say this, because
those less informed of all he did, and skillfully tried to do, have been
profuse of criticism, and sparing indeed of the meed justly his due.
Adequate facilities for transportation might have relieved the local
want of supplies, especially in Virginia, where the largest bodies of
troops were assembled; but, unfortunately, the quartermaster's
department was scarcely less provided than that of the commissary. Not
only were the railroads insufficient in number, but they were poorly
furnished with rolling stock, and had been mainly dependent upon
Northern foundries and factories for their rails and equipment. Even the
skilled operatives of the railroads were generally Northern men, and
their desertion followed fast upon every disaster which attended the
Confederate arms. In addition to other causes which have been mentioned,
the idea that Cotton was king, and would produce foreign intervention,
as well as a desire of the Northern people for the return of peace and
the restoration of trade, exercised a potent influence in preventing our
agriculturists from directing at an early period their capital and labor
to the production of food-supplies rather than that of our staple for
export. As one after another the illusions vanished, and the material
necessities of a great war were recognized by our people, never did
patriotic devotion exhibit brighter examples of the sacrifice of
self-interest and the abandonment of fixed habits and opinions, or more
effective and untiring effort to meet the herculean task which was set
before them. Being one of the few who regarded secession and war as
inevitably connected, my early attention was given to the organization
of military forces and the procurement and preparation of the munitions
of war. If our people had not gone to war without counting the cost,
they were, nevertheless, involved in it without means of providing for
its necessities. It has been heretofore stated that we had no
powder-mills. It would be needless to say that the new-born Government
had no depots of powder, but it may be well to add that, beyond the
small supply required for sporting purposes, our local traders had no
stock on hand. Having no manufacturing industries which required
saltpeter, very little of that was purchasable in our markets. The same
would have been the case in regard to sulphur, but for the fact that it
had been recently employed in the clarification of sugar-cane juice, and
thus a considerable amount of it was found in New Orleans. Prompt
measures were taken to secure a supply of sulphur, and parties were
employed to obtain saltpeter from the caves, as well as from the earth
of old tobacco-houses and cellars; and artificial niter-beds were made
to provide for prospective wants. Of soft wood for charcoal there was
abundance, and thus materials were procured for the manufacture of
gunpowder to meet the demand which would arise when the limited quantity
purchased by the Confederate Government at the North should be
exhausted.

It was our good fortune to secure the services of an able and scientific
soldier, General G. W. Rains, who, to a military education, added
experience in a large manufacturing establishment, and to him was
confided the construction of a powder-mill, and the manufacture of
powder, both for artillery and small-arms. The appalling contemplation
of the inauguration of a great war, without powder or a navy to secure
its importation from abroad, was soon relieved by the extraordinary
efforts of the ordnance department and the well-directed skill of
General Rains, to whom it is but a just tribute to say that, beginning
without even instructed workmen, he had, before the close of the war,
made what, in the opinion of competent judges, has been pronounced to be
the best powder-mill in the world, and in which powder of every variety
of grain was manufactured of materials which had been purified from
those qualities which cause its deterioration under long exposure to a
moist atmosphere.

The avowed purpose and declared obligation of the Federal Government was
to occupy and possess the property belonging to the United States, yet
one of the first acts was to set fire to the armory at Harper's Ferry,
Virginia, the only establishment of the kind in the Southern States, and
the only Southern depository of the rifles which the General Government
had then on hand.

What conclusion is to be drawn from such action? To avoid attributing a
breach of solemn pledges, it must be supposed that Virginia was
considered as out of the Union, and a public enemy, in whose borders it
was proper to destroy whatever might be useful to her of the common
property of the States lately united.

As soon as the United States troops had evacuated the place, the
citizens and armorers went to work to save the armory as far as possible
from destruction, and to secure valuable material stored in it. The
master armorer, Armistead Ball, so bravely and skillfully directed these
efforts, that a large part of the machinery and materials was saved from
the flames. The subduing of the fire was a dangerous and difficult task,
and great credit is due to those who, under the orders of Master Armorer
Ball, attempted and achieved it. When the fire was extinguished, the
work was continued and persevered in until all the valuable machinery
and material had been collected, boxed, and shipped to Richmond, about
the end of the summer of 1861. The machinery thus secured was divided
between the arsenals at Richmond, Virginia, and Fayetteville, North
Carolina, and, when repaired and put in working condition, supplied to
some extent the want which existed in the South of means for the
alteration and repair of old or injured arms, and finally contributed to
increase the very scanty supply of arms with which our country was
furnished when the war began. The practice of the Federal Government,
which had kept the construction and manufacture of the material of war
at the North, had consequently left the South without the requisite
number of skilled workmen by whose labor machinery could at once be made
fully effective if it were obtained; indeed, the want of such employees
prevented the small amount of machinery on hand from being worked to its
full capacity. The gallant Master Armorer Ball, whose capacity, zeal,
and fidelity deserve more than a passing notice, was sent with that part
of the machinery assigned to the Fayetteville Arsenal. The toil, the
anxiety, and responsibility of his perilous position at Harper's Ferry,
where he remained long after the protecting force of the Confederate
army retired, had probably undermined a constitution so vigorous that,
in the face of a great exigency, no labor seemed too great or too long
for him to grapple with and endure. So, like a ship which, after having
weathered the storm, goes down in the calm, the master armorer, soon
after he took his quiet post at Fayetteville, was "found dead in his
bed."

The difficulties which on every side met the several departments of the
executive branch of the Government one must suppose were but little
appreciated by many, whose opportunities for exact observation were the
best, as one often meets with self-complacent expressions as to modes of
achieving readily what prompt, patient, zealous effort proved to be
insurmountable. In the progress of this work, it is hoped, will be
presented not only the magnitude of the obstacles, but the spirit and
capacity with which they were encountered by the unseen and much
undervalued labors of the officers of the several departments, on whom
devolved provision for the civil service, as well as for the armies in
the field. Already has the report of General St. John, Commissary-
General of Subsistence, of the operations of that department, just
before the close of the war, exposed the hollowness of many sensational
pictures intended to fix gross neglect or utter incapacity on the
Executive.

The hoped-for and expected monograms of other chiefs of bureaus will
silence like criticisms on each, so far as they are made by those who
are not willfully blind, or maliciously intent on the circulation of
falsehood.




CHAPTER IV.

    The Proclamation for Seventy-five Thousand Men by President
    Lincoln further examined.--The Reasons presented by him to
    Mankind for the Justification of his Conduct shown to be Mere
    Fictions, having no Relation to the Question.--What is the Value
    of Constitutional Liberty, of Bills of Rights, of Limitations of
    Powers, if they may be transgressed at Pleasure?--Secession of
    South Carolina.--Proclamation of Blockade.--Session of Congress
    at Montgomery.--Extracts from the President's Message.--Acts of
    Congress.--Spirit of the People.--Secession of Border
    States.--Destruction of United States Property by Order of
    President Lincoln.


If any further evidence had been required to show that it was the
determination of the Northern people not only to make no concessions to
the grievances of the Southern States, but to increase them to the last
extremity, it was furnished by the proclamation of President Lincoln,
issued on April 15, 1861. This proclamation, which has already been
mentioned, requires a further examination, as it was the official
declaration, on the part of the Government of the United States, of the
war which ensued. In it the President called for seventy-five thousand
men to suppress "combinations" opposed to the laws, and obstructing
their execution in seven sovereign States which had retired from the
Union. Seventy-five thousand men organized and equipped are a powerful
army, and, when raised to operate against these States, nothing else
than war could be intended. The words in which he summoned this force
were these: "Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some
time past, and now are, opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed,
in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in
the marshals by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, by virtue of
the power in me vested by the Constitution and laws," etc.

The power granted in the Constitution is thus expressed: "The Congress
shall have power to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."[169] It
was to the Congress, not the Executive, to whom the power was delegated,
and thus early was commenced a long series of usurpations of powers
inconsistent with the purposes for which the Union was formed, and
destructive of the fraternity it was designed to perpetuate.

On November 6, 1860, the Legislature of South Carolina assembled and
gave the vote of the State for electors of a President of the United
States. On the next day an act was passed calling a State Convention to
assemble on December 17th, to determine the question of the withdrawal
of the State from the United States. Candidates for membership were
immediately nominated. All were in favor of secession. The Convention
assembled on December 17th, and on the 20th passed "an ordinance to
dissolve the union between the State of South Carolina and other States
united with her under the compact entitled 'The Constitution of the
United States of America.'" The ordinance began with these words: "We,
the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do
declare and ordain," etc. The State authorities immediately conformed to
this action of the Convention, and the laws and authority of the United
States ceased to be obeyed within the limits of the State. About four
months afterward, when the State, in union with others which had joined
her, had possessed herself of the forts within her limits, which the
United States Government had refused to evacuate, President Lincoln
issued the above-mentioned proclamation.

The State of South Carolina is designated in the proclamation as a
combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law.
This designation does not recognize the State, or manifest any
consciousness of its existence, whereas South Carolina was one of the
colonies that had declared her independence, and, after a long and
bloody war, she had been recognized as a sovereign State by Great
Britain, the only power to which she had ever owed allegiance. The fact
that she had been one of the colonies in the original Congress, had been
a member of the Confederation, and subsequently of the Union,
strengthens, but surely can not impair, her claim to be a State. Though
President Lincoln designated her as a "combination," it did not make her
a combination. Though he refused to recognize her as a State, it did not
make her any less a State. By assertion, he attempted to annihilate
seven States; and the war which followed was to enforce the
revolutionary edict, and to establish the supremacy of the General
Government on the ruins of the blood-bought independence of the States.

By designating the State as a "combination," and considering that under
such a name it might be in a condition of insurrection, he assumed to
have authority to raise a great military force and attack the State.
Yet, even if the fact had been as assumed, if an insurrection had
existed, the President could not lawfully have derived the power he
exercised from such condition of affairs. The provision of the
Constitution is as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect
each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature,
or of the Executive (when the Legislature can not be convened), against
domestic violence."[170] So the guarantee availed not at all to justify
the act which it was presented to excuse--the fact being that a State,
and not an "unlawful combination," as asserted, was the object of
assault, and the case one of making war. For a State or union of States
to attack with military force another State, is to make war. By the
Constitution, the power to make war is given solely to Congress.
"Congress shall have power to declare war," says the Constitution.[171]
And, again, "to raise and support armies."[172] Thus, under a perverted
use of language, the Executive at Washington did that which he
undeniably had no power to do, under a faithful observance of the
Constitution.

To justify himself to Congress and the people, or, rather, before the
face of mankind, for this evasion of the Constitution of his country,
President Lincoln, in his message to Congress, of July 4, 1861, resorted
to the artifice of saying, "It [meaning the proceedings of the
Confederate States] presents to the whole family of man the question
whether a constitutional republic or democracy--a government of the
people by the same people--can, or can not, maintain its territorial
integrity against its own domestic foes?"

The answer to this question is very plain. In the nature of things, no
union can be formed except by separate, independent, and distinct
parties. Any other combination is not a union; and, upon the destruction
of any of these elements in the parties, the union _ipso facto_ ceases.
If the Government is the result of a union of States, then these States
must be separate, sovereign, and distinct, to be able to form a union,
which is entirely an act of their own volition. Such a government as
ours had no power to maintain its existence any longer than the
contracting parties pleased to cohere, because it was founded on the
great principle of voluntary federation, and organized "to establish
justice and insure domestic tranquillity."[173] Any departure from this
principle by the General Government not only perverts and destroys its
nature, but furnishes a just cause to the injured State to withdraw from
the union. A new union might subsequently be formed, but the original
one could never by coercion be restored. Any effort on the part of the
others to force the seceding State to consent to come back is an attempt
at subjugation. It is a wrong which no lapse of time or combination of
circumstances can ever make right. A forced union is a political
absurdity. No less absurd is President Lincoln's effort to dissever the
sovereignty of the people from that of the State; as if there could be a
State without a people, or a sovereign people without a State.

But the question which Mr. Lincoln presents "to the whole family of man"
deserves a further notice. The answer which he seems to infer would be
given "by the whole family of man" is that such a government as he
supposes "can maintain its territorial integrity against its own
domestic foes." And, therefore, he concluded that he was right in the
judgment of "the whole family of man" in commencing hostilities against
us. He says, "So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out
the war power of the Government." That is the power to make war against
foreign nations, for the Government has no other war power. Planting
himself on this position, he commenced the devastation and bloodshed
which followed to effect our subjugation.

Nothing could be more erroneous than such views. The supposed case which
he presents is entirely unlike the real case. The Government of the
United States is like no other government. It is neither a
"constitutional republic or democracy," nor has it ever been thus
called. Neither is it a "government of the people by the same people";
but it is known and designated as "the Government of the United States."
It is an anomaly among governments. Its authority consists solely of
certain powers delegated to it, as a common agent, by an association of
sovereign and independent States. These powers are to be exercised only
for certain specified objects; and the purposes, declared in the
beginning of the deed or instrument of delegation, were "to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

The beginning and the end of all the powers of the Government of the
United States are to be found in that instrument of delegation. All its
powers are there expressed, defined, and limited. It was only to that
instrument Mr. Lincoln as President should have gone to learn his
duties. That was the chart which he had just solemnly pledged himself to
the country faithfully to follow. He soon deviated widely from it--and
fatally erroneous was his course. The administration of the affairs of a
great people, at a most perilous period, is decided by the answer which
it is assumed "the whole family of man" would give to a supposed
condition of human affairs which did not exist and which could not
exist. This is the ground upon which the rectitude of his cause was
placed. He says, "No choice was left but to call out the war power of
the Government, and so to resist force employed for its destruction by
force for its preservation."

"Here," he says, "no choice was left but to call out the war power of
the Government." For what purpose must he call out this war power? He
answers, by saying, "and so to resist force employed for its destruction
by force for its preservation." But this which he asserts is not a fact.
There was no "force employed for its destruction." Let the reader turn
to the record of the facts in Part III of this work, and peruse the
fruitless efforts for peace which were made by us, and which Mr. Lincoln
did not deign to notice. The assertion is not only incorrect, in stating
that force was employed by us, but also in declaring that it was for the
destruction of the Government of the United States. On the contrary, we
wished to leave it alone. Our separation did not involve its
destruction. To such fiction was Mr. Lincoln compelled to resort to give
even apparent justice to his cause. He now goes to the Constitution for
the exercise of his war power, and here we have another fiction.

On April 19th, four days later, President Lincoln issued another
proclamation, announcing a blockade of the ports of seven confederated
States, which was afterward extended to North Carolina and Virginia. It
further declared that all persons who should under their authority
molest any vessel of the United States, or the persons or cargo on
board, should be treated as pirates. In their efforts to subjugate us,
the destruction of our commerce was regarded by the authorities at
Washington as a most efficient measure. It was early seen that, although
acts of Congress established ports of entry where commerce existed, they
might be repealed, and the ports nominally closed or declared to be
closed; yet such a declaration would be of no avail unless sustained by
a naval force, as these ports were located in territory not subject to
the United States. An act was subsequently passed authorizing the
President of the United States, in his discretion, to close our ports,
but it was never executed.

The scheme of blockade was resorted to, and a falsehood was asserted on
which to base it. Mr. Seward writes to Mr. Dallas: "You will say (to
Lord John Russell) that, by our own laws and the laws of nature and the
laws of nations, this Government has a clear right to suppress
insurrection. An exclusion of commerce from national ports which have
been seized by insurgents, in the equitable form of blockade, is a
proper means to that end."[174] This is the same doctrine of
"combinations" fabricated by the authorities at Washington to serve as
the basis of a bloody revolution. Under the laws of nations, separate
governments when at war blockade each other's ports. This is decided to
be justifiable. But the Government of the United States could not
consent to justify its blockade of our ports on this ground, as it would
be an admission that the Confederate States were a separate and distinct
sovereignty, and that the war was prosecuted only for subjugation. It,
therefore, assumed that the withdrawal of the Southern States from the
Union was an insurrection.

Was it an insurrection? When certain sovereign and independent States
form a union with limited powers for some general purposes, and any one
or more of them, in the progress of time, suffer unjust and oppressive
grievances for which there is no redress but in a withdrawal from the
association, is such withdrawal an insurrection? If so, then of what
advantage is a compact of union to States? Within the Union are
oppressions and grievances; and the attempt to go out brings war and
subjugation. The ambitious and aggressive States obtain possession of
the central authority which, having grown strong in the lapse of time,
asserts its entire sovereignty over the States. Whichever of them denies
it and seeks to retire, is declared to be guilty of insurrection, its
citizens are stigmatized as "rebels," as if they had revolted against a
master, and a war of subjugation is begun. If this action is once
tolerated, where will it end? Where is the value of constitutional
liberty? What strength is there in bills of rights--in limitations of
power? What new hope for mankind is to be found in written
constitutions, what remedy which did not exist under kings or emperors?
If the doctrines thus announced by the Government of the United States
are conceded, then, look through either end of the political telescope,
and one sees only an empire, and the once famous Declaration of
Independence trodden in the dust as a "glittering generality," and the
compact of union denounced as a "flaunting lie." Those who submit to
such consequences without resistance are not worthy of the liberties and
the rights to which they were born, and deserve to be made slaves. Such
must be the verdict of mankind.

Men do not fight to make a fraternal union, neither do nations. These
military preparations of the Government of the United States signified
nothing less than the subjugation of the Southern States, so that, by
one devastating blow, the North might grasp for ever that supremacy it
had so long coveted.

To be prepared for self-defense, I called Congress together at
Montgomery on April 29th, and, in the message of that date, thus spoke
of the proclamation of the President of the United States: "Apparently
contradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point is
unmistakably evident. The President of the United States calls for an
army of seventy-five thousand men, whose first service is to be the
capture of our forts. It is a plain declaration of war, which I am not
at liberty to disregard, because of my knowledge that, under the
Constitution of the United States, the President is usurping a power
granted exclusively to Congress."

I then proceeded to say that I did not feel at liberty to disregard the
fact that many of the States seemed quite content to submit to the
exercise of the powers assumed by the President of the United States,
and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated in
the proclamation. Meantime, being deprived of the aid of Congress, I had
been under the necessity of confining my action to a call on the States
for volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with authority
previously conferred on me. I stated that there were then in the field,
at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and
Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand more were on their
way to Virginia; that it was proposed to organize and hold in readiness
for instant action, in view of the existing exigencies of the country,
an army of one hundred thousand men; and that, if a further force should
be needed, Congress would be appealed to for authority to call it into
the field. Finally, that the intent of the President of the United
States, already developed, to invade our soil, capture our forts,
blockade our ports, and wage war against us, rendered it necessary to
raise means to a much larger amount than had been done, to defray the
expenses of maintaining independence and repelling invasion.

A brief summary of the internal affairs of the Government followed, and,
notwithstanding frequent declarations of the peaceful intentions of the
withdrawing States had been made in the most solemn manner, it was
deemed not to be out of place to repeat them once more; and, therefore,
the message closed with these words: "We protest solemnly, in the face
of mankind, that we desire peace at any sacrifice, save that of honor.
In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of
any kind from the States with which we have lately been confederated.
All we ask is to be let alone--that those who never held power over us
shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must,
resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is
abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to
enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually
beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm
reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the just
cause, we must continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom,
independence, and self-government."

At this session Congress passed acts authorizing the President to use
the whole land and naval force to meet the necessities of the war thus
commenced; to issue to private armed vessels letters of marque; in
addition to the volunteer force authorized to be raised, to accept the
services of volunteers, to serve during the war; to receive into the
service various companies of the different arms; to make a loan of fifty
millions of dollars in bonds and notes; and to hold an election for
officers of the permanent Government under the new Constitution. An act
was also passed to provide revenue from imports; another, relative to
prisoners of war; and such others as were necessary to complete the
internal organization of the Government, and establish the
administration of public affairs.

In every portion of the country there was exhibited the most patriotic
devotion to the common cause. Transportation companies freely tendered
the use of their lines for troops and supplies. Requisitions for troops
were met with such alacrity that the number offering their services in
every instance greatly exceeded the demand and the ability to arm them.
Men of the highest official and social position served as volunteers in
the ranks. The gravity of age and the zeal of youth rivaled each other
in the desire to be foremost in the public defense.

The appearance of the proclamation of the President of the United
States, calling out seventy-five thousand men, was followed by the
immediate withdrawal of the States of Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, and their union with the Confederate States.
The former State, thus placed on the frontier and exposed to invasion,
began to prepare for a resolute defense. Volunteers were ordered to be
enrolled and held in readiness in every part of the State. Colonel
Robert E. Lee, having resigned his commission in the United States
cavalry, was on April 22d nominated and confirmed by the State
Convention of Virginia as "Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval
forces of the Commonwealth."

Already the Northern officer in charge had evacuated Harper's Ferry,
after having attempted to destroy the public buildings there. His report
says: "I gave the order to apply the torch. In three minutes or less,
both of the arsenal buildings, containing nearly fifteen thousand stand
of arms, together with the carpenter's shop, which was at the upper end
of a long and connected series of workshops of the armory proper, were
in a blaze. There is every reason for believing the destruction was
complete." Mr. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, on April 22d replied
to this report in these words: "I am directed by the President of the
United States to communicate to you, and through you to the officers and
men under your command at Harper's Ferry Armory, the approbation of the
Government of your and their judicious conduct there, and to tender you
and them the thanks of the Government for the same." At the same time
the ship-yard at Norfolk was abandoned after an attempt to destroy it.
About midnight of April 20th, a fire was started in the yard, which
continued to increase, and before daylight the work of destruction
extended to two immense ship-houses, one of which contained the entire
frame of a seventy-four-gun ship, and to the long ranges of stores and
offices on each side of the entrance. The great ship Pennsylvania was
burned, and the frigates Merrimac and Columbus, and the Delaware,
Raritan, Plymouth, and Germantown were sunk. A vast amount of machinery,
valuable engines, small-arms, and chronometers, was broken up and
rendered entirely useless. The value of the property destroyed was
estimated at several millions of dollars.

This property thus destroyed had been accumulated and constructed with
laborious care and skillful ingenuity during a course of years to
fulfill one of the objects of the Constitution, which was expressed in
these words, "To provide for the common defense" (see Preamble of the
Constitution). It had belonged to all the States in common, and to each
one equally with the others. If the Confederate States were still
members of the Union, as the President of the United States asserted,
where can he find a justification of these acts?

In explanation of his policy to the Commissioners sent to him by the
Virginia State Convention, he said, referring to his inaugural address,
"As I then and therein said, I now repeat, the power confided in me will
be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to
the Government." Yet he tendered the thanks of the Government to those
who applied the torch to destroy this property belonging, as he regarded
it, to the Government.

How unreasonable, how blind with rage must have been that administration
of affairs which so quickly brought the Government to the necessity of
destroying its own means of defense in order, as it publicly declared,
"to maintain its life"! It would seem as if the passions that rule the
savage had taken possession of the authorities at the United States
capital! In the conflagrations of vast structures, the wanton
destruction of public property, and still more in the issue of _lettres
de cachet_ by the Secretary of State, who boasted of the power of his
little bell over the personal liberties of the citizen, the people saw,
or might have seen, the rapid strides toward despotism made under the
mask of preserving the Union. Yet these and similar measures were
tolerated because the sectional hate dominated in the Northern States
over the higher motives of constitutional and moral obligation.


[Footnote 169: Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 8.]

[Footnote 170: Constitution of the United States, Article IV, section
4.]

[Footnote 171: Article I, section 8.]

[Footnote 172: Ibid.]

[Footnote 173: Constitution of the United States, preamble.]

[Footnote 174: Diplomatic correspondence, May 21, 1861.]




CHAPTER V.

    Maryland first approached by Northern Invasion.--Denies to
    United States Troops the Right of Way across her
    Domain.--Mission of Judge Handy.--Views of Governor Hicks.--His
    Proclamation.--Arrival of Massachusetts Troops at
    Baltimore.--Passage through the City disputed.--Activity of the
    Police.--Burning of Bridges.--Letter of President Lincoln to the
    Governor.--Visited by Citizens.--Action of the State
    Legislature.--Occupation of the Relay House.--The City Arms
    surrendered.--City in Possession of United States
    Troops.--Remonstrances of the City to the Passage of Troops
    disregarded.--Citizens arrested; also, Members of the
    Legislature.--Accumulation of Northern Forces at
    Washington.--Invasion of West Virginia by a Force under
    McClellan.--Attack at Philippi; at Laurel Hill.--Death of
    General Garnett.


The border State of Maryland was the outpost of the South on the
frontier first to be approached by Northern invasion. The first
demonstration against State sovereignty was to be made there, and in her
fate were the other slaveholding States of the border to have warning of
what they were to expect. She had chosen to be, for the time at least,
neutral in the impending war, and had denied to the United States troops
the right of way across her domain in their march to invade the Southern
States. The Governor (Hicks) avowed a desire, not only that the State
should avoid war, but that she should be a means for pacifying those
more disposed to engage in combat.

Judge Handy, a distinguished citizen of Mississippi, who was born in
Maryland, had, in December, 1860, been sent as a commissioner from the
State of his adoption to that of his birth, and presented his views and
the object of his mission to Governor Hicks, who, in his response
(December 19, 1860), declared his purpose to act in full concert with
the other border States, adding, "I do not doubt the people of Maryland
are ready to go with the people of those States for weal or woe."[175]
Subsequently, in answer to appeals for and against a proclamation
assembling the Legislature, in order to have a call for a State
convention, Governor Hicks issued an address, in which, arguing that
there was no necessity to define the position of Maryland, he wrote: "If
the action of the Legislature would be simply to declare that Maryland
was with the South in sympathy and feeling; that she demands from the
North the repeal of offensive, unconstitutional statutes, and appeals to
it for new guarantees; that she will wait a reasonable time for the
North to purge her statute-books, to do justice to her Southern
brethren; and, if her appeals are vain, will make common cause with her
sister border States in resistance to tyranny, if need be, it would only
be saying what the whole country well knows," etc.

On the 18th of April, 1861, Governor Hicks issued a proclamation
invoking them to preserve the peace, and said, "I assure the people that
no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense
of the national capital." On the same day Mayor Brown, of the city of
Baltimore, issued a proclamation in which, referring to that of the
Governor above cited, he said, "I can not withhold my expression of
satisfaction at his resolution that no troops shall be sent from
Maryland to the soil of any other State." It will be remembered that the
capital was on a site which originally belonged to Maryland, and was
ceded by her for a special use, so that troops to defend the capital
might be considered as not having been sent out of Maryland. It will be
remembered that these proclamations were three days after the
requisition made by the Secretary of War on the States which had not
seceded for their quota of troops to serve in the war about to be
inaugurated against the South, and that rumors existed at the time in
Baltimore that troops from the Northeast were about to be sent through
that city toward the South. On the next day, viz., the 19th of April,
1861, a body of troops arrived at the railroad depot; the citizens
assembled in large numbers, and, though without arms, disputed the
passage through the city. They attacked the troops with the loose stones
found in the street, which was undergoing repair, and with such
determination and violence, that some of the soldiers were wounded, and
they fired upon the multitude, killing a few and wounding many.

The police of Baltimore were very active in their efforts to prevent
conflict and preserve the peace; they rescued the baggage and munitions
of the troops, which had been seized by the multitude; and the rear
portion of the troops was, by direction of Governor Hicks, sent back to
the borders of the State. The troops who had got through the city took
the railroad at the Southern Depot and passed on. The militia of the
city was called out, and by evening quiet was restored. During the
night, on a report that more Northern troops were approaching the city
by the railroads, the bridges nearest to the city were destroyed, as it
was understood, by orders from the authorities of Baltimore.

On the 20th of April President Lincoln wrote in reply to Governor Hicks
and Mayor Brown, saying, "For the future, troops must be brought here,
but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore." On the next
day, the 21st, Mayor Brown and other influential citizens, by request of
the President, visited him. The interview took place in presence of the
Cabinet and General Scott, and was reported to the public by the Mayor
after his return to Baltimore. From that report I make the following
extracts. Referring to the President, the Mayor uses the following
language:

    "The protection of Washington, he asseverated with great
    earnestness, was the sole object of concentrating troops there,
    and he protested that none of the troops brought through
    Maryland were intended for any purposes hostile to the State, or
    aggressive as against the Southern States.... He called on
    General Scott for his opinion, which the General gave at great
    length, to the effect that troops might be brought through
    Maryland without going through Baltimore, etc.... The interview
    terminated with the distinct assurance, on the part of the
    President, that no more troops would be sent through Baltimore,
    unless obstructed in their transit in other directions, and with
    the understanding that the city authorities should do their best
    to restrain their own people.

    "The Mayor and his companions availed themselves of the
    President's full discussion of the questions of the day to urge
    upon him respectfully, but in the most earnest manner, a course
    of policy which would give peace to the country, and especially
    the withdrawal of all orders contemplating the passage of troops
    through any part of Maryland."

The Legislature of the State of Maryland appointed commissioners to the
Confederate Government to suggest to it the cessation of impending
hostilities until the meeting of Congress at Washington in July.
Commissioners with like instructions were also sent to Washington. In my
reply to the Commissioners, dated 25th of May, 1861, I referred to the
uniform expression of desire for peace on the part of the Confederate
Government, and added:

    "In deference to the State of Maryland, it again asserts in the
    most emphatic terms that its sincere and earnest desire is for
    peace; but that, while the Government would readily entertain
    any proposition from the Government of the United States tending
    to a peaceful solution of the present difficulties, the recent
    attempts of this Government to enter into negotiations with that
    of the United States were attended with results which forbid any
    renewal of proposals from it to that Government.... Its policy
    can not but be peace--peace with all nations and people."

On the 5th of May, the Relay House, at the junction of the Washington
and Baltimore and Ohio Railroads, was occupied by United States troops
under General Butler, and, on the 13th of the same month, he moved a
portion of the troops to Baltimore, and took position on Federal
Hill--thus was consummated the military occupation of Baltimore. On the
next day, reenforcements were received; and, on the same day, the
commanding General issued a proclamation to the citizens, in which he
announced to them his purpose and authority to discriminate between
citizens, those who agreed with him being denominated "well disposed,"
and the others described with many offensive epithets. The initiatory
step of the policy subsequently developed was found in one sentence:
"Therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby
requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their
occupations may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of
their doings avoided."

There soon followed a demand for the surrender of the arms stored by the
city authorities in a warehouse. The police refused to surrender them
without the orders of the police commissioners. The police
commissioners, upon representation that the demand of General Butler was
by order of the President, decided to surrender the arms under protest,
and they were accordingly removed to Fort McHenry.

Baltimore was now disarmed. The Army of the United States had control of
the city. There was no longer necessity to regard the remonstrance of
Baltimore against sending troops through the city, and that more
convenient route was henceforth to be employed. George P. Kane, Marshal
of the Police of Baltimore, who had rendered most efficient service for
the preservation of peace, as well in the city of Baltimore as at Locust
Point, where troops were disembarked to be dispatched to Washington, was
arrested at home by a military force, and sent to Fort McHenry, and a
provost-marshal was appointed by General Banks, who had succeeded to the
command. The excuse given for the arrest of Marshal Kane was that he was
believed to be cognizant of combinations of men waiting for an
opportunity to unite with those in rebellion against the United States
Government. Whether the suspicion were well or ill founded, it
constituted a poor excuse for depriving a citizen of his liberty without
legal warrant and without proof. But this was only the beginning of
unbridled despotism and a reign of terror. The Mayor and Police
Commissioners, Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, and John W. Davis,
held a meeting, and, after preparing a protest against the suspension of
their functions in the appointment of a provost-marshall, resolved that,
while they would do nothing to "obstruct the execution of such measures
as Major-General Banks may deem proper to take, on his own
responsibility, for the preservation of the peace of the city and of
public order, they can not, consistently with their views of official
duty and of the obligations of their oaths of office, recognize the
right of any of the officers and men of the police force, as such, to
receive orders or directions from any other authority than from this
Board; and that, in the opinion of the Board, the forcible suspension of
their functions suspends at the same time the active operations of the
police law."[176] The Provost-Marshal, with the plenary powers conferred
upon him, commenced a system of search and seizure, in private houses,
of arms and munitions of every description.

On the 1st of July, General Banks announced that, "in pursuance of
orders issued from the headquarters at Washington for the preservation
of the public peace in this department, I have arrested, and do detain
in custody of the United States, the late members of the Board of
Police--Messrs. Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks,
and John W. Davis." If the object had been to preserve order by any
proper and legitimate method, the effective means would palpably have
been to rely upon men whose influence was known to be great, and whose
integrity was certainly unquestionable. The first-named of the
commissioners I knew well. He was of an old Maryland family, honored for
their public services, and himself adorned by every social virtue. Old,
unambitious, hospitable, gentle, loving, he was beloved by the people
among whom his long life had been passed. Could such a man be the just
object of suspicion, if, when laws had been silenced, suspicion could
justify arrest and imprisonment? Those who knew him will accept as a
just description:

  "In action faithful, and in honor clear,
  Who broke no promise, served no private end,
  Who gained no title, and who lost no friend."

Thenceforward, arrests of the most illustrious became the rule. In a
land where freedom of speech was held to be an unquestioned right,
freedom of thought ceased to exist, and men were incarcerated for
opinion's sake.

In the Maryland Legislature, the Hon. S. Teacle Wallis, from a committee
to whom was referred the memorial of the police commissioners arrested
in Baltimore, made a report upon the unconstitutionality of the act, and
"appealed in the most earnest manner to the whole people of the country,
of all parties, sections, and opinions, to take warnings by the
usurpations mentioned, and come to the rescue of the free institutions
of the country."[177]

For no better reason, so far as the public was informed, than a vote in
favor of certain resolutions, General Banks sent his provost-marshal to
Frederick, where the Legislature was in session; a cordon of pickets was
placed around the town to prevent any one from leaving it without a
written permission from a member of General Banks's staff; police
detectives from Baltimore then went into the town and arrested some
twelve or thirteen members and several officers of the Legislature,
which, thereby left without a quorum, was prevented from organizing, and
it performed the only act which it was competent to do, i.e., adjourned.
S. Teacle Wallis, the author of the report in defense of the
constitutional rights of citizens, was among those arrested. Henry May,
a member of Congress, who had introduced a resolution which he hoped
would be promotive of peace, was another of those arrested and thrown
into prison. Senator Kennedy, of the same State, presented a report of
the Legislature to the United States Senate, reciting the outrage
inflicted upon Maryland in the persons of her municipal officers and
citizens, and, after some opposition, merely obtained an order to have
it printed. Governor Hicks, whose promises had been so cheering in the
beginning of the year, sent his final message to the Legislature on
December 3, 1861. In that, referring to the action of the Maryland
Legislature at its several sessions before that when the arrest of its
members prevented an organization, he wrote, "This continued until the
General Government had ample reason to believe it was about to go
through the farce of enacting an ordinance of secession, when the
treason was summarily stopped by the dispersion of the traitors...."
After referring to the elections of the 13th of June and the 6th of
November, he says, the people have "declared, in the most emphatic
tones, what I have never doubted, that Maryland has no sympathy with the
rebellion, and desires to do her full share in the duty of suppressing
it." It would be more easy than gracious to point out the inconsistency
between his first statements and this last. The conclusion is inevitable
that he kept himself in equipoise, and fell at last, as men without
convictions usually do, upon the stronger side.

Henceforth the story of Maryland is sad to the last degree, only
relieved by the gallant men who left their homes to fight the battle of
State rights when Maryland no longer furnished them a field on which
they could maintain the rights their fathers left them. This was a fate
doubly sad to the sons of the heroic men who, under the designation of
the "Maryland Line," did so much in our Revolutionary struggle to secure
the independence of the States; of the men who, at a later day, fought
the battle of North Point; of the people of a land which had furnished
so many heroes and statesmen, and gave the great Chief-Justice Taney to
the Supreme Court of the United States.

Though Maryland did not become one of the Confederate States, she was
endeared to the people thereof by many most enduring ties. Last in
order, but first in cordiality, were the tender ministrations of her
noble daughters to the sick and wounded prisoners who were carried
through the streets of Baltimore; and it is with shame we remember that
brutal guards on several occasions inflicted wounds upon gentlewomen who
approached these suffering prisoners to offer them the relief of which
they so evidently stood in need.

The accumulation of Northern forces at and near Washington City, made it
evident that the great effort of the invasion would be from that point,
while assaults of more or less vigor might be expected upon all
important places which the enemy, by his facilities for transportation,
could reach. The concentration of Confederate troops in Virginia was
begun, and they were sent forward as rapidly as practicable to the
points threatened with attack.

It was soon manifest that, besides the army at Washington, which
threatened Virginia, there was a second one at Chambersburg,
Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patterson, designed to move through
Williamsport and Martinsburg, and another forming in Ohio, under the
command of Major-General McClellan, destined to invade the western
counties of Virginia.

This latter force, having landed at Wheeling on May 26th, advanced as
far as Grafton on the 29th. At this time Colonel Porterfield, with the
small force of seven hundred men, sent forward by Governor Letcher, of
Virginia, was at Philippi. On the night of June 2d he was attacked by
General McClellan, with a strong force, and withdrew to Laurel Hill.
Reenforcements under General Garnett were sent forward and occupied the
hill, while Colonel Pegram, the second in command, held Rich Mountain.
On July 11th the latter was attacked by two columns of the enemy, and,
after a vigorous defense, fell back on the 12th, losing many of his men,
who were made prisoners. General Garnett, hearing of this reverse,
attempted to fall back, but was pursued by McClellan, and, while
striving to rally his rear guard, was killed. Five hundred of his men
were taken prisoners. This success left the Northern forces in
possession of that region.

The difficult character of the country in which the battle was fought,
as well from mountain acclivity as dense wood, rendered a minute
knowledge of the roads of vast importance. There is reason to believe
that competent guides led the enemy, by roads unknown to our army, to
the flank and rear of its position, and thus caused the sacrifice of
those who had patriotically come to repel the invasion of the very
people who furnished the guides to the enemy. It was treachery
confounding the counsels of the brave. Thus occurred the disaster of
Rich Mountain and Laurel Hill.

General Robert Garnett was a native of Virginia, and a graduate of the
United States Military Academy. He served in Mexico, on the staff of
General Z. Taylor, and was conspicuous for gallantry and good conduct,
especially in the battles of Monterey and Buena Vista. Recognizing his
allegiance as due to the State of Virginia, from which he was appointed
a cadet, and thence won his various promotions in the army, he resigned
his commission when the State withdrew from the Union, and earnestly and
usefully served as aide-de-camp to General R. E. Lee, the
commander-in-chief of the Army of Virginia, until she acceded to the
Confederacy.

When Western Virginia was invaded, he offered his services to go to her
defense, and, relying confidently on the sentiment, so strong in his own
heart, of devotion to the State by all Virginians, he believed it was
only needful for him to have a nucleus around which the people could
rally to resist the invasion of their country. How sadly he was
disappointed, and how bravely he struggled against adverse fortune, and
how gallantly he died in the discharge of his duty, are memories which,
though sad, bear with them to his friends the consolation that the
manner of his death was worthy of the way in which he lived, and that
even his life was an offering he was not unwilling to make for the
welfare and honor of Virginia.

He fell while commanding the rear guard, to save his retreating army,
thus exemplifying the highest quality of man, self-sacrifice for others,
and such devotion and fortitude as made Ney the grandest figure in
Bonaparte's retreat from Moscow.


[Footnote 175: "Annual Cyclopaedia," vol. i, p. 443.]

[Footnote 176: "Baltimore American," June 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 177: New York "World", August 6, 1861.]




CHAPTER VI.

    Removal of the Seat of Government to Richmond.--Message to
    Congress at Richmond.--Confederate Forces in Virginia.--Forces
    of the Enemy.--Letter to General Johnston.--Combat at Bethel
    Church.--Affair at Romney.--Movements of McDowell.--Battle of
    Manassas.


The Provisional Congress, in session at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 21st
of May, 1861, resolved "that this Congress will adjourn on Tuesday next,
to meet again on the 20th day of July at Richmond, Virginia." The
resolution further authorized the President to have the several
executive departments, with their archives, removed at such intermediate
time as he might determine, and added a proviso that, if any public
emergency should "render it impolitic to meet in Richmond," he should
call the Congress together at some other place to be selected by him.

The hostile demonstrations of the United States Government against
Virginia caused the President, at an early day after the adjournment of
Congress, to proceed to Richmond and to direct the executive
departments, with their archives, to be removed to that place as soon as
could be conveniently done.

In the message delivered to the Congress at its meeting in Richmond,
according to adjournment, I gave the following explanation of my conduct
under the resolution above cited: "Immediately after your adjournment,
the aggressive movement of the enemy required prompt, energetic action.
The accumulation of his forces on the Potomac sufficiently demonstrated
that his efforts were to be directed against Virginia, and from no point
could necessary measures for her defense and protection be so
effectively decided as from her own capital."

On my arrival in Richmond, General R. E. Lee, as commander of the Army
of Virginia, was found there, where he had established his headquarters.
He possessed my unqualified confidence, both as a soldier and a patriot,
and the command he had exercised over the Army of Virginia, before her
accession to the Confederacy, gave him that special knowledge which at
the time was most needful. As has been already briefly stated, troops
had previously been sent from other States of the Confederacy to the aid
of Virginia. The forces there assembled were divided into three armies,
at positions the most important and threatened: one, under General J. E.
Johnston, at Harper's Ferry, covering the valley of the Shenandoah;
another, under General P. G. T. Beauregard, at Manassas, covering the
direct approach from Washington to Richmond; and the third, under
Generals Huger and Magruder, at Norfolk and on the Peninsula between the
James and York Rivers, covering the approach to Richmond from the
seaboard.

The first and second of these armies, though separated by the Blue
Ridge, had such practicable communication with each other as to render
their junction possible when the necessity should be foreseen. They both
were confronted by forces greatly superior in numbers to their own, and
it was doubtful which would first be the object of attack. Harper's
Ferry was an important position, both for military and political
considerations, and, though unfavorably situated for defense against an
enemy which should seek to turn its position by crossing the Potomac
above, it was desirable to hold it as long as was consistent with
safety. The temporary occupation was especially needful for the removal
of the valuable machinery and material in the armory located there, and
which the enemy had failed to destroy, though he had for that purpose
fired the buildings before his evacuation of the post. The
demonstrations of General Patterson, commanding the Federal army in that
region, caused General Johnston earnestly to insist on being allowed to
retire to a position nearer to Winchester. Under these circumstances, an
official letter was addressed to him, from which the following extract
is made:

    "Adjutant and Inspector-General's Office,

    "Richmond, _June 13, 1861_.

    "_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Harper's Ferry,
    Virginia_.

    "Sir: ... You had been heretofore instructed to exercise your
    discretion as to retiring from your position at Harper's Ferry,
    and taking the field to check the advance of the enemy.... The
    ineffective portion of your command, together with the baggage
    and whatever else would impede your operations in the field, it
    would be well to send, without delay, to the Manassas road.
    Should you not be sustained by the population of the Valley, so
    as to enable you to turn upon the enemy before reaching
    Winchester, you will continue slowly to retire to the Manassas
    road, upon some of the passes of which it is hoped you will be
    able to make an effective stand, even against a very superior
    force. To this end, it might be well to send your engineer to
    make a reconnaissance and construct such temporary works as may
    be useful and proper.... For these reasons it has been with
    reluctance that any attempt was made to give you specific
    instructions, and you will accept assurances of the readiness
    with which the freest exercise of discretion on your part will
    be sustained.

    "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "S. Cooper,

    "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."

The earliest combat in this quarter, and which, in the inexperience of
the time, was regarded as a great battle, may claim a passing notice, as
exemplifying the extent to which the individuality, self-reliance, and
habitual use of small-arms by the people of the South was a substitute
for military training, and, on the other hand, how the want of such
training made the Northern new levies inferior to the like kind of
Southern troops.

A detached work on the right of General Magruder's line was occupied
June 11, 1861, by the First Regiment of North Carolina Volunteers and
three hundred and sixty Virginians under the command of an educated,
vigilant, and gallant soldier, then Colonel D. H. Hill, First Regiment
North Carolina Volunteers, subsequently a lieutenant-general in the
Confederate service. He reports that this small force was "engaged for
five and a half hours with four and a half regiments of the enemy at
Bethel Church, nine miles from Hampton. The enemy made three distinct
and well-sustained charges, but were repulsed with heavy loss. Our
cavalry pursued them for six miles, when their retreat became a total
rout."

On the other side, Frederick Townsend, colonel of Third Regiment of the
enemy's forces, after stating with much minuteness the orders and line
of march, describes how, "about five or six miles from Hampton, a heavy
and well-sustained fire of canister and small-arms was opened upon the
regiment," and how it was afterward discovered to be a portion of their
own column which had fired upon them. After due care for the wounded and
a recognition of their friends, the column proceeded, and the Colonel
describes his regiment as moving to the attack "in line of battle, as if
on parade, in the face of a severe fire of artillery and small-arms."
Subsequently, the description proceeds, "a company of my regiment had
been separated from the regiment by a thickly-hedged ditch," and marched
in the adjoining field in line with the main body. Not being aware of
the separation of that company, the Colonel states that, therefore,
"upon seeing among the breaks in the hedge the glistening of bayonets in
the adjoining field, I immediately concluded that the enemy were
outflanking, and conceived it to be my duty to immediately retire and
repel that advance."[178]

Without knowing anything of the subsequent career of the Colonel from
whose report these extracts have been made, or of the officers who
opened fire upon him while he was marching to the execution of the
orders under which they were all acting, it is fair to suppose that,
after a few months' experience, such scenes as are described could not
have occurred, and these citations have been made to show the value of
military training.

In further exemplification of the difference between the troops of the
Confederate States and those of the United States, before either had
been trained in war, I will cite an affair which occurred on the upper
Potomac. Colonel A. P. Hill, commanding a brigade at Romney, in Western
Virginia, having learned that the enemy had a command at the
twenty-first bridge on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, decided to
attack it and to destroy the bridge, so as to interrupt the use of that
important line of the enemy's communication. For this purpose he ordered
Colonel John C. Vaughn, of the Third Tennessee Volunteers, to proceed
with a detachment of two companies of his regiment and two companies of
the Thirteenth Virginia Volunteers to the position where the enemy were
reported to be posted.

Colonel Vaughn reports that on June 18, 1861, at 8 P. M., he moved with
his command as ordered, marched eighteen miles, and, at 5 A. M. the next
morning, found the enemy on the north bank of the Potomac in some
strength of infantry and with two pieces of artillery. He had no
picket-guards.

After reconnaissance, the order to charge was given. It was necessary,
in the execution of the order, to ford the river waist-deep, which
Colonel Vaughn reports "was gallantly executed in good order but with
great enthusiasm. As we appeared in sight at a distance of four hundred
yards, the enemy broke and fled in all directions, firing as they ran
only a few random shots.... The enemy did not wait to fire their
artillery, which we captured, both guns loaded; they were, however,
spiked by the enemy before he fled. From the best information, their
number was between two and three hundred."

Colonel Vaughn further states that, in pursuance of orders, he fired the
bridge and then retired, bringing away the two guns and the enemy's
flag, and other articles of little value which had been captured, and
arrived at brigade headquarters in the evening, with his command in high
spirits good condition.

Colonel A. P. Hill, the energetic brigade commander who directed this
expedition, left the United States Army when the State, which had given
him to the military service of the General Government, passed her
ordinance of secession. The vigilance and enterprise he manifested on
this early occasion in the war of the States gave promise of the
brilliant career which gained for him the high rank of a
lieutenant-general, and which there was nothing for his friends to
regret save the honorable death which he met upon the field of battle.

Colonel Vaughn, the commander of the detachment, was new to war. His
paths had been those of peace, and his home in the mountains of East
Tennessee might reasonably have secured him from any expectation that it
would ever be the theatre on which armies were to contend, and that he,
in the mutation of human affairs, would become a soldier. He lived until
the close of the war, and, on larger fields than that on which he first
appeared, proved that, though not educated for a soldier, he had
endowments which compensated for that disadvantage.

The activity and vigilance of Stuart, afterward so distinguished as
commander of cavalry in the Army of Virginia, and the skill and daring
of Jackson, soon by greater deeds to become immortal, checked, punished,
and embarrassed the enemy in his threatened advances, and his movements
became so devoid of a definite purpose that one was at a loss to divine
the object of his campaign, unless it was to detain General Johnston
with his forces in the Valley of the Shenandoah, while General McDowell,
profiting by the feint, should make the real attack upon General
Beauregard's army at Manassas. However that may be, the evidence finally
became conclusive that the enemy under General McDowell was moving to
attack the army under General Beauregard. The contingency had therefore
arisen for that junction which was necessary to enable us to resist the
vastly superior numbers of our assailant; for, though the most strenuous
and not wholly unsuccessful exertions had been made to reenforce both
the Armies of the Shenandoah and of the Potomac, they yet remained far
smaller than those of the enemy confronting them, and made a junction of
our forces indispensable whenever the real point of attack should be
ascertained. For this movement we had the advantage of an interior line,
so that, if the enemy should discover it after it commenced, he could
not counteract it by adopting the same tactics. The success of this
policy, it will readily be perceived, depended upon the time of
execution, for, though from different causes, failure would equally
result if done too soon or too late. The determination as to which army
should be reenforced from the other, and the exact time of the transfer,
must have been a difficult problem, as both the generals appear to have
been unable to solve it (each asking reenforcements from the other).

On the 9th of July General Johnston wrote an official letter, from which
I make the following extracts:

    "Headquarters, Winchester, _July 9, 1861_.

    "General: ... Similar information from other sources gives me
    the impression that the reenforcements arriving at Martinsburg
    amount to seven or eight thousand. I have estimated the enemy's
    force hitherto, you may remember, at eighteen thousand.
    Additional artillery has also been received. They were greatly
    superior to us in that arm before.

    "The object of reenforcing General Patterson must be an advance
    upon this place. Fighting here against great odds seems to me
    more prudent than retreat.

    "I have not asked for reenforcements, because I supposed that
    the War Department, informed of the state of affairs everywhere,
    could best judge where the troops at its disposal are most
    required....

    "Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston,

    "_Brigadier-General, etc._"

    "If it is proposed to strengthen us against the attack I suggest
    as soon to be made, it seems to me that General Beauregard might
    with _great expedition_ furnish five or six thousand men for a
    few days.

    "J. E. J."

As soon as I became satisfied that Manassas was the objective point of
the enemy's movement, I wrote to General Johnston, urging him to make
preparations for a junction with General Beauregard, and to his
objections, and the difficulties he presented, replied at great length,
endeavoring to convince him that the troops he described as embarrassing
a hasty march might be withdrawn in advance of the more effective
portion of his command. Writing with entire confidence, I kept no copy
of my letters, and, when subsequent events caused the wish to refer to
them, I requested General Johnston to send me copies of them. He replied
that his tent had been blown down, and his papers had been scattered.
His letters to me, which would show the general purport of mine to him,
have shared the fate which during or soon after the close of the war
befell most of the correspondence I had preserved, and his retained
copies, if still in his possession, do not appear to have been deemed of
sufficient importance to be inserted in his published "Narrative."

On the 17th of July, 1861, the following telegram was sent by the
Adjutant-General:

    "Richmond, _July 17, 1861_.

    "_To_ General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_.

    "General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive
    blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If
    practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to
    Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In
    all the arrangements exercise your discretion.

    (Signed) "S. Cooper,

    "_Adjutant and Inspector-General_."

The confidence reposed in General Johnston, sufficiently evinced by the
important command intrusted to him, was more than equal to the
expectation that he would do all that was practicable to execute the
order for a junction, as well as to secure his sick and baggage. For the
execution of the one great purpose, that he would allow no minor
question to interfere with that which was of vital importance, and for
which he was informed all his "effective force" would "be needed."

The order referred to was the telegram inserted above, in which the
sending the sick to Culpepper Court-House might have been after or
before the effective force had moved to the execution of the main and
only positive part of the order. All the arrangements were left to the
discretion of the General. It seems strange that any one has construed
this expression as meaning that the movement for a junction was left to
the discretion of that officer, and that the forming of a junction--the
imperious necessity--should have been termed in the order "all the
arrangement," instead of referring that word to its proper connection,
the route and mode of transportation. The General had no margin on which
to institute a comparison as to the importance of his remaining in the
Valley, according to his previous assignment, or going where he was
ordered by competent authority.

It gives me pleasure to state that, from all the accounts received at
the time, the plans of General Johnston, for masking his withdrawal to
form a junction with General Beauregard, were conducted with marked
skill, and, though all of his troops did not arrive as soon as expected
and needed, he has satisfactorily shown that the failure was not due to
any defect in his arrangements for their transportation.

The great question of uniting the two armies had been decided at
Richmond. The time and place depended on the enemy, and, when it was
seen that the real attack was to be against the position at Manassas,
the order was sent to General Johnston to move to that point. His
letters of the 12th and 15th instant expressed his doubts about his
power to retire from before the superior force of General Patterson,
therefore the word "practicable" was in this connection the equivalent
of possible. That it was, at the time, so understood by General
Johnston, is shown by his reply to the telegram.

    "Headquarters, Winchester, _July 18, 1861_.

    "General: I have had the honor to receive your telegram of
    yesterday.

    "General Patterson, who had been at Bunker Hill since Monday,
    seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles
    to the east of Winchester.

    "Unless he prevents it, we shall move toward General Beauregard
    to-day....

    (Signed) "Joseph E. Johnston.

    "General S. Cooper."

After General Johnston commenced his march to Manassas, he sent to me a
telegram, the substance of which, as my memory serves and the reply
indicates, was an inquiry as to the relative position he would occupy
toward General Beauregard. I returned the following answer:

    "Richmond, _July 20, 1861_.

    "General J. E. Johnston, _Manassas Junction, Virginia_.

    "You are a general in the Confederate Army, possessed of the
    power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the
    exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of the
    ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for the success
    of the object in which you cooeperate. The zeal of both assures
    me of harmonious action.

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

General Johnston, by his promotion to the grade of general, as well as
his superior rank as a brigadier over Brigadier-General Beauregard, gave
him precedence; so there was no need to ask which of the two would
command the whole, when their troops should join and do duty together.
Therefore his inquiry, as it was revolved in my mind, created an
anxiety, not felt before, lest there should be some unfortunate
complication, or misunderstanding, between these officers, when their
forces should be united. Regarding the combat of the 18th of July as the
precursor of a battle, I decided, at the earliest moment, to go in
person to the army.

As has been heretofore stated, Congress was to assemble on the 20th of
July, to hold its first session at the new capital, Richmond, Virginia.
My presence on that occasion and the delivery of a message were required
by usage and law. After the delivery of the message to Congress on
Saturday, the 20th of July, I intended to leave in the afternoon for
Manassas, but was detained until the next morning, when I left by rail,
accompanied by my aide-de-camp, Colonel J. R. Davis, to confer with the
generals on the field. As we approached Manassas Railroad junction, a
cloud of dust was visible a short distance to the west of the railroad.
It resembled one raised by a body of marching troops, and recalled to my
remembrance the design of General Beauregard to make the Rappahannock
his second line of defense. It was, however, subsequently learned that
the dust was raised by a number of wagons which had been sent to the
rear for greater security against the contingencies of the battle. The
sound of the firing had now become very distinct, so much so as to leave
no doubt that a general engagement had commenced. Though that event had
been anticipated as being near at hand after the action of the 18th, it
was both hoped and desired that it would not occur quite so soon, the
more so as it was not known whether the troops from the Valley had yet
arrived.

On reaching the railroad junction, I found a large number of men,
bearing the usual evidence of those who leave the field of battle under
a panic. They crowded around the train with fearful stories of a defeat
of our army. The railroad conductor announced his decision that the
railroad train should proceed no farther. Looking among those who were
about us for one whose demeanor gave reason to expect from him a
collected answer, I selected one whose gray beard and calm face gave
best assurance. He, however, could furnish no encouragement. Our line,
he said, was broken, all was confusion, the army routed, and the battle
lost. I asked for Generals Johnston and Beauregard; he said they were on
the field when he left it. I returned to the conductor and told him that
I must go on; that the railroad was the only means by which I could
proceed, and that, until I reached the headquarters, I could not get a
horse to ride to the field where the battle was ragging. He finally
consented to detach the locomotive from the train, and, for my
accommodation, to run it as far as the army headquarters. In this manner
Colonel Davis, aide-de-camp, and myself proceeded.

At the headquarters we found the Quartermaster General, W. L. Cabell,
and the Adjutant-General, Jordan, of General Beauregard's staff, who
courteously agreed to furnish us horses, and also to show us the route.
While the horses were being prepared, Colonel Jordan took occasion to
advise my aide-de-camp, Colonel Davis, of the hazard of going to the
field, and the impropriety of such exposure on my part. The horses were
after a time reported ready, and we started to the field. The stragglers
soon became numerous, and warnings as to the fate which awaited us if we
advanced were not only frequent but evidently sincere.

There were, however, many who turned back, and the wounded generally
cheered upon meeting us. I well remember one, a mere stripling, who,
supported on the shoulders of a man, who was bearing him to the rear,
took off his cap and waved it with a cheer, that showed within that
slender form beat the heart of a hero--breathed a spirit that would dare
the labors of Hercules.

As we advanced, the storm of the battle was rolling westward, and its
fury became more faint. When I met General Johnston, who was upon a hill
which commanded a general view of the field of the afternoon's
operations, and inquired of him as to the state of affairs, he replied
that we had won the battle. I left him there and rode still farther to
the west. Several of the volunteers on General Beauregard's staff joined
me, and a command of cavalry, the gallant leader of which, Captain John
F. Lay, insisted that I was too near the enemy to be without an escort.
We, however, only saw one column near to us that created a doubt as to
which side it belonged; and, as we were riding toward it, it was
suggested that we should halt until it could be examined with a
field-glass. Colonel Chesnut dismounted so as the better to use his
glass, and at that moment the column formed into line, by which the wind
struck the flag so as to extend it, and it was plainly revealed to be
that of the United States.

Our cavalry, though there was present but the squadron previously
mentioned, and from a statement of the commander of which I will make
some extracts, dashed boldly forward to charge. The demonstration was
followed by the immediate retreat of what was, I believe, the last,
thereabout, of the enemy's forces maintaining their organization, and
showing a disposition to dispute the possession of the field of battle.
In riding over the ground, it seemed quite possible to mark the line of
a fugitive's flight. Here was a musket, there a cartridge-box, there a
blanket or overcoat, a haversack, etc., as if the runner had stripped
himself, as he went, of all impediments to speed.

As we approached toward the left of our line, the signs of an utter rout
of the enemy were unmistakable, and justified the conclusion that the
watchword of "On to Richmond!" had been changed to "Off for Washington!"

On the extreme left of our field of operations, I found the troops whose
opportune arrival had averted impending disaster, and had so materially
contributed to our victory. Some of them had, after arriving at the
Manassas Railroad junction, hastened to our left; their
brigadier-general, E. K. Smith, was wounded soon after getting into
action, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Elzy, by whom it
was gallantly and skillfully led to the close of the battle; others,
under the command of General (then Colonel) Early, made a rapid march,
under the pressing necessity, from the extreme right of our line to and
beyond our left, so as to attack the enemy in flank, thus inflicting on
him the discomfiture his oblique movement was designed to inflict on us.
All these troops and the others near to them had hastened into action
without supplies or camp-equipage; weary, hungry, and without shelter,
night closed around them where they stood, the blood-stained victors on
a hard-fought field.

It was reported to me that some of the troops had been so long without
food as to be suffering severe hunger, and that no supplies could be got
where they were. I made several addresses to them, all to the effect
that their position was that best adapted to a pursuit of the enemy, and
that they should therefore remain there; adding that I would go to the
headquarters and direct that supplies should be sent to them promptly.

General (then Colonel) Early, commanding a brigade, informed me of some
wounded who required attention; one, Colonel Gardner, was, he said, at a
house not far from where we were. I rode to see him, found him in severe
pain, and from the twitching, visible and frequent, seemed to be
threatened with tetanus. A man sat beside him whose uniform was that of
the enemy; but he was gentle, and appeared to be solicitously attentive.
He said that he had no morphine, and did not know where to get any. I
found in a short time a surgeon who went with me to Colonel Gardner,
having the articles necessary in the case. Before leaving Colonel
Gardner, he told me that the man who was attending to him might, without
hindrance, have retreated with his comrades, but had kindly remained
with him, and he therefore asked my protection for the man. I took the
name and the State of the supposed good Samaritan, and at army
headquarters directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner. The
sequel will be told hereafter.

It was then late, and we rode back in the night, say seven miles, to the
army headquarters. I had not seen General Beauregard on the field, and
did not find him at his quarters when we returned; the promise made to
the troops was therefore communicated to a staff-officer, who said he
would have the supplies sent out. At a later hour when I met General
Beauregard and informed him of what had occurred, he stated that,
because of a false alarm which had reached him, he had ordered the
troops referred to from the left to the right of our line, so as to be
in position to repel the reported movement of the enemy against that
flank. That such an alarm should have been credited, and a night march
ordered on account of it, shows how little the completeness of the
victory was realized.


[Footnote 178: see "Rebellion Record," vol. ii, pp. 164, 165.]




CHAPTER VII.

    Conference with the Generals after the Battle.--Order to pursue
    the Enemy.--Evidences of a Thorough Rout.--"Sweet to die for
    such a Cause."--Movements of the Next Day.--What more it was
    practicable to do.--Charge against the President of preventing
    the Capture of Washington.--The Failure to pursue.--Reflection
    on the President.--General Beauregard's Report.--Endorsement
    upon it.--Strength of the Opposing Forces.--Extracts relating to
    the Battle, from the Narrative of General Early.--Resolutions of
    Congress.--Efforts to increase the Efficiency of the Army.


At a late hour of the night, I had a conference with Generals Johnston
and Beauregard; the Adjutant-General of the latter, Colonel Jordan, was
present, and sat opposite to me at the table.

When, after some preliminary conversation, I asked whether any troops
had been sent in pursuit of the enemy, I was answered in the negative.
Upon further inquiry as to what troops were in the best position for
pursuit, and had been least fatigued during the day, General Bonham's
brigade was named. I then suggested that he should be ordered in
pursuit; a pause ensued, until Colonel Jordan asked me if I would
dictate the order. I at once dictated an order for immediate pursuit.
Some conversation followed, the result of which was a modification of
the order by myself, so that, instead of immediate pursuit, it should be
commenced at early dawn. Colonel Jordan spoke across the table to me,
saying, "If you will send the order as you first dictated it, the enemy
won't stop till he gets into the Potomac." I believe I remember the
words very nearly, and am quite sure that I do remember them
substantially. On the 25th of March, 1878, I wrote to General Beauregard
as follows:

    "Dear Sir: Permit me to ask you to recall the conference held
    between General Johnston, yourself, and myself, on the night
    after the close of the battle of Manassas; and to give me, if
    you can, a copy of the order which I dictated, and which your
    adjutant-general, T. J. Jordan, wrote at my dictation, directing
    Brigadier-General Bonham to follow the retreating enemy. If you
    can not furnish a copy of the order, please give me your
    recollection of its substance.

    "Yours respectfully,

    (Signed)  "Jefferson Davis."

To this letter General Beauregard courteously replied that his
order-book was in New York, in the hands of a friend, to whom he would
write for a copy of the order desired if it should be in said book, and
that he would also write to his adjutant, General Jordan, for his
recollection of the order if it had not been inscribed in the
order-book.

On the 24th of April General Beauregard forwarded to me the answer to
his inquiries in my behalf, as follows:

    "New York, 63 Broadway, _April 18, 1878_.

    "My dear General: In answer to your note, I hasten to say that
    properly Mr. Davis is not to be held accountable for our failure
    to pursue McDowell from the field of Manassas the night of the
    21st of July, 1861.

    "As to the order, to which I presume Mr. Davis refers in his
    note to you, I recollect the incident very distinctly.

    "The night of the battle, as I was about to ascend to your
    quarters over my office, Captain E. P. Alexander, of your staff,
    informed me that Captain ----, attached to General Johnston's
    Army of the Shenandoah, reported that he had been as far forward
    as Centreville, where he had seen the Federal army completely
    routed and in full flight toward Washington.

    "This statement I at once repeated to Mr. Davis, General
    Johnston, and yourself, whom I found seated around your
    table--Mr. Davis at the moment writing a dispatch to General
    Cooper.

    "As soon as I had made my report, Mr. Davis with much animation
    asserted the necessity for an urgent pursuit that night by
    Bonham, who, with his own brigade and that of Longstreet, was in
    close proximity to Centreville at the moment. So I took my seat
    at the same table with you, and wrote the order for pursuit,
    substantially at the dictation of Mr. Davis. But, while writing,
    either I happened to remember, or Captain Alexander himself--as
    I am inclined to believe--called me aside to remind me that his
    informant was known among us of the old army as ---- ----,
    because of eccentricities, and in contradistinction with others
    of the same name. When I repeated this reminder, Mr. Davis
    recalled the _sobriquet_, as he had a precise personal knowledge
    of the officers of the old army. He laughed heartily, as did all
    present.

    "The question of throwing General Bonham forward that night,
    upon the unverified report of Captain ----, was now briefly
    discussed, with a unanimous decision against it; therefore, the
    order was not dispatched.

    "It is proper to add in this connection that, so far as I am
    aware--and I had the opportunity of knowing what occurred--this
    was the only instance during Mr. Davis's stay at Manassas in
    which he exercised any voice as to the movement of the troops.
    Profoundly pleased with the results achieved by the happy
    juncture of the two Confederate armies upon the very field of
    battle, his bearing toward the generals who commanded them was
    eminently proper, as I have testified on a former occasion; and,
    I repeat, he certainly expressed or manifested no opposition to
    a forward movement, nor did he display the least disposition to
    interfere by opinion or authority touching what the Confederate
    forces should or should not do.

    "You having at the close of the day surrendered the command,
    which had been left in your hands, over both Confederate armies
    during the engagement, General Johnston was that night in chief
    command. He was decidedly averse to an immediate offensive, and
    emphatically discountenanced it as impracticable.

    "Very truly, your friend,

    (Signed) "Thomas Jordan.

    "General P. G. T. Beauregard, _New Orleans, Louisiana_."

General Beauregard, in his letter forwarding the above, wrote, "The
account given herewith by General Jordan of what occurred there
respecting further pursuit that night agrees with my own recollection."

It was a matter of importance, as I regarded it, to follow closely on
the retreating enemy, but it was of no consequence then or now as to who
issued the order for pursuit, and, unless requested, I should not have
dictated one, preferring that the generals to whom the operations were
confided should issue all orders to the troops. I supposed the order, as
modified by myself, had been sent. I have found, however, since the
close of the war, that it was not, but that an order to the same effect
was sent on the night of the 21st of July, for a copy of which I am
indebted to the kindness of that chivalrous gentleman, soldier, and
patriot, General Bonham. It is as follows:

    "Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

    "Manassas, _July 21, 1861_.

    "(Special Orders, No. 140.)

    "I. General Bonham will send, as early as practicable in the
    morning, a command of two of his regiments of infantry, a strong
    force of cavalry, and one field-battery, to scour the country
    and roads to his front, toward Centreville. He will carry with
    him abundant means of transportation for the collection of our
    wounded, all the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital
    stores, subsistence, and baggage, which will be sent immediately
    to these headquarters.

    "General Bonham will advance with caution, throwing out an
    advanced guard and skirmishers on his right and left, and the
    utmost caution must be taken to prevent firing into our own men.

    "Should it appear, while this command is occupied as directed,
    that it is insufficient for the purposes indicated, General
    Bonham will call on the nearest brigade commander for support.

    "II. Colonel P. St. George Cocke, commanding, will dispatch at
    the same time, for similar purposes, a command of the same size
    and proportions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the road
    _via_ Stone Bridge; and another command of two companies of
    infantry and one of cavalry on the road by which the enemy
    retreated toward and _via_ Sudley's Mills.

    "By command of Brigadier-General Beauregard:

    (Signed) "Thomas Jordan, _A. A. Adjutant-General._

    "To Brigadier-General Bonham."

Impressed with the belief that the enemy was very superior to us, both
in numbers and appointments, I had felt apprehensive that, unless
pressed, he would recover from the panic under which he fled from the
field, rally on his reserves, and renew the contest. Therefore it was
that I immediately felt the necessity for a pursuit of the fugitives,
and insisted that the troops on the extreme left should retain their
position during the night of the 21st, as has been heretofore stated. In
conference with the generals that night, this subject was considered,
and I dictated an order for a movement on the rear of the enemy at early
dawn, which, on account of the late hour at which it was given, differed
very little from one for an immediate movement. A rainfall,
extraordinary for its violence and duration, occurred on the morning of
the succeeding day, so that, over places where during the battle one
could scarcely get a drink of water, rolled torrents which, in the
afternoon of the 22d, it was difficult to cross.

From these and other causes, the troops were scattered to such an extent
that but few commands could have been assembled for immediate service.
It was well for us that the enemy, instead of retiring in order, so as
to be rallied and again brought to the attack, left hope behind, and
fled in dismay to seek for safety beyond the Potomac.

Each hour of the day following the battle added to the evidence of a
thorough rout of the enemy. Abandoned wagons, stores, guns, caissons,
small-arms, and ammunition, proved his complete demoralization. As far
as our cavalry went, no hostile force was met, and all the indications
favored the conclusion that the purpose of invasion had for the time
been abandoned.

The victory, though decisive and important, both in its moral and
physical effect, had been dearly bought by the sacrifice of the lives of
many of our bravest and best, who at the first call of their country had
rushed to its defense.

When riding to the front, I met an ambulance bearing General Barnard Bee
from the field, where he had been mortally wounded, after his patriotism
had been illustrated by conspicuous exhibitions of skill, daring, and
fortitude. Soon after, I learned that my friend Colonel Bartow had
heroically sealed with his life-blood his faith in the sanctity of our
cause. He had been the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in
the Provisional Congress, and, after the laws were enacted to provide
for the public defense, he went to the field to maintain them. It is to
such virtuous and devoted citizens that a country is indebted for its
prosperity and honor, as well in peace as in war.

Reference has been made to the dispersion of our troops after the
battle, and in this connection the following facts are mentioned: In the
afternoon of the 22d, with a guide, supposed to be cognizant of the
positions at which the different commands would be found, I went to
visit the wounded, and among them a youth of my family, who, it was
reported to me, was rapidly sinking. After driving many miles, and
witnessing very painful scenes, but seldom finding the troops in the
position where my guide supposed them to be, and always disappointed in
not discovering him I particularly sought, I was, at the approach of
night, about to abandon the search, when, accidentally meeting an
officer of the command to which the youth belonged, I was directed to
the temporary hospital to which the wounded of that command had been
removed. It was too late; the soul of the young soldier had just left
his body; the corpse lay before me. Around him were many gentle boys,
suffering in different degrees from the wounds they had received. One
bright, refined-looking youth from South Carolina, severely if not
fatally wounded, responded to my expression of sympathy by the heroic
declaration that it was "sweet to die for such a cause."

Many kindred spirits ascended to the Father from that field of their
glory. The roll need not be recorded here; it has a more enduring
depository than the pen can make--the traditions of a grateful people.

The victory at Manassas was certainly extraordinary, not only on account
of the disparity of numbers and the inferiority of our arms, but also
because of many other disadvantages under which we labored. We had no
disciplined troops, and, though our citizens were generally skilled in
the use of small-arms, which, with their high pride and courage, might
compensate for the want of training while in position, these
inadequately substituted military instruction when manoeuvres had to be
performed under fire, and could not make the old-fashioned musket equal
to the long-range, new-model muskets with which the enemy was supplied.
The disparity in artillery was still greater, both in the number and
kind of guns; but, thanks to the skill and cool courage of the Rev.
Captain W. N. Pendleton, his battery of light, smooth-bore guns, manned
principally by the youths whose rector he had been, proved more
effective in battle than the long-range rifle-guns of the enemy. The
character of the ground brought the forces into close contact, and the
ricochet of the round balls carried havoc into the columns of the enemy,
while the bolts of their rifle-guns, if they missed their object,
penetrated harmlessly into the ground.

The field was very extensive, broken, and wooded. The senior general had
so recently arrived that he had no opportunity minutely to learn the
ground, and the troops he brought were both unacquainted with the field
and with those with whom they had to cooeperate. To all this must be
added the disturbing fact that the plan of battle, as originally
designed, was entirely changed by the movement of the enemy on our
extreme left, instead of right and center, as anticipated. The
operations, therefore, had to be conducted against the plan of the
enemy, instead of on that which our generals had prepared and explained
to their subordinate commanders. The promptitude with which the troops
moved, and the readiness with which our generals modified their
preconceived plans to meet the necessities as they were developed,
entitled them to the commendation so liberally bestowed at the time by
their countrymen at large.

General Johnston had been previously promoted to the highest grade in
our army, and I deemed it but a fitting reward for the services rendered
by General Beauregard that he should be promoted to the same grade;
therefore, I addressed to him the following letter:

    "Manassas, Virginia, _July 21, 1861._

    "Sir: Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas, and
    on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording
    the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your
    gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are
    promoted to be a general in the army of the Confederate States
    of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly
    commissioned accordingly.

    "Yours, etc.,

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis.

    "General P. G. T. Beauregard, etc."

The 22d, the day after the battle, was spent in following up the line of
the retreating foe, and collecting the large supplies of arms, of
ammunition, and other military stores. The supplies of the army were on
a scale of such luxurious extravagance as to excite the surprise of
those accustomed only to our rigid economy. The anticipation of an easy
victory had caused many to come to the battle as to a joyous feast, and
the signs left behind them of the extent to which they had been
disappointed in the entertainment, constituted the staple of many
laughable stories, which were not without their value because of the
lesson they contained as to the uncertainties of war, and the
mortification that usually follows vain boasting. Among the articles
abandoned by the enemy in his flight were some which excited a just
indignation, and which indicated the shameless disregard of all the
usages of honorable warfare. They were handcuffs, the fit appendage of a
policeman, but not of a soldier who came to meet his foeman hilt to
hilt. These were reported to have been found in large numbers; some of
them were sent to Richmond.

On the night of the 22d I held a second conference with Generals
Johnston and Beauregard. All the revelations of the day were of the most
satisfactory character as to the completeness of our victory. The large
amount gained of fine artillery, small-arms, and ammunition, all of
which were much needed by us, was not the least gratifying consequence
of our success. The generals, like myself, were well content with what
had been done.

I propounded to them the inquiry as to what more it was practicable to
do. They concurred as to their inability to cross the Potomac, and to
the further inquiry as to an advance to the south side of the Potomac,
General Beauregard promptly stated that there were strong fortifications
there, occupied by garrisons, which had not been in the battle, and were
therefore not affected by the panic which had seized the defeated army.
He described those fortifications as having wide, deep ditches, with
palisades, which would prevent the escalade of the works. Turning to
General Johnston, he said, "They have spared no expense." It was further
stated in explanation that we had no sappers and miners, nor even the
tools requisite to make regular approaches. If we had possessed both,
the time required for such operations would have more than sufficed for
General Patterson's army and other forces to have been brought to that
locality in such numbers as must have rendered the attempt, with our
present means, futile.

This view of the matter rests on the supposition that the fortifications
and garrisons described did actually exist, of which there seemed then
to be no doubt. If the reports which have since reached us be true, that
there were at that time neither fortifications nor troops stationed on
the south bank of the Potomac; that all the enemy's forces fled to the
north side of the river, and even beyond; that the panic of the routed
army infected the whole population of Washington City; and that no
preparation was made, or even contemplated, for the destruction of the
bridge across the Potomac--then it may have been, as many have asserted,
that our army, following close upon the flying enemy, could have entered
and taken possession of the United States capital. These reports,
however, present a condition of affairs altogether at variance with the
information on which we had to act. Thus it was, and, so far as I knew,
for the reasons above stated, that an advance to the south bank of the
Potomac was not contemplated as the immediate sequence of the victory at
Manassas. What discoveries would have been made and what results would
have ensued from the establishment of our guns upon the south bank of
the river, to open fire upon the capital, are speculative questions upon
which it would be useless to enter.

After the conference of the 22d, and because of it, I decided to return
to Richmond and employ all the power of my office to increase the
strength of the army, so as the better to enable it to meet the public
need, whether in offensive-defensive or purely defensive operations, as
opportunity should offer for the one, or the renewal of invasion require
the other.

A short time subsequent to my return, a message was brought to me from
the prison, to the effect that a non-commissioned officer, captured at
Manassas, claimed to have a promise of protection from me. The name was
given Hulburt, of Connecticut. I had forgotten the name he gave when I
saw him; but, believing that I would recognize the person who had
attended to Colonel Gardner, and to whom only such a promise had been
given, the officer in charge was directed to send him to me. When he
came, I had no doubt of his identity, and explained to him that I had
directed that he should not be treated as a prisoner, but that, in the
multitude of those wearing the same uniform as his, some neglect or
mistake had arisen, for which I was very sorry, and that he should be
immediately released and sent down the river to the neighborhood of
Fortress Monroe, where he would be among his own people. He then told me
that he had a sister residing a few miles in the country, whom he would
be very glad to visit. Permission was given him to do so, and a time
fixed at which he was to report for transportation; and so he left, with
manifestations of thankfulness for the kindness with which he had been
treated. In due time a newspaper was received, containing an account of
his escape, and how he had lingered about the suburbs of Richmond and
made drawings of the surrounding fortifications. The treachery was as
great as if his drawings had been valuable, which they could not have
been, as we had only then commenced the detached works which were
designed as a system of defenses for Richmond.

When the smoke of battle had lifted from the field of Manassas, and the
rejoicing over the victory had spread over the land and spent its
exuberance, some, who, like Job's war-horse, "snuffed the battle from
afar," but in whom the likeness there ceased, censoriously asked why the
fruits of the victory had not been gathered by the capture of Washington
City. Then some indiscreet friends of the generals commanding in that
battle, instead of the easier task of justification, chose the harder
one of exculpation for the imputed failure. Their ill-advised zeal,
combined perhaps with malice against me, induced the allegation that the
President had prevented the generals from making an immediate and
vigorous pursuit of the routed enemy.

This, as other stories had been, was left to the correction which time
it was hoped would bring, the sooner because it was expected to be
refuted by the reports of the commanding generals with whom I had
conferred on that subject immediately after the battle.

After considerable time had elapsed, it was reported to me that a member
of Congress, who had served on that occasion as a volunteer aide to
General Beauregard, had stated in the House of Representatives that I
had prevented the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat at Manassas.

This gave to the rumor such official character and dignity as seemed to
me to entitle it to notice not theretofore given, wherefore I addressed
to General Johnston the following inquiry, which, though restricted in
its terms to the allegation, was of such tenor as left it to his option
to state all the facts connected with the slander, if he should choose
to do me that justice, or should see the public interest involved in the
correction, which, as stated in my letter to him, was that which gave it
in my estimation its claim to consideration, and had caused me to
address him on the subject:

    "Richmond, Virginia, _November 3, 1861._

    "General J. E. Johnston, _commanding Department of the Potomac._

    "Sir: Reports have been, and are being, widely circulated to the
    effect that I prevented General Beauregard from pursuing the
    enemy after the battle of Manassas, and had subsequently
    restrained him from advancing upon Washington City. Though such
    statements may have been made merely for my injury, and in that
    view might be postponed to a more convenient season, they have
    acquired importance from the fact that they have served to
    create distrust, to excite disappointment, and must embarrass
    the Administration in its further efforts to reenforce the
    armies of the Potomac, and generally to provide for the public
    defense. For these public considerations, I call upon you, as
    the commanding general, and as a party to all the conferences
    held by me on the 21st and 22d of July, to say whether I
    obstructed the pursuit of the enemy after the victory at
    Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or other active
    operation which it was feasible for the army to undertake.

    "Very respectfully, yours, etc.,

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

    "Headquarters, Centreville, _November 10, 1861_.

    "To his Excellency the President.

    "Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 3d
    inst., in which you call upon me, 'as the commanding general,
    and as a party to all the conferences held by you on the 21st
    and 22d of July, to say whether you obstructed the pursuit after
    the victory of Manassas, or have ever objected to an advance or
    other active operation which it was feasible for the army to
    undertake?'

    "To the first question I reply, No. The pursuit was 'obstructed'
    by the enemy's troops at Centreville, as I have stated in my
    official report. In that report I have also said why no advance
    was made upon the enemy's capital (for reasons) as follows:

    "The apparent freshness of the United States troops at
    Centreville, which checked our pursuit; the strong forces
    occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, and Alexandria;
    the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if needed, would
    reach Washington with his army of more than thirty thousand
    sooner than we could; and the condition and inadequate means of
    the army in ammunition, provisions, and transportation,
    prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the capital.

    "To the second question I reply that it has never been feasible
    for the army to advance farther than it has done--to the line of
    Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced posts at Upton's,
    Munson's, and Mason's Hills. After a conference at Fairfax
    Court-House with the three senior general officers, you
    announced it to be impracticable to give this army the strength
    which those officers considered necessary to enable it to assume
    the offensive. Upon which I drew it back to its present
    position.

    "Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed) "J. E. Johnston."

This answer to my inquiry was conclusive as to the charge which had been
industriously circulated that I had prevented the immediate pursuit of
the enemy, and had obstructed active operations after the battle of
Manassas, and thus had caused the failure to reap the proper fruits of
the victory.

No specific inquiry was made by me as to the part I took in the
conferences of the 21st and 22d of July, but a general reference was
made to them. The entire silence of General Johnston in regard to those
conferences is noticeable from the fact that, while his answer was
strictly measured by the terms of my inquiry as to pursuit, he added a
statement about a conference at Fairfax Court-House, which occurred in
the autumn, say October, and could have had no relation to the question
of pursuit of the enemy after the victory of Manassas, or other active
operations therewith connected. The reasons stated in my letter for
making an inquiry, naturally pointed to the conferences of the 21st and
22d of July, but surely not to a conference held months subsequent to
the battle, and on a question quite different from that of hot pursuit.
In regard to the matter of this subsequent conference I shall have more
to say hereafter.

I left the field of Manassas, proud of the heroism of our troops in
battle, and of the conduct of the officers who led them. Anxious to
recognize the claim of the army on the gratitude of the country, it was
my pleasing duty to bear testimony to their merit in every available
form. Those who left the field and did not return to share its glory, it
was wished, should only be remembered as exceptions proving a rule.

With all the information possessed at the time by the commanding
generals, the propriety of maintaining our position, while seeking
objects more easily attained than the capture of the United States
capital, seemed to me so demonstrable as to require no other
justification than the statements to which I have referred in connection
with the conference of the 22d of July. It would have seemed to me then,
as it does now, to be less than was due to the energy and fortitude of
our troops, to plead a want of transportation and supplies for a march
of about twenty miles through a country which had not then been denuded
by the ravages of war.

Under these impressions, and with such feelings, I wrote to General
Beauregard as follows:

    "Richmond, Virginia, _August 4, 1861._

    "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia._

    "My Dear Sir: ... I think you are unjust to yourself in putting
    your failure to pursue the enemy to Washington to the account of
    short supplies of subsistence and transportation. Under the
    circumstances of our army, and in the absence of the knowledge
    since acquired, if indeed the statements be true, it would have
    been extremely hazardous to have done more than was performed.
    You will not fail to remember that, so far from knowing that the
    enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was moved by you,
    in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack upon our
    right, and that the next day's operations did not fully reveal
    what has since been reported of the enemy's panic. Enough was
    done for glory, and the measure of duty was full; let us rather
    show the untaught that their desires are unreasonable, than, by
    dwelling on possibilities recently developed, give form and
    substance to the criticisms always easy to those who judge after
    the event.

    "With sincere esteem, I am your friend,

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

I had declared myself content and gratified with the conduct of the
troops and the officers, and supposed the generals, in recognition of my
efforts to aid them by increasing their force and munitions, as well as
by my abstinence from all interference with them upon the field, would
have neither cause nor motive to reflect upon me in their reports, and
it was with equal surprise and regret that in this I found myself
mistaken. General Johnston, in his report, represented the order to him
to make a junction with General Beauregard as a movement left to his
discretion, with the condition that, if made, he should first send his
sick and baggage to Culpepper Court-House. I felt constrained to put
upon his report when it was received the following endorsement:

    "The telegram referred to by General Johnston in this report as
    received by him about one o'clock on the morning of the 18th of
    July is inaccurately reported. The following is a copy:

    "'Richmond, _July 17, 1861_.

    "'General J. E. Johnston, _Winchester, Virginia_.

    "'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive
    blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If
    practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to
    Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In
    all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.

    "'S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General_.'

    "The word 'after' is not found in the dispatch before the words
    'sending your sick,' as is stated in the report; so that the
    argument based on it requires no comment. The order to move 'if
    practicable' had reference to General Johnston's letters of the
    12th and 15th of July, representing the relative strength and
    positions of the enemy under Patterson and of his own forces to
    be such as to make it doubtful whether General Johnston had the
    power to effect the movement."

Upon the receipt of General Beauregard's report of the battle of
Manassas, I found that it contained matter which seemed to me out of
place, and therefore addressed to him the following letter:

    "Richmond, Virginia, _October 30, 1861_.

    "General Beauregard, _Manassas, Virginia_.

    "Sir: Yesterday my attention was called to various newspaper
    publications purporting to have been sent from Manassas, and to
    be a synopsis of your report of the battle of the 21st of July
    last, and in which it is represented that you have been
    overruled by me in your plan for a battle with the enemy south
    of the Potomac, for the capture of Baltimore and Washington, and
    the liberation of Maryland.

    "I inquired for your long-expected report, and it has been
    to-day submitted to my inspection. It appears, by official
    endorsement, to have been received by the Adjutant-General on
    the 18th of October, though it is dated August 26, 1861.

    "With much surprise I found that the newspaper statements were
    sustained by the text of your report. I was surprised, because,
    if we did differ in opinion as to the measure and purposes of
    contemplated campaigns, such fact could have no appropriate
    place in the report of a battle; further, because it seemed to
    be an attempt to exalt yourself at my expense; and, especially,
    because no such plan as that described was submitted to me. It
    is true that, some time before it was ordered, you expressed a
    desire for the junction of General Johnston's army with your
    own. The movement was postponed until the operations of the
    enemy rendered it necessary, and until it became thereby
    practicable to make it with safety to the Valley of Virginia.
    Hence, I believe, was secured the success by which it was
    attended.

    "If you have retained a copy of the plan of campaign which you
    say was submitted to me through Colonel Chesnut, allow me to
    request that you will furnish me with a duplicate of it."

    "Very respectfully yours, etc.,"

    (Signed)  "Jefferson Davis."

As General Beauregard did not think proper to omit that portion of his
report to which objection was made, it necessitated, when the entire
report was transmitted to Congress, the placing of an endorsement upon
it, reviewing that part of the report which I considered objectionable.
The Congress, in its discretion, ordered the publication of the report,
except that part to which the endorsement referred, thereby judiciously
suppressing both the endorsement and the portion of the report to which
it related. In this case, and _every other_ official report ever
submitted to me, I made neither alteration nor erasure.

That portion of the report which was suppressed by the Congress has,
since the war, found its way into the press, but the endorsement which
belonged to it has not been published. As part of the history of the
time, I will here present both in their proper connection:

    "General S. Cooper, _Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond
    Virginia._

    "Before entering upon a narration of the general military
    operations in the presence of the enemy on July 21st, I
    propose--I hope not unreasonably--first to recite certain events
    which belong to the strategy of the campaign, and consequently
    form an essential part of the history of the battle.

    "Having become satisfied that the advance of the enemy with a
    decidedly superior force, both as to numbers and war equipage,
    to attack or turn my position in this quarter was immediately
    impending, I dispatched, on July 13th, one of my staff, Colonel
    James Chesnut, of South Carolina, to submit for the
    consideration of the President a plan of operations
    substantially as follows:

    "I proposed that General Johnston should unite, as soon as
    possible, the bulk of the Army of the Shenandoah with that of
    the Potomac, then under my command, leaving only sufficient
    force to garrison his strong works at Winchester, and to guard
    the five defensive passes of the Blue Ridge, and thus hold
    Patterson in check. At the same time Brigadier-General Holmes
    was to march hither with all of his command not essential for
    the defense of the position of Acquia Creek. These junctions
    having been effected at Manassas, an immediate, impetuous attack
    of our combined armies upon General McDowell was to follow, as
    soon as he approached my advanced position, at and around
    Fairfax Court-House, with the inevitable result, as I submitted,
    of his complete defeat, and the destruction or capture of his
    army. This accomplished, the Army of the Shenandoah, under
    General Johnston, increased with a part of my forces and
    rejoined as he returned by the detachment left to hold the
    mountain-passes, was to march back rapidly into the Valley, fall
    upon and crush Patterson with a superior force, wheresoever he
    might be found. This, I confidently estimated, could be achieved
    within fifteen days after General Johnston should march from
    Winchester for Manassas.

    "Meanwhile, I was to occupy the enemy's works on this side of
    the Potomac, if, as I anticipated, he had been so routed as to
    enable me to enter them with him or, if not, to retire again for
    a time within the lines of Bull Run with my main force.
    Patterson having been virtually destroyed, then General Johnston
    would reenforce General Garnett sufficiently to make him
    superior to his opponent (General McClellan) and able to defeat
    that officer. This done, General Garnett was to form an
    immediate junction with General Johnston, who was forthwith to
    cross the Potomac into Maryland with his whole force, arouse the
    people as he advanced to the recovery of their political rights,
    and the defense of their homes and families from an offensive
    invader, and then march to the investment of Washington, in the
    rear, while I resumed the offensive in front. This plan of
    operations, you are aware, was not acceptable at the time, from
    considerations which appeared so weighty as to more than
    counterbalance its proposed advantages. Informed of these views,
    and of the decision of the War Department, I then made my
    preparations for the stoutest practicable defense of the line of
    Bull Run, the enemy having developed his purpose, by the advance
    on and occupation of Fairfax Court-House, from which my advance
    brigade had been withdrawn.

    "The War Department having been informed by me, by telegraph on
    July 17th, of the movement of General McDowell, General Johnston
    was immediately ordered to form a junction of his army corps
    with mine, should the movement in his judgment be deemed
    advisable. General Holmes was also directed to push forward with
    two regiments, a battery, and one company of cavalry."[179]

    "ENDORSEMENT.

    "The order issued by the War Department to General Johnston was
    not, as herein reported, to form a junction, 'should the
    movement in his judgment be deemed advisable.' The following is
    an accurate copy of the order:

    "'General Beauregard is attacked. To strike the enemy a decisive
    blow, a junction of all your effective force will be needed. If
    practicable, make the movement, sending your sick and baggage to
    Culpepper Court-House, either by railroad or by Warrenton. In
    all the arrangements, exercise your discretion.'

    "The words 'if practicable' had reference to letters of General
    Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely
    doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of
    the relative strength and position of Patterson's forces as
    compared with his own.

    "The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but not
    accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department,
    can not be found among its files, nor any reference to any
    decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had
    advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously
    selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have
    continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of
    our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be
    verbally delivered, was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the
    conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested
    on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a
    junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be
    made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a
    victory. The junction was made, the victory was won; but the
    consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why
    no such consequences could result are given in the closing
    passages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the
    responsibility can not be transferred to the Government at
    Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan
    to accomplish such desirable results.

    "If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been
    presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail
    to permit proper investigation, it must have been pronounced to
    be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have
    been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and
    positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it
    impossible are the following:

    "1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chesnut, on
    the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand
    men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General
    Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven
    thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front,
    ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his
    withdrawal.

    "2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction
    of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General
    Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett's forces amounted
    only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid
    retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the
    news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived
    within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut's arrival in
    Richmond.

    "3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible
    supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and
    motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack
    them in detail.

    "4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the
    battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications
    on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of
    fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the
    generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor
    does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a
    condition to attempt such a movement.

    "It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on
    file in the War Department, as recited at the close of the
    report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance
    of our forces and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to
    and beyond the Potomac.

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."

It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To the
reports of the officers serving on the field, in the armies of both
Governments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of the
details, and it will be the task of the future historian, from
comparison of the whole, to deduce the truth.

It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error and
misrepresentation have, in their inconsistencies and improbabilities,
the elements of self-destruction, while truth is in its nature
consistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks in
regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate
to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time
to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to
elucidate obscurity as to correct error.

From the official reports it appears that the strength of the two armies
was: Confederate, 30,167 men of all arms, with 29 guns;[180] Federal,
35,732 men,[181] with a body of cavalry, of which only one company is
reported, and a large artillery force not shown in the tabular
statement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in the
battle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent on
our side than on that of the enemy. He selected the point of attack, and
could concentrate his troops for that purpose, but we were guarding a
line of some seven miles front, and therefore widely dispersed.

For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from a
narrative in the "Operations on the Line of Bull Run in June and July,
1861, including the First Battle of Manassas." The name of the author,
J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee for
the accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusions
announced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state that
he was educated as a soldier; after leaving the army became a lawyer,
but, when his country was involved in war with Mexico, he volunteered
and served in a regiment of his native State, Virginia. After that war
terminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he was
actively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused the
call of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from the
Union. He was sent, by the people of the county in which he resided, to
represent them in that convention. There he opposed to the last the
adoption of the ordinance for secession; but, when it was decided,
against his opinion, to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from the
Union, he, true to his allegiance to the State of which he was a
citizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth to
defend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted in
peace gleamed brightly in war. He rose to the high grade of
lieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier, none
have shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bitter
trials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended and
nominal peace began.

Extracts from the narrative of General J. A. Early, of events occurring
when he was colonel of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Virginia Infantry
and commanding a brigade:

    "On June 19, 1861, I arrived at Manassas Junction and reported
    to General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Twenty-fourth Virginia
    Regiment having been previously sent to him, under the command
    of Lieutenant-Colonel Hairsten, from Lynchburg, where I had been
    stationed under the orders of General Robert E. Lee, for the
    purpose of organizing the Virginia troops which were being
    mustered into service at that place....

    "On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved, by order of
    General Beauregard, to the left of Camp Walker, on the railroad,
    and remained there some time....

    "On falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his
    instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope's
    Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at
    Camp Walker I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad-bridge
    over Bull Run, which was burned that morning.

    "The burning of this bridge had not been included in the
    previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss
    to know why it was now fired. That bridge certainly was not
    necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his
    troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous
    places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover,
    susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to
    it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by
    the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a
    short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy, in the
    event of our defeat, or evacuation of Manassas without a fight.
    As it was, we were afterward greatly inconvenienced by its
    destruction." ...

The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our right
center, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditable
to our raw troops, of whom he writes:

    "On the 19th they were occupied in the effort to strengthen
    their position by throwing up the best defenses they could with
    the implements at hand, which consisted of a very few picks and
    spades, some rough bowie-knives, and the bayonets of the
    muskets.... The position was a very weak one, as the banks on
    the opposite side of Bull Run overlooked and commanded those on
    the south side, which were but a few feet above the water's
    edge, and there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods
    on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and
    down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to
    observation from the opposite one, as the strip of woods
    afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through....

    "About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a
    conference at McLean's house by General Beauregard, and he then
    informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered,
    at his instance, from the Valley, and was marching to cooeperate
    with us. He stated that Johnston would march directly across the
    Blue Ridge toward the enemy's right flank, and would probably
    attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had
    finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the
    event of Johnston's attack on the enemy's right flank, a party
    of horsemen rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one
    of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier-General T.
    J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of
    Johnston's troops by the way of Manassas Gap Railroad, and he
    stated that his brigade was about twenty-five hundred strong.
    This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise,
    and, after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars
    at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General
    Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct
    road, so as to get on the enemy's right flank. General Jackson
    replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the
    time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not; that he
    thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad
    from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw
    General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very
    favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I
    subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to
    know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he
    found himself, of General Johnston's intended movements, and I
    presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his
    superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could
    have elicited as much information from him, under the
    circumstances, as was obtained. After General Jackson had given
    the information above stated, and received instructions where to
    put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to
    develop fully his plans for the next day. The information
    received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected, but General
    Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed,
    and was mistaken; that he was satisfied General Johnston was
    marching with the rest of his troops and would attack the
    enemy's right flank early next day as he had before stated. Upon
    this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston's attack
    began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge
    from the character of the musketry-fire, we should cross Bull
    Run from our several positions, and move upon the enemy so as to
    attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no
    doubt General Johnston's attack would be a complete surprise to
    the enemy; that the latter would not know what to think of it;
    that when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself
    assailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and
    would not know what to do; that the effect would become a
    complete rout--a perfect Waterloo; and that, when the enemy took
    to flight, we would pursue, cross the Potomac, and arouse
    Maryland....

    "During the 20th General Johnston arrived at Manassas Junction
    by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him
    assuming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard
    and himself.

    "Early on the morning of the 21st (Sunday), we heard the enemy's
    guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they
    had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the
    movement of my brigade....

    "Upon arriving there (McLean's Ford), I found General Jones had
    returned to the intrenchments with his brigade, and I was
    informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I
    should join him (General Beauregard) with my brigade.... He then
    asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to
    go to him, and, on my replying in the negative, he informed me
    that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to
    one of his staff-officers for the note, and showed it to me. The
    note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was
    in pencil. At the foot of it were these words: 'Send Early to
    me.' This was all the order that I received to move to the left,
    and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o'clock....
    Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained
    the order I received, passed me at McLean's Ford going on to
    Jones about, or a little after, eleven o'clock. If I had not
    received the order until 2 P. M., it would have been impossible
    for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3.30
    P. M. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all
    the troops to fall back across Bull Run.... I was met by Colonel
    John S. Preston, one of the General's aides, who informed me
    that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was ... but
    that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were
    that we should proceed to the left, where there was a heavy fire
    of musketry.... When we reached General Johnston, he expressed
    great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible
    that his anticipations were not sanguine. He gave me special
    instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines
    completely before going to the front.... In some fields on the
    left of our line we found Colonel Stuart with a body of cavalry
    and some pieces of artillery, belonging, as I understood, to a
    battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham.... I found Stuart
    already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I
    understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham's guns, which
    were firing on the enemy's extreme right flank, thus rendering
    very efficient service. I feel well assured that Stuart had but
    _two_ companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw
    when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached
    the left, a young man named Saunders came galloping to me from
    Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating,
    and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of
    encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of
    the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was
    then moving as rapidly as my men could move; but he soon
    returned with another message informing me that the other was a
    mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in
    front to form a new flanking column, and cautioning me to be on
    my guard. This last information proved to be correct. It was the
    last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left,
    and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front....
    The hill on which the enemy's troops were was Chinn's Hill, so
    often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one
    next year, on the same field.... An officer came to me in a
    gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front, and
    I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident
    tone, that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill, and rode
    to the top of it, when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty
    yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping
    around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable
    from the Confederate flag of that day. I thought that, if the
    one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this
    must also be a Confederate one; but one or two shots from
    Beckham's guns on the left caused the regiment to face about,
    when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United
    States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did
    not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to
    the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the
    hill and across the Warrenton Pike. At that time there was very
    little distinction between the dress of some of the Federal
    regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in
    regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade
    advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the
    enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired
    precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the
    fields in rear of Dogan's house, and north of the turnpike.
    Colonel Cocke, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our
    pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy's
    columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse, and
    we soon discovered that they were in full retreat.... When my
    column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it
    was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information
    that such a column was on the Manassas Gap Railroad. The enemy
    took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body
    of our troops from the Valley; and as my men, moving by flank,
    were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness, they
    were greatly over-estimated. We scared the enemy worse than we
    hurt him....

    "We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and
    unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the
    enemy's defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments. It was
    impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I
    was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the Run and the
    woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my
    brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were
    very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been
    unavailing, as the enemy's troops retreated with such rapidity
    that they could not have been overtaken by any other than
    mounted troops. On the next day we found a great many articles
    that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing
    that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in
    equipping his army.... In my movement after the retreat of the
    enemy commenced, I passed the Carter house and beyond our line
    of battle. The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and,
    having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground
    for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops
    from our line, I halted, with the expectation of receiving
    further orders. Observing some men near the Carter house, I rode
    to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers, who had
    collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them
    Colonel Gardner, of the Eighth Georgia Regiment, who was
    suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was
    fractured just above the ankle.... Just after my return from the
    house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company
    with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was, and
    addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession,
    which received him with great enthusiasm.

    "I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received, and
    the movements of my brigade, and asked him what I should do
    under the circumstances. He told me that I had better get my men
    into line, and wait for further orders. I then requested him to
    inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position, and my
    desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition
    in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones
    being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have
    a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear
    attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were
    talking, we saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of
    Bull Run, some distance below us.

    "Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel
    Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther,
    and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very
    considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out
    a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bivouacked in this
    position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were
    made it was night, and I then rode back with Captain Gardner
    over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to
    find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might
    receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement
    early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis house, which I
    found to be a hospital filled with wounded men; but was unable
    to get any information about either of the generals. I then rode
    toward Manassas, and, after going some distance in that
    direction, I met an officer who inquired for General Johnston,
    stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was
    looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General
    Beauregard, and supposed they were at Manassas; but he said that
    he was just from Manassas, and neither of the generals was
    there.... At about twelve o'clock at night I lay down in the
    field in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in
    the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a
    haversack on the field, which was filled with hard biscuits, and
    had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its
    contents I made my own supper, distributing the rest among a
    number of officers who had nothing.

    "Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for
    the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to
    Manassas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to
    remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the
    camp-equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men
    spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and
    picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets,
    overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and
    other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy....

    "After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose
    to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the
    field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the
    vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the
    wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the
    field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama,
    had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island
    regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had
    what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he
    would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short.
    I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the
    time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of
    medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he
    knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar
    mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at
    different points near the field, and asked if there would be any
    objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the
    use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much
    service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that,
    but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his
    patients. There did not come within my observation any instance
    of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy's wounded; nor did I
    see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them.
    The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on
    the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in
    regard to 'rebel atrocities,' were very grossly exaggerated, or
    manufactured from the whole cloth....

    "On the night following the battle, when I was looking for
    Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear
    of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the
    troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state
    of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and
    squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as
    far as I went toward Manassas. It was very apparent that no
    considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the
    left could have been brought into a condition next day for an
    advance toward Washington....

    "The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the
    field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most
    unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned
    was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected
    him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by
    McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought
    was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly
    unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a
    defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reenforcements
    from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston
    and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was
    actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the
    odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the
    troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered,
    and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire
    until reenforcements could be brought up. According to the
    statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on
    the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to
    exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to
    General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of
    all the reenforcements as they arrived were unquestionably
    directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the
    movement of Elzey's brigade to the left averted a great danger,
    and both concur in attributing the turning of the tide of battle
    to the movement of my brigade against the enemy's extreme right
    flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the
    battle-flag, and General Johnston in his 'Narrative' recently
    published).

    "General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty assigned
    him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full
    credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a
    controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can
    there be in it?

    "General Johnston assumes the responsibility for the failure to
    advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made
    to shift it on any one else? He certainly was
    commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he
    thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance
    was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army
    is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th,
    our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have
    advanced, as easily as to Manassas, for the enemy had repaired
    the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to
    destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant
    transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance
    as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments
    had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have
    furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had
    none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to
    convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and
    we started from the battle-field of second Manassas with no
    rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely
    dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with
    supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly
    depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July,
    1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of
    supplies is wholly untenable."

I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel
(then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for my
use. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminary
matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies,
the narrative proceeds:

    "I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 A. M., July 21,
    1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his
    headquarters. About 7.30 A. M. I accompanied him and General
    Johnston to a position near to Mitchell's Ford, where for some
    hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of
    the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank
    movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we
    rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard
    immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position
    near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3.15 P. M.,
    Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to
    the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I
    was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and
    watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy,
    producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to
    join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command
    from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston
    said: 'Now is your time; push the pursuit.' I started at once on
    a trot, was passing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and
    I understood him to say, 'Salute the President in passing.' ...
    I saluted, and passed on at a gallop.

    "I halted at Bull Run to water my horses--then suffering--and to
    confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General
    Philip St. George Cocke.

    "I passed on, ... when to my astonishment I saw the President
    near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said
    that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the
    forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of
    our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that
    I was then about to charge....

    "We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we
    reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops
    beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our
    left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley
    Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale,
    to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded
    United States officers, and was going on until a superior force
    should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over
    the field to my quarters at Manassas a little before daylight--I
    and my little gallant squadron--having been actively in the
    saddle, I think, more than twenty hours....

    (Signed) "John F. Lay,

    _"Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A._

    "N.B.: It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker
    (then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my
    office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L."

The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard's command, W. L. Cabell,
states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August,
1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard's
forces before the battle of Manassas, that as nearly as he could
remember it was as follows, viz.:

  One four-horse wagon to each company.
  One  "     "     "   for field and staff (regimental).
  One  "     "     "    "  ammunition.
  One  "     "     "    "  hospital purposes.
  Two  "     "   wagons "  each battery of artillery.
  Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes.
  One ambulance for each regiment.

Transportation belonging to General Johnston's army did not arrive until
the day (or probably two days) after the battle.

If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field
transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as
to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early
states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861,
was prevented by want of transportation.

The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the
circumstances, had corresponding gratification among all classes and in
all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress,
then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President
from the field of Manassas, adopted resolutions expressive of their
thanks to the most high God, and inviting the people of the Confederate
States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty
deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had
caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons,
and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy;
assuring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined "the
names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and constitutional
liberty."

If universal gratulation at our success inspired an overweening
confidence, it also begat increased desire to enter the military
service; and, but for our want of arms and munitions, we could have
enrolled an army little short of the number of able-bodied men in the
Confederate States.

I have given so much space to the battle of Manassas because it was the
first great action of the war, exciting intense feeling, and producing
important moral results among the people of the Confederacy; and
further, because it was made the basis of misrepresentation, and unjust
reflection upon the chief Executive, which certainly had no plausible
pretext in the facts, and can not be referred to a reasonable desire to
promote the successful defense of our country.

Impressed with the conviction that time would naturally work to our
disadvantage, as training was more necessary to make soldiers of the
Northern people than of our own; and further, because of their larger
population, as well as their greater facility in obtaining recruits from
foreign countries, the Administration continued assiduously to exert
every faculty to increase the efficiency of the army by addition to its
numbers, by improving its organization, and by supplying the needful
munitions and equipments. Inactivity is the prolific source of evil to
an army, especially if composed of new levies, who, like ours, had
hurried from their homes at their country's call. For these, and other
reasons more readily appreciated, it was thought desirable that all our
available forces should be employed as actively as might be practicable.

On the 1st of August, 1861, I wrote to General J. E. Johnston, at
Manassas, as follows:

    "We are anxiously looking for the official reports of the battle
    of Manassas, and have present need to know what supplies and
    wagons were captured. I wish you would have prepared a statement
    of your wants in transportation and supplies of all kinds, to
    put your army on a proper footing for active operations....

    "I am, as ever, your friend,

    (Signed) "Jefferson Davis."


[Footnote 179: The foregoing was copied from "The Land we Love," for
February, 1867 (vol. ii, No. 4).]

[Footnote 180: General Beauregard's report.]

[Footnote 181: General McDowell's return, July 16, 17, 1861.]




CHAPTER VIII.

    The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-'99.--Their Influence on
    Political Affairs.--Kentucky declares for
    Neutrality.--Correspondence of Governor Magoffin with the
    President of the United States and the President of the
    Confederate States.--Occupation of Columbus, Kentucky, by
    Major-General Polk.--His Correspondence with the Kentucky
    Commissioners.--President Lincoln's View of Neutrality.--Acts of
    the United States Government.--Refugees.--Their Motives of
    Expatriation.--Address of ex-Vice-President Breckinridge to the
    People of the State.--The Occupation of Columbus secured.--The
    Purpose of the United States Government.--Battle of
    Belmont.--Albert Sidney Johnston commands the Department.--State
    of Affairs.--Line of Defense.-Efforts to obtain Arms; also
    Troops.


Kentucky, the eldest daughter of Virginia, had moved contemporaneously
with her mother in the assertion of the cardinal principles announced in
the resolutions of 1798-'99. She then by the properly constituted
authority did with due solemnity declare that the Government of the
United States was the result of a compact between the States to which
each acceded as a State; that it possessed only delegated powers, of
which it was not the exclusive or final judge; and that, as in all cases
of compact among parties having no common judge, "each party has an
equal right to judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode
and measure of redress." Thus spoke Kentucky in the first years of her
existence as a sovereign. The great truth announced in her series of
resolutions was the sign under which the Democracy conquered in 1800,
and which constituted the corner-stone of the political edifice of which
Jefferson was the architect, and which stood unshaken for sixty years
from the time its foundation was laid. During this period, the growth,
prosperity, and happiness of the country seemed unmistakably to confirm
the wisdom of the voluntary union of free sovereign States under a
written compact confining the action of the General Government to the
expressly enumerated powers which had been delegated therein. When
infractions of the compact had been deliberately and persistently made,
when the intent was clearly manifested to pervert the powers of the
General Government from the purposes for which they had been conferred,
and to use them for the injury of a portion of the States, which were
the integral parties to the compact, some of them resolved to judge for
themselves of the "mode and measure of redress," and to exercise the
right, enunciated in the Declaration of Independence to be the
unalienable endowment of every people, to alter or abolish any form of
government, and to institute a new one, "laying its foundation on such
principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." By no rational
mode of construction, in view of the history of the Declaration of
Independence, or of the resolutions of Kentucky, can it be claimed that
the word "people" had any other meaning than that of a distinct
community, such as the people of each colony who by their delegates in
the Congress declared themselves to be henceforth a State; and that none
other than the people of each State could, by the resolutions of
1798-'99, have been referred to as the final judge of infractions of
their compact, and of the remedy which should be applied.

Kentucky made no decision adverse to this right of a State, but she
declared, in the impending conflict between the States seceding from and
those adhering to the Federal Government, that she would hold the
position of neutrality. If the question was to be settled by a war of
words, that was feasible; but, if the conflict was to be one of arms, it
was utterly impracticable. To maintain neutrality under such
circumstances would have required a power greater than that of both the
contestants, or a moral influence commanding such respect for her wishes
as could hardly have been anticipated from that party which had, in
violation of right, inflicted the wrongs which produced the withdrawal
of some of the States, and had uttered multiplied threats of coercion if
any State attempted to exercise the rights defined in the resolutions of
1798-'99. If, however, any such hope may have been entertained, but few
moons had filled and waned before the defiant occupation of her
territory and the enrollment of her citizens as soldiers in the army of
invasion must have dispelled the illusion.

The following correspondence took place in August, between Governor
Magoffin, of Kentucky, and President Lincoln--also between the Governor
and myself, as President of the Confederate States--relative to the
neutrality of the State:

    "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department,

    "Frankfort, _August 19,1861_.

    To his Excellency Abraham Lincoln, _President of the United
    States_.

    "Sir: From the commencement of the unhappy hostilities now
    pending in this country, the people of Kentucky have indicated
    an earnest desire and purpose, as far as lay in their power,
    while maintaining their original political status, to do nothing
    by which to involve themselves in the war. Up to this time they
    have succeeded in securing to themselves and to the State peace
    and tranquillity as the fruits of the policy they adopted. My
    single object now is to promote the continuance of these
    blessings to this State.

    "Until within a brief period the people of Kentucky were quiet
    and tranquil, free from domestic strife, and undisturbed by
    internal commotion. They have resisted no law, rebelled against
    no authority, engaged in no revolution, but constantly
    proclaimed their firm determination to pursue their peaceful
    avocations, earnestly hoping that their own soil would be spared
    the presence of armed troops, and that the scene of conflict
    would be kept removed beyond the border of their State. By thus
    avoiding all occasions for the introduction of bodies of armed
    soldiers, and offering no provocation for the presence of
    military force, the people of Kentucky have sincerely striven to
    preserve in their State domestic peace and avert the calamities
    of sanguinary engagements.

    "Recently a large body of soldiers have been enlisted in the
    United States army and collected in military camps in the
    central portion of Kentucky. This movement was preceded by the
    active organization of companies, regiments, etc., consisting of
    men sworn into the United States service, under officers holding
    commissions from yourself. Ordnance, arms, munitions, and
    supplies of war are being transported into the State, and placed
    in large quantities in these camps. In a word, an army is now
    being organized and quartered within the State, supplied with
    all the appliances of war, without the consent or advice of the
    authorities of the State, and without consultation with those
    most prominently known and recognized as loyal citizens. This
    movement now imperils that peace and tranquillity which from the
    beginning of our pending difficulties have been the paramount
    desire of this people, and which, up to this time, they have so
    secured to the State.

    "Within Kentucky there has been, and is likely to be, no
    occasion for the presence of military force. The people are
    quiet and tranquil, feeling no apprehension of any occasion
    arising to invoke protection from the Federal arm. They have
    asked that their territory be left free from military
    occupation, and the present tranquillity of their communication
    left uninvaded by soldiers. They do not desire that Kentucky
    shall be required to supply the battle-field for the contending
    armies, or become the theatre of the war.

    "Now, therefore, as Governor of the State of Kentucky, and in
    the name of the people I have the honor to represent, and with
    the single and earnest desire to avert from their peaceful homes
    the horrors of war, I urge the removal from the limits of
    Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within
    the State. If such action as is here urged be promptly taken, I
    firmly believe the peace of the people of Kentucky will be
    preserved, and the horrors of a bloody war will be averted from
    a people now peaceful and tranquil.

    "I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    "B. Magoffin."


    "Washington, _August 24, 1861_.

    "To his Excellency B. Magoffin, _Governor of the State of
    Kentucky._

    "Sir: Your letter of the 19th instant, in which you 'urge the
    removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now
    organized and in camp within that State,' is received.

    "I may not possess full and precisely accurate knowledge upon
    this subject; but I believe it is true that there is a military
    force in camp within Kentucky, acting by authority of the United
    States, which force is not very large, and is not now being
    augmented.

    "I also believe that some arms have been furnished to this force
    by the United States.

    "I also believe this force consists exclusively of Kentuckians,
    having their camp in the immediate vicinity of their own homes,
    and not assailing or menacing any of the good people of
    Kentucky.

    "In all I have done in the premises, I have acted upon the
    urgent solicitation of many Kentuckians, and in accordance with
    what I believed, and still believe, to be the wish of a majority
    of all the Union-loving people of Kentucky.

    "While I have conversed on this subject with many of the eminent
    men of Kentucky, including a large majority of her members of
    Congress, I do not remember that any one of them, or any other
    person except your Excellency and the bearers of your
    Excellency's letter, has urged me to remove the military force
    from Kentucky, or to disband it. One very worthy citizen of
    Kentucky did solicit me to have the augmenting of the force
    suspended for a time.

    "Taking all the means within my reach to form a judgment, I do
    not believe it is the popular wish of Kentucky that this force
    shall be removed beyond her limits; and, with this impression, I
    must respectfully decline to so remove it.

    "I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to
    preserve the peace of my own native State, Kentucky. It is with
    regret I search for, and can not find, in your not very short
    letter, any declaration or intimation that you entertain any
    desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.

    "Your obedient servant, A. Lincoln."


    "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Executive Department,

    "Frankfort, _August 24, 1861_.

    "Hon. Jefferson Davis, _Richmond, Virginia._

    "Sir: Since the commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending
    in the country, the people of Kentucky have indicated a
    steadfast desire and purpose to maintain a position of strict
    neutrality between the belligerent parties. They have earnestly
    striven by their policy to avert from themselves the calamity of
    war, and protect their own soil from the presence of contending
    armies. Up to this period they have enjoyed comparative
    tranquillity and entire domestic peace.

    "Recently a military force has been enlisted and quartered by
    the United States authorities within this State. I have on this
    day addressed a communication and dispatched commissioners to
    the President of the United States, urging the removal of these
    troops from the soil of Kentucky, and thus exerting myself to
    carry out the will of the people in the maintenance of a neutral
    position. The people of this State desire to be free from the
    presence of the soldiers of either belligerent, and to that end
    my efforts are now directed.

    "Although I have no reason to presume that the Government of the
    Confederate States contemplate or have ever proposed any
    violation of the neutral attitude thus assumed by Kentucky,
    there seems to be some uneasiness felt among the people of some
    portion of the State, occasioned by the collection of bodies of
    troops along their southern frontier. In order to quiet this
    apprehension, and to secure to the people their cherished object
    of peace, this communication is to present these facts and
    elicit an authoritative assurance that the Government of the
    Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the
    position indicated as assumed by Kentucky.

    "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    "B. Magoffin."


    "Richmond, _August 28, 1861._

    "To Hon. B. Magoffin, _Governor of Kentucky, etc._

    "Sir: I have received your letter informing me that 'since the
    commencement of the unhappy difficulties pending in the country,
    the people of Kentucky have indicated a steadfast desire to
    maintain a position of strict neutrality between the belligerent
    parties.' In the same communication you express your desire to
    elicit 'an authoritative assurance that the Government of the
    Confederate States will continue to respect and observe the
    neutral position of Kentucky.'

    "In reply to this request, I lose no time in assuring you that
    the Government of the Confederate States neither desires nor
    intends to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky. The assemblage of
    troops in Tennessee, to which you refer, had no other object
    than to repel the lawless invasion of that State by the forces
    of the United States, should their Government seek to approach
    it through Kentucky, without respect for its position of
    neutrality. That such apprehensions were not groundless has been
    proved by the course of that Government in the States of
    Maryland and Missouri, and more recently in Kentucky itself, in
    which, as you inform me, 'a military force has been enlisted and
    quartered by the United States authorities.'

    "The Government of the Confederate States has not only respected
    most scrupulously the neutrality of Kentucky, but has continued
    to maintain the friendly relations of trade and intercourse
    which it has suspended with the United States generally.

    "In view of the history of the past, it can scarcely be
    necessary to assure your Excellency that the Government of the
    Confederate States will continue to respect the neutrality of
    Kentucky so long as her people will maintain it themselves.

    "But neutrality, to be entitled to respect, must be strictly
    maintained between both parties; or, if the door be opened on
    the one side for the aggressions of one of the belligerent
    parties upon the other, it ought not to be shut to the assailed
    when they seek to enter it for purposes of self-defense.

    "I do not, however, for a moment believe that your gallant State
    will suffer its soil to be used for the purpose of giving an
    advantage to those who violate its neutrality and disregard its
    rights, over others who respect both.

    "In conclusion, I tender to your Excellency the assurance of my
    high consideration and regard, and am, sir, very respectfully,

    "Yours, etc., Jefferson Davis."

Movements by the Federal forces in southwestern Kentucky revealed such
designs as made it absolutely necessary that General Polk, commanding
the Confederate forces in that section, should immediately occupy the
town of Columbus, Kentucky; a position of much strategic importance on
the shore of the Mississippi River.

That position was doubly important, because it commanded the opposite
shore in Missouri, and was the gateway on the border of Tennessee.

Two States of the Confederacy were therefore threatened by the
anticipated movement of the enemy to get possession of Columbus.

Major-General Polk, therefore, crossed the State line, took possession
of Hickman on September 3d, and on the 4th secured Columbus. General
Grant, who took command at Cairo on September 2d, being thus
anticipated, seized Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee River, and
occupied it in force on the 5th and 6th.

After the occupation, under date of September 4th, I received the
following dispatch from Major-General Polk: "The enemy having descended
the Mississippi River some three or four days since, and seated himself
with cannon and entrenched lines opposite the town of Columbus,
Kentucky, making such demonstrations as left no doubt upon the minds of
any of their intention to seize and forcibly possess said town, I
thought proper, under the plenary power delegated to me, to direct a
sufficient portion of my command both by the river way and land to
concentrate at Columbus, as well to offer to its citizens that
protection they unite to a man in accepting, as also to prevent, in
time, the occupation by the enemy of a point so necessary to the
security of western Tennessee. The demonstration on my part has had the
desired effect. The enemy has withdrawn his forces even before I had
fortified my position. It is my intention to continue to occupy and hold
this place." On the same day I sent the following reply to Major-General
Polk: "Your telegram received; the necessity must justify the action."

The Legislature of Kentucky passed resolutions and appointed a committee
to inquire into the action of General Polk, from which the annexed
correspondence resulted:

    CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MAJOR-GENERAL POLK AND THE AUTHORITIES OF
    KENTUCKY.

    _Resolutions of the Kentucky Senate relative to the Violation of
    the Neutrality of Kentucky._

    "_Resolved by the Senate_, That the special committee of the
    Senate, raised for the purpose of considering the reported
    occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by
    Confederate troops, take into consideration the occupation of
    Paducah and other places in Kentucky by the Federal authorities,
    and report thereon when the true state of the case shall have
    been ascertained. That the Speaker appoint three members of the
    Senate to visit southern Kentucky, who are directed to obtain
    all the facts they can in reference to the recent occupation of
    Kentucky soil by Confederate and Federal forces, and report in
    writing at as early a day as practicable.

    "In Senate of Kentucky, Saturday, September 7, A. D. 1861.

    "Twice read and adopted.

    "Attest: (Signed) J. H. Johnson, S. S.

    "In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the Speaker
    appointed as said committee Messrs. John M. Johnson, William B.
    Read, and Thornton F. Marshall.

    "Attest:  (Signed)  J. H. Johnson, S. S."


    _Letter of Hon. J. M. Johnson, Chairman of the Committee of the
    Kentucky Senate, to General Polk_.

    "Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861._

    "To Major-General Polk, _commanding forces, etc._

    "Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a resolution of the
    Senate of Kentucky, adopted by that body upon the reception of
    the intelligence of the military occupation of Hickman, Chalk
    Bank, and Columbus, by the Confederate troops under your
    command. I need not say that the people of Kentucky are
    profoundly astonished that such an act should have been
    committed by the Confederates, and especially that they should
    have been the first to do so with an equipped and regularly
    organized army.

    "The people of Kentucky, having with great unanimity determined
    upon a position of neutrality in the unhappy war now being
    waged, and which they had tried in vain to prevent, had hoped
    that one place at least in this great nation might remain
    uninvaded by passion, and through whose good office something
    might be done to end the war, or at least to mitigate its
    horrors, or, if this were not possible, that she might be left
    to choose her destiny without disturbance from any quarter.

    "In obedience to the thrice-repeated will of the people, as
    expressed at the polls, and in their name, I ask you to withdraw
    your forces from the soil of Kentucky.

    "I will say, in conclusion, that all the people of the State
    await, in deep suspense, your action in the premises.

    "I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, etc.,

    (Signed) "John M. Johnson,

    "_Chairman of Committee_."


    _Letter from General Polk to the Kentucky Commissioners._

    Columbus, Kentucky, _September 9, 1861._

    To J. M. Johnson, _Chairman of Committee, Senate of Kentucky._

    "Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
    of this date, conveying to me a copy of a resolution of the
    Senate of Kentucky, under which a committee (of which you are
    chairman) was raised 'for the purpose of considering the
    reported occupation of Hickman and other points in Kentucky by
    the Confederate troops, and that they take into consideration
    the reported occupation of Paducah and other points in Kentucky
    by the Federal authorities, and report thereon'; also, that they
    be 'directed to obtain all the facts they can in reference to
    the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the Confederate and
    Federal forces, and report, in writing, at as early a day as
    practicable.'

    "From the terms of the resolution, it appears your office, as
    committee-men, was restricted merely to collecting the facts in
    reference to the recent occupation of Kentucky soil by the
    Confederate and Federal forces, and to report thereon in
    writing, at as early a day as possible. In answer to these
    resolutions, I have respectfully to say that, so far as the
    Confederate forces are concerned, the facts are plain, and
    shortly stated. The Government which they represent, recognizing
    as a fundamental principle the right of sovereign States to take
    such a position as they choose in regard to their relations with
    other States, was compelled by that principle to concede to
    Kentucky the right to assume the position of neutrality, which
    she has chosen in the passing struggle. This it has done on all
    occasions, and without an exception. The cases alluded to by his
    Excellency, Governor Magoffin, in his recent message, as
    'raids,' I presume, are the cases of the steamers Cheney and
    Orr. The former was the unauthorized and unrecognized act of
    certain citizens of Alabama, and the latter the act of citizens
    of Tennessee and others, and was an act of reprisal. They can
    not, therefore, be charged, in any sense, as acts of the
    Confederate Government.

    "The first and only instance in which the neutrality of Kentucky
    has been disregarded is that in which the troops under my
    command, and by my direction, took possession of the place I now
    hold, and so much of the territory between it and the Tennessee
    line as was necessary for me to pass over in order to reach it.
    This act finds abundant justification in the history of the
    concessions granted to the Federal Government by Kentucky ever
    since the war began, notwithstanding the position of neutrality
    which she had assumed, and the firmness with which she
    proclaimed her intention to maintain it. That history shows the
    following among other facts: In January, the House of
    Representatives of Kentucky passed anti-coercion
    resolutions--only four dissenting. The Governor, in May, issued
    his neutrality proclamation. The address of the Union Central
    Committee, including Mr. James Speed, Mr. Prentice, and other
    prominent Union men, in April, proclaimed neutrality as the
    policy of Kentucky, and claimed that an attempt to coerce the
    South should induce Kentucky to make common cause with her, and
    take part in the contest on her side, 'without counting the
    cost.' The Union speakers and papers, with few exceptions,
    claimed, up to the last election, that the Union vote was strict
    neutrality and peace. These facts and events gave assurance of
    the integrity of the avowed purpose of your State, and we were
    content with the position she assumed.

    "Since the election, however, she has allowed the seizure in her
    port (Paducah) of property of citizens of the Confederate
    States; she has, by her members in the Congress of the United
    States, voted supplies of men and money to carry on the war
    against the Confederate States; she has allowed the Federal
    Government to cut timber from her forests for the purpose of
    building armed boats for the invasion of the Southern States;
    she is permitting to be enlisted in her territory, troops, not
    only of her own citizens, but of the citizens of other States,
    for the purpose of being armed and used in offensive warfare
    against the Confederate States. At Camp Robinson, in the county
    of Garrard, there are now ten thousand troops, if the newspapers
    can be relied upon, in which men from Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana,
    and Illinois are mustered with Kentuckians into the service of
    the United States, and armed by that Government for the avowed
    purpose of giving aid to the disaffected in one of the
    Confederate States, and of carrying out the designs of that
    Government for their subjugation. Notwithstanding all these and
    other acts of a similar character, the Confederate States have
    continued to respect the attitude which Kentucky had assumed as
    a neutral, and forborne from reprisals, in the hope that
    Kentucky would yet enforce respect for her position on the part
    of the Government of the United States.

    "Our patient expectation has been disappointed, and it was only
    when we perceived that this continued indifference to our rights
    and our safety was about to culminate in the seizure of an
    important part of her territory by the United States forces for
    offensive operations against the Confederate States, that a
    regard for self-preservation demanded of us to seize it in
    advance. We are here, therefore, not by choice, but of
    necessity, and as I have had the honor to say, in a
    communication addressed to his Excellency Governor Magoffin, a
    copy of which is herewith inclosed and submitted as a part of my
    reply, so I now repeat in answer to your request, that I am
    prepared to agree to withdraw the Confederate troops from
    Kentucky, provided she will agree that the troops of the Federal
    Government be withdrawn simultaneously, with a guarantee (which
    I will give reciprocally for the Confederate Government) that
    the Federal troops shall not be allowed to enter nor occupy any
    part of Kentucky for the future.

    "In view of the facts thus submitted, I can not but think the
    world at large will find it difficult to appreciate the
    'profound astonishment' with which you say the people of
    Kentucky received the intelligence of the occupation of this
    place.

    "I have the honor to be, respectfully,

    "Your obedient servant, etc.,

    "Leonidas Polk,

    "_Major-General commanding_."


    _Letter from General Polk to Governor Magoffin._

    "Columbus, Kentucky, _September 3, 1861_.

    "Governor Magoffin, _Frankfort, Kentucky_.

    "I should have dispatched to you immediately, as the troops
    under my command took possession of this position, the very few
    words I addressed to the people here; but my duties since that
    time have so preoccupied me, that I have but now the first
    leisure moment to communicate with you. It will be sufficient
    for me to inform you (as my short address herewith will do) that
    I had information, on which I could rely, that the Federal
    forces intended, and were preparing to seize Columbus. I need
    not describe to you the danger resulting to western Tennessee
    from such occupation.

    "My responsibility could not permit me quietly to lose to the
    command intrusted to me so important a position. In evidence of
    the accuracy of the information I possessed, I will state that,
    as the Confederate force approached this place, the Federal
    troops were found in formidable numbers in position upon the
    opposite bank, with their cannon turned upon Columbus. The
    citizens of the town had fled with terror, and not a word of
    assurance of safety or protection had been addressed to them.
    Since I have taken possession of this place, I have been
    informed by highly respected citizens of your State that certain
    representatives of the Federal Government are seeking to take
    advantage of its own wrong, are setting up complaints against my
    acts of occupation, and are making it a pretest for seizing
    other points. Upon this proceeding I have no comments to make.
    But I am prepared to say that I will agree to withdraw the
    Confederate troops from Kentucky, provided that she will agree
    that the troops of the Federal Government be withdrawn
    simultaneously, with a guarantee (which I will give reciprocally
    for the Confederate Government) that the Federal troops shall
    not be allowed to enter or occupy any part of Kentucky in the
    future.

    "I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

    (Signed)

    "Leonidas Polk,

    "_Major-General commanding_."

However willing the government of Kentucky might have been to accede to
the proposition of General Polk, and which from his knowledge of the
views of his own Government he was fully justified in offering, the
State of Kentucky had no power, moral or physical, to prevent the United
States Government from using her soil as best might suit its purposes in
the war it was waging for the subjugation of the seceded States.
President Lincoln, in his message of the previous July, had distinctly
and reproachfully spoken of the idea of neutrality as existing in some
of the border States. He said: "To prevent the Union forces passing one
way, or the disunion the other, over their soil, would be disunion
completed.... At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of
secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade."

The acts of the Federal Government corresponded with the views announced
by its President. Briefly, but conclusively, General Polk showed in his
answer that the United States Government paid no respect to the neutral
position which Kentucky wished to maintain; that it was armed, but not
neutral, for the arms and the troops assembled on her soil were for the
invasion of the South; and that he occupied Columbus to prevent the
enemy from taking possession of it. When our troops first entered
Columbus they found the inhabitants had been in alarm from
demonstrations of the United States forces, but that they felt no dread
of the Confederate troops. As far as the truth could be ascertained, a
decided majority of the people of Kentucky, especially its southwestern
portion, if left to a free choice, would have joined the Confederacy in
preference to remaining in the Union. Could they have foreseen what in a
short time was revealed, there can be little doubt that mule contracts,
and other forms of bribery, would have proved unavailing to make her the
passive observer of usurpations destructive of the personal and
political rights of which she had always been a most earnest advocate.
With the slow and sinuous approach of the serpent, the General
Government, little by little, gained power over Kentucky, and then,
throwing off the mask, proceeded to outrages so regardless of law and
the usages of English-speaking people, as could not have been
anticipated, and can only be remembered with shame by those who honor
the constitutional Government created by the States. While artfully
urging the maintenance of the Union as a duty of patriotism, the
Constitution which gave the Union birth was trampled under foot, and the
excesses of the Reign of Terror which followed the French Revolution
were reenacted in our land, once the vaunted home of law and liberty.
Men who had been most honored by the State, and who had reflected back
most honor upon it, were seized without warrant, condemned without
trial, because they had exercised the privilege of free speech, and for
adhering to the principles which were the bed-rock on which our fathers
builded our political temple. Members of the Legislature vacated their
seats and left the State to avoid arrest, the penalty hanging over them
for opinion's sake. The venerable Judge Monroe, who had presided over
the United States District Court for more than a generation, driven from
the land of his birth, the State he had served so long and so well, with
feeble step, but upright conscience and indomitable will, sought a
resting place among those who did not regard it a crime to adhere to the
principles of 1776 and of 1787, and the declaratory affirmation of them
in the resolutions of 1793-'99. About the same time others of great
worth and distinction, impelled by the feeling that "where liberty is
there is my country," left the land desecrated by despotic usurpation,
to join the Confederacy in its struggle to maintain the personal and
political liberties which the men of the Revolution had left as an
inheritance to their posterity. Space would not suffice for a complete
list of the refugees who became conspicuous in the military events of
the Confederacy; let a few answer for the many: J. C. Breckinridge, the
late Vice-President of the United States, and whose general and
well-deserved popularity might have reasonably led him to expect in the
Union the highest honors the States could bestow; William Preston,
George W. Johnston, S. B. Buckner, John H. Morgan, and a host of others,
alike meritorious and alike gratefully remembered. When the passions of
the hour shall have subsided, and the past shall be reviewed with
discrimination and justice, the question must arise in every reflecting
mind, Why did such men as these expatriate themselves, and surrender all
the advantages which they had won by a life of honorable effort in the
land of their nativity? To such inquiry the answer must be, the
usurpations of the General Government foretold to them the wreck of
constitutional liberty. The motives which governed them may best be
learned from the annexed extracts from the statement made in the address
of Mr. Breckinridge to the people of Kentucky, whom he had represented
in both Houses of the United States Congress, with such distinguished
ability and zeal for the general welfare as to place him in the front
rank of the statesmen of his day:

    "Bowling Green, Kentucky, _October 8,1861_.

    "In obedience, as I supposed, to your wishes, I proceeded to
    Washington, and at the special session of Congress, in July,
    spoke and voted against the whole war policy of the President
    and Congress; demanding, in addition, for Kentucky, the right to
    refuse, not men only, but money also, to the war, for I would
    have blushed to meet you with the confession that I had
    purchased for you exemption from the perils of the battle-field,
    and the shame of waging war against your Southern brethren, by
    hiring others to do the work you shrunk from performing. During
    that memorable session a very small body of Senators and
    Representatives, even beneath the shadow of a military
    despotism, resisted the usurpations of the Executive, and, with
    what degree of dignity and firmness, they willingly submit to
    the judgment of the world.

    "Their efforts were unavailing, yet they may prove valuable
    hereafter, as another added to former examples of many protest
    against the progress of tyranny.

    "On my return to Kentucky, at the close of the late special
    session of Congress, it was my purpose immediately to resign the
    office of Senator. The verbal and written remonstrances of many
    friends in different parts of the State induced me to postpone
    the execution of my purpose; but the time has arrived to carry
    it into effect, and accordingly I now hereby return the trust
    into your hands.... In the House of Representatives it was
    declared that the South should be reduced to 'abject
    submission,' or their institutions be overthrown. In the Senate
    it was said that, if necessary, the South should be depopulated
    and repeopled from the North; and an eminent Senator expressed a
    desire that the President should be made dictator. This was
    superfluous, since they had already clothed him with dictatorial
    powers. In the midst of these proceedings, no plea for the
    Constitution is listened to in the North; here and there a few
    heroic voices are feebly heard protesting against the progress
    of despotism, but, for the most part, beyond the military lines,
    mobs and anarchy rule the hour.

    "The great mass of the Northern people seem anxious to sunder
    every safeguard of freedom; they eagerly offer to the Government
    what no European monarch would dare to demand. The President and
    his generals are unable to pick up the liberties of the people
    as rapidly as they are thrown at their feet.... In every form by
    which you could give direct expression to your will, you
    declared for neutrality. A large majority of the people at the
    May and August elections voted for the neutrality and peace of
    Kentucky. The press, the public speakers, the candidates--with
    exceptions in favor of the Government at Washington so rare as
    not to need mention--planted themselves on this position. You
    voted for it, and you meant it. You were promised it, and you
    expected it.... Look now at the condition of Kentucky, and see
    how your expectations have been realized--how these promises
    have been redeemed.... General Anderson, the military dictator
    of Kentucky, announces in one of his proclamations that he will
    arrest no one who does not act, write, or speak in opposition to
    Mr. Lincoln's Government. It would have completed the idea if he
    had added, or think in opposition to it. Look at the condition
    of our State under the rule of our new protectors. They have
    suppressed the freedom of speech and of the press. They seize
    people by military force upon mere suspicion, and impose on them
    oaths unknown to the laws. Other citizens they imprison without
    warrant, and carry them out of the State, so that the writ of
    _habeas corpus_ can not reach them.

    "Every day foreign armed bands are making seizures among the
    people. Hundreds of citizens, old and young, venerable
    magistrates, whose lives have been distinguished by the love of
    the people, have been compelled to fly from their homes and
    families to escape imprisonment and exile at the hands of
    Northern and German soldiers, under the orders of Mr. Lincoln
    and his military subordinates. While yet holding an important
    political trust, confided by Kentucky, I was compelled to leave
    my home and family, or suffer imprisonment and exile. If it is
    asked why I did not meet the arrest and seek a trial, my answer
    is, that I would have welcomed an arrest to be followed by a
    judge and jury; but you well know that I could not have secured
    these constitutional rights. I would have been transported
    beyond the State, to languish in some Federal fortress during
    the pleasure of the oppressor. Witness the fate of Morehead and
    his Kentucky associates in their distant and gloomy prison.

    "The case of the gentleman just mentioned is an example of many
    others, and it meets every element in a definition of despotism.
    If it should occur in England it would be righted, or it would
    overturn the British Empire. He is a citizen and native of
    Kentucky. As a member of the Legislature, Speaker of the House,
    Representative in Congress from the Ashland district, and
    Governor of the State, you have known, trusted, and honored him
    during a public service of a quarter of a century. He is eminent
    for his ability, his amiable character, and his blameless life.
    Yet this man, without indictment, without warrant, without
    accusation, but by the order of President Lincoln, was seized at
    midnight, in his own house, and in the midst of his own family,
    and led through the streets of Louisville, as I am informed,
    with his hands crossed and pinioned before him--was carried out
    of the State and district, and now lies a prisoner in a fortress
    in New York Harbor, a thousand miles away....

    "The Constitution of the United States, which these invaders
    unconstitutionally swear every citizen whom they
    unconstitutionally seize to support, has been wholly abolished.
    It is as much forgotten as if it lay away back in the twilight
    of history. The facts I have enumerated show that the very
    rights most carefully reserved by it to the States and to
    individuals have been most conspicuously violated.... Your
    fellow-citizen,

    (Signed)  "John C. Breckinridge."

Such was the "neutrality" suffered by the Confederacy from governments
both at home and abroad.

The chivalric people of Kentucky showed their sympathy with the just
cause of the people of the Southern States, by leaving the home where
they could not serve the cause of right against might, and nobly shared
the fortunes of their Southern brethren on many a blood-dyed field. In
like manner did the British people see with disapprobation their
Government, while proclaiming neutrality, make new rules, and give new
constructions to old ones, so as to favor our enemy and embarrass us.
The Englishman's sense of fair-play, and the manly instinct which
predisposes him to side with the weak, gave us hosts of friends, but all
their good intentions were paralyzed or foiled by their wily Minister
for Foreign Affairs, and his coadjutor on this side, the artful,
unscrupulous United States Secretary of State.

I have thus presented the case of Kentucky, not because it was the only
State where false promises lulled the people into delusive security,
until, by gradual approaches, usurpation had bound them hand and foot,
and where despotic power crushed all the muniments of civil liberty
which the Union was formed to secure, but because of the attempt, which
has been noticed, to arraign the Confederacy for invasion of the State
in disregard of her sovereignty.

The occupation of Columbus by the Confederate forces was only just soon
enough to anticipate the predetermined purpose of the Federal
Government, all of which was plainly set forth in the letter of General
Polk to the Governor of Kentucky, and his subsequent letter to the
Kentucky commissioners.

Missouri, like Kentucky, had wished to preserve peaceful relations in
the contest which it was foreseen would soon occur between the Northern
and the Southern States. When the Federal Government denied to her the
privilege of choosing her own position, which betokened no hostility to
the General Government, and she was driven to the necessity of deciding
whether or not her citizens should be used for the subjugation of the
Southern States, her people and their representative, the State
government, repelled the arbitrary assumption of authority by military
force to control her government and her people.

Among other acts of invasion, the Federal troops had occupied Belmont, a
village in Missouri opposite to Columbus, and with artillery threatened
that town, inspiring terror in its peaceful inhabitants. After the
occupation of Columbus, under these circumstances of full justification,
a small Confederate force, Colonel Tappan's Arkansas regiment, and
Beltzhoover's battery, were thrown across the Mississippi to occupy and
hold the village, in the State of Missouri, then an ally, and soon to
become a member, of the Confederacy. On the 6th of November General
Grant left his headquarters at Cairo with a land and naval force, and
encamped on the Kentucky shore. This act and a demonstration made by
detachments from his force at Paducah were probably intended to induce
the belief that he contemplated an attack on Columbus, thus concealing
his real purpose to surprise the small garrison at Belmont. General Polk
on the morning of the 7th discovered the landing of the Federal forces
on the Missouri shore, some seven miles above Columbus, and, divining
the real purpose of the enemy, detached General Pillow with four
regiments of his division, say two thousand men, to reenforce the
garrison at Belmont. Very soon after his arrival, the enemy commenced an
assault which was sternly resisted, and with varying fortune, for
several hours. The enemy's front so far exceeded the length of our line
as to enable him to attack on both flanks, and our troops were finally
driven back to the bank of the river with the loss of their battery,
which had been gallantly and efficiently served until nearly all its
horses had been killed, and its ammunition had been expended. The enemy
advanced to the bank of the river below the point to which our men had
retreated, and opened an artillery-fire upon the town of Columbus, to
which our guns from the commanding height responded with such effect as
to drive him from the river bank. In the mean time General Polk had at
intervals sent three regiments to reenforce General Pillow. Upon the
arrival of the first of these, General Pillow led it to a favorable
position, where it for some time steadily resisted and checked the
advance of the enemy. General Pillow, with great energy and gallantry,
rallied his repulsed troops and brought them again into action. General
Polk now proceeded in person with two other regiments. Whether from this
or some other cause, the enemy commenced a retreat. General Pillow,
whose activity and daring on the occasion were worthy of all praise, led
the first and second detachments, by which he had been reenforced, to
attack the enemy in the rear, and General Polk, landing further up the
river, moved to cut off the enemy's retreat; but some embarrassment and
consequent delay which occurred in landing his troops caused him to be
too late for the purpose for which he crossed, and to become only a part
of the pursuing force.

One would naturally suppose that the question about which there would be
the greatest certainty would be the number of troops engaged in a
battle, yet there is nothing in regard to which we have such conflicting
accounts. It is fairly concluded, from the concurrent reports, that the
enemy attacked us on both flanks, and that in the beginning of the
action we were outnumbered; but the obstinacy with which the conflict
was maintained and the successive advances and retreats which occurred
in the action indicate that the disparity could not have been very
great, and therefore that, after the arrival of our reenforcements, our
troops must have become numerically superior. The dead and wounded left
by the enemy upon the field, the arms, ammunition, and military stores
abandoned in his flight, so incontestably prove his defeat, that his
claim to have achieved a victory is too preposterous for discussion.
Though the forces engaged were comparatively small to those in
subsequent battles of the war, six hours of incessant combat, with
repeated bayonet-charges, must place this in the rank of the most
stubborn engagements, and the victors must accord to the vanquished the
meed of having fought like Americans. One of the results of the battle,
which is at least significant, is the fact that General Grant, who had
superciliously refused to recognize General Polk as one with whom he
could exchange prisoners, did, after the battle, send a flag of truce to
get such privileges as are recognized between armies acknowledging each
other to be "foemen worthy of their steel."

General Polk reported as follows: "We pursued them to their boats, seven
miles, and then drove their boats before us. The road was strewed with
their dead and wounded, guns, ammunition, and equipments. The number of
prisoners taken by the enemy, as shown by their list furnished, was one
hundred and six, all of whom have been returned by exchange. After
making a liberal allowance to the enemy, a hundred of their prisoners
still remain in my hands, one stand of colors, and a fraction over one
thousand stand of arms, with knapsacks, ammunition, and other military
stores. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, was six hundred and
forty one; that of the enemy was probably not less than twelve hundred."

Meanwhile, Albert Sidney Johnston, a soldier of great distinction in the
United States Army, where he had attained the rank of brigadier-general
by brevet, and was in command of the Department of California, resigned
his commission, and came overland from San Francisco to Richmond, to
tender his services to the Confederate States. Though he had been bred a
soldier, and most of his life had been spent in the army, he had not
neglected such study of political affairs as properly belongs to the
citizen of a republic, and appreciated the issue made between States
claiming the right to resume the powers they had delegated to a general
agent and the claims set up by that agent to coerce States, his
creators, and for whom he held a trust.

He was a native of Kentucky, but his first military appointment was from
Louisiana, and he was a volunteer in the war for independence by Texas,
and for a time resided in that State. Much of his military service had
been in the West, and he felt most identified with it. On the 10th of
September, 1861, he was assigned to command our Department of the West,
which included the States of Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, the Indian
country, and the western part of Mississippi.

General Johnston, on his arrival at Nashville, found that he lacked not
only men, but the munitions of war and the means of obtaining them. Men
were ready to be enlisted, but the arms and equipments had nearly all
been required to fit out the first levies. Immediately on his survey of
the situation, he determined to occupy Bowling Green in Kentucky, and
ordered Brigadier-General S. B. Buckner, with five thousand men, to take
possession of the position. This invasion of Kentucky was an act of
self-defense rendered necessary by the action of the government of
Kentucky, and by the evidences of intended movements of the forces of
the United States. It was not possible to withdraw the troops from
Columbus in the west, nor from Cumberland Ford in the east, to which
General Felix K. Zollicoffer had advanced with four thousand men. A
compliance with the demands of Kentucky would have opened the frontiers
of Tennessee and the Mississippi River to the enemy; besides, it was
essential to the defense of Tennessee.

East of Columbus, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Hopkinsville were
garrisoned with small bodies of troops; and the territory between
Columbus and Bowling Green was occupied by moving detachments which
caused the supposition that a large military force was present and
contemplated an advance. A fortified camp was established at Cumberland
Gap as the right of General Johnston's line, and an important point for
the protection of East Tennessee against invasion. Thus General Johnston
located his line of defense, from Columbus on the west to the Cumberland
Mountains on the east, with his center at Bowling Green, which was
occupied and intrenched. It was a good base for military operations, was
a proper depot for supplies, and, if fortified, could be held against
largely superior numbers.

On October 28th General Johnston took command at Bowling Green. He
states his force to have been twelve thousand men, and that the enemy's
force at that time was estimated to be double his own, or twenty-four
thousand. He says: "The enemy's force increased more rapidly than our
own, so that by the last of November it numbered fifty thousand, and
continued to increase until it ran up to between seventy-five and one
hundred thousand. My force was kept down by disease, so that it numbered
about twenty-two thousand."

The chief anxiety of the commander of the department was to procure arms
and men. On the next day after his arrival at Nashville, he wrote to the
Governor of Alabama, "I shall beg to rely on your Excellency to furnish
us as rapidly as possible, at this point, with every arm it may be in
your power to provide--I mean small-arms for infantry and cavalry." The
Governor replied, "It is out of the power of Alabama to afford you any
assistance in the way of arms." The Governor of Georgia replied to the
same request on September 18th, "It is utterly impossible for me to
comply with your request." General Bragg, in command at Pensacola,
writes in reply on September 27th: "The mission of Colonel Buckner will
not be successful, I fear, as our extreme Southern country has been
stripped of both arms and men. We started early in this matter, and have
wellnigh exhausted our resources." On September 19th General Johnston
telegraphed to me: "Thirty thousand stand of arms are a necessity to my
command. I beg you to order them, or as many as can be got, to be
instantly procured and sent with dispatch." The Secretary of War
replied: "The whole number received by us, by that steamer, was eighteen
hundred, and we purchased of the owners seventeen hundred and eighty,
making in all thirty-five hundred Enfield rifles, of which we have been
compelled to allow the Governor of Georgia to have one thousand for
arming troops to repel an attack now hourly threatened at Brunswick. Of
the remaining twenty-five hundred, I have ordered one thousand sent to
you, leaving us but fifteen hundred for arming several regiments now
encamped here, and who have been awaiting their arms for several
months.... We have not an engineer to send you. The whole engineer corps
comprises only six captains together with three majors, of whom one is
on bureau duty. You will be compelled to employ the best material within
your reach, by detailing officers from other corps, and by employing
civil engineers."

These details are given to serve as an illustration of the deficiencies
existing in every department of the military service in the first years
of the war. In this respect much relief came from the well-directed
efforts of Governor Harris and the Legislature of Tennessee. A
cap-factory, ordnance-shops, and workshops were established. The
powder-mills at Nashville turned out about four-hundred pounds a day.
Twelve or fourteen batteries were fitted out at Memphis. Laws were
passed to impress and pay for the private arms scattered throughout the
State, and the utmost efforts were made to collect and adapt them to
military uses. The returns make it evident that, during most of the
autumn of 1861, fully one half of General Johnston's troops were
imperfectly armed, and whole brigades remained without weapons for
months.

No less energetic were the measures taken to concentrate and recruit his
forces. General Hardee's command was moved from northeastern Arkansas,
and sent to Bowling Green, which added four thousand men to the troops
there. The regiment of Texan rangers was brought from Louisiana, and
supplied with horses and sent to the front. Five hundred Kentuckians
joined General Buckner on his advance, and five regiments were gradually
formed and filled up. A cavalry company under John H. Morgan was also
added. At this time (September, 1861), General Johnston, under the
authority granted to him by the Government, made a requisition for
thirty thousand men from Tennessee, ten thousand from Mississippi, and
ten thousand from Arkansas. The Arkansas troops were directed to be sent
to General McCulloch for the defense of their own frontier. The Governor
of Mississippi sent four regiments, when this source of supply was
closed.

Up to the middle of November only three regiments were mustered in under
this call from Tennessee, but, by the close of December, the number of
men who joined was from twelve to fifteen thousand. Two regiments,
fifteen hundred strong, had joined General Polk.

In Arkansas, five companies and a battalion had been organized, and were
ready to join General McCulloch.

A speedy advance of the enemy was now indicated, and an increase of
force was so necessary that further delay was impossible. General
Johnston, therefore, determined upon a levy _en masse_ in his
department. He made a requisition on the Governors of Tennessee,
Alabama, and Mississippi, to call out every able-bodied member of the
militia into whose hands arms could be placed, or to provide a volunteer
force large enough to use all the arms that could be procured. In his
letters to these Governors, he plainly presents his view of the posture
of affairs on December 24th, points out impending dangers, and shows
that to his applications the response had not been such as the emergency
demanded. He says:

    "It was apprehended by me that the enemy would attempt to assail
    the South, not only by boats and troops moving down the river,
    to be assembled during the fall and winter, but by columns
    marching inland, threatening Tennessee, by endeavoring to turn
    the defenses of Columbus. Further observation confirms me in
    this opinion; but I think the means employed for the defense of
    the river will probably render it comparatively secure. The
    enemy will energetically push toward Nashville the heavy masses
    of troops now assembled between Louisville and Bowling Green.
    The general position of Bowling Green is good and commanding;
    but the peculiar topography of the place and the length of the
    line of the Barren River as a line of defense, though strong,
    require a large force to defend it. There is no position equally
    defensive as Bowling Green, nor line of defense as good as the
    Barren River, between the Barren and the Cumberland at
    Nashville; so that it can not be abandoned without exposing
    Tennessee, and giving vastly the vantage-ground to the enemy. It
    is manifest that the Northern generals appreciate this; and, by
    withdrawing their forces from western Virginia and east
    Kentucky, they have managed to add them to the new levies from
    Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and to concentrate a force in front
    of me variously estimated at from sixty to one hundred thousand
    men, and which I believe will number seventy-five thousand. To
    maintain my position, I have only about seventeen thousand men
    in this neighborhood. It is impossible for me to obtain
    additions to my strength from Columbus; the generals in command
    in that quarter consider that it would imperil that point to
    diminish their force, and open Tennessee to the enemy. General
    Zollicoffer can not join me, as he guards the Cumberland, and
    prevents the invasion and possible revolt of East Tennessee."

On June 5th General Johnston was reenforced by the brigades of Floyd and
Maney from western Virginia. He also sent a messenger to Richmond to ask
that a few regiments might be detached from the several armies in the
field, and sent to him to be replaced by new levies. He said: "I do not
ask that my force shall be made equal to that of the enemy; but, if
possible, it should be raised to fifty thousand men." Meantime such an
appearance of menace had been maintained as led the enemy to believe
that our force was large, and that he might be attacked at any time.
Frequent and rapid expeditions through the sparsely settled country gave
rise to rumors which kept alive this apprehension.




CHAPTER IX.

    The Coercion of Missouri.--Answers of the Governors of States to
    President Lincoln's Requisition for Troops.--Restoration of
    Forts Caswell and Johnson to the United States Government.--
    Condition of Missouri similar to that of Kentucky.--
    Hostilities, how initiated in Missouri.--Agreement between
    Generals Price and Harney.--Its Favorable Effects.--General
    Harney relieved of Command by the United States Government
    because of his Pacific Policy.--Removal of Public Arms from
    Missouri.--Searches for and Seizure of Arms.--Missouri on the
    Side of Peace.--Address of General Price to the People.--
    Proclamation of Governor Jackson.--Humiliating Concessions of
    the Governor to the United States Government, for the sake of
    Peace.--Demands of the Federal Officers.--Revolutionary
    Principles attempted to be enforced by the United States
    Government.--The Action at Booneville.--The Patriot Army of
    Militia.--Further Rout of the Enemy.--Heroism and Self-sacrifice
    of the People.--Complaints and Embarrassments--Zeal: its
    effects.--Action of Congress.--Battle of Springfield.--General
    Price.--Battle at Lexington.--Bales of Hemp.--Other Combats.


To preserve the Union in the spirit and for the purposes for which it
was established, an equilibrium between the States, as grouped in
sections, was essential. When the Territory of Missouri constitutionally
applied for admission as a State into the Union, the struggle between
State rights and that sectional aggrandizement which was seeking to
destroy the existing equilibrium gave rise to the contest which shook
the Union to its foundation, and sowed the seeds of geographical
divisions, which have borne the most noxious weeds that have choked our
political vineyard. Again, in 1861, Missouri appealed to the
Constitution for the vindication of her rights, and again did usurpation
and the blind rage of a sectional party disregard the appeal, and assume
powers, not only undelegated, but in direct violation of the fourth
section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which every Federal
officer had sworn to maintain, and which secured to every State a
republican government, and protection against invasion.

If it be contended that the invasion referred to must have been by other
than the troops of the United States, and that their troops were
therefore not prohibited from entering a State against its wishes, and
for purposes hostile to its policy, the section of the Constitution
referred to fortifies the fact, heretofore noticed, of the refusal of
the Convention, when forming the Constitution, to delegate to the
Federal Government power to coerce a State. By its last clause it was
provided that not even to suppress domestic violence could the General
Government, on its own motion, send troops of the United States into the
territory of one of the States. That section reads thus:

    "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
    a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
    against invasion, and on application of the Legislature, or of
    the executive (when the Legislature can not be convened),
    against domestic violence."

Surely, if Federal troops could not be sent into a State without its
application, even to protect it against domestic violence, still less
could it be done to overrule the will of its people. That, instead of an
obligation upon the citizens of other States to respond to a call by the
President for troops to invade a particular State, it was in April,
1861, deemed a high crime to so use them: reference is here made to the
published answers of the Governors of States, which had not seceded, to
the requisition made upon them for troops to be employed against the
States which had seceded.

Governor Letcher, of Virginia, replied to the requisition of the United
States Secretary of War as follows:

    "I am requested to detach from the militia of the State of
    Virginia the quota designated in a table which you append, to
    serve as infantry or riflemen, for the period of three months,
    unless sooner discharged.

    "In reply to this communication, I have only to say that the
    militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at
    Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view.
    Your object is to subjugate the Southern States, and a
    requisition made upon me for such an object--an object, in my
    judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution, or the Act
    of 1795--will not be complied with."

Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:

    "Your dispatch is received. In answer, I say emphatically,
    Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of
    subduing her sister Southern States."

Governor Harris, of Tennessee, replied:

    "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty
    thousand, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those
    of our Southern brothers."

Governor Jackson, of Missouri, answered:

    "Requisition is illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary,
    inhuman, diabolical, and can not be complied with."

Governor Rector, of Arkansas, replied:

    "In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas, to
    subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that none will be
    furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury."

Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, responded to the requisition for
troops from that State as follows:

    "Your dispatch is received, and, if genuine--which its
    extraordinary character leads me to doubt--I have to say, in
    reply, that I regard the levy of troops made by the
    Administration, for the purpose of subjugating the States of the
    South, as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of
    power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of
    the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free
    people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

Governor Ellis, who had lived long enough to leave behind him an
enviable reputation, was a fair representative of the conservatism,
gallantry, and tenacity in well-doing, of the State over which he
presided. He died too soon for his country's good, and the Confederacy
seriously felt the loss of his valuable services. The prompt and
spirited answer he gave to the call upon North Carolina to furnish
troops for the subjugation of the Southern States, was the fitting
complement of his earlier action in immediately restoring to the Federal
Government Forts Johnson and Caswell, which had been seized without
proper authority. In communicating his action to President Buchanan, he
wrote:

    "My information satisfies me that this popular outbreak was
    caused by a report, very generally credited, but which, for the
    sake of humanity, I hope is not true, that it was the purpose of
    the Administration to coerce the Southern States, and that
    troops were on their way to garrison the Southern ports, and to
    begin the work of subjugation.... Should I receive assurance
    that no troops will be sent to this State prior to the 4th of
    March next, then all will be peace and quiet here, and the
    property of the United States will be fully protected, as
    heretofore. If, however, I am unable to get such assurances, I
    will not undertake to answer for the consequences.

    "The forts in this State have long been unoccupied, and their
    being garrisoned at this time will unquestionably be looked upon
    as a hostile demonstration, and will in my opinion certainly be
    resisted."

The plea so constantly made by the succeeding Administration, as an
excuse for its warlike acts, that the duty to protect the public
property required such action, is shown by this letter of Governor Ellis
to have been a plea created by their usurpations, but for which there
might have been peace, as well as safety to property, and, what was of
greater worth, the lives, the liberties, and the republican institutions
of the country.

There was great similarity in the condition of Missouri to that of
Kentucky. They were both border States, and, by their institutions and
the origin of a large portion of their citizens, were identified with
the South. Both sought to occupy a neutral position in the impending
war, and offered guarantees of peace and order throughout their
territory if left free to control their own affairs. Both refused to
furnish troops to the United States Government for the unconstitutional
purpose of coercing the Southern States. Both, because of their stronger
affinity to the South than to the North, were the objects of suspicion,
and consequent military occupation by the troops of the United States
Government. At the inception of this unwarrantable proceeding, an effort
was made by the Governor of Missouri to preserve the rights of the State
without disturbing its relations to the United States Government. If it
had been the policy of the Government to allow to Missouri the control
of her domestic affairs, and an exemption from being a party to the
violation of the Constitution in making war against certain of the
States, the above-described effort of the Governor might and probably
would have been successful. The form and purpose of that effort appear
in the compact entered into between Major-General Price, commanding the
militia or "Missouri State Guard," and General Harney, of the United
States Army, commanding the Department of the West, a geographical
division which included the State of Missouri.

During a temporary absence of General Harney, Captain Lyon, commanding
United States forces at St. Louis, initiated hostilities against the
State of Missouri under the following circumstances:

In obedience to the militia law of the State, an annual encampment was
directed by the Governor for instruction in tactics. Camp Jackson, near
St. Louis, was designated for the encampment of the militia of the
county in 1861. Here for some days companies of State militia, amounting
to about eight hundred men, under command of Brigadier-General D. M.
Frost, were being exercised, as is usual upon such occasions. They
presented no appearance of a hostile camp. There were no sentinels to
guard against surprise; visitors were freely admitted; it was the
picnic-ground for the ladies of the city, and everything wore the aspect
of merry-making rather than that of grim-visaged war.

Suddenly, Captain (afterward General) Nathaniel Lyon appeared with an
overwhelming force of Federal troops, surrounded this holiday
encampment, and demanded an unconditional surrender. Resistance was
impracticable, and none was attempted; the militia surrendered, and were
confined as prisoners; but prisoners of what? There was no war, and no
warrant for their arrest as offenders against the law. It is left for
the usurpers to frame a vocabulary suited to their act.

After the return of General Harney, Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, of
the Missouri militia, appealed to him from his prison, the St. Louis
Arsenal, on May 11, 1861, representing that, "in accordance with the
laws of the State of Missouri, which have been existing for some years,
and in obedience to the orders of the Governor, on Monday last I entered
into an encampment with the militia force of St. Louis County for the
purpose of instructing the same in accordance with the laws of the
United States and of this State." He further sets forth that every
officer and soldier of his command had taken an oath to sustain the
Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Missouri,
and that while in the peaceable performance of their duties the
encampment was surrounded by the command of Captain N. Lyon, United
States Army, and a surrender demanded, to which General Frost replied as
follows:

    "Camp Jackson, _May 10, 1861_.

    "Sir: I, never for a moment having conceived the idea that so
    illegal and unconstitutional a demand as I have just received
    from you would be made by an officer of the United States Army,
    am wholly unprepared to defend my command from this unwarranted
    attack, and shall therefore be forced to comply with your
    demand.

    "I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

    "D. Frost,

    "_Brigadier-General, commanding Camp Jackson, M. M._

    "Captain N. Lyon, _commanding United States troops_."